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It is widely presumed that the world exhibits hierarchical structure: that the 
objects of science can be arranged into levels and that some of those levels are higher 
than others. Organisms, on this view, are at a higher level than cells, which are at a 
higher level than molecules, which are at a higher level than atoms.  
Although it is popular, this “layered worldview” faces notable challenges. Some 
critics contend that it is hopelessly idealized or even ultimately incoherent. Others 
contend that it makes no difference to our explanatory practices and has no metaphysical 
or epistemic significance. 
I argue that these critics are mistaken. By undertaking a comprehensive analysis 
of the logical and metaphysical nature of hierarchical structures and their application 
within contemporary philosophy and ecology, I argue for three claims: that hierarchies 
exist (insofar as the objects of scientific discourse exist); that the domain of ecological 
interests is hierarchically structured in a way that is incompatible with ontological 
reductionism – the idea that everything in the scientific domain is, in fact, contained 
 
 
within the “fundamental level of reality”; and that the hierarchical structure of the world 
often (but not always) justifies the practice of describing, explaining, and analyzing 
things using hierarchical terms.  
My analysis begins with a review of the existing accounts of hierarchies in 
ecology, biology, sociology, and economics. Arguing that these accounts are inadequate, 
I then develop an improved account called Core Hierarchy Theory (CHT). CHT, I argue, 
is an improvement over its predecessors in two respects: generality and simplicity. Other 
accounts are either too narrow (e.g., failing to count branching hierarchies as genuine 
hierarchies) or make unnecessary theoretical commitments. Using a formalized version of 
CHT, I then prove four theorems that are relevant to well-known philosophical debates 
that involve hierarchies. For example, I show that two of the core metaphysical 
commitments of the ontological reductionist – that the higher level sciences reduce to 
fundamental science and that all of reality is, in fact, contained within the fundamental 
level – are in fact inconsistent with the most basic and unrestricted conception of 
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1.0 The Metaphysics of Ecology: Aims, Scope, and Strategy 
Philosophical studies in ecology generally come in two varieties: the normative, which 
studies the moral or aesthetic value of nature; and the epistemological, which studies the 
methods of investigation and explanation within ecology as a science. Inquiry into the 
metaphysics of ecology is a far less common endeavor by comparison.  
The metaphysical issues that do arise within ecology are often tied-up with 
epistemological issues, sometimes leaving a murky boundary between them. The more 
common strategy is to avoid the murkiness by focusing only on the epistemological 
issues, perhaps with some hope that settling them helps to inform metaphysical inquiry. 
Here I take the less-ventured path through the murk. I aim to investigate the 
metaphysics of ecology in a way that informs its epistemology. It is a work directed 
towards metaphysicians, philosophers of science, philosophers of ecology, and theoretical 
ecologists. My strategy is to adopt the standard philosophical presuppositions found 
within the theoretical ecologist’s framework and then to reason about its metaphysics, 
keeping epistemology within the periphery. 
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Whether or not such a strategy is legitimate depends on the problem being 
investigated. For one, the problem must have both a metaphysical and an epistemological 
component, and for another, the murky connection between them must resolve in manner 
that appears conducive to metaphysical study. Any issue which meets these legitimizing 
conditions falls within the scope of our inquiry. 
There are at least two problems that meet these criteria in ecology. First, there is 
the debate between reductionists and holists. And second, there is a disagreement among 
holists (Allen and Starr 1982; c.f. Salthe 1985, 2009) regarding the existence of 
hierarchies and their relation to the natural world. My tactic here is to examine both of 
these issues simultaneously, by investigating a notion that is relevant to reductionists, 
holists, hierarchical realists and anti-realists alike: the notion of a hierarchy.   
1.1 Issue #1: Reductionism versus Holism 
The debate between reductionists and holists serves as the main backdrop to my 
investigation. The debate meets both of the aforementioned legitimizing conditions. It has 
both a metaphysical and epistemological component, and these components are related in 
a way that is conducive to metaphysical inquiry. 
The metaphysical component of reductionism is the idea that the whole and its 
properties are “nothing above” its parts and their properties (in some sense of ‘nothing 
above’ that remains mysterious and elusive). The epistemological component involves 
the claim that knowledge of the part’s properties and relationships is sufficient for 
knowledge of the whole’s properties (Keller and Golley 2000, p. 172). Here the 
connection between metaphysics and epistemology appears to be clear. David Keller and 
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Frank Golley echo common opinion when they urge us to “bear in mind that epistemic 
reduction presupposes ontological reduction.” (ibid.) 
Holism is taken to be the polar opposite of reductionism. The metaphysical 
component of holism involves the claim that the whole and its properties are indeed 
“something above” its parts and their properties (in some sense of ‘something above’ that 
remains mysterious and elusive).1 The epistemological component of holism involves the 
claim that knowledge of the parts is insufficient for knowledge of the whole. (ibid.) 
Complete ecological understanding, for the holist, requires understanding both parts and 
wholes in tandem, giving rise to a sort of explanation and a sort of analysis popularly 
called multi-level explanation and analysis.  
Again, the connection between metaphysics and epistemology is clear: epistemic 
holism presupposes metaphysical holism. If metaphysical holism is false, after all, then 
metaphysical reductionism is true: the whole is “nothing above” its parts. But this idea 
does not fit well with epistemic holism. Insofar as the whole is “nothing above” its parts, 
the reductionist takes it to be nothing more than its parts. Thus, if metaphysical holism is 
false, then there is nothing more than the parts for us to understand, pace the epistemic 
holist. Epistemological holism therefore implies its metaphysical counterpart. 
Although they remain notoriously unclear, the locutions ‘nothing above’ and 
‘something above’ can be understood as relating to a hierarchical worldview: a 
worldview in which the domain is partitioned into different levels, and some things are 
                                                   
1 This metaphysical component of holism should not be confused with the claim that the whole is “more 
than the sum of its parts” (note the emphasis on ‘sum’). This is the rallying cry of the emergentist, and not 
the ecological holist. I have no intention of investigating whether or not one implies the other. Emergence 
in ecology is an issue that lies beyond the scope of this work. 
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considered “higher than” others. Such a worldview provides the basis upon which the two 
views are distinguished. This is one respect in which hierarchies play a role in the 
reductionism-holism debate. Both sides of the debate have some sort of hierarchical 
picture of ecology affixed in their minds: the holist places wholes above their parts in that 
hierarchy, whereas the reductionist does not.  
To avoid confusion, note that by ‘reductionism’ I do not mean to refer to any 
particular model of scientific reduction, such as Ernest Nagel’s (1961) or Kemeny and 
Oppenheim’s (1956) models.2 Rather, I am referring directly to the general idea that 
inspires these sorts of models: (roughly) the view that swarms of fundamental particles, 
their behaviors, and interactions, are all that there really is to nature, and are all that is 
really needed to give an account of it.  
We should be wary of characterizing reductionism in this way, for the use of 
‘really’ is even more mysterious than the notorious ‘nothing above’. If ‘all there really is’ 
means all there is, simpliciter, then reductionism is no different from eliminitivism (the 
radical view that nothing physically exists except for the smallest bits of matter and their 
properties). But the ecological reductionist is not so extreme.3 If ‘really’ means that 
fundamental particles are, in some sense, ontologically privileged4 over their composites, 
then we need both an account of ‘privilege’, and a way to resolve any other mysterious 
                                                   
2 Both of which presuppose the deductive-nomological model of explanation advanced by Hempel and 
Oppenheim (1948).  
 
3 On my understanding, reductionism occupies the middle ground between the extremes of holism and 
eliminitivism. I will not be entertaining the eliminitivist view until the final chapter since it runs contrary to 
standard assumptions found within ecology (see §5.0 below): that organisms and their environments 
actually exist. Within the philosophy of ecology, the debate is between reductionists and holists; only 
within metaphysics, as a general field of study, is such a strong eliminitivism taken seriously.  
 




terms used to formulate that account. None of this is necessary on our original 
characterization. We can avoid the, perhaps infinite, regress-of-mystery by simply 
adopting the straightforward hierarchical understanding of ‘above’ that both parties have 
in mind.5 
That both parties have a hierarchical picture in mind is not enough. If the 
reductionist-holist debate is to make any sense, then the same hierarchical picture of 
ecology must be shared by both parties. Hierarchies are then philosophically useful. They 
allow us to get away from the notorious locutions ‘nothing above’ and ‘something above’ 
without introducing expressions of equal notoriety. They allow us to straightforwardly 
characterize the metaphysical difference between reductionism and holism as follows.  
[Reductionism] If the world is hierarchical in the sort of way portrayed 
within ecology, then wholes are there along with their parts 
at the bottommost level, whatever that might be.  
[Holism] The world is hierarchical in the sort of way portrayed 
within ecology, but the wholes are not there along with 
their parts at the bottommost level, whatever that might be. 
By removing the mysterious locution ‘above’ from the metaphysical characterization of 
reductionism and holism, the distinction between them becomes clear.6 Although it 
                                                   
5 The pairing of hierarchies with reductionism is nothing new. Dan Steel (2004, p. 60) notes that 
reductionism is often understood in a way that makes an appeal to hierarchical levels. 
 
6 I will henceforth designate the pre-theoretic notion with a lower-case letter, e.g., ‘reduction’, whereas my 




remains unclear what the bottommost level is, this is a matter that can be settled 
empirically.  
This distinction might seem suspicious to some. Dan Steel (2004) argues, for 
example, that there is a weaker sort of reductionism that is compatible with holism.7 He 
calls it token-token reductionism. He argues that there are sometimes exceptions to 
holistic generalizations, and that these exceptions can be accounted for within an 
explanation involving posits residing at a more “fundamental” level.  
Such suspicion is unwarranted. By distinguishing reduction from holism as I do, 
notice that Steel’s notion of weak-reduction counts as a type of holism. This, I take it, is 
an advantage of my approach: certainly no holist has ever denied that there is a type of 
reduction that is compatible with holistic explanation; in fact, it is part of the holist view 
that some explanations involve posits residing at lower levels. As Frank Golley notes, 
“the holist understands that the results of reductionist research are always relevant at 
some level in understanding a phenomenon… is tolerant of the reductionist agenda and 
even supportive of it” (1993, p.28) That there are aspects of reductionism which are 
compatible with the holist agenda is thus no reason to rouse suspicion over my 
characterization. 
 Besides, my manner of articulating the distinction is useful. Not only does it help 
to clarify the debate,8 but it allows for a focused examination of its conceptual 
                                                   
7 Steel uses ‘pluralism’ in lieu of ‘holism’. While there might be subtle differences between the meanings 
of these terms, they do not seem relevant for our purposes. 
 
8 I am not the first to take note of this. Stanley Salthe boldly claims that “Reductionism in fact requires 
hierarchical structure in order to make sense.” (1985 p. ix) While I am sympathetic to his boldness, I am 
unsure of what he means by “required”. Hierarchical terminology might be useful in characterizing 
reductionism, but truth of reductionism hardly depends on the world’s being genuinely hierarchically 
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foundations. At the heart of my distinction is the notion of a hierarchy. Resolving 
outstanding issues about hierarchies should then, at the very least, help to enrich the 
debate, and, at the very most, help to settle it.  
1.2 Issue #2: Hierarchical Realism versus Anti-Realism 
Among the most prominent methodological approaches to holism in ecology one finds 
the widely cited Hierarchy Theory of T. F. H. Allen and Thomas Starr (1982). These 
authors defend the idea that ecological understanding involves a process of multi-level 
explanation and analysis that emphasizes the role of the observer in the explanatory and 
analytical process. Their ideas have been influential. Not only is their methodological and 
analytical approach widely cited within ecology, it also serves as a promising basis for a 
unified ecology (Allen and Hoekstra 1992).9  
 Still, there is disagreement among Holists regarding the nature and existence of 
hierarchies. Allen, Starr, and Victoria Ahl argue that hierarchies should not “be 
interpreted as features of the external world, existing independently of an observer’s 
criteria for delimiting the system.” (Allen and Ahl 1996, p. 33) They take hierarchies to 
be purely conceptual artifacts. 
                                                                                                                                                       
structured. Notice that, on my characterization, Reductionism does not require anything to be hierarchical. 
In fact, this is an advantage of my characterization. The reductionist does not quake at the prospect of 
eliminitivism, she simply takes it to be unnecessary and extreme. My conditional characterization captures 
this: Reductionism is vacuously true if eliminitivism is correct. Eliminitivists tell us that the world is not 
hierarchical in the sort of way portrayed within ecology, since there are, they say, no ecological entities to 
be hierarchically arranged.  
 
9 Here I am largely unconcerned with the unification movement. Although I will touch on the unification 
motivation for Hierarchy Theory early on, it is largely tangential to my investigation: it appears to be a 
purely epistemological issue.  
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One reason for this approach, given by Allen and Starr, is that there are an infinite 
number of ways to delineate levels, and none are more ontologically privileged than any 
of the others; they argue that there is nothing less real about a level consisting in a person 
with an air-pocket around them than one consisting in the person alone, or one consisting 
in the person minus a nanometer-thick layer of skin. Since what matters, says Allen and 
Starr, is the information we gain from our selection of levels, and our selecting levels 
does not require their reification, there is hence no need to reify them; to reify an infinite 
number of levels without being required to do so is senseless. Taking hierarchies to be 
conceptual artifacts, they think, is good enough for science. (1982, p. 10) 
 Other philosophers of ecology disagree. Stanley Salthe (1985), Richard Levins 
and Richard Lewontin (2000) claim that hierarchies are real features of the world. Levins 
and Lewontin argue that a “proper materialism… looks for the actual material 
relationships among entities at all levels.” (2000, p. 221) Salthe’s metaphysical 
commitment is made clear when he expresses that he “will not abandon the entitative 
ontological perspective in favor of the kind of operationalist phenomenalism suggested 
by, for example, Allen and Starr.”  (1985, p. 21) 
 As with the reductionism-holism debate, this second, far less prominent, issue 
meets both legitimizing conditions. It has a metaphysical component, an epistemic 
component, and the components connect up in a way that is favorable to metaphysics. 
The metaphysical component of the debate is captured in the following distinction 
between hierarchical realism and hierarchical anti-realism. 
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[Realism]  Not all hierarchies are intellectual artifacts or abstracta; i.e. 
the natural world is a hierarchy or contains hierarchies. 
[Anti-Realism]  All hierarchies are either intellectual artifacts or abstracta; 
i.e. the natural world is not a hierarchy and does not contain 
hierarchies. 
Although they do not characterize their dispute in this way, it should be clear that Salthe, 
Levins, and Lewontin are committed to hierarchical Realism, whereas Allen, Starr, and 
Ahl are committed to Anti-Realism. 
  The epistemological component to their debate involves their respective 
justification for a multi-level approach to explanation10 and analysis. Paired with Realism 
is the metaphysical justification, 
[Metaphysical-MLE] The hierarchical structure of the world justifies our 
describing, explaining, and analyzing things using 
hierarchical terms. 
Paired with Anti-Realism is the epistemological justification, 
[Epistemic-MLE] The usefulness of hierarchical structure justifies our 
describing, explaining, and analyzing things using 
hierarchical terms. 
                                                   
10 Note that at this early stage, I use ‘explanation’ in the social sense: as a description that one person gives 
to another so that the recipient might gain understanding. Later, I will discuss a metaphysical sense of 
explanation that involves the description of a mechanism (Machamer, Darden, and Craver, 2000; Glennan 
1996, 2002).  
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Although my focus is on ecology, multi-level explanation and multi-level analysis 
are notions that extend beyond their ecological applications. Patrick McGivern, who is 
primarily concerned with physics, tells us that, “For many systems it is necessary to 
describe them simultaneously on multiple levels… in order to get an accurate 
representation of their behavior… [it] is extremely useful in modeling systems in a wide 
variety of disciplines, including fluid mechanics, aerodynamics, chemistry, ecology, 
geophysics, and neuroscience.” (2008 p. 54, emphasis added; Anderson 1972, pp. 393-
396 makes a similar claim) 
McGivern’s usage of ‘level’ is clearly the one which relates to hierarchies, rather 
than that which relates to building tables and hanging picture-frames. His usage of 
‘necessary’, on the other hand, is puzzling. He claims that multi-level descriptions are 
necessary to get an accurate depiction of behavior; but necessary in what sense? And why 
is it necessary in that sense?  
McGivern might mean that multi-level descriptions are sometimes causally-
necessary in that some phenomena can be produced only via the coordination of things 
spanning different levels. Or he might mean that multi-level descriptions are 
epistemologically-necessary in that some phenomena can be understood only by 
representing systemic behavior on many levels. Perhaps both senses are meant: the 
metaphysical reading might even imply the epistemological reading; it depends on what 
one means by ‘produced’, ‘coordination’, and ‘spanning’. 
Notice that the ambiguity of McGivern’s claim fits nicely within the dispute over 
Realism, as well as the corresponding Metaphysical-MLE and Epistemic-MLE 
11 
 
distinction. Explanation in ecology, it is widely presumed, involves causal notions.11 The 
causal reading of ‘necessary’ then seems to support the metaphysical justification: if the 
production of some phenomena requires multi-level causal coordination – i.e., different 
causal relations holding between different things residing at different levels – then the 
hierarchical structure of causation appears to imply (or at least suggest) Metaphysical-
MLE. Likewise, the epistemic reading seems to support the epistemic justification: if 
multi-level descriptions are necessary for our understanding, then Epistemic-MLE 
becomes hard to deny.  
Although there clearly is a connection between Realism, Anti-Realism, and multi-
level explanation, it is a weaker connection than what we see in the Reductionist-Holist 
debate. The epistemic components – Metaphysical and Epistemic-MLE – are not 
mutually exclusive. Realists can endorse both justificatory approaches: even if the world 
is, in fact, hierarchical, it might also be that our use of hierarchical terminology is 
justified instrumentally. Epistemic-MLE, then, does not presuppose Anti-Realism; it is 
compatible with both Realism and Anti-Realism. 
Nevertheless, the connection between the metaphysical and epistemic components 
of this second issue is sufficient to legitimize our strategy: Metaphysical-MLE appears to 
presuppose Realism; if the world is not really hierarchical, then the use of hierarchical 
terminology is not justified by virtue of the world’s hierarchical structure (and the causal 
disambiguation of McGivern’s claim is then false). The issue over Realism and Anti-
Realism, then, is relevant to epistemology, as our strategy requires. If we can show 
                                                   
11 The issue of causation and explanation in ecology is too complicated to be teased apart here. I leave it as 
a matter for future research.  
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Realism to be false or problematic, then we have made progress towards an 
epistemological issue. 
 Aside from the relationships found within each issue, it is also worth noting the 
connections between the two issues. Reductionism, for example, can be held along with 
either Realism or Anti-Realism,12 but is clearly incompatible with both Epistemic and 
Metaphysical-MLE. Reductionism implies their negation: if accounting for the behavior 
of the parts at the bottommost level suffices to account for the behavior of wholes, then 
the account need not mention any other level aside from the bottom. Hierarchies become 
irrelevant to ecological understanding under Reductionism since it implies that there is no 
need to coordinate multiple levels to achieve such understanding. Epistemic and 
Metaphysical-MLE, therefore, presuppose Holism. 
The Reductionism-Holism debate also helps to answer an interesting question 
regarding the connection between Realism and Metaphysical-MLE. Evidently, the latter 
implies the former, but what of the reverse: does Realism imply Metaphysical-MLE? If 
Reductionism is true, then Realism has no such implication. Reductionist-Realism is a 
prima facie consistent position that implies the negation of Metaphysical-MLE, for the 
reasons described in the paragraph above. On the other hand, if Holist-Realism is correct, 
then it is indeed plausible to suggest that multi-level explanation has a metaphysical 
justification, and the causal reading of McGivern’s claim also gains intuitive credibility. 
                                                   
12 The existence (or non-existence) of hierarchies does not directly imply Holism, since the hierarchies 
themselves might be said to be, in reality, “nothing above” the things they contain, or are composed of. In 
fact, this is a classic way to characterize the reductionist view. Reductionists such as Oppenheim and 
Putnam (1958) and Jaegwon Kim (2002) pair reductionism with a principle called the downward-inclusion 
principle: all levels, they say, are included within the bottommost level. This principle plays a decisive role 
in later chapters. 
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The connections found within, and between, our two main issues are clearly quite 
complicated. To help simply matters, let us collect together the most important 
relationships noted so far, and proceed under the assumption that they are correct: 
(a) Holism is true if and only if Reductionism is not. 
(b) Realism is true if and only if Anti-Realism is not. 
(c) The epistemic component of reductionism presupposes (metaphysical) 
Reductionism. 
(d) Metaphysical-MLE presupposes Realism. 
(e) Neither Realism nor Anti-Realism implies Holism. 
(f) Reductionism implies that neither Metaphysical-MLE nor Epistemic-MLE is 
correct. 
As with the Reductionism-Holism debate, we do not investigate the Realism vs. 
Anti-Realism disagreement directly. There is little point. The arguments in favor of either 
position are hopelessly few. Anti-Realists do nothing to refute Realism; they simply think 
that it is, for their purposes, unnecessary. Likewise, Realists do nothing to refute Anti-
Realism; they think that an avoidance of ontology is unnecessary.  
Instead, I investigate this smaller issue indirectly. I use it as a backdrop for a more 
focused investigation into hierarchies. Resolving outstanding issues about hierarchies, at 
the very least, helps to clarify and to enrich the disagreement, and, at the very most, helps 
us to settle it. 
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1.3 An Example From Ecology: The Nitrogen Cycle 
Before proceeding to describe my central thesis and argument structure, it is useful to see 
how these debates play out with respect to an example from actual ecology. Consider 
nutrient cycling (Gibson 2009, p. 144).  
Nutrient cycling tracks the movement of nutrients (e.g., nitrogen and phosphorus) 
throughout an ecosystem. Understanding how nutrients are cycled within an ecosystem 
helps to explain changes in landscape and biodiversity. As such, it is important for 
conservation efforts. Human activities can intervene on these cycles in a significant way.  
To explain lake-eutrophication, for example, it is often important to consider 
changes to the nitrogen cycle. Nitrogen is initially found in the atmosphere. Bacteria 
convert the nitrogen into organic nitrogen, which is usable by plants to aid in 
photosynthesis. Plants absorb the nitrogen in the form of ammonium and/or nitrate ions 
via root hairs. The process is called assimilation. Animals eat the plants, defecate, and 
then die and decompose. The plants themselves die, their leaves fall, and they too 
decompose. This decomposition is facilitated by ammonification: bacteria and fungi 
covert the organic nitrogen from the decomposing entity into ammonium. Other bacteria 
(e.g., the Nitrosomonas species) then convert the ammonium to nitrites (which are toxic 
to plants in high levels), at which point other bacteria (e.g., the Nitrobacte species) 
convert the nitrites into nitrates; the process is called nitrification. Lastly, dentrification 
begins: bacteria use the nitrates instead of oxygen as an electron acceptor in respiration, 
releasing dinitrogen gas back into the atmosphere. With dinitrogen gas back in the 
atmosphere, the nitrogen cycle is complete.  
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Through human intervention, more nitrogen is added to the ecosystem than what 
can be effectively cycled. When the excess nutrients enter a lake an overabundance of 
phytoplankton and cyanobacteria is the result. The overabundance of phytoplankton 
crowds out other marine plants, causing the lake to become hypoxic, and cyanobacteria 
release neurotoxins into the lake. Marine vertebrates do not stand a chance: a dead lake 
results.     
The explanation we see here involves plants (growth rates, death rates, 
decomposition rates), animals, nitrogen, fungi and bacteria of various sorts. All of these 
entities engage in specialized behaviors that are relevant to the cycling of nitrogen; and, 
moreover, they are commonly thought to correspond to different hierarchical levels. Each 
of the different organisms is part of the ecosystem, and different parts of the organisms 
involved are relevant to the cycling of nitrogen.  
The Reductionist tells us that to acquire complete understanding of how nitrogen 
is cycled it is enough to describe the cycle at the finest grain of detail possible: at the 
level of the ecosystem’s tiniest parts using the terminology of fundamental physics. For 
the Holist, to understand the nitrogen cycle requires understanding that the ecosystem 
involved is a, say, grassland ecosystem, as well as understanding the individual 
contributions of its parts to the cycling of nitrogen. Fundamental physical descriptions, 
for the Holist, are not enough: one must understand bacteria as bacteria, not as swarms of 
fundamental particles, in order to understand the cycling of nutrients. 
Hierarchical Anti-Realists tell us that we are making an implicit appeal to 
hierarchical levels when we described nutrient cycling, not because the world really is 
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hierarchical, but rather, because that is the way we perceive the world to be. Realists 
express the opposite opinion. They say that the grassland ecosystem really is hierarchical, 
and this is why the cycling of nutrients can only understood by describing processes that 
reside on a variety of different levels.  
How, then, should ecology proceed? Should ecologists understand nutrient 
cycling Reductively or Holistically? If they should understand it Holistically, should they 
take a Realist position or not? Answering these questions is not a trivial matter. Some 
initial assumptions are required. 
2.0 Multi-Grade Holism: Assumptions, Thesis and Argument 
I begin with assumptions that are standard within the various branches of ecology. Keller 
and Golley (2000) list three basic assumptions: naturalism, scientific realism13, and the 
“comprehensive scope of ecology” (p. 11).  
Naturalism, Keller and Golley say, is the idea that “there is but one system of 
reality… that can be explained using the same methods and terminology.” (ibid. p. 12) 
By ‘scientific realism’, they mean what they call metaphysical-epistemic realism, “the 
position that there are patterns or regularities in nature existing independently of human 
perceivers, and these patterns, to some extent, are objectively knowable by humans.” 
                                                   
13 Note that their usage of ‘scientific realism’, should be distinguished from the special sort of Realism 





(ibid.) By ‘comprehensive scope’, they mean that ecology studies “all of nature” (ibid.), 
by studying the interactions between organisms and their environment.14 
 Within these three assumptions, one finds three more: that the “ecological” 
entities, processes, and phenomena that make up the “pattern of nature” are all real; that 
they interact with one another causally,15 betraying a mild anti-Humean stance; and that 
they have parts. 
 To these assumptions I add some of my own prejudices. First, my understanding 
of parthood is that of classical mereology (e.g., Simons, 1987) supplemented with the 
doctrine of mereological monism, the idea that there is one supremely general and 
fundamental notion of parthood under which all specific sorts of parthood (e.g., material-
part, functional-part, undetached-part) and which applies across all ontological 
categories;16 second, that the notion of causation that is relevant to science is adequately 
modeled by manipulationist theories of causation (Woodward, 2003); and third, that 
causal explanation proceeds along mechanistic (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; 
                                                   
14 I am uncertain as to whether Keller and Golley mean that ecology takes scope over all such interactions 
at all levels, including the fundamental level of physics, or whether its scope is restricted to those levels 
which are, in some sense, organic. This uncertainty is no barrier to the present aim. If it were a barrier, we 
might instead proceed on the organic reading: the idea that ecology takes scope over physics strikes me as 
being too bizarre without rigorous motivation. 
 
15 Contrast this with physics, where statistical correlation is commonly thought to replace the need for 
robustly causal notions. 
 
16 Mereological monism is the subject of some controversy in analytic metaphysics, as is classical 
mereology. Nevertheless, I shall make no attempt resolve or settle the controversy. This is work in the 
metaphysics of ecology, not mereology. I take classical monistic mereology for granted because, for one, it 
is the standard approach, and for another, it is standard for a good reason. The basic conception of ‘part’ at 
the heart of classical mereology is quantitative: parts are some of the whole and anything which is some of 
the whole is a part of it. Insofar as some of is monistic, parthood is too. (Sider 2007) And insofar as some of 
is reflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive, so is parthood; these three properties together form the core of 
classical mereology. Classical monistic mereology (supplementation principles notwithstanding), then, is a 




c.f., Glennan 1996, 2002) or Bayesian lines (Woodward, 2003)17. Although controversy 
surrounds all three of these assumptions, they are quite common within philosophy. I 
make no effort to defend them here.  
 These assumptions and foundational prejudices are used to develop and defend a 
view called Multi-Grade Holism. This view consists in the following three claims, the 
conjunction of which is my central thesis. 
(T1)  Realism is true; Anti-Realism is false. 
(T2)  Metaphysical-MLE is false (as a general principle). 
(T3) Reductionism is false; Holism is true. 
 
What might seem initially odd about this view is the conjunction of (T1) and (T2). 
Realism and Metaphysical-MLE were paired together in our initial characterization. It 
was also noted that rejecting (T1) was the most obvious way to affirm (T2), using claim 
(d) above as a key premise.  
Nevertheless, we will see later on that the sort of Realism to be defended has 
characteristics which appear to undermine the metaphysical warrant for multi-level 
explanation. Note, however, that (T2) is not an essential characteristic of the view I 
defend; I am happy to do away with it should someone else is able to solve the problems I 
raise for Metaphysical-MLE in ecology. 
As noted earlier, the tactic I use to achieve my strategic aim has nothing to do 
with addressing the specific arguments for or against any of the positions mentioned. 
                                                   
17 Or a combination of the two lines. I use ‘Bayesian’ rather than ‘manipulationist’ since I take it, pace 
Woodward, that explanation is a passively predictive enterprise. Woodward has an active view of 




Instead I investigate their conceptual foundations: I develop a theory of hierarchies that is 
suitable to help resolve these issues without begging any questions. That theory of 
hierarchies is called Core Hierarchy Theory and it plays a central role in the argument for 
Multi-Grade Holism. The overarching structure of the argument is as follows: 
 
(P1) The ecological domain is a compositional hierarchy.   (Chapter 1) 
(P2) Core Hierarchy Theory is our best (qua simplest and most general) theory of 
hierarchies.        (Chapter 2-3) 
(P3) Core Hierarchy Theory implies (T1): Realism.    (Chapter 3) 
(P4) Core Hierarchy Theory implies (T3): Reductionism is false. (Chapter 4)  
(P5) Core Hierarchy Theory appears to imply (T2): Metaphysical-MLE appears false 
with respect to some hierarchies.     (Chapter 5) 
(C)  Thus, our best theory of hierarchies supports (T1)-(T3): Multi-Grade Holism. 
If the argument is sound, then my initial aim is achieved: Reductionism has an epistemic 
component and Metaphysical-MLE is itself partially an epistemic claim. Insofar as Core 
Hierarchy Theory is the best account of ecological hierarchies, this argument presents a 
case in which the metaphysics of ecology informs its epistemology, at least insofar as we 
are compelled to accept the claims that are implied by our best theories. 
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3.0 Chapter Structure and Summary 
The argument Multi-Grade Holism begins with an inquiry into the use of hierarchies 
within ecology, proceeds to an investigation into the very notion of a hierarchy, and then 
uses the results of the latter investigation to argue for Multi-Grade Holism. A brief 
summary of each chapter is found below. 
Chapter 1:  The first chapter is a case-study in the actual use of hierarchies within 
science. Ecology, for example, is standardly thought of (by ecologists) as being a 
hierarchical science. But there are a number of issues surrounding this idea. The most 
pressing is that, at present, there is no clear and concise account of the ecological 
hierarchy. It is most difficult to investigate the nature and significance of something when 
you do not know what that something is. Using the work of ecologist Robert Ricklefs as a 
foil, I formulate a clear and concise account of the ecological hierarchy, and I defend it 
from some objections.  
Chapter 2: The second chapter is a survey of the various theories of hierarchies that 
have been offered by scientists and philosophers. I examine the hierarchy theories of 
Allen and Starr (1982), Roberto Poli (2001; 2004; 2006), Herbert Simon (1962; 1973), 
Burton Voorhees (1983), Mario Bunge (1969), and Richard Dawkins (1976), dividing 
them into three general categories: idiosyncratic theories, partial order theories and strict 
partial order theories. The difference between the latter two is a subtle one, but it is very 
important. I show that the partial order view faces a class of counterexamples. Given a 
choice between the two theories, the strict partial order view is favorable, but 
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nevertheless, it is under-motivated. In the literature, the view is most often stipulated, 
rather than developed.  
Chapter 3: The third chapter then expands on the second. The goal is to develop the 
strict partial order view of hierarchies from humble beginnings, instead of introducing it 
as a stipulation. The development culminates into a general account of hierarchies and 
hierarchical structure called Core Hierarchy Theory. I argue that a hierarchy is a 
mereological collection of things, related by some strict partial order (to which we give 
the label “higher than”), that meets a special linkage condition. In developing this 
account, I argue both that being a strict partial order is necessary for a relation to count as 
a higher than relation; and that being a strict partial order is sufficient for a relation to 
count as higher than. With the complete account in hand, I then use it to argue for 
Realism. In the appendices to this chapter, I formalize Core Hierarchy Theory and prove 
some theorems that are relevant to the debate between Reductionism and Holism. 
Chapter 4:  Here I review some well-known accounts of a hierarchical worldview 
from the Reductionist perspective (Gillett 2007; c.f., Wimsatt 1976, 1994, and 2007). 
These accounts of hierarchical reduction fit within my own characterization of 
Reductionism found above. Using the results obtained from Core Hierarchy Theory, I 
then argue against Reductionism: either Core Hierarchy Theory is unacceptable, 
Reductionism is false, or the whole debate is ill-founded. 
Chapter 5:  Having argued that we have reason to take the Holist worldview seriously, 
in this chapter I review Holist (i.e., non-reductive) accounts of the layered worldview in 
science more generally. I conclude by arguing against Metaphysical-MLE as a general 
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principle: the ecological hierarchy modeled by Core Hierarchy Theory, despite satisfying 
Realism, has properties which appear to undermine the metaphysical justification for 
multi-level explanation in ecology. There are some hierarchies (e.g., mechanistic 
hierarchies) which seem to provide a metaphysical justification for multi-level 
explanation, but the ecological hierarchy described in the first chapter is not one of them. 
Chapter 6:  In the sixth and final chapter, I add the finishing touches to Multi-Grade 
Holism. I begin by considering objections from a neglected third player, the eliminitivist 
who seeks to challenge the reality of hierarchies. The challenge is this: since higher level 
things, and the realization relation that holds between them, do not make a causal 
difference to the world, they (and the hierarchy of them) therefore do not exist within the 
scientific domain. In response, I argue, first, that higher level events and the realization 
relation itself, do in fact make a difference to the world, and second, that even if they did 
not make a difference, the eliminitivst argument still fails.  
 To summarize: What follows is a comprehensive investigation into the 
metaphysics of ecology. My aim is to engage in a metaphysical study that has 
consequences for the epistemology of ecology. Falling within the scope of my inquiry is 
any issue which has both a metaphysical component and an epistemological component, 
and is such that the two components connect up in a way that makes metaphysics 
relevant. To accomplish my aim, my strategy is to investigate the debate over 
Reductionism vs. Holism, as well as the disagreement with respect to hierarchical 
Realism. My tactic is to offer a deep investigation into a notion that is relevant to both 
issues: I offer a fully general, non-question-begging, theory of hierarchies and then I 
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1.0 Introduction 
Hierarchical structures are ubiquitous within ecology. A quick scan of any introductory 
textbook reveals a variety of different applications. Taxonomic hierarchies and trophic 
(food-chain) hierarchies are among the most commonly encountered. But there is 
another, more general, purpose for hierarchies within ecology: they help to identify and 
organize that which is relevant to the study of ecological phenomena. My main concern 
in this chapter is to investigate the most well-known hierarchy that serves this purpose: 
the so-called “ecological hierarchy”.  
25 
 
There are at least three ways in which the ecological hierarchy serves this 
purpose. First, it helps to differentiate some of the individual subjects of study within 
ecology; for example, populations vs. ecosystems. Second, it helps to differentiate 
between the different fields of study within ecology; for example, population dynamics 
vs. ecosystems science. And third, it is thought to help to account for the relationships 
between these subjects and fields; relationships of causal dependence and influence, for 
example.  
Although hierarchies play a significant role in the structure of ecology, the 
ecological hierarchy remains a rather murky notion that is easily misinterpreted. My 
primary aim here is to give a clear account of the ecological hierarchy, and to defend its 
place in ecology from recent objections.  
The chapter takes the following structure. The first section is devoted to 
developing a clear account of the ecological hierarchy, as conceived of and used by 
ecologists. I begin by offering two competing presentations of the ecological hierarchy: 
the atomic view, which takes atoms to be part of the ecological hierarchy; and the 
organism view, which takes organisms to be the fundamental units of the hierarchy. 
Arguing against the organism view, I proceed with the atomic view in mind.  
Building on the arguments of Allen and Starr (1982), I then develop a precise 
account of what it is to be at a level of the ecological hierarchy, as well as what it is to be 
higher than something else in the hierarchy. All of this culminates in a clear and concise 
characterization of the ecological hierarchy itself, at the end of the first section.  
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In the second section, I describe and respond to two objections to the ecological 
hierarchy: one from Robert Ricklefs (2008b), and the other from Angela Potochnik and 
Brian McGill (forthcoming). In brief, Ricklefs argues that the standard conception of the 
community within ecology is incompatible with the standard conception of the ecological 
hierarchy, and Potochnik and McGill argue that the usage of hierarchies in ecology has 
been motivated by appealing to certain implications of hierarchies which are either 
implausible or obviously false. In response, I argue that the account of the ecological 
hierarchy given in the first section comes away from these challenges unscathed. Having 
defended the use of hierarchies within ecology, a deeper investigation into their 
metaphysics is then warranted. 
2.0 The Ecological Hierarchy 
A hierarchy, roughly put, is an arrangement of some things, where some of those things 
are higher than others. (Craver 2007, Ch. 5) These things are generally called “levels”, or 
are otherwise contained within levels. The most encompassing presentation of the 
ecological hierarchy places atoms at the lowest level (Sadava, 2008; Potochnik and 
McGill, forthcoming). Atoms come together to form molecules, which make up the next 
lowest level. Molecules come together to form cells, which come together to form tissues. 
Tissues come together to form organs, which form organ systems (e.g., the circulatory 
system), which in turn come together to form organisms: the individual members of a 
species and the unit of natural selection (Ricklefs, 2008a). 
The next level of the hierarchy is the population level. Organisms of the same 
species that are living together come together to form a population (Ricklefs, 2008a): the 
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unit of evolution and population dynamics. Next, populations of different species come 
together to form a local community. A local community, as standardly conceived (c.f. 
Sadava, 2008 p. 8, Ricklefs, 2008b p. 742), is a collection of populations of different 
species found within the same specified area. At the community level, ecologists study 
interactions between populations (e.g., predation, parasitism, symbiosis, etc.) as well as 
biodiversity. At the next level, communities come together, along with the abiotic 
features of the environment, to form ecosystems. At this level, ecologists are concerned 
with large-scale energy exchanges and nutrient cycles. Lastly, ecosystems come together 
to form the earth’s bio-sphere, at the topmost level.18  
2.1 How Deep is The Ecological Hierarchy? 
The height of the ecological hierarchy is not a major point of disagreement; the main 
disagreement involves its depth. Some versions of the hierarchy do not include anything 
below the organism level (Ricklefs 2008).19 Atoms, for example, might seem to have no 
place in an ecological hierarchy since there appears to be nothing remotely ecological 
about them. Such a restriction yields a hierarchy that reaches only from organisms to the 
biosphere. Ricklefs, for example, remarks that “The organism is the most fundamental 
unit in ecology.” (ibid. p. 3) 
The remark is no surprise: ecology, as a field of study, is classically conceived as 
the study of the relationship between organisms and their environment, broadly 
                                                   
18 Although some earlier presentations of the ecological hierarchy, influenced by Alfred Tansley (2000), 
include the universe itself as a level, contemporary ecologists do not tend to do so. Contemporary 
presentations of the ecological hierarchy are only as high as the biosphere. 
 




construed. From the perspective of a community ecologist, such as Ricklefs, organisms 
and groups of organisms are of primary and fundamental concern. Still, ecosystem 
ecologists have a different perspective. They consider neither organisms nor communities 
to be primary. Within ecosystem science, it is imprudent to ignore the parts of the 
organisms, as well as the environment in which they (and their parts) are situated.  
We might then agree with Ricklefs that organisms are the fundamental objects of 
study within community ecology, but this should not be taken to imply that they are 
metaphysically, or explanatorily fundamental within ecology as a general discipline. 
Insofar as the ecological hierarchy is offered as a way to structure all that is relevant to 
ecology as a discipline, leaving atoms and molecules out of the ecological hierarchy 
suggests that they play no role in ecological explanations. But that is a mistake. 
Ecosystem ecologists study nutrient cycles, and to describe a nutrient cycle, one must 
consider interactions between molecular compounds – e.g., interactions involving nitrites 
or nitrates. A similar consideration holds for atoms as well. Atmospheric composition is 
important to ecologists studying anything from individual organisms to the biosphere, 
and is largely understood in terms of atomic proportions. Take O2 and CO2 for example: 
one cannot have an O2 molecule without O atoms. Molecules and atoms, then, have an 
important explanatory role to play. Thus, if the domain of ecology stretches only from 
organisms to the biosphere, then important explanatory elements (e.g., atoms and 
molecules) are left outside of it.  
Ricklefs might not see this as much of a problem. One might simply take the 
ecological hierarchy to bottom out at the organism level, and introduce the missing 
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explanatorily relevant features as something external to the ecological hierarchy.20 There 
might even be advantages to such a qualification. For one, it presents a compelling way 
to distinguish ecology from the general study of biology, yet at the same time brings the 
two fields together by virtue of their overlapping concern for organisms and 
populations.21 While the global unity of science movement (c.f. Oppenheim and Putnam, 
1958; Fodor 1974) is generally seen as a failure, a local unity of the “life sciences” is then 
made to seem quite plausible under this hierarchical approach. That some ecological 
explanations require appeals to molecular-biology and chemistry, and as such require an 
appeal to features outside the primary concern of ecology, only serves to enhance this 
hierarchical unity: ecology takes as explanans what biology takes as explanandum. 
Unification, I take it, is a desirable feature; and so, such an advantage should 
indeed arouse interest. But nonetheless, it is no reason to think that the ecological 
hierarchy completely ceases its downward progression at the organism level. Just because 
the biological and ecological explanandum hierarchies can be distinguished from one 
another does not imply that they are not in fact integrated into a single hierarchy that 
contains everything relevant to the production and explanation of ecological 
phenomenon. To hierarchically organize only the explanandum of ecology is to represent 
only a small part of the interest within the discipline taken as a whole. Ecologists also 
                                                   
20 Alternatively, one might introduce atomic, molecular, and molecular-biological properties at the levels in 
which they seem most appropriate in ecological explanations. Atoms, for example, might make an 
appearance no lower than the ecosystem level, and molecular-biological properties might appear no lower 
than the organism level. The general idea is that we can introduce atoms and molecular properties at the 
levels which include the phenomena these entities help to explain. Although this is indeed one way to 
characterize an ecological hierarchy, it is not the standard view in ecology. The standard view, as we will 
soon see, is ordered by composition. Atoms are parts of organisms and everything else in the ecological 
hierarchy; and so, on the standard view, appear lower than organisms, and everything else, in the ecological 
hierarchy.  
 
21 Population genetics, for example, is obviously concerned with populations.  
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care very much about how these phenomena of interest come about, which implies that 
they are interested in things found below the organism level in the integrated hierarchy. 
To model the structure of ecology as a unified field (or as a collection of disunified sub-
fields), one must be sure to include all of the relevant interests, not only those concerns 
taken to be primary by a particular sub-discipline of ecology (e.g., community ecology, 
population ecology, etc.). Atomic, chemical, and biological predicates are all found 
within ecological literature, and not as idle footnotes. I take it, then, that Ricklefs’ remark 
regarding the fundamentality of organisms is not in reference to the hierarchy of 
ecological interests, but rather only to the top-portion of it: the hierarchy of ecological 
explananda.22 
Even with the explanadum restriction, there is still a problem. Atomic, chemical, 
and biological predicates can also appear within the ecological explanadum. Explaining 
the declining population of a certain species of fish, for example, might involve a 
description of specific chemical properties found in the area, but explaining how the 
chemical properties came to be in the area to begin with is something else that needs to 
be explained. Are chemists and molecular biologists called upon to investigate such an 
issue? Perhaps they are, but if so, then they are going beyond their normal duties. The 
issue is plainly one for the ecologist. Chemical properties, then, also count as ecological 
explanandum. The hierarchy that Ricklefs is describing therefore cannot be an 
explanadum hierarchy. While there might be another way to characterize Ricklefs’ 
vision, it is tangential to our present concern. Our investigation will proceed with the 
                                                   
22 Or perhaps Ricklefs only means to give the hierarchy of interests relevant to community ecologists, such 




complete hierarchy in mind, extending from the biosphere all the way down to the atomic 
level.23  
2.2 Ordering the Hierarchy 
Leaving aside the issue of depth, let us now turn to the issue of ordering. In general, there 
can be no hierarchy without some sort of ordering of its levels and contents. According to 
the standard conception of the ecological hierarchy, it is this notion of “coming together” 
– i.e., a compositional relationship – that gives it depth. The main alternative to a 
compositional ordering is one based on scale (Potochnik and McGill, forthcoming; 
McGivern 2010).24  
Even if we take a compositional ordering for granted, the hierarchy’s contents 
remain unclear. There is still the task of specifying what is being hierarchically ordered 
via this “coming together.” There are a number of plausible options. We might take the 
hierarchy to be one of objects, processes, events, properties, types, kinds or we might 
think of it as a hierarchy which integrates all of these things into a single hierarchy. 
Despite the numerous options, some of them share similar features which allow us to 
form two general categories of contents: I will call them individuals, and instanceables. 
With this categorization in mind, the options are narrowed down to three: the individual 
view, the instanceable view, and the integrated view. 
                                                   
23 Notice that the sub-atomic level is not part of the ecological hierarchy. As far as I know, sub-atomic 
particles lay beyond its scope. They appear in no existing explanation of any ecological phenomenon. That, 
of course, might change. A quantum influence on genetic mutation or on global climate warrants the 
addition of a sub-atomic level to the ecological hierarchy.  
 
24 Ecologists do not often acknowledge a distinction between these two methods (see, for example, Allen 




On the first view, the individual view, each level consists only of individuals: 
singular things that can satisfy predicates (e.g., objects, events, and perhaps processes, 
behaviors, and phenomena).25 The properties of these individuals are not themselves 
associated with any level.26 
On the instanceable view, one thinks of the ecological hierarchy as an ordering of 
things which has individual instances (e.g. types, properties, kinds, and perhaps 
processes, behaviors, and phenomena).27 Types, properties, and kinds, however, are not 
likely to be composed of anything: composition is generally taken to be a relation 
between particulars. To produce a compositional hierarchy of types, properties, or kinds 
it seems that one cannot avoid involving individuals in some regard: presumably, the 
levels are ordered by virtue of the fact that all particular instances of these instanceables 
can be decomposed into instances of lower level instanceables. Communities can be 
decomposed into atoms, for example; so community-relevant properties are higher than 
atomic properties. Despite the important role of the individual in the hierarchy of 
instanceables, the individual instances themselves are not found on any level of the type-
hierarchy. 
                                                   
25 Our usage of ‘individual’ then differs from David Hull’s (1980). For our purposes, the term ‘individual’ 
merely picks out something that falls within the range of our singular quantifiers (i.e., “there is an x”), and 
can satisfy predicates. Unlike Hull, I do not use the term in a substantive metaphysical way. He is asking a 
different set of question from what we are asking here. 
 
26 To be clear, I should note upfront that by expressions like ‘is included in’, ‘is in’, ‘is contained in’, and 
‘is at’ I am talking about the same relationship: the relationship holding between hierarchies, levels, and the 
things they put into order. 
 
27 I list processes and behaviors as potential examples of both individuals and instanceables since I do not 
have a clear grasp of their metaphysics. On the one hand, it seems that there are types of processes one can 
engage in; e.g. making coffee. But on the other hand, it seems that there are token processes as well: my 
making of the coffee earlier this morning. The same sort of consideration holds for behaviors and 
phenomena. There is no need to resolve these issues here, however. 
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Neither of these views adequately represents the sort of hierarchy utilized by 
ecologists. The ecological hierarchy appears to include individuals and instanceables. The 
reason: if there are only bare individuals, and no properties, (or vice versa) found within 
the ecological hierarchy, then the hierarchy is utterly uninteresting to Ecology. Ecologists 
are not so much interested in things or properties simpliciter; but rather, the contribution 
things and properties make to explanation and understanding. 
For example, to explain why a species of bat has a certain physical distribution 
across a large region, (a population level explanation) requires reference to more than an 
individual population of bats, but also to its properties and the properties of its parts as 
well: if an organism thrives on the faces of cliffs, then that helps to explain why the 
population is distributed as it is. To give an explanation at a level of the ecological 
hierarchy, then, it is more appropriate to associate both individuals (e.g., bat populations) 
and properties (e.g., thrives on cliffs) with the levels of the hierarchy: explanation 
involves more than bare individuals and more than bare instanceables.  
Insofar as the ecological hierarchy is a hierarchy of ecological interests, the most 
accurate characterization of the ecological hierarchy is therefore the integrated view. On 
the integrated view, both individuals and instanceables are associated with levels. We can 
say that an instanceable is within a level if and only if it has instances within that level. 
But then, we might ask, what is it for an individual instance to be in a level of the 
ecological hierarchy?  
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2.3 Nested vs. Non-Nested Hierarchies 
To answer this question, we must first specify what sort of hierarchy we are dealing with 
in ecology. Within ecology, there is a well-known distinction between nested and non-
nested hierarchies. Non-nested hierarchies are thought to be those in which one level does 
not contain the lower (Allen and Starr 1982 p. 40; Ahl and Allen 1996 p. 107). Examples 
of non-nested hierarchies include most food chains, corporate hierarchies, and college 
rankings. Nested hierarchies, on the other hand, are thought to be those in which a level 
does contain the levels below it (Allen and Starr 1982 p. 38; Ahl and Allen 1996 p. 107-
10). Such a relationship can be presented in terms of nested sets or circles. To present the 
ecological hierarchy as a nested hierarchy, we might use the following:  
[Biosphere [Ecosystems [Communities [Populations [Organisms […]]]]]]28 
Or we might use: 
Allen and Starr (1982) famously argue that compositional hierarchies involve 
such nesting. They ask us to consider military hierarchies as an example. Generals, they 
                                                   
28 We should not take this to be an expression of set-theory. The top-level does not describe a two-
membered set consisting in a set and the biosphere. Rather, it describes a series of nested subsets. This 
method of representing hierarchical nesting comes from Salthe 1985. 









Figure 1: The Nested Hierarchy 
35 
 
note, do not contain their subordinates, but armies do contain their battalions and soldiers. 
The former hierarchy, the command hierarchy, is paradigmatically non-nested; whereas 
the latter hierarchy, qua compositional, is marked as being nested. (1982 p. 39; also, see 
Salthe 1985, p. 10) Analogously, we are then to conclude, the ecological hierarchy, qua 
compositional, is a nested hierarchy.  
Although it is never made explicit by Allen, Starr, or Salthe, the justification for 
nested compositional hierarchies seems to involve the transitivity of the containment 
relation. If a level x contains individual y, and individual y contains lower level 
individual z, then x contains z. The contents of lower levels in a compositional hierarchy 
are thus also contents of higher levels by virtue of being contained within the higher level 
individuals as their parts. Although one might question the transitivity of hierarchical 
containment, which is needed for their argument, there is, in fact, a growing body of 
psychological research which suggests that the everyday notion of hierarchical 
containment is indeed transitive (see Winer 1980; Greene 1989, 1994; Murphy 2002; 
Deneault and Ricard, 2006; and Slattery et al 2011).29   
But, of course, none of this suggests that a non-nested compositional hierarchy is 
impossible. To generate a non-nested compositional hierarchy, one simply constrains the 
containment relation in a way that invalidates its transitivity, yielding a refined notion of 
containment (e.g., x directly-contains y iff x contains y and there is no intermediary 
container z such that x contains z and z contains y). We can then add yet add another 
distinction to supplement the nested/non-nested dichotomy: a distinction between nested 
                                                   
29 The primary question many of these psychologists seek to answer is at what age are hierarchical notions 
acquired within children. The answer, it seems, is between five and nine years of age. (Slattery et al 2011) 
36 
 
hierarchies of things, and hierarchies of nested things. The former are represented in a 
manner similar to Figure 1; whereas the latter would be represented by any hierarchy 
(perhaps non-nested) whose levels contain nested things. For example, one might 
reconstruct the compositional military hierarchy using a constrained notion of 
containment that does not imply that soldiers are contained within the army-level. Such a 
constraint transforms the exemplar nested hierarchy, into a non-nested one.  
That the containment relation can be constrained is no reason to think that it is or 
should be constrained with respect to the ecological hierarchy. Unless the very notion of 
a nested hierarchy turns out to be incompatible with ecological ambitions, to add 
constraints to containment would only serve to add unnecessary complications. Assuming 
that there is no such incompatibility, the simplest and most general presentation of the 
ecological hierarchy therefore takes it to be nested.  
In fact, there is a reason to think that ecological ambitions are not incompatible 
with nesting. The nested hierarchy allows for the inclusion of individuals and 
instanceables that do not fall within the specified level restrictions. Consider the place of 
antlers in the ecological hierarchy, for example. Antlers are bony branching protrusion 
from the skulls of mature males belonging to the Cervidae family.30 Antlers are not 
ecosystems, communities, populations, organisms, organs, organ-systems, tissues, cells, 
molecules, or atoms. If level specifications were understood to imply restrictions to the 
sorts of things that are contained within each level of the ecological hierarchy, then 
antlers would fall outside the ecological hierarchy altogether. But that conflicts with one 
of the main purposes of the ecological hierarchy: to organize all that is of interest to 
                                                   
30 Female caribou and reindeer, note, are exceptions. They too have antlers. 
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ecologists. Antlers are objects of interest to evolutionary ecologists, and are therefore to 
be included in the hierarchy of ecological interests. To include antlers in the ecological 
hierarchy one need only remove the restrictions on a levels contents. If the ecological 
hierarchy is nested, then antlers – qua composed of tissues – are appropriately positioned 
in the organ level, and all higher levels. This is not the only advantage of nesting. If the 
size of antlers found within a population, community, or ecosystem can be used as a 
metric for determining the “health” of an ecosystem, community, or population, then 
including antlers as contents of those higher levels is wholly appropriate. Since antler size 
is largely influenced by nutrition, their use as a metric is not at all implausible. 
Nevertheless, these advantages of nesting might be overruled by conceptual 
difficulties for nested hierarchies. If the ecological hierarchy is nested, as Allen and Starr 
argue, then molecules will turn out to be within both the molecular level and the 
ecosystem level, by virtue of ecosystems being composed of molecules. Since the 
ecosystem level is taken to be higher than the molecular level, the fact that molecules are 
found within both these levels might be taken to suggest that molecules are higher than 
themselves. Taking for granted that the higher than relation is asymmetric (as evidenced 
by the psychological studies mentioned above), nothing can be higher than itself. So, it 
might be argued, nested hierarchies are deeply incoherent. 
 Fortunately for Allen and Starr, there is a simple response to the incoherence 
worry. They merely need to acknowledge a distinction between two relationships: the 
higher than relation, which holds between levels, and the is at a higher level than 
relation, which holds between the contents of levels. Drawing such a distinction allows 
them to agree to the asymmetry constraint when it comes to the ordering of levels, while 
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at the same time allowing them to deny it with respect to the ordering of their contents. 
Nestedness, then, can be retained without falling into incoherence. 
2.4 Being “at” a Level in the Ecological Hierarchy   
Having drawn the nested/non-nested distinction, and having argued for its relevance to 
the ecological hierarchy, any account of what it is to be contained within, or to be at, a 
level of the ecological hierarchy must take that distinction into account. Previously, we 
said that hierarchical levels contain both individuals and instanceables. An instanceable is 
contained within a level whenever it has individual instances at that level. All that 
remains, then, is an account of what it is for an individual to be at a level of the nested 
ecological hierarchy; an account that respects the nesting constraint, as discussed in the 
previous section.  
Note that the purpose of the account is not to give a semantics of ‘x is at y’. We 
have already identified it as a sort of containment, inclusion, or (perhaps) parthood 
relation. Any of these options suffices for the present purpose. Here we only want an 
account of what it is to be at some given level of the nested ecological hierarchy we have 
already mentioned: an account which will allow us to determine, for anything found 
within the domain of ecological interest, which level or levels contain it. It is not enough 
to simply say that an individual, x, is at the community level if and only if x is a 
community. Since the ecological hierarchy is nested hierarchy, other things aside from 
communities are included in the community levels: organisms, for example, are 
associated with the community level qua nested.   
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The proposal that I have in mind is accomplished in three steps: first, begin with 
the domain of ecological interests; second, specify a label or name for each level, and 
rank them as the hierarchical analyst desires (viz., as a higher than ranking); and then, 
third, offer an algorithm or definition that each individual in the domain is placed into the 
appropriate level. Given the ordering of ecological levels we have so far – atoms (L0), 
molecules (L1), cells (L2), tissues (L3), organs (L4), organ-systems (L5), organisms (L6), 
populations (L7), communities (L8), ecosystems (L9), and the biosphere (L10) – we can 
say that:  
(AT-LEVEL) Given any ecological level Ln, for all individuals x, x is at 
Ln iff either (1) or (2) 
(1) x is atomic31 and n = 0; 
(2) If x is a non-atomic individual, then for each of its 
proper parts p, there is some level Lz, (where 0≤z<n) 
such that p is at Lz. 
The account might appear to be circular, but in fact it is not. 32 Recall this is not 
intended to be a reductive semantic or conceptual analysis of x is at level y, for any x and 
y. The ‘is at’ predicate is being taken for granted here as a way to give a more specific 
analysis, an analysis of what it is to be at level Ln of the ecological hierarchy, for any 
                                                   
31 Note that by ‘atomic’ I do not mean to refer to an object without proper-parts (i.e., an indivisible whole), 
but rather, the sorts of things that micro-physicists study.  
 
32 One might also notice that gerrymandered sums of atoms, molecules, cells, etc., seem to be misplaced 
within this analysis. Note, however, that since our domain is restricted to individuals that are of ecological 
interest, the gerrymandered sums of atoms, molecules, cells, etc., fall outside the scope of the analysis.  
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chosen Ln from the list above (viz. L0-L10). In other words, rather than giving an analysis 
of ‘is at’, we’re giving an analysis of ‘is at Ln’ where 0≤n≤10.  
What the AT-LEVEL analysis provides us with is a schematic framework to 
provide a series of analyses, one for each level of the ecological hierarchy L0-L10. To 
arrive at this series, one merely drops the leading quantifier of AT-LEVEL and replaces 
each instance of the Ln-variable with one of L0-L10 from the list above. One such analysis 
in the series, for example: for all individuals x, x is at L7 (the population level) iff x is 
composed of and only of individuals found within L0-L6 (the atomic through organism 
levels). The analyses generated from the AT-LEVEL schema are thus informative and 
non-circular: on the left hand side of the ‘iff’ we state our interest in some particular 
level, and on the right hand side, we satisfy that interest.  
The purpose of AT-LEVEL, recall, is to describe where each entity of ecological 
interest resides within the structure of nested levels. The analysis accomplishes its task: it 
provides, in principle, a way to associate each entity with the appropriate level(s) in a 
way that satisfies the nesting constraint. Atoms and atomic properties appear at the 
bottom level by virtue of (1), and also appear at all higher levels by virtue of (2), 
satisfying the nesting constraint.33 Also by virtue of (2), all and only those individuals 
who are composed of atoms, and nothing else besides atoms, are found at the molecular 
levels. Keeping with the trend, all and only those individuals composed of things residing 
on the molecular level or lower, and nothing else besides things found on the molecular 
level or lower, is found on the cellular level and all levels higher than the cellular level. 
                                                   




And so on. The process is repeated until one has pinned one’s entity of interest to the first 
level one is able to, starting from the bottom as we do here. To put the point most simply: 
individuals found at any level L are also found at every level L* higher than L, since the 
L-things are composed of things, and only of things, found at levels lower than L*.  
 Although every lower level thing is contained within the higher levels, according 
to AT-LEVEL there are nevertheless some things that are exclusive to the higher levels. 
Biospheres, for example, are not found at the ecosystem level or lower: since biospheres 
are composed of ecosystems, they not composed of and only of things found levels lower 
than ecosystems. Similarly, molecules and higher level individuals are not found at the 
atomic level since they are not composed of anything lower than atoms; there are no such 
things in the domain of the eco-hierarchy. Lower levels are contained within higher 
levels, but higher levels are not (completely) contained within the lower levels. There is 
an imperfect overlap. The nesting constraint has thus been satisfied. 
 With this understanding of being at a level, we can then go on to account for what 
it is to be at a higher level than something else in the ecological hierarchy (as well as 
accounting for being at a lower level than) in a straightforward matter. Note that the 
following variables are intended to range over both individuals and instanceables. 
(HIGHER-LEVEL) for all X and Y, X is higher than Y (i.e., Y is lower than X) 
iff the least n1 such that X is at Ln1 is greater than the least 
n2 such that Y is at Ln2. 
There are, of course, other ways to specify what it is for an individual or property to be at 
a higher level than some other. HIGHER-LEVEL is useful in that it gives us a way to 
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understand what it is to be at a higher level that is compatible with both nested and non-
nested hierarchies. In a nested hierarchy, cells are at a higher level than atoms: the lowest 
level at which cells can be found (L2) has a greater rank than the lowest level at which 
atoms are found (L0). The same consideration holds under any non-nested conception of 
the ecological hierarchy as well. 
Our first major task is then complete. We have arrived at an account of the 
ecological hierarchy that is concise and complete. Let us henceforth take this account to 
be representative of the hierarchical structure of ecological science:  
(ECOHIERARCHY) The ecological hierarchy =df the hierarchy which (a) 
consists in all individuals and instanceables relevant to 
ecological interests; (b) spans from the atomic to the 
biospheric level in the following order (from bottom to top)  
– atoms (L0), molecules (L1), cells (L2), tissues (L3), organs 
(L4), organ-systems (L5), organisms (L6), populations (L7), 
communities (L8), ecosystems (L9), and the biosphere (L10)  
– and (c) satisfies both AT-LEVEL and HIGHER-LEVEL. 
3.0 Challenges to the Ecological Hierarchy 
The compositional account of the ecological hierarchy has increasingly been met with 
scrutiny. In this section, I will present and respond to two challenges that have been 
raised to the compositional hierarchy. The first comes from Ricklefs (2008b) and the 
second comes from Potochnik and McGill (forthcoming). 
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3.1 Ricklefs Challenge to the Community 
Ricklefs (2008b) argues that the popular conception of community, Gleanson’s (1926) 
“local” account, makes for an awkward fit within the ecological hierarchy, and has, 
perhaps, impeded progress within the discipline. His goal is to produce an alternative 
characterization of the community that achieves greater fit with the ecological hierarchy, 
and might even advance the field of ecology itself. I only focus on the hierarchical 
concern that arises from his challenge.   
3.1.1 Disintegrating the Local-Community 
On the standard view, we noted earlier, communities are thought to be composed of 
populations living within a specified area – i.e., a location in space and time. But 
‘specified area’ and ‘location in space and time’ are imprecise. Areas can be specified in 
many different ways; and ‘location’ might mean either a region of space, or a single 
space-time point. The dominant precisification is Gleanson’s. Call it, the local-
community concept: a (local) community is a collection of populations with overlapping 
distribution that co-occur at a point in space-time (Ricklefs 2008b).  
In his critique, Ricklefs interprets Gleason’s characterization in two different 
ways. First, he seems to interpret Gleason to mean that a local community consists in a 
single space-time point, surrounded by an assemblage of organisms from different 
species (2008b, p.744). Call this the point interpretation. As I understand the view, the 
space-time point is identified on a map, and the populations whose distributions overlap 




Who would ever hold the point-view? Ecologists who find it useful to pin hand-
written labels to points on maps might see fit to hold it; and so might those among those 
who regularly use Geographic Information Systems (GISs) to perform similar tasks. It is 
natural for such individuals to think of communities as mere conceptual tools, rather than 
as real things in the world.  
On the second interpretation, Ricklefs takes Gleason to mean that a local 
community consists in something real: an assemblage of species found within an area 
surrounding a single point in space-time (ibid p. 742). Call this the assemblage 
interpretation. On this interpretation, communities are not relativized to space-time 
points. They are very real things that fall within a certain range, perhaps determined by 
the location of a pin on a map, or GIS system.  
We can differentiate the two interpretations using the following diagram:  
Where the large polygon represents an aerial view of an environmental region with 
natural boundaries (say, an isolated valley); D represents the spatial distribution of a 
population of deer; W represents the distribution of a wolf population; B represents the 
distribution of black bears; S represents the distribution of swans surrounding a local 







Figure 2: Ricklefs’ Two Interpretations of the Local Community 
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On the point interpretation of Gleason, the community lacks spatial extent. It is 
nothing other than the dot found within the overlap of B, D, and W in Figure 2. On the 
assemblage interpretation, the community has spatial extent. It consists in the organisms 
found within the shaded region in Figure 2, or some arbitrarily specified sub-region.  
  No matter which interpretation ecologists generally have in mind, Ricklefs 
moves to reject the localized characterization in favor of the following alternative, call it, 
the regional-community concept: a (regional) community is a collection of populations 
falling within an environmental or geographic gradient; that is, it is a non-arbitrary region 
of space-time bounded by such things as natural barriers to dispersal and migration, 
geographic features such as watersheds, or perhaps bounded by features such as 
temperature, altitude, distance from water, and so on. To account for the difference 
between his own view and the Gleason standard, Ricklefs says the following: 
The local community concept represents what I think of as a vertical 
perspective on species occurring within an arbitrarily bounded area, 
vertical because the species present local add together – pile up, so to 
speak – to form the local assemblage. The occurrence of species elsewhere 
within a region is of no consequence. In contrast, the regional community 
concept corresponds to a horizontal perspective on the distribution of 
populations over ecological and geographic gradients (2008b p. 744) 
Figure 2 illuminates this distinction. The Gleason “local” standard takes the community, 
either as an assemblage of individual organisms found within shaded region (or sub-
region thereof), or as some point within that region. Ricklefs preferred “regional” view of 
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the community can include everything in the valley: bear, deer, wolves, squirrels, and 
zebras. It depends on the gradient of particular interest. 
Ricklefs mentions two reasons for “disintegrating”, as he puts it, the local 
community from the ecological hierarchy. Each corresponds to one of the two 
interpretations of community. The problem with both interpretations of the local 
approach, says Ricklefs, is that they do not fit within the standard compositionally 
ordered ecological hierarchy. (2008b p. 742) If he is correct, then there is a tension 
between ECOHIERARCHY and the community-concept: ECOHIERARCHY includes 
the community-concept, but if Ricklefs is correct, then the community-concept does not 
fit within ECOHIERARCHY. 
With respect to the point interpretation of the community: populations, he argues, 
are spread out geographically, but space-time points are not. They have no spatial extent; 
and so, the “point community” (ibid p. 744) ceases to be a composite individual; indeed, 
he says, it is not an entity at all. (ibid.) Communities are nothing more than a point on a 
map to which we assign some group of organisms. Since the ecological hierarchy takes 
communities to be individuals, if the first interpretation is correct, then indeed the 
community has no place within ECOHIERARCHY.  
With respect to the second interpretation: populations, he argues, are widely 
spread out geographically, but local assemblages of species are not. The shaded region 
(or its sub-regions) in Figure 2 occupy a space that is much smaller than the spatial extent 
of the associated populations of deer, wolves, and bears; and moreover, and the number 
of organisms found within the shaded region is much smaller than the number of 
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organisms in their respective populations (Ibid. p. 742). Thus, Ricklefs concludes, “a 
local community cannot be inclusive of the populations of its components species.” (ibid)  
On both interpretations, then, it appears that the local community concept cannot 
fit within the ecological hierarchy. On both interpretations, the whole community is much 
smaller than the distribution and contents of its component populations. It is not literally 
composed of those populations. The local community concept, he concludes, must be 
disintegrated from the eco-hierarchy.  
3.1.2 Re-integrating the Local-Community 
There is, in fact, a third interpretation of the local-community that Ricklefs fails to 
consider, one that escapes the problems he raises for the eco-hierarchy. To replace the 
local community concept with a region-based conception is, then, a bit hasty.  
The third interpretation can be called the compositional interpretation of the local-
community. It can also be described using Figure 2 as an example. On the compositional 
interpretation, the local community does not just consist in those organisms found within 
the overlapping (i.e., shaded) region; rather, it consists in all of the organisms found 
within the populations that happen to overlap. With respect to Figure 2, we can interpret 
the local community as being the assemblage of everything within population D, within 
population W, and within population B. In other words, instead of taking the community 
to be a subset of the intersection of D, W, and B, we can instead take it to be the 
collection of organisms that fall within the union of D, W, and B. 
On such a view, one might still see fit to add a regional boundary of some sort; 
but not one that makes a difference to the individuation of the community. It does not 
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matter whether or not an organism is found within any specified boundary for it to be 
considered a member of a community whose spatial distribution spatially overlaps that 
boundary, at least, not on the compositional interpretation of the local community. What 
really matters for the individuation of community, as with any other community, is that 
there is an area in which these populations have a chance to interact. The compositional 
interpretation described above satisfies this requirement. 
That the interactive requirement has been satisfied is not obvious, by any means. 
It might seem problematic that those members of the populations who lie outside the 
overlapping area have no chance to interact with other members of other populations. But 
insofar as we are defending ECOHIERARCHY here, communities are composed of 
populations. Although not each and every member of these population interact, it 
nevertheless remains true that the populations themselves interact. Consider an analogy: 
one common ways for humans to interact is for their parts to touch – shaking hands is an 
obvious (albeit boring) example; I see no reason to think that populations are any 
different in this respect. Their members are their parts under the standard understanding 
of populations; since some of those parts interact, by our analogy, the populations 
interact. Of course, the stipulated area might be where the action is from the perspective 
of the working ecologist, but it by no means exhausts the membership of the community. 
The compositional interpretation of the local community concept fits well with 
the ECOHIERARCHY analysis given earlier. Populations are composed of organisms 
grouped together by proximity (or the potential for mating, perhaps); and communities 
are composed of entire populations whose spatial distributions overlap, and who therefore 
have a chance for interaction and influence (e.g., predation and symbiosis). Ecosystems, 
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such as the valley ecosystem depicted in Figure 2, we can say, are composed of all the 
communities (all the overlapping distributions of populations) and abiotic features found 
within the region.  
  Although we should oppose Ricklefs’ call to revise the community concept, there 
is no need to reject his conception of the regional-community. The compositional 
approach I propose above fits with Ricklefs’ suggestion as well. But rather than help to 
individuate communities, we can instead use the regional-community to help integrate 
two levels: the community level and the ecosystem level. The ecosystemic level, recall, 
includes abiotic features as well as communities of populations as compositional 
elements. But which abiotic features does the ecosystem include? How do we decide? If 
Ricklefs’ is correct, then the specification of the regional boundaries can be used to 
determine the abiotic components of the ecosystem. The ecosystem consists in the 
communities and abiotic elements that are found within some region that is used to pick 
out some regional community at the community level.  
I do not mean to suggest that ecology needs a regional community concept, to 
prevent the community and ecosystem levels from dis-integrating. If we did not introduce 
regions at the community-level, we could simply introduce them at the ecosystem level; 
and so, the regional-community is inessential to hierarchical integration. But 
nevertheless, if Ricklefs is correct and the regional-community concept is useful within 
ecology, its integration-enhancing features suggest that it does have a place within the 
ecological hierarchy. I only argue that the regional community should not be thought to 
replace the existing understanding of the community. Ricklefs’ contribution should thus 
be seen as an enrichment and extension of the community-concept. It should not be taken 
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to be a complete revision. When viewed in this way, Ricklefs’ insights do not pose a 
challenge to ECOHIERARCHY. 
3.2 Potochnik and McGill vs. Scientific Hierarchies 
Whereas Ricklefs raises a very specific problem for the ecological hierarchy – namely, 
the community concept – Potochnik (a philosopher) and McGill (an ecologist) present a 
very general problem for the compositional ordering of the hierarchy. They argue that the 
ecological hierarchy, standardly conceived as a compositional hierarchy, is commonly 
ascribed problematic implications (§2 p. 9). They write: 
In our view, the many overly ambitious conclusions drawn from the 
simple fact of part-whole composition – and the persistence of those 
conclusions – demonstrate that hierarchical stratification is not useful as a 
general conception of ecology or science. (ibid) 
It appears that their case is this: since the compositionally ordered ecological hierarchy 
leads scientists and philosophers to draw bad conclusions and hasty generalizations, it 
should not be used as an organizing principle for the discipline and should be replaced 
with a different organizing structure: scale. 
 To evaluate Potochnik and McGill’s case against hierarchical ecology, I begin by 
detailing the conception of hierarchy that they take to be standard in the biological 
sciences. I argue that the concept of hierarchy that they are arguing against is a departure 
from the aforementioned ECOHIERARCHY, and is, in fact, incoherent: their case 
against compositional hierarchies is a straw-man. I conclude the section by providing 
reasons to prefer ECOHIERARCHY over the scalar alternative they propose. 
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3.2.1 The Coherence Problem 
Before attempting to undermine the motivation for the ecological hierarchy, Potochnik 
and McGill attack the conception of the hierarchy itself. According to 
ECOHIERARCHY, the organizing structure of ecology is a nested compositional 
hierarchy that consists of individuals and instanceables, and spans from the atomic level 
to the biosphere. Potochnik and McGill appear to agree with all of this (the inclusion of 
instanceables notwithstanding). They write, 
The basic idea is that higher-level entities are composed of (and only of) 
lower-level entities, but the prevalent concept of hierarchical organization 
involves stronger claims as well. The compositional hierarchy is often 
taken to involve stratification into discrete and universal levels of 
organization. It is also often assumed that levels are nested, that is, that an 
entity at any level is composed of aggregate entities at the next lower 
level. (§1 p. 2) 
Their agreement, however, is illusory. In fact, the characterization quoted above is 
incoherent. When one clarifies the standard usage of nestedness and discreteness, it 
becomes clear that levels are nested only if they are not discrete.  
First, let us get clear on what Potochnik and McGill mean by ‘nested 
stratification’. They claim that nested stratification depends on “the uniformity of part-
whole composition. For strata to emerge, atoms must always compose molecules, 
populations must always compose communities, etc.” (forthcoming, §2.1) But in fact, this 
cannot be a requirement of stratification. Two far-flung atoms do not compose a 
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molecule, and so atoms do not always compose molecules. I think what they mean by 
nested stratification is better expressed using what might be called the principle of 
homogenous decomposition: 
(HOMO-DECOMP) For any entity e on level L, there are some entities “the xs” 
on level L-1, such that each of the xs is a proper part of e, 
and there is no proper part of e that is not a part of one of 
the xs.  
If HOMO-DECOMP is correct, then everything on every level has an exhaustive 
decomposition into the next lower level. 
On Potochnik and McGill’s understanding, discreteness appears to imply that the 
levels within the hierarchy do not have any entities in common. In other words, the levels 
of a hierarchy are discrete when and only when there is no overlap between them.34 
Atoms, on such a view, are not found at the molecular level and molecules are not found 
at the cellular level. 
With such a characterization in mind, Potochnik and McGill argue against the 
ecological hierarchy by arguing against HOMO-DECOMP and similar principles. They 
draw on examples of objects at level n that are not composed exclusively of objects at 
                                                   
34 I offer this interpretation out of charity. Although they eventually give a precise statement of what 
discreteness amounts to: “that an object taken to be at some level n is composed of all and only parts at 
level n − 1.” (§2.1), nobody actually holds this view. It implies something plainly absurd: that if I am 
composed of organ-parts, then I am not composed of atoms, molecules, cells, or tissues. I know of no 
ecologist who holds that organisms are not composed of molecules. If this is the understanding of 
discreteness they mean to argue against, then they are wasting their time. Their argument is a straw-man. 
HOMO-DECOMP is a far more accurate way to present the actual compositional intuitions employed 
within ecology. See Kim (2002) for a discussion of this, and similar principles.  
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level n-1. Kim calls these sorts of problems free-molecule problems (Kim 2002; also see 
Guttman 1976). For example,  
ecosystems are said to be composed of… communities, but individual 
molecules, such as molecules of food waste, are also an important 
component. Tissues are only partly composed of cells; also crucial are the 
macromolecules that hold the cells together. (Potochnick and McGill, 
forthcoming, §2.1) 
These molecules, Potochnik and McGill presume, are parts of the ecosystem (or tissue), 
but are not part of any entity at the community level. Since (their vision of) the ecological 
hierarchy implies HOMO-DECOMP, which succumbs to these sorts or counterexamples, 
they suggest that we have a strong reason to reject the ecological hierarchy. 
3.2.2 The Nesting Defense  
Within all of their criticisms Potochnik and McGill are using a characterization of the 
nested ecological hierarchy that is clearly at odds with the standard conception of 
nestedness discussed in the first section. Nestedness, recall, involves containment; 
specifically, the containment of the lower levels by the higher. Insofar as the army-level 
contains soldiers, the molecular level contains atoms, pace Potochnik and McGill.35 The 
following diagram should help to illustrate nestedness:  
                                                   
35 Note that Kim (2002) suggests a different solution to this problem, although Potochnik and McGill fail to 
consider it. He suggests that HOMO-DECOMP should be replaced with a weaker principle: one that 
requires each entity to decompose into entities, each found at the L-1 level or lower. Adding “or lower” 
means that entities need not exhaustively decompose into the L-1 level, and so the free-floating molecules 
no longer count as a counterexample. But this solution has its own implications some might find to be 
problematic. It entails that every higher level thing is also a lower level thing: e.g. ecosystems, qua having 




In fact, given the notion of nestedness accounted for within the AT-LEVEL analysis 
given in the previous section, HOMO-DECOMP is trivialized: since each levels contains 
all of the lower levels, all of the proper parts of an entity, e, reside at the next level down; 
and so, e trivially possesses an exhaustive decomposition into entities at that level.36 
Potochnik and McGill’s mistake lies in their presumption that each level is 
discrete, that it consists only of entities characteristic of that level. For example, the 
ecosystem level contains only ecosystems, and the cellular level contains only cells. If 
Figure 3 is to serve as an illustration of the nested hierarchy, then that presumption must 
be rejected. And since Figure 3 appears to illustrate the notion of nestedness introduced 
by Allen and Starr (1982), and it is their work on hierarchies that introduces the nesting 
                                                                                                                                                       
having an exhaustive decomposition into the molecular level or lower, ecosystems are therefore at the 
molecular level. Reductionists should have no problem with this implication; but many ecologists are not 
reductionists. One of the purposes of hierarchical ecology, as presented by Allen and Starr (1982) and 
Allen and Ahl (1996) is to provide an alternative to reductionism.  
 
36 Does this mean that the laws of atomic physics must also be considered a part of ecology, if atoms are 
included? No. Such laws should be included only Insofar as they are found within the domain of ecological 
interest to begin with. As far as I know, the laws of atomic physics do not play an active role in ecological 
explanations. They appear to reside beyond the scope of ecological interest, despite the fact that atomic 
predicates, and the individual atoms that satisfy them, do generally fall within the scope of ecology. Just 
because physics and ecology have overlapping concerns does not imply that all of physics gets subsumed 
within ecology.    








Figure 3: A Nested Hierarchy -- the lower level is contained 
within the higher-level (c.f. Piero 2009, p. 23). 
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concept to begin with, it appears that Potochnik and McGill are working with a 
conception of the ecological hierarchy that is not representative of what one finds within 
ecology. 
ECOHIERARCHY, therefore, is not as hopeless as Potochnik and McGill 
purport; here we have shown them to be attacking an incoherent straw man. In the next 
section, we will examine the motivational facet of their argument against the use of 
compositional hierarchies within ecology.  
3.2.3 The Motivation Problem 
Potochnik and McGill’s attack on the coherence of ECOHIERARCHY is only one of the 
problematic implications they investigate. They also consider five other implications of 
compositional hierarchies, which, they seem to think, are needed to motivate the use of 
hierarchies within ecology. They cite James Feibleman (1954) as the source of many of 
these implications.  
The implications they cite include metaphysical claims and epistemic claims, 
providing two different dimensions along which hierarchical ecology can be motivated. 
Potochnik and McGill argue that these motivational implications are false. Without a 
reason to think that the ecological hierarchy is metaphysically or epistemically 
significant, they conclude that we have no reason to retain the hierarchical approach to 
ecology. Although they make a number of good points, I ultimately think that their 
challenges fail to undermine the motivation for hierarchical ecology. Let us address each 
motivating implication in turn.  
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 The first purported implication involves a relationship between properties; 
specifically, an adherence to mereological supervenience.37 Within a compositional 
hierarchy, higher level entities are thought to have properties not found on lower levels, 
since they are particular organizations of their lower level parts. But if that is all the 
entity is, an organization of its parts, then its properties are the properties of the 
organization of parts. This, it is often suggested, implies mereological supervenience. 
Call this the supervenience implication.  
The problem with the supervenience implication, Potochnik and McGill argue, is 
that it is not universal. They cite examples of higher level properties that do not 
supervene on lower level properties. Camouflage, they point out, is a property of 
organisms, but whether or not a particular skin-color pattern counts as camouflage 
depends on more than the properties of the organism’s parts. It depends on environmental 
factors as well, such as the sensory powers of predators. Moreover, they point out, 
phenotypic properties of organisms do not always supervene on genetic properties, even 
though phenotypic properties appear on a higher level than genotypic properties. Thus, 
the use of compositional hierarchies does not imply the supervenience of all properties on 
the properties of parts. And so, mereological supervenience cannot be used to motivate 
the metaphysical significance of hierarchies: mereolgoical supervenience is not a general 
property of compositional hierarchies.  
I take it that this first challenge is a good one. Whoever offers the supervenience 
implication as a motivating the metaphysical significance of hierarchies seems to be 
conflating compositional hierarchies and supervenience hierarchies. ECOHIERARCHY, 
                                                   
37 I.e., the idea that the properties of the whole supervene on the properties of its parts. 
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recall from above, makes no mention of supervenience. Although an asymmetric 
supervenience relation might be considered hierarchical (see Kim 2002), there is no 
reason to think ECOHIERARCHY (or any other compositional hierarchy) is such a 
hierarchy. Just because some properties of the whole supervene on their parts does not 
directly imply that every property found on every level of a compositional hierarchy 
supervenes on the properties found within the next lower level. Potochnik and McGill are 
correct: since the ecological hierarchy is not mereologically supervenient, its being 
mereologically supervenient cannot be a reason to think the ecological hierarchy is 
metaphysically significant. 
Potochnik and McGill’s other challenges are not so convincing. Their second 
challenge pertains to some purported implications for complexity. According to 
Potochnik and McGill, compositional hierarchies are thought to be significant since they 
are thought to imply that complexity always increases as levels are ascended. They cite 
Jagers op Akkerhuis (2008) who says “the organization of nature is profoundly 
hierarchical, because from its beginning, interactions between simple elements have 
continuously created more complex systems, that themselves served as the basis for still 
more complex systems.” (p. 2)  
Potochnik and McGill argue against the complexity-implication by pointing out 
that ecosystems sometimes exhibit remarkably simple behaviors: the simplicity of certain 
predator-prey cycles serves as their main example. Since compositional hierarchies do 
not genuinely imply that complexity always increases along with hierarchical ascension, 
the increasing complexity of higher levels cannot be used as a reason to think that 
compositional hierarchies are metaphysically or epistemologically significant.  
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 Given the nesting constraint on the ecological hierarchy, Potochnik and McGill’s 
complaint is quite clearly incorrect. Although the ecosystemic level does contain some 
simple behaviors, the complexity found at lower levels is also found at higher levels, by 
virtue of our nesting constraint.38 So, complexity does increase as levels are ascended. 
While this does not warrant the claim that all higher level systems are more complex than 
all lower level systems, this is not a claim a defender of hierarchical ecology needs to 
maintain. 
 The third purported implication involves rates of change. Potochnik and McGill 
claim that compositional hierarchies imply that rates of change always decrease as levels 
are ascended. To support this claim, they cite O’Neill et al. (1986), who argue that higher 
levels will change more slowly than lower levels since higher level changes are the result 
of a great many lower level interactions taken together.  
The problem with this implication, Potochnik and McGill argue, is that there are 
many examples of lower level changes that are much slower than higher level changes. 
Changes to a genotype, they point out, occur very gradually, whereas changes to an 
individual organism’s phenotypic traits, say, the amount of body hair, can change over 
the course of a few minutes of reckless shaving. Since compositional hierarchies do not 
imply that rates of change always slow along with hierarchical ascension, the slowing of 
rates of change as levels increase lends no credence to the claim that the ecological 
hierarchy is metaphysically or epistemologically significant.  
                                                   
38 It is worth noting that Feibleman (1954 p. 59), the progenitor of the “implications” (he calls them Laws) 
to which Potochnik and McGill are objecting, explicitly includes the nesting constraint within his first law 
governing levels and complexity: on more than one occasion he remarks that the “levels are cumulative 
upward.” (ibid. p. 60) 
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 This argument is not convincing. Of course, it must be acknowledged that rates of 
change do not always slow as levels increase: the nesting constraint, recall, implies that 
rapidly changing lower level individuals are also found on higher levels as well. But this 
does not imply that a heuristic generalization cannot be made here. That is, Potochnik and 
McGill have not ruled out that, in a statistically significant number of cases, rates of 
change tend to become slower with an increase in level. Until they do, their challenge to 
the epistemic significance of the ecological hierarchy is not likely to gain much traction.  
Indeed, Potochnik and McGill’s phenotype/genotype counterexample might well 
be an isolated case. Upon discovering a genotypic change within a sub-population which 
give rise to fitness enhancing phenotypic traits (under the right developmental 
circumstances), the ecologist appears warranted in expecting a gradual change to the 
phenotypic traits of the general population. Although the generalization is not without 
exception, changes to the whole population do appear to come slower than changes to the 
individual organisms that compose the population. If we did not understand ecology as a 
compositional hierarchy, then it is unclear what would underwrite these expectations. 
Changes to the properties of the whole depend on changes to the properties of the part. 
And that there is such dependence strikes me as an evidential reason for thinking that the 
compositional ecological hierarchy is indeed metaphysically and epistemologically 
significant. The inferences we make about, for example, rates of change, appear to be 
informed by this metaphysical relationship of part-whole dependence. 
 The fourth purported implication involves the relationship between hierarchies, 
causation, and causal mechanisms. Compositional hierarchies, they suggest, imply that 
what goes on at a given level is accomplished by a mechanism at the level below. In 
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support of this, they cite Craver and Bechtel (2007) who argue that mechanisms play a 
central role in making sense of inter-level causal claims. According to Craver and 
Bechtel, levels of mechanisms are a species of compositional, or part-whole relationships, 
and causal relationships only occur intra-level (i.e., within a single mechanistic level).  
To argue against this implication, Potochnik and McGill give examples of cases 
of inter-level causal processes; they argue that causation can be either upward or 
downward. To support the existence of so-called “downward” causation, they cite a 
growing consensus for a move away from “the traditional idea that [the population size of 
an organism] is determined locally through interactions with competitors and predators… 
and toward the idea that global abundance (abundance of a species across its entire 
range), shaped by processes such as the evolution of specialists vs. generalists, is a 
crucial determiner.” (forthcoming, §2.2) They also claim that one cannot explain holistic 
medical problems such as “metabolic syndrome,” (linking heart disease, diabetes, 
obesity, among other conditions) by looking at isolated molecules. These considerations, 
they claim, undermine the idea that change is always mediated by causal mechanisms at 
lower levels, and so, mechanistic mediation cannot provide a reason for thinking the 
ecological hierarchy is metaphysically or epistemologically significant.  
I doubt that many will find these causal considerations compelling, mostly 
because the central example is rather unclear: upward and downward causation is an 
extremely contentious issue, and I am quite skeptical that anything can be inferred until 
the contention is resolved. Potochnik and McGill only hint at some possible examples of 
inter-level causation. And while it might turn out that they are correct, it is not at all clear 
that they are. It is possible that these are not genuine examples of inter-level causation. 
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And so, their examples are insufficient to conclude that this is indeed a problem for the 
significance of ECOHIERARCHY and compositional hierarchies in general. For now, 
how causation works within hierarchical contexts must remain an open question, and as 
such, cannot tell us anything about the metaphysical or epistemological significance of 
hierarchies.  
 Aside from these counterexamples, Potochnik and McGill also complain that 
compositional hierarchies are responsible for the widespread idea that lower level 
theories are more epistemically secure than higher levels, are better supported, and have a 
wider application than higher level theories. These purely epistemic implications, they 
argue, are also not genuine; they do not provide a reason to think that hierarchical 
ecology is epistemically significant.  
I can understand why someone might think that epistemic security of lower levels 
is implied by hierarchies. Quite often we explain the behavior of higher level things by 
analyzing and describing the behaviors of their parts. Nothing Potochnik and McGill say 
gives us reason to doubt this practice. Since the parts reside on different compositional 
levels, compositional levels are then explanatorily significant.  
Indeed, Potochnik and McGill’s survey of the significance of hierarchies is hardly 
exhaustive. Aside from the complexity implication, the rate-of-change heuristic, and the 
prolificacy of downward-looking explanations, there might be other ways in which the 
metaphysical or epistemological significance might be maintained.  
One major obstacle for Potochnik and McGill’s general ambition is that they give 
no good account of what they mean by a hierarchy, compositional or otherwise. Without 
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some account of hierarchies in general, it is extremely difficult to figure out what sorts of 
claims actually are, and are not, genuine implications of compositionally ordered 
hierarchical structures.  
3.3 The Significance of Compositional Hierarchies 
Even without a clear account of hierarchies, there still are a few points to be made in 
favor of hierarchical ecology, to add to those listed in the preceding sub-section. The first 
is the simplest: understanding the structure of the world, or some part thereof, is often 
thought to be a common scientific and philosophical ambition.  
If there is a reason to think the whole of ecology (or some part thereof) is 
structured hierarchically, then articulating that reason counts as an interesting 
contribution to ecological science in its own right; for lack of a better word, its 
significance is intrinsic. And there are such reasons. At the outset we characterized 
ecology as the study of the interactions between the individual and its environment, 
broadly conceived. Since individuals are parts of ecosystems, and ecosystems are an 
environment for the species that reside within them, ecology thus appears to carry a 
compositional burden by its very nature. 
Another point in favor of ECOHIERARCHY is one we have already noted. A 
compositional ordering helps to unify ecology from a patchwork of disconnected sub-
fields which ask different question and employ different methods for answering them, to 
a singular inter-related picture of systemic interactions which integrates well with other 
hierarchical approaches to science. Even if the global unity of science movement has 
been abandoned, a local approach to ecological (and biological) unity might nevertheless 
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be facilitated by the hierarchical approach to ecology. In this regard, hierarchies are 
significant to ecological science. 
Moreover, the compositional approach to hierarchical ecology is significant in 
that it captures and makes clear an important relationship between the individuals being 
ordered within the hierarchy: that, ceteris paribus, when something, say an ecosystem, 
undergoes change, it does not do so independently of changes to the communities and 
abiotic features that help to compose it.  
I cannot help but to agree with Potochnik and McGill that the ecological hierarchy 
is not a supervenience hierarchy, where “being higher than” is interpreted as implying 
“supervenes on”. Nevertheless, changes to wholes generally imply some change to some 
of its parts. To use Potochnik and McGill’s example: the phenotypic properties of the 
platypus do not supervene on its genotypic properties. But still, they do supervene on the 
relative spatial locations of its parts. The platypus cannot have a duck-bill, unless it has 
parts configured into a duck-bill shape. That the compositional hierarchy captures this 
chain of change-dependencies strongly suggests that the compositional hierarchical 
approach to ecology is indeed metaphysically significant, at least insofar as composition 
is metaphysically significant. 
Those resistant to ECOHIERARCHY will no doubt continue to discount both the 
metaphysical and epistemic significance of hierarchies. But I urge them to reconsider. 
The significance of change-dependencies is not only some idle metaphysical feature; it is 
an epistemically significant feature. Within community ecology there is a metric known 
as beta-diversity. Exactly how the metric should be understood is something of a 
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contentious matter (Tuomisto, 2010); but, roughly put, it is a measure of the difference in 
species diversity between ecosystems (or communities) or change of diversity within a 
single ecosystem (or community) over time. When concerned with the beta-diversity of a 
single ecosystem over time, the ecologist pays close attention to the breeding and dying 
(c.f. Ricklefs, 2008b; Whittaker, 2001), and perhaps migration patterns, of organisms 
within the ecosystem of interest.39  
The ecological hierarchy, qua compositional, allows for a generalization of such 
diversity at all levels: generally, we can say that the beta-diversity of something increases 
when there is an increase in the number of different kinds (or “species”) of its parts. For 
example, an ecosystem’s beta-diversity increases when the number of species in its 
component communities increases; whereas the beta-diversity of a community increases 
when the number of species composing the community increases; whereas the beta-
diversity of a population, we can say, increases when the number of different types of 
individual organism increases, given some way of categorizing organisms of a single 
species (e.g., tall-neck giraffes vs. short-neck giraffes) that is relevant to the interests of 
ecology. On such a generalization, we could even talk about the relative beta-diversity of 
different molecules, if it was fitting to do so. In short, ECOHIERARCHY suggests that 
the familiar concept of beta-diversity can be made into a general metric that applies at all 
levels of composition, should we see fit to apply it. That strikes me as a significant 
implication of the standard compositional ordering of the ecological domain. One 
Potochnik and McGill do not consider. 
                                                   
39 Although the beta-diversity metric is typically thought to apply to a region, this is simply a matter of 
prejudice. Beta-diversity can be described relative to any area of interest. The fact that the area of 
ecological interest is often regional is inessential to beta-diversity as a general metric. 
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3.4 Composition vs. Scale 
Potochnik and McGill might retort that this beta-generalization feature is not unique to 
the ECOHIERARCHY. The beta-diversity metric is also commonly associated with a 
scalar (i.e., size-based) approach to ecology; and so, they might see this trend as 
supporting a scalar hierarchy for ecology insofar as it supports a compositional ordering. 
Indeed, they ultimately suggest that scalar orderings provide the right framework for 
ecology (c.f. Potochnik and McGill, forthcoming, and Rueger and McGivern 2010).  
Although sympathy for scalar orderings is widespread throughout ecology, and 
such orderings are thought to be largely coextensive with compositional orderings, (even 
the composition-oriented Allen and Starr 1982, p. 271 claim that hierarchical levels can 
be understood as being associated with some scale), it is not at all clear to me that the 
scalar approach supports a generalization of beta-diversity. 
Moreover, Potochnik and McGill do not address the main problem with pure 
scalar hierarchies: scales of interest can change depending on what is being studied. A 
population of bacteria, for example, can be much smaller than a single elephant. 
Similarly, individuals belonging to a certain species of fungi can grow to be kilometers in 
size. That is larger than some communities, and perhaps even some quaint ecosystems.  
These vast discrepancies in scale are only one reason to complain about using 
scalar orderings as an organizing structure for ecology (and perhaps science in general). 
There are other problems as well. In general, scale is not useful in coming to a clear 
understanding of the different objects of study in ecology, such as ecosystems and 
communities. How does one specify scale such that it captures all and only the 
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ecosystems? What about the communities? That ecosystems are larger than communities 
does not help us understand what an ecosystem is, or what a community is. But notice, by 
understanding ecosystems as being composed of communities plus abiotic features, we 
have both a way of understanding what an ecosystem is, and a way of understanding how 
it relates to communities. Part-of is informative in ways that larger-than is not. By 
understanding ecological organization in terms of parthood, we gain some grasp of each 
thing being ordered. Moreover, such an understanding delivers a stable (i.e., an 
unchanging) hierarchical structure that ecologists can exploit when organizing and 
categorizing elements relevant to the discipline.  
Besides, if ecologists find scale orderings useful, there is nothing stopping them 
from using them. There is no need to see scale and composition as being mutually 
exclusive approaches: parts, after all, are quite typically smaller than their wholes. 
 Before we continue, let us summarize what we have done in this section. We 
began by specifying what Potochik and MCGill take to be the standard view of the 
ecological hierarchy, and we saw that, on the surface, it matches my own 
ECOHIERARCHY analysis. Upon deeper investigation, however, it turns out that their 
conception is incoherent. They claim that the levels in the hierarchy are both nested and 
discrete, which is impossible. Given the understanding of nesting introduced by 
ecologists such as Allen and Starr (1982), ECOHIERARCHY, qua nested, explicitly 
denies the discreteness of levels. 
Next, we saw a list of five purported “implications” of hierarchies: hierarchies 
imply mereological supervenience; hierarchies imply that complexity increases as levels 
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are ascended; hierarchies imply that rates of change slow as levels are ascended; 
hierarchies imply that causation at a level is the result of causal mechanisms at lower 
levels; and hierarchies imply epistemic security for lower level theories and explanations. 
Potochnik and McGill’s counterexamples show that some of these are not genuine 
implications. Nevertheless, we have other reasons to think that compositional hierarchies 
are significant: complexity does increase as ECOHIERARCHY’s levels are ascended, 
rates of change typically do slow as levels are ascended, the structure of ecology is of 
intrinsic significance, compositional hierarchies adequately characterize an important set 
of change-dependencies. Not only is this characterization metaphysically significant, but 
it is epistemologically significant as well, since it permits a generalization of the beta-
diversity metric to apply to all levels.  
Lastly, I listed a number of drawbacks to the scalar approach Potochnik and 
McGill favor instead of compositional hierarchies. Scalar metrics are arbitrary, there are 
vast discrepancies of scale among organisms, and scalar orderings are of limited use 
when it comes to characterizing and individuating the subjects of interest within ecology. 
4.0 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce the notion of an ecological hierarchy, to 
make the notion precise, and to defend the notion from some recent objections. 
Hierarchies, we have seen, are used, and are useful, in theoretical ecology.   
Hierarchies serve two main purposes within ecology. First, hierarchies provide an 
organizing structure for the discipline itself. By organizing the subjects of ecological 
study into levels, we have a way of understanding how various research programs within 
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ecology relate to one another. Each level is associated with its own subjects, theories, and 
research methods, and the hierarchical ordering of these levels corresponds to the way 
human beings perceive nature to be structured.40 Second, the ecological hierarchy gives 
us a way to individuate the subjects of ecological study, making clearer what sorts of 
things are relevant to ecological phenomena, and what sorts of things we can expect to 
figure into ecological explanations. 
This second purpose plays an important role in the ECOHIERARCHY account of 
the ecological hierarchy, as well as our analysis of what it is to be at a level of this 
hierarchy. I argued that the ecological hierarchy is a nested hierarchy ordered by 
composition: nested in that each level contains everything found in the levels below; 
compositionally ordered in that that everything found on any level except the bottommost 
level is composed of things found within the lower levels. 
With this account of the ecological hierarchy in hand, I then sought to defend it 
from recent objections. First, we examined a criticism from Robert Ricklefs which 
suggests that the common “local” understanding of the community level fails to fit into 
the ECOHIERARCHY account featured above. His arguments are not convincing.  
Second, we examined a series of criticisms from Angela Potochnik and Brian 
McGill. They argue that the ecological hierarchy is a “vexed” concept, and is riddled with 
difficulties. For one, they claim that the compositional structure of the ecological 
hierarchy, as standardly conceived by ecologists, exhibits an inner-conflict: they claim 
that there is no nested hierarchy with discrete levels. Although I agree with this claim, I 
argued that it is no slight against ECOHIERARCHY. The discreteness presumption is 
                                                   
40 And perhaps to the way nature really is structured. 
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simply false; discreteness is not part of the conception of the ecological hierarchy as a 
nested. Some hierarchies are discrete; but ECOHIERARCHY is not one of them. Their 
concern is therefore not a reason to reject hierarchical ecology. 
Although the hierarchical approach to ecology is able to withstand the 
aforementioned challenges raised by Ricklefs, Potochnik, and McGill, there is still much 
left to accomplish in order to meet the ambitions laid out in the introductory chapter. We 
have not yet answered the question of hierarchical realism: is hierarchical structure is part 
of the structure of the world, or is it a human invention? We have not yet investigated the 
justification for the multi-level approach to explanation and analysis, nor have we taken 
any steps to investigate the Reductionism vs. Holism debate. And above all, we have not 
yet said exactly what a hierarchy is.  
The remainder of this dissertation involves a close examination of these 
outstanding issues. We will begin with an investigation of the existing general theories of 
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1.0 Introduction 
If anything is evident from the preceding chapter, it is that there are serious confusions 
when it comes to a general understanding of hierarchies. This is not at all surprising. 
Fully developed theories of hierarchies qua hierarchies are hard to come by. 
71 
 
In this chapter, I review some attempts to formulate a general theory of 
hierarchies, grouping them into three categories: idiosyncratic accounts, partial order 
accounts, and strict partial order accounts. The idiosyncratic views come from by Allen 
and Starr, and Roberto Poli. Although I argue against the idiosyncratic views, Poli’s 
approach is useful. I use it to argue that there is a tight connection between hierarchies 
and mereology. The partial order view is attributed to Herbert Simon, and upheld by 
Jackson Webster, Burton Voorhees, and Mario Bunge. I argue that the partial order view 
is too narrow to capture the sense of ‘hierarchy’ actively in use within science and 
philosophy.  
The strict partial order views are attributed to Richard Dawkins, and the 
International Society for Systems Science (ISSS). This strict approach has intuitive merit, 
but it is not without its problems. Aside from being undermotivated, underdeveloped, and 
underexplored, it faces conceptual difficulties. Where the partial-approach is too narrow, 
the strict approach errs by being too general: it admits hierarchies that are clearly not 
hierarchies.  
 What we are left with, in the end, is only a superficial notion of what a hierarchy 
is. It is progress nonetheless. In the next chapter, I show how we can use the superficial 
analysis to develop a robust and well-supported general theory of hierarchies qua 




2.0 Idiosyncratic Theories of Hierarchies 
To arrive at an answer to the question of hierarchical Realism mentioned in the 
introduction, we first need an acceptable account of hierarchies and at least some of their 
properties. As we will see, the idiosyncratic approaches are unsuccessful. We will look at 
two idiosyncratic approaches: the Anti-realist “ecological” account from Allen and Starr, 
as well as the ontological approach of Roberto Poli. 
2.1 The Approach from Ecology 
Ecologists are not shy when it comes to discussions of hierarchies. Recall from the 
introduction that Timothy Allen, writing with Starr (1982) and later with Victoria Ahl 
(1996), is champion of the Anti-realist approach to hierarchies, whereas the biologist and 
ecologist Stanley Salthe (1985) advances a Realist approach. 
Although Allen and Starr’s (1982) work on hierarchies is one of the most well-
known in theoretical ecology, the analysis that they end up with is unclear.  The only 
explicit definition they give comes early on: 
We have defined a hierarchy to be a system… where holons with slow 
behavior are at the top while successively faster behaving holons occur 
lower in the hierarchy. (p. 37) 
There are a number of reasons to reject this definition.41 First, not all hierarchies have 
anything to do with behaviors (consider the hierarchy of pure sets, for example). Second, 
                                                   
41 The term ‘holon’ comes from Koestler (1967). A holon is something that exhibits a mereological duality: 




there is an explicit reference to process-rates (i.e., speed – faster and slower), when not 
all hierarchies are diachronic.42 Third, Allen and Starr do not take into account that 
hierarchies can be inverted – i.e., turned “upside down” – to produce a second hierarchy 
that ranks its levels in reverse order. For example, a hierarchy in which faster is higher 
and slower is lower. Call this, the inversion principle.  
(Inversion Principle) For every hierarchy H, there is a hierarchy H* such that it 
ranks the levels of H in the reverse order. 
The inversion principle is not unique to hierarchies. Given any relation R, (e.g., higher 
than) a converse relation R* can be defined. If R is a sort of ranking (e.g., a hierarchical 
ranking), then R* is simply that ranking, reversed. 
Perhaps the most striking problem with Allen and Starr’s account comes from 
within ecology itself: it contains straightforward counterexamples. Consider the 
hierarchical relationship between communities and their constituent populations. 
Communities are at higher levels than populations, but community-holons (i.e., 
individual communities) do not always exhibit slower behavior than population-holons. 
Suppose, for whatever reason (say, climate change), that the number of invasive insect 
species in a locale sharply increases. Changes in the alpha-diversity of the local 
community (i.e., changes to the number of different species that compose the community) 
then occurs more quickly than the alpha-diversity of any given population (i.e., changes 
to the number of different sub-types within a population) within that community. We thus 
                                                   
42 These appear to be the sorts of claims that lead Potochnik and McGill to raise their concerns regarding 
the appeal to hierarchies within ecology (as discussed in the previous chapter). If their conception of 
hierarchies is informed by the Allen and Starr analysis, it is no wonder that they are skeptical. 
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have a tidy example in which the higher level is changing more rapidly than the lower, 
pace Allen and Starr’s characterization. 
Their characterization, therefore, suffers from a lack of sufficient generality. Not 
only does it conflict with the inversion principle, which follows from the standard 
understanding of ranking relations, it is also subject to straightforward counterexamples 
from within ecology.  
2.2 The Approach from Ontology 
Roberto Poli (2001, Gnoli and Poli 2004, and 2006) also takes seriously the idea of a 
metaphysical hierarchy. He sees a study of hierarchies as part of a study in ontology, on 
par with mereology. His approach differs from the ecologist’s in that it shifts the central 
notion from hierarchy, to level. 
Levels, for Poli, have something to do with relationships between categories. He 
tells us that a level is simply a collection (or “complex”) of categories that is bound and 
directed in the appropriate way to other groups of categories. (2001; 2006; Gnoli and Poli 
2004, p. 156) 
Poli’s work on levels raises an important issue: what is the relationship between 
hierarchies, levels, and mereology? Are levels parts of hierarchies? Are those things 
found within each level parts of the levels? Poli rejects this mereological approach, but I 
do not find Poli’s case convincing. I offer a positive argument for thinking that levels are 
indeed parts of hierarchies. 
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2.2.1 Levels: Objects or Categories? 
Although Poli is one of the few philosophers who voices complaint that there is no good 
definition of ‘level’ or ‘hierarchy’ on offer (2004), he does not offer a precise definition 
of these terms. He is more interested in drawing a distinction between the categorical 
approach to levels and the object-approach, and then defending the former.  
The distinction is easily stated: Poli’s categorical approach takes levels to be 
categories, which he compares to the metaphysics of universals, rather than the strict 
mathematical sense of Category Theory. The object-approach, on the other hand, takes 
levels to be particular objects, constituted by a collection of things residing at that level. 
Some levels are of a higher ‘granularity’ than others on Poli’s characterization of the 
object view.   
He argues against the object-approach in two ways: First, he claims it is an 
ideological legacy from positivism with no substantial support,43 and then argues that 
since the categorical approach is more general, it can subsume the positivist picture and 
do much more besides: it can be used to model what he calls ‘tangled’ hierarchies,44 as 
opposed to mere linear hierarchies (2001 p. 266).  
Second, he argues that the object-approach is tied up with mereology – the theory 
of parts and wholes – and this “makes it impossible to discover whether a properly 
                                                   
43 I must confess that I do not understand his reference to positivism. 
 
44 In mathematics, ‘tangled hierarchy’ is an idiom that refers to a sort of loop. The idiom is a substantial 
departure from the standard understanding of hierarchies. Higher than is generally taken to be either 
asymmetric or anti-symmetric; either way, a hierarchical ordering of levels is in no way loopy. What might 
be loopy, however, is the hierarchical ordering of the levels contents.   
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developed theory of levels, as distinct from the theory of wholes and their parts, has 
something to add to our understanding of reality.” (2004, p. 156)  
Poli’s dismissal of mereology is an important aspect of his view. In his defense of 
the categorical approach, Poli claims that levels are not parts of objects. He writes, 
In order to mark as clearly as possible the difference between the theory of 
wholes and the theory of levels, let us boldly claim that levels are internal 
to items but not as their parts… [this is] the main principle of the theory 
of levels (as different from the theory of wholes and their parts). Claiming 
that levels are not parts means that levels are not elements of entities.  
(2004, p. 156)  
Although the connection is not obvious, Poli concludes from this that the categorical 
approach is the best way to go. Presumably, he thinks that since levels are not parts of 
entities, but are, in some other sense, related to those entities, the only other alternative is 
to say that they are categories, which we are to understand as universals or classes. 
2.2.2 Dissolving the Dilemma: Levels Can Be Both 
Although Poli presents an interesting picture of the metaphysics of levels, his arguments 
are not very convincing. The dilemma between the categorical and object-based 
approaches is a false one: they are not mutually exclusive.  
Consider the hierarchy of natural numbers. In such a hierarchy, we are clearly 
ranking individual numbers, rather than classes or universals. Although Poli might want 
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to say that we are really ranking unit-classes of numbers, there is no argument (that I 
know of) for that claim. 
On the other hand, we should be compelled to agree with Poli that there are 
hierarchies in which the levels are categories. Let S be the category of ecosystems and let 
M be the category of molecules. Is there any sense denying that there can be a hierarchy 
in which M is higher than S? I think not. Levels can be categories. Levels can be objects. 
There is no dilemma for us to confront. 
Indeed, it is evident that in a hierarchical analysis (metaphysical or otherwise) 
levels can be whatever you want. Whether levels are particulars, objects, categories, 
groups, sets, universals, or classes (including equivalence classes) depends on the intent 
and purpose of the hierarchical analyst, and what she sees as being appropriate to 
quantify over and to put into hierarchical order. When developing a general theory of 
hierarchies qua hierarchies, then, we must be sure to avoid favoring one horn of Poli’s 
dilemma over the other.  
2.2.3 Are Levels Parts of Hierarchies?  
The relationship between hierarchies and mereology is less than clear. Poli’s view on this 
matter, which we quoted in the previous section, is in direct opposition to that of Herbert 
Simon, whose ideas serve as a foundation for much of the subsequent discussion on 
hierarchies in the philosophy of ecology. Simon notes that by ‘hierarchy’, he means a 
certain sort of “partitioning in conjunction with the relations that hold among its parts.” 
(1962, p. 2 n.6, emphasis added). In other words, levels, for Simon, are parts of 
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hierarchies that have a special higher than relationship holding between them. Poli, as we 
have seen, disagrees. He claims that levels are not parts of the things that have them.  
One drawback to Poli’s view is that he does not offer a positive account of the 
relation holding between levels and the hierarchies that have them; the relationship is left 
mysterious. This drawback is not as innocent as it might seem. It, in fact, leads to the 
following argument in favor of Simon’s view.   
Without claiming outright that levels are parts of hierarchies, let us take for 
granted that hierarchies consist (in some sense of ‘consist’ that does not imply parthood) 
only of ordered levels, the contents of those levels, and combinations thereof.45 An 
account of hierarchies which takes hierarchies to consist in things other than what is 
listed here faces a more parsimonious competing account without these extra 
commitments. 
With that in mind, let us now consider Poli’s claim. If levels are not parts of 
hierarchies, what, then, are its parts? If hierarchies only have improper parts, then 
hierarchies are mereologically simple (i.e., atomic). But hierarchies are not 
mereologically simple. An organizational hierarchy for an international conglomerate, for 
example, is clearly quite complex: it is not uncommon for corporate and government 
mandates to break large organizations into smaller pieces. Upon doing so, the 
organizational hierarchy breaks into pieces as well. Insofar as pieces are parts, and I take 
it for granted that they are, hierarchies are then not mereologically simple. Hierarchies, 
therefore, have proper parts. 
                                                   




Working under the assumption that levels are not parts of hierarchies, and that 
hierarchies consist only in levels and their contents (or combinations thereof), it follows 
that hierarchies either have the contents of levels as parts, or combinations thereof. If it 
were to have any other parts aside from these, then hierarchies would consist in more 
than what we would expect. Parsimony does not favor such a suggestion. 
Under the present assumption, note that combinations of levels cannot be 
considered parts of hierarchies: if combinations of levels are parts of hierarchies, then so 
are levels: since combinations of levels are parts of hierarchies, and individual levels are 
parts of combinations of levels, it follows from the transitivity of parthood that levels are 
parts of hierarchies, which runs contrary to our assumption. So, the proper parts of 
hierarchies, under our assumption, must either be the contents of levels or combinations 
of those contents (or both).  
Notice that the same sort of reasoning holds with respect to combinations of 
contents; if combinations of contents are parts of hierarchies, and the contents of levels 
are part of the combinations of those contents, then by the transitivity of parthood, we can 
straightforwardly infer that the contents of levels are parts of hierarchies. Therefore 
(closing our open assumption), if levels are not parts of hierarchies, then the contents of 
those levels are parts of hierarchies. 
But here we arrive at a reason to reject Poli’s claim in favor of Simon’s. If those 
contents, x1…xn of a hierarchy’s levels are appropriately combined such that those 
combinations can be arranged as being higher than each other, then there is no point in 
positing Poli’s metaphysically mysterious “levels” to begin with: all reference to levels 
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can be replaced with reference to their combined contents. In other words, to say that 
levels are not parts of hierarchies makes the appeal to levels in hierarchies superfluous: if 
levels are not parts of hierarchies, then an ordering of their collected contents, which are 
proper parts of the hierarchy, suffices to produce a hierarchical arrangement without 
positing any of what Poli calls “levels.”  
Thus, insofar as one posits levels at all, one should take them to be nothing more 
than combinations of their contents. To suggest otherwise is to forsake parsimony; it is to 
add extra metaphysical or theoretical content when it is not called for. An adequate 
theory of levels and hierarchies, therefore, takes levels to be parts of hierarchies, insofar 
as one mentions levels at all.46 
2.2.4 Levels of Containment 
The argument from parsimony might raise worries about one of the central arguments 
from the preceding chapter. ECOHIERARCHY, recall, was formulated and defended 
using the “nesting” argument from Allen and Starr. That argument appears to presume 
that the correct way of thinking about the relationship between hierarchies, their levels, 
and the contents of those levels involves the notion of containment: hierarchies contain 
levels which contain other things. The argument from parsimony implies otherwise: it 
implies that the relationship is one of parthood, and containment is not parthood. A 
toolbox, for example, contains tools, but is not composed of them.  
                                                   
46 Note, however, that we do not want to say that levels must be collections (or combinations) of their 
contents. We have been understanding collections as those singular things with proper parts: those things 
that are being collected. To suggest that levels must be collection thus rules out the possibility of a 
hierarchy of mereological atoms, ordered by velocity, acceleration, distance-from-my-left-foot, or some 
other property. The possibility of such hierarchies should not be ruled out a priori: levels can be collections 




The intuition that hierarchies contain their levels, which, in turn, contain their 
contents is easily retained under the mereological approach. Although containment is not 
generally a sort of parthood, parthood is nevertheless a sort of containment. Allen and 
Starr’s argument, recall, relies on the coherence of ‘contains-as-part’, which is not 
something we have good reason to question. The worry, then, is not serious.47  
That there is an implicative difference between containment and parthood might 
be used to raise a different problem for the parsimony argument. If there is a difference 
between containment and parthood, and the two approaches to understanding the 
relationship between hierarchies, levels, and their contents, are equally parsimonious, 
then it might appear that we have no reason to favor the mereological approach over the 
containment approach. Poli’s opposition to Simon might then be seen as a disagreement 
over whether levels are containers or whether levels are parts. Parsimony, one might 
argue, favors neither, for it is a virtue possessed by both approaches.  
Here I protest. The mereological “levels-as-parts” approach is more parsimonious 
that the pure containment view. If hierarchies contain levels which contain their contents, 
but those levels and those contents are not parts of hierarchies or levels, there must then 
be a boundary which separates the contained from the uncontained. If the levels-as-
containers approach were to provide a foundation for a general account of hierarchies, 
then a general account of hierarchical boundaries must be provided. Without such an 
                                                   
47 Allen and Starr’s argument is easily restated in mereological terms. Given any compositional hierarchy 
(e.g., the ecological hierarchy), if L is a level of that hierarchy, and x is part of that level, then any part of x 
is also a part of L. In a compositional hierarchy where wholes are ranked higher than their parts, the parts 
of lower levels are thus also parts of higher levels, assuming parthood is transitive. Nestedness, then, is a 





account, the levels-as-containers approach would remain incomplete. Try as I might, I 
cannot make good sense of such a boundary. But even if I could, the account of these 
hierarchical boundaries would be a needless complication. Insofar as we are committed to 
parthood, that is all we need for a robust theory of the relationship between hierarchies, 
levels, and their contents. There is no need to posit hierarchical boundaries on the 
mereological approach; what separates the contained from the uncontained is that the 
former are parts, whereas the latter are not.  
2.2.5 Levels, Elements, and Parts of Classes 
Another way to defend Poli from the parsimony-based argument is to suggest that there is 
another sense of ‘consist’ and ‘combine’ that has nothing to do with parthood. In many 
philosophical circles, it has become standard to think that there are two entirely different 
ways to make one thing out of many: the one can be mereologically composed of the 
many, in the sense that it has those many things as its parts, or, the one can be a set (or 
class) of the many, in the sense that it has the many as its members. Membership, 
according to the initiates of these circles, is not parthood. David Lewis (1991), for 
example, uses the distinction as a basis from which to argue that the parts of a set are all 
and only its subsets. 
Perhaps, then, the relationship between hierarchies and their levels is one of set-
membership rather than parthood. If that is indeed what Poli has in mind,48 then he has a 
reply to the above parsimony-based argument: organizational hierarchies are indeed 
                                                   
48 I do not think this is what Poli has in mind; for he also claims that levels are not elements. Elementhood, 
as it is commonly understood, is nothing other than the set-membership relation. Even so, the set-theoretic 




complex, and they might indeed have parts, but that does not mean that levels are their 
parts. If hierarchies are sets or classes, then the charge of mereological atomicity can be 
avoided by pointing out that the corporate hierarchy does have proper-parts: the subsets 
of its levels. Yet, those subsets are not themselves (necessarily) levels of the hierarchy. 
Levels are organizational departments; they are not (necessarily) sets of departments. 
 Of course, such a response is convincing only insofar as we can agree that the 
members of a set are, in general, not to be considered parts of it. Outside of the 
aforementioned philosophical circles, it is common for the uninitiated to intuit that 
members are indeed parts of sets. It is doubtful that many speakers of English would 
object to the claim that the set of all American presidents has Richard Nixon as part, or 
that fifty-two playing cards strewn about the floor are all parts of the set of those playing 
cards. 
Of course, these are only the intuitions of the uninitiated. Intuitions are not 
arguments. In fact, it is a well-known line of argument that separates the initiated from 
the uninitiated to begin with. Its most elegant presentation comes from David Lewis: 
A member of a member of something is not, in general, a member of it; 
whereas a part of a part of something is always a part of it. Therefore, we 
learn not to identify membership with the relation of part to whole. (1991, 
p. 3) 
Such simple arguments are a treat for philosophers. But in this case the simplicity is 
deceptive. The argument is invalid. 
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 The problem is in the definite description “the relationship of part to whole”; 
Lewis neglects to acknowledge that the part to whole relationship comes in different 
varieties: direct-parts, functional-parts, and spatial-parts are all sorts of part to whole 
relations, and all of them are easily defined using the same primitive mereological notion 
of parthood. Not all of these varieties possess the same formal properties of primitive-
parthood, however. Consider direct-parthood: x is a direct-part of y iff x is a part of y and 
there is no z such that x is a proper part of z and z is a proper part of y. Clearly, direct-
parthood is intransitive: if x is a direct-part of z, and z is a direct-part of y, then it follows 
from the definition of direct-parthood that x is not a direct-part of y. Nevertheless, direct-
parthood is a sort of part to whole relation, despite its intransitivity. 
Let us then consider an analogue of Lewis’ argument, with ‘direct-part’ taking the 
place of set-membership: a direct-part of a direct-part of something is not, in general, a 
direct-part of it; whereas a part of a part of something is always part of it. Therefore, we 
learn not to identify direct-parthood with the relation of part to whole.  
Clearly this argument is invalid. The premises are as evident as in Lewis’ original 
argument, but the conclusion – there is exactly one relation of part to whole and it is not 
identical to direct-parthood – is plainly false. Direct-parthood is surely a relation of part 
to whole; one such relation among others.49 Since Lewis’ argument shares the same 
logical form as the invalid argument (membership simply takes the place of direct-
parthood), it too is therefore invalid. 
                                                   
49 Some might see this claim as being inconsistent with our endorsement of mereological monism in the 
introductory chapter. Rest assured, for there is no inconsistency here. Mereological monism does not forbid 
other, more restricted, varieties of parthood, i.e., -parthood; it only requires that these -parts obtain their 
part-ness by virtue of being parts in the unrestricted sense captured by classical mereology (or whatever 




Where does this leave Poli and Lewis? It leaves them without a good reason to 
think that members of sets are not parts of sets.50 In Lewis’ case, this undermines the 
motivation for his main conclusion (viz., that the parts of a class are all and only its 
subclasses) by undermining his justification for his first premise: 
First Thesis: One class is a part of another iff the first is a subclass of the second. 
(1991, p. 4) 
 Although Lewis is able to convincingly argue for one direction of this biconditional – 
that if S is a subclass of C, then S is a part of C – he does little to motivate the other 
direction. This is unfortunate. The argumentative gap, as slight as it is, opens a way to 
undermine Lewis’ project before it begins. Where C and D are (non-null) classes, and 
where D = {C, 1}, and C ≠ {1},  if it turns out that members are parts of sets, then we 
have a counterexample to the First Thesis: we have a case in which one class, C, is a 
member-part of D, but is not a subclass of D. The only argument Lewis (1991) offers 
against this sort of counterexample is his transitivity-argument against the idea that 
members are parts of sets. That argument is invalid. If there are positive reasons for 
thinking that members are parts of sets, then we have reason to reject his main thesis, 
undermining much of his mereologically grounded set-theory. 
                                                   
50 Lewis’ second reason for thinking that a set’s members are not its parts is undermined by the same 
counterexample as his transitivity argument. The second argument (1991, p. 5) is that a whole can be 
exhaustively divided into parts in many different ways (e.g., the sum of all cats can be exhaustively divided 
into cats, cat-parts, or microphysical particles), whereas a set does not divide exhaustively into its members 
in the same number of ways; so, members, in general, are not parts of sets (whereas subsets are parts, Lewis 
suggests, since their exhaustive division matches that of the sum). But notice, there is a mismatch between 
the number of ways a whole can be exhaustively divided into its parts and the number of ways it can be 
exhaustively divided into its direct parts. There are far less of the latter than there are the former. Since we 
cannot validly conclude from this mismatch that direct-parts are not parts, we cannot validly conclude that 




 There are at least two reasons for thinking that members are, in fact, parts of sets; 
the first is, ironically, an analogue of Lewis’ argument for taking subsets to be parts of 
sets: it conforms to common speech. As Lewis writes, it seems  
natural to say that the class of women is part of the class of human beings, 
the class of even numbers is part of the class of natural numbers, and so 
on. Likewise it seems natural to say that a hyperbola has two separate 
parts – and not to take that back when we go on to say that the hyperbola 
is a class of x-y pairs… a standard word for ‘subset’ is “Teilmenge’, 
literally, ‘part-set’. (1991, pp. 4-5) 
He notes that there are two explanations for this conformity to common speech. First, the 
straightforward explanation: we speak as if subsets are parts of sets because they really 
are parts of sets. Second, the “devious” explanation: we speak in this way because there 
is an analogy of formal character between the subset relation and the primitive-parthood 
relation; that is, they have the same formal properties. Although Lewis does not say it, we 
can rule out the devious explanation. The idea that subsets are parts of sets is intuitive 
without considering the respective formal characters of parthood and membership. The 
intuition arises straightforwardly upon realizing that combining (or taking the union of) 
the set {1,2} with the set {3} gives us the set {1,2,3}, and that {1,2} and {3} are both 
subsets of {1,2,3}. Learning these two basic facts about set-theory is enough for anyone 




In fact, Lewis’ argument can be used against him: an analogous consideration 
holds for membership. It is common to hear people say that a member of a committee is 
part of the committee, or a member of a species is part of that species, despite that the 
usage of ‘part’ in this case is intransitive. Hands are parts of committee members and 
species members, but hands are not often taken to be parts of committees or species. Such 
usage suggests that membership implies parthood, even if it is not the same as primitive-
parthood. Membership, then, is simply a special type of parthood: a restricted type of -
parthood.  
That these cases of membership do not make explicit reference to sets is no reason 
to worry. In general, sets are defined to be (sorts of) collections of objects; and, in 
general, we commonly say that collections have parts. Picasso’s paintings, for example, 
are parts of art collections. Moreover, notice that the usage of ‘part’ in these sorts of cases 
is not transitive. Although Picasso’s paintings are parts of art collections, we do not say 
that the oddly placed eye and nose in any given Picasso painting is a part of one of those 
collections. There is, then, at least one respect in which a sort of parthood relation 
matches the formal character of the membership relation: intransitivity.51  
Also consider Lewis’ example of the hyperbola as a class of x, y pairs. Not only 
do we consider the left and right halves to be parts of the hyperbola, there is also the 
intuition that each point on the hyperbola is a part of it. Since these points are simply x, y 
pairs, which are members of the hyperbola (viz., the hyperbola-class), if we agree with 
                                                   
51 On a related note, if one thinks that a member of a set is some of that set, then the argument given in 
favor of mereological monism can be reapplied here: if ‘parthood’ is simply the name we give to the some 
of relation as it applies to wholes, and we agree that a set is a kind of whole, and that the elements or 
members of that set are some of that whole, then it straightforwardly follows that elements are parts of sets.  
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Lewis that common usage supports the idea that subsets are parts of sets, then it also 
supports the idea that sets have their members as parts.  
Intuition and common usage, then, suggests that members are parts of sets. Why 
is that? There are two competing explanations: the devious explanation according to 
which the intuition arises because of an analogy of formal character, and the 
straightforward explanation that it arises because members really are a sort of part. In 
this case, the devious explanation can be ruled out entirely. Recall that the intuition that 
members are parts of sets, according to Lewis, is to be rejected on the grounds of formal 
character. Members of sets, then, should be taken to be parts of those sets; even if 
membership is not identical to primitive-parthood. 
To summarize: insofar as we are convinced that subsets are parts of sets on the 
basis of intuition and common speech, we should then be equally convinced that 
members of a set are parts of it as well. What convinces Lewis, and others, that set-
membership is not a sort of parthood is the difference in the formal properties of 
membership and primitive-parthood. But this difference is irrelevant. There are different 
varieties of parthood, all of which are defined on primative-parthood.52 And so, Lewis is 
correct that membership is not identical to primitive-parthood, but our intuitions are 
nevertheless retained under the notion of membership-parthood, or -parthood, which, 
like direct-parthood, is generally intransitive. 
Those still attached to Lewis’ idea might respond that their intuitions are not as 
strong in the case of membership. Let us then buttress these intuitions with second 
                                                   
52 That is, assuming the doctrine of mereological monism: if there is only one sort of parthood that applies 
across all ontological categories, then all other varieties of parts, i.e., -parts, are only parts by virtue of 
being primitive parts. 
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argument: the argument from explanatory economy. There is clearly a difference between 
the following two sets A = {1,2} and B= {2}. Why is there a difference? The answer is 
straightforward: 1 is a member of A but not B. But now consider the two sets A* = 
{{1,2}} and B* = {{2}}. Our previous answer does not apply in this case since 1 is not a 
member of A*. Although we can introduce the member of a member of relation to explain 
the difference, there is a simpler solution: we can say the difference is a difference in 
parts: 1 is a part of A* but not B*. Notice that the simpler solution maintains its 
simplicity, regardless of how many set-braces we add. Consider A** = {{{{1,2}}}} and 
B** = {{{{2}}}}. To explain the difference in terms of membership requires an 
additional ‘… a member of’ for each additional pair of braces. If members are parts, 
nothing whatsoever needs to be added; the same answer holds no matter how deep the 
sets are embedded. 
There are, of course, other possible explanations. To explain the difference 
between A** and B** in terms of non-mereological containment might seem to provide a 
solution as simple as the suggested appeal to parthood, while avoiding a commitment to 
the idea that members are parts of sets. Note, however, that taking sets to be containers 
suffers from the same explanatory drawback noted earlier: if sets contain their members, 
but not as parts, then we must ask: what is the boundary that separates the contained from 
the uncontained? It is certainly not the set-braces themselves: they are merely bits of 
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useful syntax, designating no set-theoretic entity in particular.53 Non-mereological 
containment, then, does not appear to be a viable option.54 
Sets, we should then conclude, appear to have at least two different sorts of parts: 
their subsets and their members.55 There is no reason to be alarmed or concerned by this. 
The conceptual foundations of mathematics remain unchanged: membership is still 
primitive, and subset is defined as it normally is. Working mathematicians can continue 
to go about their business in whichever manner they see fit. Only philosophers who hope 
for a Lewisian foundation for set-theory have any reason to be concerned: subset 
continues to imply part, but pace Lewis, the converse does not hold.  
Although the main thesis of this section, that members are parts of sets pace 
Lewis, might be cause for philosophic concern, this is not the forum to explore them. 
They must be left aside as a direction for future research. At this point, it becomes 
prudent to return to the main issue at hand: hierarchies and their levels. 
                                                   
53 Moreover, we cannot say that the empty-set provides the boundary; for if we say that the empty set, {}, 
provides the containing boundary, then the empty set loses its distinctive character. It is no longer empty. 
 
54 One might think to avoid the appeal to parthood by appealing instead to the transitive-closure of 
elementhood on each set. But the explanation obtained by doing so is hardly informative: to explain the 
difference between {{{1,2}}} and {{{2}}} as a difference in their respective transitive-closures, R and R’, 
leaves us to wonder what the difference between R and R’ is; R and R’, after all, are both sets. Notice that 
the mereological explanation is straightforward: R and R’ are different for the same reason {{{1,2}}} and 
{{{2}}} are; they have different parts. 
 
55 I say ‘at least’ since sets seem to have parts other than their members or subsets. Consider the set 
{{{1,2},3},4}. Intuitively, 2 is part of this set, but it is neither a member nor a subset of it. To explain this 
intuition by pointing out that 2 is a member of a member of a member of the set only serves to reinforce the 




2.2.6 Being “at” a Level 
Even if we take for granted that levels are parts of hierarchies, this tells us nothing of the 
relationship levels bear to their contents.56 The use of ‘contents’, however, is suggestive. 
It suggests that to be in, or “at”, a level is to be contained within that level. But what sort 
of containment? There are two possibilities: mereological containment (i.e., contains-as-
part) or non-mereological containment. 
There are two reasons that favor mereological containment as general approach to 
being at a level. One is negative; the other, positive. The negative argument is familiar. If 
levels contain their contents, but not as parts, then what is the boundary which separates 
the contained from the uncontained? It is implausible that there is an answer to this 
question that holds generally across all particular instances of hierarchies. In some 
instances we might specify spatial boundaries. But such a specification fails to provide a 
general analysis of hierarchies: some level-boundaries might not be spatial at all. 
Consider, for example, the hierarchy of pure sets, or Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs. 
Neither of these well-known hierarchies have anything to do with spatial containment.  
Other varieties of non-mereological containment face exactly the same concern. 
Since we are investigating the notion of a hierarchy as a univocal notion, a general 
answer to the separation-question is needed. If there is no general answer, then the notion 
of a hierarchy is fractured into many different notions. Such fracturing is a detriment to 
hierarchical science. If we must clarify what we mean by ‘hierarchy’ each and every time 
we use the term, then the label is useless: hierarchies become platitudes without 
                                                   
56 Although the claim ‘contents are parts of levels’ was used to argue that levels are parts of hierarchies, 
that claim only appears within the scope of an assumption, and as the consequent of a conditional. In this 
section, my goal is to convince the reader of its truth, simpliciter. 
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substance. But that is a counterintuitive prospect. It certainly seems that our various 
references to hierarchies involve the application of a single general concept. Without a 
good reason to think otherwise, casting suspicion on the univocality of ‘hierarchy’ is not 
warranted.  
That is the negative argument. Let us now take up the positive argument that 
being “at” a level, in the most general sense, means part. The argument, once again, 
involves considerations of parsimony. The argument is this: if those things “at” levels 
were not parts of those levels, then levels would be a needless complication. It would be 
more straightforward for us to give a hierarchy without “levels” at all, simply by ranking 
the collections of those things that are “at” each level as being higher or lower, leaving 
their mereologically detached levels behind.  
That is, even if the relationship between levels and their contents is non-
mereological, a prior commitment to mereology (revealed by one’s use of ‘part’ in 
regular or scientific discourse) commits us to a collection of those contents. Insofar as the 
levels are ranked as higher or lower, the mereological collections of those contents are 
also ranked as higher or lower than one another.57 Committing oneself to the non-
mereological interpretation does not release one’s commitment to a competing 
mereological interpretation. But the extra commitment is unnecessary. Since we are 
committed to a mereological interpretation on both the mereological and non-
                                                   
57 Since the contents of each level are “at” that level, there is a mapping from those contents to those 
ordered levels. Since there is such a mapping, and since the collections of things “at” each level are just 
those things taken as one whole, there is, for each level, a mapping from that level to exactly one of those 
collections such that the mapping preserves the original ranking. Therefore, insofar as the levels are ranked 
as higher or lower, the collections themselves have the same ranking. They too are ranked as higher or 




mereological interpretations of being “at” a level, the non-merelogical interpretation is 
the one to avoid. 
In simpler terms, if those things “at” each level are not parts of it, then there is 
good reason to drop levels altogether. It is simpler for us to take all the things that we say 
are “at” each level, collect them together mereologically, and rank those collections using 
higher and lower. Since these odd and detached things we have so-far been calling levels 
have become superfluous, they can be dropped from the hierarchical framework 
altogether, releasing the term ‘level’ from its hitherto semantic baggage. This leaves us 
with ordered collections of things that were formerly “at” these, now non-existent, levels. 
What shall we call these ordered collections? They are ordered as being higher or lower, 
so why not call them levels? After all, there is a vacancy in the denotation of the term; the 
previous tenant has, just moments ago, been evicted. The term seems fitting, so let us put 
it to use: insofar as one mentions levels at all, we can thus conclude that “x’s being at a 
level y” (i.e., x’s being a part of collection y) implies that x is part of y. If we do not 
accept the implication, then we retreat to a sense of ‘level’ that is inessential, unimportant 
and uninteresting. 
To summarize, there are two reasons to think that those things “at” each level are 
part of that level. One is negative, the other positive. The negative: the non-mereological 
approach to being “at” at level is fundamentally mysterious; the mereological approach is 
not. The positive: we are committed to a mereological approach to being at a level in any 
case, whereas we are not committed to a non-mereological approach at all; to respect 
parsimony, we drop the excess commitment, leaving us with the mereological approach. 
Something’s being “at” a level thus implies that it is a part of that level. 
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To resist this line of argument, one might suggest that it rests on the observation 
that the term ‘contents’ is commonly used to describe the relationship between levels and 
those things that are “at” those levels. It might be objected that this observation does not 
expose a deep understanding of the relationship itself, but only exposes the most common 
methodological choice. There are other approaches to understanding the relationship 
between levels and their “contents” aside from literal containment.  
One might, for example, simply take “at” to designate the general relationship of 
association; that is, being “at” a level is to be associated with that level, and nothing 
more. A univocal account of being “at” a level can be given using the relationship of 
general association, which does not imply parthood. Being at a certain mailing address, 
for example, does not imply that one is part of that address.  
Note, however, that it is not my ambition to give a semantic analysis of “is at” in 
the most general sense; what it is to be “at” a physical address is beyond the present 
concern. The goal in this section is to provide a substantive understanding of the 
relationship between a level and those things “at” that level. To understand this 
relationship as one of general association is not substantive. It is trivial. One purpose of 
giving a substantive account of hierarchies is to resolve the mysterious sense of 
“association” that levels bear to their contents.  
The aforementioned argument from parsimony delivers such a resolution. 
Regardless of the account of “is at” we favor, any hierarchy that falls under that account, 
by virtue of our prior commitment to parthood, implies a mereological account anyway. 
Those with a preference for minimizing one’s commitments should therefore favor a 
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mereological account of being at a level over any others. To fly in the face in parsimony 
here is ill advised: since a mereological account of “is at” is unavoidable, as was argued 
above, insisting on a second, non-mereological, understanding of being “at” a level is 
ruinous to a univocal account of hierarchies. It will not do to leave “is at” mysterious; and 
since every non-mereological way of resolving ‘is at’ implies a competing mereological 
resolution, to insist on a non-mereological understanding is to introduce another sense of 
‘hierarchy’ altogether.  
One might also object that even if we grant that the contents of levels are parts of 
those levels, there are clearly contexts in which we do not want to say that a part of a 
level counts (in that context) as being “at” that level. For example, consider a three-level 
hierarchy of Batman’s bat-mobile, where the top level is the car level, the middle level is 
the engine level, and the lowest level is the piston level. Since pistons are not engines, it 
appears to follow that the pistons are not “at” the engine level; yet, pistons are parts of 
that level, qua parts of the engine, which, we have argued, is a part of the engine level. 
Since parthood is transitive, it appears that parthood does not imply “is at” in all contexts. 
In making such an objection, one must be careful not to presume that the piston 
level is restricted to pistons. Level specifications are guides to what can be found “at” 
that level, but they are not generally restrictive. That something is not a piston does not, 
on its own, imply that it is not at the piston level. Consider the place of teeth in the 
ecological hierarchy, for example. Teeth are not ecosystems, communities, populations, 
organisms, organ-systems, tissues, cells, molecules, or atoms. If level-specifications were 
generally restrictive, in the sense that they imply restrictions to the sorts of things that are 
“at” levels, then teeth would reside outside the hierarchy entirely. Yet, teeth are objects of 
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interest to evolutionary ecologists, and are therefore to be included in the hierarchy of 
ecological interests.  Level-specifications, therefore, are not restrictive as one might 
presume. 
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that there are contexts in which some parts 
of levels do not count as being “at” that level in that context. Such an acknowledgement 
can fortunately be reconciled with the mereological account of being at a level. The 
reconciliation comes with a simple qualification: being part of a level suffices to be “at” 
that level in the most general unrestricted sense. Although there are contexts in which we 
want a narrower reading of ‘is at’ that filters-out some of the uninteresting parts of the 
level in question, all this tells us is that ‘is at’ is subject to contextual manipulation. When 
one removes the contextual filter from our three-level automotive hierarchy, a more 
general hierarchy appears: one that includes pistons at the engine level, regardless of the 
interests of the hierarchical analyst. In short: if the analyst is not interested in the pistons 
at the engine level, she is free to ignore them. By doing so, she has introduced a new 
sense of ‘is at’, one that narrows down the inventory of a level’s parts by simple fiat. It 
has already been argued that the contents of levels are its parts, the choice of which part 
counts, in the context of interest, as being “at” that level is up to the analyst. 
To help us understand what the hierarchical analyst is doing with these parts-by-
fiat, consider an analogous example. Suppose Bob is part of a hockey team but is, in 
games, relegated to the bench. Bob never actually plays. But that does not prevent us 
from (correctly) claiming that that the team is playing, while the game is in progress. 
During the game, our interest is only in the parts of the team that are actually on the ice. 
We do not deny that Bob is part of the team; he is merely an uninteresting part: a part that 
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we do not care about in the context of the game, either because of an injury, streak of bad 
luck, or a general lack of talent. In other words, we are, by contextual-fiat, ignoring Bob. 
We do not deny that Bob is part of (or “is on”) the team, in general; it is only something 
we deny in the context of the game, since Bob does not fall within the scope of our 
present interest. Being at a level, in this regard, is no different than being on the team. 
What counts as being at a level, or being on the team, in any given context is restricted by 
fiat, as determined by our interests. In short, when specifying an account of what it is to 
be “at” a level in the most general and unrestricted sense, it suffices to think of “is at” as 
“is part of”. Restrictions as to what counts as being at a level are later issued by 
contextual fiat.  
The theory of hierarchies found within ontology, then, is a helpful foil in coming 
to an understanding of hierarchies qua hierarchies. By challenging Poli’s claim that 
hierarchy theories should be detached from mereology, we have narrowed our candidates 
for ‘is at’ to only a few options: to be at a level might mean to be part of it, a member of 
it, a subset of it, to be non-mereologically contained within it, or being “at” a level might 
be taken as primitive. Taking “at” to be primitive is unhelpful in coming to a substantive 
account of hierarchies qua hierarchies, since the relation between levels and their 
contents remains mysterious. To take it to designate a sort of non-mereological 
containment implies a container – a boundary. Without a general account of these 
boundaries, the containment view does not provide an adequate understanding.  
Following David Lewis (1991), it was noted that inclusion is a sort of parthood. 
This leaves us with two plausible options: to be “at” a level is either to be part of it, or to 
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be a member of it. Arguing, pace Lewis, that membership is a sort of parthood, we are 
left with only one plausible options: parthood.  
Even if one discovers a good reason to reject the idea that members are parts of 
sets, there is an independent reason to think that being “at” a level is not a sort of 
membership. Although ‘is at’ was introduced in the first chapter as a synonym for ‘is in’, 
and it is often taken for granted that members of sets are, in some sense, in those sets, the 
formal properties of set-membership are not favorable to an account of “is in” with 
respect to hierarchies. Knowing that an individual is “in” a level of hierarchy H suffices 
for us to know that the individual is “in” H. That is, ‘is in’ is a transitive relation, whereas 
set-membership is not. Set-membership, therefore, does not provide an acceptable 
account of being in a hierarchy.   
At this point, I hope to have convinced the reader that the existing idiosyncratic 
and ontological approaches to a general account of hierarchies qua hierarchies are 
unsatisfying. But these are negative results; they bring us no closer to understanding what 
a hierarchy is. So far, we only have reason to think that hierarchies and their levels 
exhibit a mereological nature. In the next two sections we will add to this understanding 
by examining two contenders for a robust positive account: the partial order view, and the 
strict partial order view. 
3.0 The Partial Order View 
The partial order view has three main defenders. Let us begin with Herbert Simon and his 




3.1 Simon on Hierarchies 
Herbert Simon, in his address to the American Philosophical Society, characterized a 
hierarchical organization as “a system that is composed of interrelated subsystems, each 
of the latter being, in turn, hierarchic in structure until we reach the lowest level of an 
elementary subsystem.” (Simon 1962, p. 468; quoted in Turney 1989, p. 518) 
This initial characterization is weak. First and foremost, it is circular; we are left 
to wonder what it is for a structure to be “hierarchic.” And secondly, it fails to 
characterize what can be called bottomless hierarchies: those hierarchical structures for 
which there is no lowest-level, implying that the hierarchical decent proceeds into 
perpetuity.  
That his analysis is weak does make it entirely uninteresting. Simon was, as far as 
I can tell, among the first to point out that contemporary use of the term ‘hierarchy’ bears 
scant resemblance to its etymological origins. He writes, 
Etymologically, the word “hierarchy” has had a narrower meaning than I 
am giving it here. The term has generally been used to refer to a complex 
system in which each of the subsystems is subordinated by an authority 
relation to the system it belongs to… each system consists of a “boss” and 
a set of subordinate subsystems. Each of the subsystems has a “boss” who 
is the immediate subordinate of the boss of the system. 
Thinking of hierarchies in terms of “bosses” or hierarchs (to use another term) limits 
discussions of hierarchies to a very narrow and restricted conception, a conception that 
many people find offensively value-laden. Although superiority and inferiority can be 
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modeled hierarchically, it is a mistake to think that hierarchies are, by their nature, 
models of superiority and inferiority. In the ecological hierarchy, for example, 
ecosystems are higher than organisms, but there is no reason to think that ecosystems are 
in any way superior to organisms. Even in social hierarchies (the sorts of hierarchies with 
which Simon was most concerned) being higher does not imply being superior. Ranking 
employees by their respective seniority yields a hierarchy, but it is inappropriate to infer 
from this ranking that the old guard is in any way superior to the new.  
 An acceptable general account of hierarchies qua hierarchies, then, should be far 
more general than what the etymology of ‘hierarchy’ will allow. Those who have refined 
Simon’s approach seem to agree. Yet, as I will argue, the conception of hierarchy that 
they use is nevertheless too narrow.  
3.2 Webster on Hierarchies 
Simon’s original account of hierarchies was later refined in his 1973 paper, “The 
Organization of Complex Systems.” His refinement is far more influential. Jackson 
Webster (1979), for example, adopts this refinement when investigating the appeal to 
hierarchies within ecology.58 According to Simon and Webster, a hierarchy is a partial 
ordering of some set. Webster writes,  
That is, a hierarchical organization of a set, U, with subsets A, B, C,…, is 
formed by ordering the subsets by a relation, R, which specifies that the 
                                                   
58 Note that Webster’s work on the ecological hierarchy precedes that of Allen and Starr’s, as discussed 




elements of A are higher than the elements of B which are higher than the 
elements of C. The relation R is a binary relation in U. (1979, p. 120) 
According to Webster, this binary “higher than” relation, R, is antisymmetric and 
transitive.59 R, he says, partitions the set U into levels. Levels, for Webster, are simply the 
relata of R, the higher than relation. He also notes that there are many sets, and many 
relations which meet these conditions. He borrows his main example of a hierarchy, “the 
Chinese box” from Simon (1962, 1973). The series of increasingly smaller boxes are the 
elements of U, and R is interpreted as containment: one box is higher than the other if it 
contains the other. (ibid.) 
 The box example is quite apt when it comes to the set/subset and 
system/subsystem characterization of hierarchies. But not all hierarchies are anything like 
these nested boxes. School rankings, for example, are hierarchical: there are top schools, 
mid-range schools, and others below those. Washington Adventist University is not a 
subsystem of the Oxford University system, although I would guess that it ranks lower. 
The Simon-Webster general characterization of hierarchies only suits a specific concern. 
It is therefore not a general analysis: it is far too narrow. 60 
3.3 Hierarchies: Set Theory vs. Mereology 
The Simon-Webster characterization of hierarchies is too narrow for another reason. On 
their account a hierarchy is, by definition, a set. They are not alone in their set-theoretic 
                                                   
59 If xRy and yRx, then x=y (antisymmetry); and if xRy and yRz, then xRz (transitivity). Webster says 
nothing about reflexivity, but since he claims R is a partial order, we can presume that R is reflexive: xRx, 
for all x in R’s domain. 
 
60 To his credit, Simon was more interested in the question of “why are there hierarchies?” than in asking 
what, exactly, they are. His answer: because hierarchical structures are more stable (less liable to accidental 
breakage) than other complex structures. (1962, p. 470) 
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approach. Most available accounts of hierarchies, including those discussed below, are 
described as sets. I agree that set-theory offers a convenient precision when reasoning 
about hierarchies, but to define a hierarchy to be a set is a bit too quick. Such set-theoretic 
accounts do not offer a fully general characterization of hierarchies qua hierarchies. Such 
accounts are too narrow. 
The problem is that not every hierarchical structure need be a set: to say otherwise 
betrays a common philosophical bias for set theory. Such a bias is unproblematic, and 
even useful, in many cases, but it strikes me as inappropriate in the present 
circumstances. Why inappropriate? There are four reasons.  
First, the standard understanding of sets takes them to be abstract objects. It must 
be argued that concrete structures are necessarily not hierarchical to motivate an 
abstracta-based general characterization. To claim, without argument, that hierarchies are 
necessarily abstracta is to beg the question against Realists, such as Stanley Salthe. 
Second, even if one avoids begging the question against Realism by endorsing a 
view according to which sets are (or can be) concrete (e.g., Maddy 1990), we are still 
without a reason to think that a hierarchy must be a set. Set theory is a very useful 
method for representing and reasoning about puzzling situations in a precise way, but 
here we have gone beyond convenient representations of what hierarchies are; we are 
after what hierarchies are. Using an ontology of sets to investigate what hierarchies are is 
nowhere near as innocuous as when one uses sets to represent hierarchies for purposes of 
precise reasoning. Sets are theoretically useful, but they are also ontologically 
controversial regardless of whether or not we take them to be abstracta or concreta. Since 
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we are, at present, inquiring into the metaphysics of hierarchies, rather than the innocuous 
representation of hierarchies, to maintain the view that hierarchies are sets in the face of 
any sort of controversy, a reason must be given.  
Third, by reflecting on the arguments found above (in section 2.2), I hesitate to 
assume that a convincing reason to take hierarchies to be sets can be offered, for the set-
based approach lacks theoretical virtues possessed by the competing approach. Given our 
stated commitment to mereology, for any set SH that is a hierarchy, there is a more 
general mereological collection,61 CH, such that each level of SH is identical to some part 
of CH, and each part of CH is identical to some level of SH, but CH is not a set (by 
stipulation). Despite not being a set, CH, is nevertheless hierarchical: it has, as we just 
noted, parts arranged hierarchically. By virtue of being something that has a hierarchical 
arrangement of its parts, it certainly seems appropriate to call CH a hierarchy despite that 
it is not a set. Where ‘{}’ designates a set and ‘[]’ designates a general mereological 
collection, insofar as {1, 2, 3} is a hierarchy of numbers, so is [1, 2, 3]. By all 
appearances, taking hierarchies to be sets makes them out to be a more specific kind of 
thing than necessary; that there are non-sets which are appropriately labeled hierarchies 
implies that a set-based approach lacks generality. 
Fourth, with respect to the other theoretical virtue mentioned earlier, namely, 
parsimony, take note of the difference between the set-based approach and the 
mereological approach: the empty set, and a plethora of subsets. On the set-based 
approach, every hierarchy has its subsets, and thus the empty-set (the empty-set is a 
                                                   
61 More general since every set is a mereological whole, but not every whole need be a set. Sets, as I 
understand them here, are special kinds of wholes. 
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subset of every set), as parts; not so for the mereological approach. Despite appearances 
to the contrary, the empty set is not nothing; so, hierarchies defined using the set-based 
approach do not simply consist in their levels and the contents of those levels (and 
collections thereof). They have extra bits: their subsets, including the empty set. Thus, 
strictly speaking, the mereological approach is more parsimonious than the set-based 
approach, if only by a hair. The mereological characterization of hierarchies, then, 
benefits from two theoretic virtues over its set-based competitor: parsimony and 
generality. 
In short: there appears to be no clear reason to impose the requirement that 
hierarchies must be sets. To do so makes hierarchies out to be a more specific kind of 
thing than necessary; granted that some hierarchies are sets, not all of them need to be. 
Moreover, a set-based approach is less parsimonious than its mereological competitor (if 
only by a hair). A purely mereological characterization of hierarchies, such as that found 
in section 2.2 above, therefore benefits from greater parsimony and greater generality 
than the set-based characterization.  
3.4 Voorhees and Bunge on Hierarchies 
Improving upon the Simon-Webster account, Burton Voorhees (1983) generalizes the 
partial order analysis. He refines it by generalizing away from the “subset” aspects of 
their characterization:  
An hierarchical structure on a system S is a partial ordering of the 
variables of S. (1983 p. 26) 
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By framing the analysis in terms of a partial ordering – reflexive anti-symmetric, and 
transitive – Voorhees regains the precision and clarity of the Simon-Webster analysis 
without “Chinese boxing” himself in a corner. Voorhees’ analysis appears to be a 
substantial improvement on the partial order account.  
 The term ‘variable’ is the most obvious drawback to Voorhees’ analysis. He is 
upfront with his intention to take the notion as a primitive, but gives no reason for doing 
so. As was argued in a previous section, unnecessary primitives are to be avoided when 
giving a substantive analysis. There should be a reason for taking something to be 
primitive.   
Mario Bunge (1969), has what is probably the most rigorous of all the partial 
order accounts. He offers an axiomatic treatment of hierarchies, beginning with a 
definition of ‘hierarchy’:  
an ordered triple H = <S, b, D> where S is a non-empty set, b a distinguished 
element of s, and D a binary relation in S, such that… S has a single beginner, 
namely, b [That is, H has one and only one supreme commander]… b stands in 
some power of D to to every other member of S [That is, no matter how low in 
the hierarchy an element of S may stand, it still is under the command of the 
beginner.]… For any given element y of S except b, there is exactly one other 
element x of S such that Dxy. [That is, every member has a single boss.]… D is 
antisymmetric and transitive… D represents [mirrors] domination or power. [That 
is,… the behavior of each element of S save its beginner is ultimately determined 
by its superiors.] (1969, p. 18) 
106 
 
Bunge’s appeal to ‘commander’ and ‘boss’ are merely illustrative. He is not claiming that 
hierarchies are conceptually bound to the notion of authority. What matters, for Bunge, is 
that you have a topmost level, with branches extending downward, but never upward. 
Anything that fails to meet these conditions, says Bunge, is not a hierarchy (by 
definition).  
 Voorhees’ and Bunge’s respective definitions face a familiar problem. In 
Voorhees’ case it is hidden behind the term ‘system’. The problem is that their respective 
accounts share in the Simon-Webster set-theoretic bias. A system, for Voorhees, is “a set 
of variables in interaction” (1983, p. 25). For Bunge, the reference to sets is explicit.  
 Their characterizations then rest on shaky ground. We have every reason to think 
that there are non-set-theoretic individuals that, exhibiting a hierarchical structure, 
deserve the label ‘hierarchy’. It is senseless to define them away, simply to exploit the 
convenient precision of set-theory. Some sets might indeed be hierarchical: the hierarchy 
of pure sets, for instance. But still, it is not obvious that all hierarchies need to be related 
to sets. And there is no sense deciding the matter on an a priori basis, not when a more 
general characterization of ‘hierarchy’ is available.62 
A quick adjustment to the partial order view can accommodate this insight, and 
remove the set-theoretic bias. Using Bunge’s formulation, if we replace ‘set’ with 
‘collection’, which we understand in terms of the parthood relation, then the set-theoretic 
bias disappears. We are left with a clear, simple, and fully general theory of hierarchies. 
Or so it appears. 
                                                   
62 Recall: since all set-theoretic structures are parthood structures, but not all parthood structures are set-




3.5 Rejecting the Partial Order Account 
Unfortunately for us, the partial order account is not fully general. At least, it is not 
general enough for our purposes. The partial order view rules out, a priori, structures that 
are commonly called hierarchies.  
Consider an organizational hierarchy for a corporation consisting of the marketer 
(M), the financier (F), and the employee (E). The upwards-directed arrows indicate that 
M and F are both higher than E. 
Organizational theorists do not hesitate to label the sort of organizational structure we see 
in Figure 4 as a hierarchy. It is a command hierarchy, ordered by virtue of some having 
power over others. 
Bunge’s analysis is obviously at odds with Figure 4: that there is exactly one 
“boss” for every subordinate is an axiom of his system. What we see in Figure 4 fails to 
respect that. 
The incompatibility extends more generally to all versions of the partial order 
view. If the partial order view of Simon, Webster, Voorhees, and others, is correct, then 
the arrow in Figure 4 designates an antisymmetric and reflexive ordering. But there is a 
M F 
E 
Figure 4: An Organizational 




tension between reflexivity and antisymmetry. If we agree that higher than is reflexive, 
then in Figure 4 we must say that higher than is has as much or more power than, rather 
than the asymmetric (and irreflexive) has more power than. Notice, however, that in the 
organization depicted in Figure 4, M and F have the same amount of power – they both 
have power over E and no one else – it follows from the antisymmetry of higher than that 
M=F: since M has as much or more power than F, and F has as much or more power than 
M, an antisymmetric higher than implies that they are identical. The Marketer and The 
Financier, however, are not identical; they are different people with different talents. If 
we take Figure 4 to be a genuine hierarchy, ordered by the power one has, then the partial 
order view cannot provide a general account of hierarchies qua hierarchies.  
Also note that organization hierarchies are not merely a special case. Jaegwon 
Kim (2002) and William Wimsatt (1976) are recalcitrant that hierarchies in science can, 
and often do, branch upward. For example, Wimsatt’s hierarchical model of the scientific 
domain (presented in the fourth chapter of this dissertation) is massively upward-
branching. Kim’s model is similar, but involves a much more modest degree of 
branching. 
Figure 4 is, in fact, suggestive of a more serious problem. Let us flip the image in 
Figure 4 upside-down.63 In this new picture, let M denote Mary, let F denote Frank, and 
let E designate the executive in charge. In such an organization, Mary and Frank have as 
                                                   
63 Note that the inversion principle mentioned earlier is incompatible with the partial order view as we have 
presented it. If certain upward-branching hierarchies are ruled out a priori, then not every hierarchy can be 
flipped upside-down to produce an inverse hierarchy. Downward branching hierarchies, for example, 
cannot be flipped. Our present appeal to the inversion principle, however, is not problematic in this way: 
we are appealing to inversion to produce a downward branching hierarchy from an upward branching one. 
Downward branching hierarchies are, we can assume, acceptable to the partial order theorist. Inverting 
Figure 1 should be unproblematic from the partial order perspective. 
109 
 
much or more power than one another, since they have exactly as much power in the 
organization – absolutely none whatsoever – it follows from the antisymmetry constraint 
that Frank and Mary are identical. Not only must the partial order theorist rule out 
upward branching hierarchies. They must rule out downward branching hierarchies as 
well. Such a consequence is unacceptable; the partial order view is to be rejected. 
4.0 The Strict Partial Order View 
Leaving the partial order view behind us, let us proceed to its main competitor: the strict 
partial order view. The main difference between the two is ever so slight. The partial 
order view takes higher than to be antisymmetric, whereas the strict view takes it to be 
asymmetric: if x is higher than y, then y is not higher than x.  
Aside from the problem of generality that we raised for Simon and his followers, 
usage of the term ‘hierarchy’ within philosophy and the sciences, in fact, favors the strict 
interpretation. Oppenheim and Putnam (1958), Kim (2002), and Craver (2007, Chapter 
5), for example, are all upfront with their prejudice that higher than is asymmetric. None 
of these thinkers, however, cares to flesh out this prejudice in the pursuit of a fully 
general theory of hierarchies qua hierarchies. In fact, there are only two strict partial 
order accounts that I am aware of. One comes from Richard Dawkins, and the other 
comes from the international society for systems science (henceforth, ISSS). 
4.1 Dawkins on Hierarchy 
Richard Dawkins (1976 p. 9) attempts to give the notion of hierarchy a precise 
foundation using the language of set theory. Although I maintain that this is a problem for 
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a fully general theory of hierarchies, we already know how to forgive someone of set-
theoretic bias: we simply read ‘set’ as ‘collection’.   
For Dawkins, a hierarchy is a set that meets two conditions: first, no element of 
the set is superior to itself; and second, there is one element of the set, the hierarch, 
which is superior to all other elements of the set. Superior to is an asymmetric and 
transitive relation. 
There are two problems for Dawkins analysis, however. Both of them parallel the 
problems faced by Simon. First, the analysis of ‘higher than’ is empty. The superiority 
relation that defines the hierarchy is, for Dawkins, understood in terms of a primitive 
relation ‘is boss of’: x is superior to y iff either x is boss of y, or x is boss of something 
superior to y. (1976, p. 8) While it is possible that Dawkins intends to define the 
superiority relation recursively, he has not expressed that intention clearly. His account of 
higher than is clearly circular. We are left with no understanding of what “higher than” is 
supposed to mean. Moreover, Dawkins is lead to take ‘boss of’ as a primitive relation; 
and moreover, one which we are expected to grasp by metaphor. Those who are 
interested in the conceptual underpinnings of hierarchical science will find this very 
frustrating.  
The second problem is that, as with partial order theorists, his account is too 
narrow. He limits the class of hierarchies to those with a hierarch – a top level. Where 
Simon faces the problem of bottomless hierarchies, Dawkins then faces the problem of 
topless hierarchies. Any structure without a top-level is ipso facto not a hierarchy on 
Dawkin’s analysis.  
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What makes this narrowing especially problematic is that Dawkins fails to justify 
this restriction. There appears to be no reason to disqualify a structure as a hierarchy 
simply because it has no top level: the natural numbers, for example, could be ordered 
hierarchically, where each successor is superior to its predecessor. The hierarchy of pure 
sets, for another example, is generated by a recursive process in which the number of 
levels increases with every step of the recursion.  
Dawkin’s anticipates these sorts of worries. To resolve them, he suggests that 
topless hierarchies are not hierarchies at all, but are rather an infinite collection of finite 
hierarchies. The idea is that we can give an infinite series of finite hierarchies, where for 
each hierarchy, H, there is another finite hierarchy, H*, such that H’s hierarch is the 
immediate subordinate to H*’s hierarch. In simpler terms: for every hierarchy there is 
another hierarchy with one extra level on top. 
A nice trick, I can agree; but I cannot agree that it gives Dawkins a genuine 
solution to the problem. Consider, again, the set of natural numbers. Hierarchies become 
a priori finite at the top level, on Dawkins’ view. The set of natural numbers, however, is 
infinite. So, the set of natural numbers is not hierarchical (nor is the set of integers, for 
that matter). Dawkins allows for an infinite number of finite hierarchies corresponding to 
the natural numbers, but that is not the point. The point is that the set of natural numbers 
must have a hierarchical structure, insofar as the hierarchy of pure sets does: for every 
countable iteration for the hierarchy of pure sets, there is an isomorphism from the 
natural numbers to the levels of the pure-set hierarchy, qua countable. Thus, if the 
countably infinite hierarchy of pure sets has a hierarchical structure – and it does – then 
so does the set natural numbers, qua a self-evident structure preserving mapping from the 
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levels into the set of numbers. Dawkins view cannot be correct. No account of hierarchies 
that requires the presence of a hierarch can be correct. Not if one’s hope is to provide a 
conceptual underpinning to the usage of hierarchies within science and philosophy. 
4.2 Hierarchies as Directed Acyclic Graphs 
There is another way to interpret Dawkins’ view, independently of his explicit definition. 
In describing his concept of a hierarchy, Dawkins makes use of the language of Graph 
Theory. His usage suggests the following alternative characterization of hierarchies: a 
hierarchical structure is an acyclic directed graph. Nothing about this definition 
demands the presence of a hierarch. There can be infinite hierarchies insofar as there are 
infinite acyclic directed graphs. 
 A directed graph is a mathematical structure <V, E> where V is a set of vertices 
and E is a set of edges. Typically we visualize these vertices as objects and the edges as 
lines with arrows, which represent direction. What makes a particular directed graph 
acyclic is that it contains no completed circuits: you cannot follow the arrows in any way 
that forms a circle. 
 There is a problem with the graph-theoretic definition, one that we raised earlier 
for set-theoretic definitions: we are confronted with abstracta-bias; this time, more 
straightforwardly so than in the case of sets.64 If we understand hierarchies as graphs, 
then hierarchies, by definition, cannot be found in the physical world. We have defined 
away the issue of Realism, which is exactly what we do not want to do.  
                                                   
64 While some might think of sets as concrete things, I know of no one who defends graphs as concreta. 
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The fix is simple. Let us then define a hierarchy as anything (physical or 
mathematical) that can be represented using an acyclic directed graph. Generality appears 
to be restored. But there is still one minor problem. We have not given an analysis of 
what hierarchies are; we have merely said what they are like. We can all agree, I hope, 
that hierarchies correspond to acyclic directed graphs; but that does not tell us what 
hierarchies are, in the most general sense. 
There is, in fact, another problem with the directed graph view. It is a problem 
that also applies to the standard view of hierarchies for the International Society for 
System Science (ISSS). Let us introduce their view before issuing the criticism. 
4.3 The ISSS on Hierarchies 
The ISSS has an official answer to the question: What are hierarchies? They say that “a 
hierarchy is a collection of parts with ordered asymmetric relationships inside a whole.”65 
The reference to asymmetry identifies the ISSS as a class of strict partial order theorists 
for that reason. Although the ISSS appears to take no official stance regarding the 
transitivity of hierarchies, such a stance is unnecessary. Everyone takes higher than to be 
transitive. There is no need for them to make it explicit.  
 This, I take to be evident, is the best theory of hierarchies that we have seen so 
far. It is mereological in nature, contra Poli. It takes higher than to be asymmetric rather 
than antisymmetric. And it tells us what a hierarchy is: a collection of things exhibiting 
an asymmetric (and transitive) higher than structure. 
                                                   
65 http://www.isss.org/hierarchy.htm (accessed  4/13/12). The web-document was compiled by none other 




 Alas, there are two lingering problems. First, the account is overly general. There 
are structures consistent with the ISSS definition and the acyclic graph definition that are 
quite clearly not hierarchies (although one might still say that they are hierarchical in 
some sense). Consider Figure 5, below: 
In Figure 5 we see a counterexample to the strict partial order view: the disconnected, or 
“broken”, hierarchy. If a collection or system S, for example, has four components, a, b, 
c, and d, and the ordering relation R is such that aRb, cRd, bRa, and dRc, and neither 
a nor b stands R to either c or d, then R satisfies asymmetry and transitivity. Thus, 
according to the best strict partial order views we have – the graph-view and the standard 
ISSS view – S is a hierarchy. However, intuitively, S is not a hierarchy: it is two 
disconnected hierarchies. An extra constraint must be added to rule out the broken 
hierarchy. I will offer a suggestion in the next chapter.66 
The other problem is one of motivation. Granted that there are all these different 
accounts of hierarchies qua hierarchies, why should we think that the strict partial order 
view, however it is articulated, is really getting at what scientist and philosophers mean 
                                                   
66 Within the language of graph theory, we can simply add a connectedness constraint. That is, we can say 
that a hierarchy is anything that can be represented by a connected acyclic directed graph. Such a 
modification does nothing to resolve the other problems mentioned with the graph approach to hierarchies, 
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when they talk about hierarchies? Although I think that strict partial order theorists are 
getting at how the term ‘hierarchy’ is used within science, it is not obvious. Nor can we 
say that their view is justified on the grounds of an argument-by-cases. Although the 
partial order and idiosyncratic contenders face serious concerns, there might be a host of 
alternative accounts that we did not cover.  
So we should not trust the strict partial order view. We have not refuted it, as we 
did for its known competitors. It might even seem intuitive. But we have not argued for 
it. So we have no reason to think that the strict partial order view gives an adequate 
account of hierarchies and hierarchical structures mentioned in science and philosophy. 
5.0 A Superficial Account of Hierarchies 
Notice that most of the accounts we have discussed here share a similar ambition: to 
make precise the scientific notion of a hierarchy.67 Within all of the positive accounts we 
have seen, notice, there is an imprecise notion of hierarchy lurking in the background. 
One that everyone appears to share: 
A hierarchy is a collection of things (call them “levels”) linked together by 
the higher than relationships among them. 
This conception is not precise. It is superficial. It says nothing about what a level is, what 
linkage is, and most importantly, what higher than is.  
To argue for the strict partial order view, I propose that we begin by abandoning 
it altogether. Striking the view from our minds, let us then, in the next chapter, try to 
                                                   
67 Poli is an exception. Poli thinks that we should ignore hierarchies and shift our attention to levels. 
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recover it via argument. Such a recovery, however, requires that we begin somewhere. I 
will begin with the superficial account stated above. This one sentence, it seems, is what 
lies at the heart of all these accounts. The problem is that no one can agree on what it 
means. What is a level? What is a higher than relationship? What is it to be linked by 
one? These are all good questions. The answers are not trivial.  
6.0 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have reviewed the main theories of hierarchies qua hierarchies that 
have been influential to scientists and philosophers over the past fifty years. The 
idiosyncratic view of Allen and Starr is shockingly specific. They think that hierarchies, 
by their nature, have something to do with rates of behaviors. I cannot help but to agree 
with Potochnik and McGill (from the previous chapter) that this is a mistake. 
 The idiosyncratic view of Roberto Poli, which ignores theories of hierarchies in 
favor of a theory of levels, presents a stark contrast to Allen and Starr’s approach. 
Although Poli had not formulated any sort of general definition, his work nevertheless 
serves as a productive platform for investigating the connection between hierarchies and 
mereology. Using Poli as a foil, it was argued that (i) levels can be objects or classes, 
depending on the circumstance; (ii) that levels are parts of hierarchies; (iii) that those 
things “at” each level are part of it; and (iv) that each part of a level is “at” that level, in 
the unrestricted sense, but can always be ignored by fiat, depending on the practical goals 
of the hierarchical analyst. These features will be taken into account in the next chapter, 
where I develop a general theory of hierarchies from the ground up. 
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 We also examined the partial order views of Simon, Webster, Voorhees, and 
Bunge. All these thinkers take ‘higher than’ to designate an antisymmetric relation, and 
define hierarchies as a sort of set. The partial order view, I argued, was too narrow to 
serve as a general theory of hierarchies qua hierarchies. First, set-based approaches to the 
metaphysics of hierarchies (rather than the representation) of hierarchies suffer 
drawbacks that are not to be taken lightly; second, branching hierarchies pose a problem 
for their account of higher than.  
 Lastly, we investigated the strict partial order views of Richard Dawkins and the 
International Society for Systems Science. Although they provide the most intuitive 
definition it suffers from two problems: it is too general, since it makes “broken” 
hierarchies out to be actual hierarchies; and it is also undermotivated. Building a case for 
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1.0 Introduction 
At this point we have only the most superficial grasp of hierarchies. Our understanding is 
restricted to a mere surface-description of the basic concept, the concept that the theorists 
described in the previous chapter were hoping to capture. Hierarchies, we said, are 
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collections of levels linked by a higher than relation. It is a description that everyone 
appears committed to, but it is not a useful one. It is vague. Making it precise has been 
difficult. We have seen that the most influential attempts to do so are inadequate. 
The main point of disagreement among hierarchy theorists, and the source of the 
inadequacy in their accounts, surrounds the nature of higher than. Our first task in this 
chapter is to come to an understanding of this relation. After justifying, and building upon 
our surface description, what we will end up with is a version of the strict partial order 
view, a version which provides a suitable foundation for a robust formal theory of 
hierarchies. Herein is our secondary purpose: to develop a formal theory of hierarchies 
that can be made available to scientists, philosophers, computer scientists, ontologists, 
engineers, organizational theorists, and anyone else who might find hierarchies useful. 
The formal development can be found in Appendices A and B.  
 Having formulated and defended a general theory of hierarchies, our second task 
is to explore its implications for the central questions of the dissertation, specifically, the 
question of hierarchical Realism (as it was characterized in the introduction). I argue that 
the account we developed, call it Core Hierarchy Theory, supports a Realist 
interpretation of hierarchies, insofar as we are realists about scientific phenomena to 
begin with. In this regard, I am arguing in favor of Stanley Salthe’s (1985) position over 
the standard view of Allen and Starr (1982). Yet, on the other hand, I also argue that 
Allen and Starr’s approach to the ecological hierarchy, as well as Simon and Webster’s 
approach to hierarchies – viz., the nested approach that we encountered in the first and 
second chapters – is a direct consequence of Core Hierarchy Theory when the “is at” 
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relation is interpreted as the primitive-parthood relation, rather than a restricted -part 
relation. I call such hierarchies “unrestricted” hierarchies.  
This chapter is structured as follows. I begin with the superficial understanding of 
‘hierarchy’ that we ended off with in the previous chapter, systematically removing the 
superficiality surrounding each of its substantive lexical components: collection, linkage, 
and higher than. I then proceed to an analysis of higher than. I argue that every such 
relation is an asymmetric and transitive relation; and that every asymmetric and transitive 
relation can be given a higher than interpretation. The argument for the latter claim is 
regrettably quite complicated. I show, in two different ways, that any asymmetric and 
transitive relation suffices for the creation of a higher than structure that is isomorphic to 
the asymmetric and transitive ordering we began with. I conclude with some 
consequences of Core Hierarchy Theory. Within a formal reconstruction of Core 
Hierarchy Theory, I show that this simplest and most general theory of hierarchies 
implies that, when the “is at” relation is unrestricted (i.e., when ‘is at’ denotes primitive-
parthood), every compositional hierarchy is a level of itself and every such compositional 
hierarchy is a nested hierarchy. This result vindicates the coherence of Simon (1962, 
1973), Webster (1979), Allen and Starr (1982), and Salthe’s (1985) nested approach to 
compositional hierarchies.  
2.0 Core Hierarchy Theory: Superficial and Naïve 
In this section, I carve out a general theory of hierarchies qua hierarchies. Such a theory 
requires four things: (i) an account of ‘hierarchy’; (ii) an account of ‘higher than’; (iii) an 
account of ‘level’; and (iv) an account of what it is to be “at” a level.  
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Two of these needs have already been satisfied.  We satisfied (iv) within our 
interrogation of Roberto Poli on mereology: to be at a level to be some part of it that fits 
the interests of the hierarchical analyst. We satisfied (iii) with our examination of Poli 
and the partial order theorists: a level is the relatum68 of higher than,69 whatever that 
means. In what follows, then, we need only focus our attention on (i) and (ii). 
2.1 What is a Hierarchy? 
Our superficial description – a hierarchy is a collection of levels linked together by 
higher than – gives us a substantial head-start regarding the satisfaction of (i) – an 
account of ‘hierarchy’. We cannot say that we have satisfied it just yet. The description is 
only a useful starting point.  
We must first ensure that we understand the terms used to formulate it: 
‘collection’, ‘linked’, ‘level’, and ‘higher than’.  ‘Level’ is a notion we already 
understand. The notion of ‘higher than’, however, is not nearly so simple. Until we turn 
our attention to ‘higher than’, it is taken as a primitive.  
2.1.1 A Collection of Levels … 
Let us begin by clarifying ‘collection’, a notion that I introduced earlier. Most hierarchy 
theorists, recall, are in the grip of a set-theoretic bias, and tend to frame things in terms of 
sets rather than collections. 
                                                   
68 Either an individual or Poli’s categories/classes. 
 
69 Recall that, in Chapter 1, we saw fit to draw a distinction between is a higher level than and is at a 
higher level than. The former holds between levels, the latter holds between the contents of levels. By 
convention, I use the term ‘higher than’ to designate the former, rather than the latter, relation. A 
justification for this convention can be found later in the chapter. Briefly put, is at a higher level is more 
easily defined in terms of is a higher level than vice versa. By ‘higher than’ I mean to designate the more 
general relation: is a higher level than. 
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We argued against that bias in the previous chapter. If the set-membership and 
subset relations are a sort of parthood, as was argued, then hierarchies are collections in 
our sense of ‘collection’. We are understanding ‘collection’, recall, to be anything with 
proper parts. Following David Lewis, we argued that subsets are parts of sets, and pace 
Lewis, we argued that its members are too. Insofar as ‘hierarchy’ applies to sets, then, it 
also applies to collections. Since calling them collections is metaphysically neutral, 
whereas calling them sets is not, we must then prefer the mereological characterization to 
avoid begging any questions regarding hierarchical Realism. 
But perhaps we are unwittingly begging another question. One might object to 
‘collection’ on the grounds that there is an even more general term: ‘plurality’. If we use 
‘collection’, then we must maintain, on a priori grounds, that no “uncollectable” plurality 
has a hierarchical structure. If it had such a structure, then it would appear to count as a 
hierarchy. 
Here it is useful to draw a distinction between hierarchies and hierarchical 
structures. A hierarchy is a thing that has a hierarchical structure, which is a sort of 
relational structure. The relational structure that makes hierarchies hierarchical is simply 
the higher than relation. Uncollectable pluralities, then, can still have a hierarchical 
structure insofar as each thing in the plurality is linked to the others by higher than. 
These pluralities are not hierarchies, but they are still hierarchical. 
One might question the usefulness of this distinction. The arguments found in the 
previous chapter involve two constraints on acceptable accounts of hierarchies: 
parsimony and generality. One might argue that taking hierarchies to be uncollected 
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pluralities offers a more parsimonious and a more general account than taking them to be 
individuals. More parsimonious because it eliminates the commitment to anything aside 
from levels and their contents, and more general because it accounts for potential 
hierarchies whose levels cannot be collected into a single individual. 
I maintain that the distinction is a useful one. There is good reason to think that a 
hierarchy is not a plurality, and there is a good reason to think that it is not simply a sort 
of relational structure (i.e., a relation) defined on a plurality or collection.  
First, let us say why hierarchies are not pluralities. There is no doubt that one can 
individuate hierarchies and differentiate between them: ECOHIERARCHY is one 
hierarchy, a corporate hierarchy is another. If hierarchies were pluralities, then each and 
every one of these hierarchies would, in fact, be many things (viz., levels). But, as David 
Lewis (1991) points out, one thing is not many things. Therefore, hierarchies are not 
pluralities. A hierarchy is one thing; pluralities are many things.  
A collection, as I use the term, is simply one thing made from many. Anytime one 
attempts to count pluralities, “one plurality, two pluralities, three pluralities, four…” one 
is counting collections. I simply cannot make sense of the idea that we are enumerating 
the many when counting in this way: not only is it odd to say, “one many, two many, 
three many, four…”, it seems outright incoherent. To argue for its coherence is 
tantamount to arguing that the one can in fact be many, pace Lewis and basic common 
sense. There are few maxims as self-evident as “one is not many”. 
Now let us say why it will not do to define a hierarchy as a sort of relational 




If hierarchies are relations, then they must have relata. What are their relata? In 
the previous chapter it was argued that hierarchies consist only in their levels and the 
contents of those levels. Taking this argument for granted, we then have three options: 
the relata are either levels, contents of levels, or both. Note, however, that we have 
already designated the relationship between levels as the higher than relationship70, the 
relationship between the contents of levels as the is at a higher level than relation, and 
the relationship between levels and their contents as the is at (or is in) relation.  
If we say that the hierarchy relation is any one of these three (or some other 
relation I might have neglected to mention) then we are left with a denotational gap: what 
do we call the collection of levels itself? 71 We can call it whatever we want. Why not 
‘hierarchy’? Such a label is surely not arbitrary: since we already have labels for the three 
aforementioned relations, the term ‘hierarchy’ seems more appropriately assigned 
elsewhere. Insofar as a hierarchy consists only in levels and their contents, the 
assignment of ‘hierarchy’ to the collection of levels certainly appears to be the most 
appropriate option for filling the denotational gap. It is inappropriate, recall, to assign it 
to any plurality.  
Also, take note of how ‘hierarchy’ is commonly used. If hierarchies are 
collections of levels, then one would expect ‘hierarchy’ to be used as a monadic 
                                                   
70 Or: the is a higher level than relation, which we shortened to higher than by convention. 
 
71 I neglect to mention the three-place relation holding between contents of levels, the levels they are at, and 
the levels that they are higher than. To think of a hierarchy as this three-place relation is quite 
inappropriate. For one, it makes hierarchies out to be much more complicated than they appear, or need to 
be. For another, to identify the hierarchy with this three-place relation still leaves a denotational gap with 




predicate, whereas if they were relations, one would expect common usage to reflect this; 
we would expect to hear “… is a hierarchy of (levels) L1…Ln” whenever a hierarchical 
reference is made. Since the word ‘hierarchy’ is most commonly used as a monadic 
predicate, rather than a relation, usage of the term ‘hierarchy’ lends no support to the 
relational view. On the contrary, common usage supports the collection-view. The 
ecological hierarchy, for example, is a hierarchy.   
Having argued that hierarchies are best taken to be collections, rather than 
pluralities or relations, we are ready to move forward with the analysis. Let us then 
proceed to clarify ‘linked together’.  
2.1.2 … Linked Together by… 
The problem with strict partial order view of hierarchies, defended by Dawkins and the 
ISSS, is that their respective accounts do not rule out a broken hierarchical structure: two 
disjoined hierarchies, taken together in a single disconnected acyclic graph, satisfy the 
strict partial order definition. Fortunately, there is a straightforward way to solve the 
problem. We simply add a linkage constraint: a constraint which ensures that there are no 
gaps in the hierarchical structure. 
One way to obtain an internal linkage amongst the levels is to introduce a 
hierarch. But, recall that we are no longer under the spell of the hierarch. To include a 
hierarch is to necessitate a top level, ruling out the topless hierarchy of pure sets, which is 
a very important hierarchy within science. 
 There is another way to ensure the appropriate sort of linkage using nothing but 
the resources of mereology. We have already argued that levels are parts of hierarchies. 
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Let us now exploit this mereological feature. Where H is a collection, -part specifies a 
kind, , of part72 (e.g., direct-part,  functional-part, etc.), and ‘R’ is any relation at all 
(including higher than), we can specify our linkage constraint generally as follows: 
(LINKAGE) The -parts of H are linked by relation R iff for every way of 
partitioning H into two sub-collections of -parts, H* and H**, 
without remainder, there is an x in H* and a y in H** such that x 
and y stand in the R relation. 
Where  picks out levels, and R picks out higher than, the LINKAGE conditions, when 
satisfied, ensure that the levels of the hierarchy are joined together to form a single unit: 
it requires that for every way of cutting the collection in two, there remains at least one R 
(i.e. higher than) connection between parts of the two sub-collections. This linkage 
condition, when satisfied, thus rules out the possibility of broken hierarchies without 
introducing the problematic hierarch. 
2.2 … Higher Than 
So far, we have been taking the higher than relation as primitive. Now we must give it 
substance, preferably in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions.  
The argument for this analysis comes in two stages. First, the necessity stage: I 
argue that higher than is an asymmetric and transitive relation. Second, the sufficiency 
stage: I argue that all asymmetric and transitive relations are to be considered higher than 
                                                   
72 Note that  can be given a null interpretation, if, for example, one wants to test whether or not a 
collection of parts is linked, without having a kind of part in mind. To give the null interpretation, simply 
turn your gaze away from the ‘’ and go about your business as if it does not exist. 
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relations. These two arguments taken together imply the strict partial order view 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
Let us first argue that higher than is transitive. To do so, it is useful to make a 
distinction between branching and non-branching hierarchies.  
2.2.1 Transitivity and Complex Non-branching Hierarchies 
Non-branching hierarchies require that for any pair of levels in that hierarchy, one 
member of the pair must be higher than the other. Branching hierarchies do not have such 
a requirement: levels residing on different branches are incomparable with respect to the 
higher than relation.  
The common way of representing non-branching hierarchies reveals an important 
feature of higher than: it is transitive. Consider Figure 6 below. It is a simple depiction of 
a three-level non-branching hierarchy: ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’ designate levels, and the 
upwards-directed arrow designates higher than (by convention, the arrows always point 









But there is something missing. Given our understanding of non-branching hierarchies 
(still taking higher than as a primitive), it must then be that, in Figure 6, either level C is 
higher than A, or level A is higher than C, even though this connection has not been 
made explicit using an arrow. A, however, is not plausibly higher than C: such a chain 
would be circular as opposed to hierarchical. Our naïve concept of hierarchies allows for 
branching and non-branching hierarchies, but it does not allow for circular hierarchies. If 
it did, then Figure 6 would lead to an ambiguity between the following two 
representations (Figure 7): 
I know of no one who, when confronted with Figure 6, recognizes the ambiguity depicted 
in Figure 7.73 As soon as one is told that Figure 6 represents a non-branching hierarchy 
(in which the arrows point to the higher level), there is little doubt that C is higher than 
A.74  
                                                   
73 Note that the ambiguity is not three-way: “levels A and C are not related by higher than at all” is not a 
third possible disambiguation. Non-branching hierarchies, such as what we see in the above figure, must 
satisfy the claim ‘for any two levels in the hierarchy, they stand in a higher than relationship with one 
another’.   
 
74 Adding arbitrary branches to Figure 6 appears to make no difference to the disambiguation. Since 
branching and non-branching hierarchies exhaust the logical space of hierarchies, the transitivity 
disambiguation should then generalize to all hierarchies. 









This strongly suggests that transitivity is a necessary condition for higher than. If 
higher than were not transitive, then one would not naturally rule out the circular 
hierarchy as a possible disambiguation of Figure 6: a paradigmatic expression of a non-
branching hierarchy. Rather, we would ask for disambiguation if transitivity were not 
inherent in our concept of higher than; for all the time I have spent showing these pictures 
to others, no one has ever asked for disambiguation.  
One might complain that, as it stands, this “ambiguity” argument suffers from a 
lack of rigor. I have not performed any meticulous psychological studies to support my 
hypothesis. One might even suggest that there could be a cultural bias at play in my 
informal experiment.  
Even so, this is no reason to doubt the hypothesis that the leftmost structure in 
Figure 7 would be ruled out by test subjects, were such an experiment to be performed. In 
the first chapter I noted that an investigation into hierarchical concepts is an active area of 
research within cognitive science (e.g., Winer 1980; Greene 1989, 1994; Murphy 2002; 
Deneault and Ricard, 2006; and Slattery et al 2011). The consensus in this literature is 
that the relationship between levels of hierarchical classification is both transitive and 
asymmetric (Slattery et al 2011, p. 243; Murphy 2002, p. 200-2); and it has been 
observed that such hierarchical structure “appears to be a universal property of all 
cultures’ categories of the natural world.” (Murphy 2002, p. 204)75 If one were to 
perform a more rigorous experiment to test the above hypothesis, and the results were 
                                                   
75 Although it is irrelevant to our analysis, it is worth noting that Murphy (2002) assumes (without 
argument) that hierarchies cannot branch upwards. This, as we will see, is contrary to Jaegwon Kim and 
William Wimsatt’s view of hierarchies. 
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contrary to that hypothesis, then that would indeed be a very interesting and surprising 
result.  
Taking higher than to be transitive is thus warranted. Let us then state our first 
necessary condition for higher than. For any hierarchy, H, and levels, x, y, and z of H: 
(TRANSITIVITY) If x is higher than y and y is higher than z, then x is higher 
than z. 
2.2.2 Higher vs. Lower 
Although noting the transitivity of higher than is important for our understanding of 
hierarchies, it does not provide us with a complete analysis. To search for an informative 
definition of higher than, it is useful to contrast it with its opposite: the equally notorious 
lower than relation. 
The lower than relation is no less mysterious than higher than. Even so, there is 
much we can say. For instance, we can say why these relations are equally mysterious: 
the relations are directly inter-definable. No one denies that the lower than relation is 
simply the converse of higher than.  
 (INTER-DEFINABILITY) x is higher than y iff y is lower than x. 
This definition is, of course, trivial: it adds nothing to our understanding of either 
relation. Still, there is more we can say about the relationship between “higher” and 
“lower”. For any hierarchy, H, and any two levels x and y of H,  
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 (INCOMPATIBILITY) if x is higher than y, then x is not lower than y.76 
Why should we endorse INCOMPATIBILITY? Because to deny it is to claim that there 
is at least one level that is both higher and lower than some other level, and we have 
already ruled out this sort of case. If there are hierarchies that contain such levels, then 
Figure 6, for all we know, might be such a hierarchy. It is consistent with a denial of 
INCOMPATIBILITY that both of the disambiguations that we see in Figure 7 are 
correct. But as noted above, no disambiguation is needed. The downward arrow 
connecting C to A in Figure 7 is immediately ruled out, as soon as one is told that Figure 
6 depicts a hierarchy.  
Taken together, INTER-DEFINABILITY and INCOMPATIBILITY imply an 
interesting feature of higher than: that it is asymmetric. Given a hierarchy, H, For every 
pair of levels x and y of H, 
 (ASYMMETRY)  if x is higher than y, then y is not higher than x. 
The inference is straightforward: If x is higher than y and y is also higher than x, then 
INTER-DEFINABILITY tells us that y is lower than x and INCOMPATIBILITY tells us 
that y is not lower than x; a contradiction. Insofar as we accept these two basic principles, 
asymmetry cannot be denied. 
 What we are left with, then, is the strict partial order view. We have not 
presupposed it. We have argued for it from more basic claims and testable psychological 
hypotheses. We can, after all, test the hypothesis that Figure 6 is universally 
unambiguous between the two images in Figure 7.  
                                                   
76 Since x and y might be the same level, the conditional does not hold in the reverse direction. 
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 Taking the success of such experiments for granted, we are still only half-way to a 
complete account of higher than. Having argued that higher than is asymmetric and 
transitive, we must now ask: which asymmetric and transitive relation? Here we face a 
dilemma: either higher than is a relation unto its own, or it is a designator for an entire 
class of relations, each of which count as higher than in some context or another.  
In the next two sections, I argue for the latter horn of the dilemma. In the next 
section, I argue that ‘higher than’ designates a class of relations, and then, in the section 
that follows, I argue that being an asymmetric and transitive relation suffices to count as a 
higher than relation. With that, our analysis will be complete. 
2.2.3 Hierarchical Identity and Distinctness 
We have, so far, been looking only at a single hierarchy. Doing so has been fruitful for 
our investigation into higher than. Contrasting the higher than and lower than relations 
has also been fruitful. To press our conclusions further, let us now see what we can glean 
from contrasting two different hierarchies. 
Given our naïve (but no longer superficial) definition of hierarchies, it is 
appropriate to infer that hierarchies H1 and H2 are the same if and only if they have 
exactly the same levels ordered in exactly the same way. For two hierarchies to be 
distinct, then, is for them to either differ in at least one level, or for them to be ordered in 
a different way, or both.  
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In Figure 8, H1 and H2 are distinct only if either B≠Y or A≠Z. If B were Y and A 
was Z, then both hierarchies would contain the same levels, in the same higher than 
order: H1 and H2 would be identical. 
 This implies that there are different higher than relations: if two hierarchies are 
distinct, but have all the same levels, then those levels must be ordered differently. For 
example, if we let B=Z and A=Y, then what would make these hierarchies distinct is that 
the ordering would differ. But since they are both hierarchies, they must both be ordered 
by a higher than relation. And so, there is no single relation, higher than. There must be 
many. 
But this is to be expected. In all of the hierarchical contexts we care about for the 
purposes of this dissertation, there is some way to understand the higher than relation in 
terms of another relation. Things are never just plain higher than: in a hierarchy of 
importance, for example, they are (typically) ordered by the relation more important 
than; in power-hierarchies, they are ordered by has more power than. In the upwards-
nested ecological hierarchy, the ordering relation is a bit more complicated; after each 
instanceable and individual has been situated within the appropriate level via AT-






Figure 8: Two Distinct Hierarchies H1 and H2 – 





is not contained within L*.  Being a higher than relation, then, is a second-order 
property: some relations count as higher than, where others do not. 
2.2.4 The SPO Analysis of Higher than.  
Which relations count as higher than relations? At the very least, they must be strict 
partial ordering (SPO) relations. In fact, it is enough: it can be shown that any such 
relation can be given as a higher than relation. 
In what follows, I give two different proofs. The first is much longer than the 
second. The second is short, less-mechanical, but requires a lot more thinking. 
Let me begin with a brief summary of what I am doing with the longer proof. I am 
showing that for any asymmetric and transitive relation, R, there is a corresponding 
higher than structure. Doing so shows that asymmetric and transitive relations are higher 
than relations, giving us an analysis of higher than. To accomplish this, I describe the 
most basic higher than structure, and then use this notion to exhaustively partition the 
class of higher than structures into four groups: those that are basic, those that branch, 
those that do not branch, and those that are one of the first three with at least one 
disconnected bit.77 I show that any strictly partially ordered set with two (the smallest 
such set78) or three elements can be placed in one of these four groups. I then show that 
adding an element to the structured set produces a structure that falls into one of the four 
                                                   
77 We could exhaustively partition the class into less than four groups, but doing so adds complications. 
 
78 Proof: if a set has only one element, a, then any binary relation defined upon it, <a,a>, is reflexive. Strict 
partial orders are, by definition, asymmetric. Asymmetry implies irreflexivity. Therefore, the smallest 
strictly partially ordered set has two distinct elements. 
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groups. The procedure can be repeated ad infinitum, and so all strict partial orders, 
including infinite ones, can be given as higher than structures.79 
Here are the definitions. A branching higher than structure is any structure in 
which something x stands either higher than, or lower than, at least two distinct things 
that do not stand higher than the other.80 A non-branching structure is one that does not 
branch.  
Fixing all that in your mind, here is the longer version of the argument. Consider 
a set of things, C, and a strict-partial order, R, on that set. If the ordered set has only two 
elements – x and y – that stand in relation R to one another, e.g., xRy, we can represent 
this as, what we see in Figure 9 (below), a basic hierarchy: x can be represented as being 
higher than y, for example.  
                                                   
 
79 Take note that these arguments can be run with respect to collections and their proper parts rather than 
sets and their elements. The presentation is analogous with ‘collection’ substituted for ‘set’ and ‘proper 
part’ substituted for ‘element’. I opt for conventional terminology here.  
 
80 Note that there are two kinds of branching structures: an upward-branching higher than structure, let us 
say, is any structure that has at least three distinct elements x,y, and z, such that x and y are higher than z, 
but neither is higher than the other. A downward-branching higher than structure, by contrast, is any 
structure that has at least three distinct elements x, y, and z, such that x is higher than both y and z, but 













By ‘basic hierarchy’ I mean that H cannot be understood to be a combination of any 
smaller hierarchies. Adding a third element, z, to our set, then it must be either that  
(I) xRz,  
(II) zRx, or  
(III) neither (I) nor (II).  
Presume (I) for conditional proof. There are three options regarding z’s relation to 
y: (i) zRy, (ii) yRz, and (iii) neither. If (i), then we can depict the situation as a three-level 
hierarchy such as that found in Figure 6: the transitivity of R implies that z takes the 
middle place between x and y (xRzRy). 
  If (ii) then either (a) yRx, (b) xRy, or (c) neither. If (ii) and (a) hold, then the 
sequence yRxRz results in another instance of Figure 6. If (ii) and (b) hold, then xRyRz 
results, again resulting in an instance of Figure 6. If (ii) and (c) hold, then yRz and xRz, 
but y and x are incomparable with respect to R: a situation that we can depict using an 







Figure 10: An Upward Branching 
Hierarchy H3 as Two Basic Hierarchies 







If (iii), then either (a) yRx,(b) xRy, or (c) neither. (I), (iii), and (a), however, are 
not consistent with R being a strict partial order: (a) yRx, (I) xRz, and the transitivity of R 
imply (ii) yRz, which implies not-(iii).  
If (iii) and (b), then all three of the following are true: xRz, xRy, z and y are not 
R-related. We can depict this situation as a downward-branching hierarchy (Figure 11): 
If (iii) and (c) hold, then y does not bear R to anything at all, and what we are left 
with is a higher than structure consisting of a basic hierarchy and a dangling y left over. 
Closing our first conditional proof, we have shown that every strict partial 
ordering of three elements that satisfies (i) yields a higher than structure: either a 
hierarchy, or a hierarchy with a dangling bit left over. 
Presume (II), zRx, for conditional proof. We are confronted with three familiar 
options: (i) zRy, (ii) yRz, and (iii) neither. If (i), then either (a) yRx,(b) xRy, or (c) 
neither. If (i) and either (a) or (b) hold, then a non-branching hierarchy (as in Figure 6) 






Figure 11: Downward Branching 
Hierarchy H3 as Two Basic 
Hierarchies H1 and H2 That Have 






hold, then a downward-branching hierarchy results: we have zRx, zRy, but x and y do not 
stand R. That is, we get Figure 11, except with x and z having switched places.  
If (ii), then the transitivity of R, given our present assumption that zRx, implies 
that yRx. Again, we see the non-branching Figure 6. This time ordered (from top to 
bottom): yRzRx. 
If (iii), neither zRy nor yRz, then there are three possible options: (a) yRx, (b) 
xRy, or (c) neither. If (iii) and (a), then we have an upward-branching hierarchy: yRx, 
zRx, with y and z being incomparable with respect to R gives us Figure 10 with z and x 
switching places. 
If (iii) and (b), then R is not a strict partial order. By our presumption that (II), we 
have zRx, by (b) we have xRy, and so, if R is transitive (which it must be if R is a strict 
partial order), then zRy must be the case, which implies not-(iii). (iii) is the claim ‘neither 
zRy nor yRz’. 
If (iii) and (c), then we have a higher than structure consisting in a basic hierarchy 
– z’s being higher than x (from II) – and a bit left over: y.  
Closing our second conditional proof: every strict partial order that satisfies (II) 
corresponds to some higher than structure: either a hierarchy or a higher than structure 
with a bit left over. Only one more presumption remains. 
Presume (III) for conditional proof. If (III), then again there are three options: 
either (i) zRy, (ii) yRz, and (iii) neither. If (i), then we face three more options: either (a) 
yRx,(b) xRy, or (c) neither. 
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If (i) and (a) hold, then R is not a strict partial order. If zRy and yRx hold, and R 
is transitive, then zRx follows. zRx implies not-(III). 
If (i) and (b) hold, then from our presumption that (III), we derive that zRy, xRy, 
but z and x do not stand R. This situation can be depicted as an upward-branching 
hierarchy: Figure 10 with y and z switching places. 
If (i) and (c) hold, then zRy, but x does not stand R with anything. That is, we 
have a higher than structure consisting in a basic hierarchy in which z is higher than y, 
with an extra bit left over: x. 
If (ii), then we face three options. Either (a) yRx,(b) xRy, or (c) neither.  
If (ii) and (a) hold, then a downward-branching hierarchy is the result: y is higher 
than both z and x, but x and z are not comparable with respect to R. That is, we have 
Figure 11 with x and y switching places. 
If (ii) and (b) hold, then R is not a strict partial order. (b) xRy, (ii) yRz and a 
transitive R imply xRz, which implies not-(III). Maintaining the presumption that (III), 
(ii), and (b), it follows that R is not transitive; and therefore, not a strict partial order. 
If (ii) and (c) hold, then we have yRz, but x is R-related to neither y nor z. So, 
again we have a higher than structure consisting of a basic hierarchy – y being higher 
than z – and an extra bit left over: x. 
If (iii), then neither zRy nor yRz. Given (III), we can add that neither xRz nor 
zRx. That is, z is not R-related to either x or y. We have three more options: (a) yRx,(b) 
xRy, or (c) neither. 
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If (iii) and either (a) or (b), then we have a higher than structure consisting of a 
basic hierarchy and a bit, z, left over: if (a), then y is higher than x; if (b), then x is higher 
than y. 
If (iii) and (c), maintaining our presumption that (III), then nothing in our set, C, 
stands R to anything else. There is no R relation at all.   
Closing our third, and final, conditional proof, we see that for every strict partial 
order that satisfies (III), there is a corresponding higher than structure: either a hierarchy 
or a hierarchy with extra bits left over. This is the same result we get for both (I) and (II), 
which exhausts the logical space. Therefore, for every relational combination of three 
items that satisfy a strict partial ordering, we can depict the situation using a higher than 
structure: either a basic, branching, or non-branching higher than structure, with or 
without disconnected bits leftover. 
 From this, we can generalize to an R-ordered set with n elements. If there is a 
fourth element, f, we merely compare its R-relatedness to each of the existing elements. 
We can depict it as being lower-than all those elements  for which Rf; and we can 
depict it as higher than all those elements  for which fR. If there is no  such that Rf, 
then either f is at the top of its hierarchy, or it is an extra disconnected bit of the higher 
than structure we already have; if there is no  such that fR, then either f is at the bottom 
of its hierarchy, or it is an extra disconnected bit of the higher than structure we already 
have. Under all of these options, the addition of an extra element nevertheless yields a 
higher than structure, constructed out of one or more basic hierarchies, perhaps with 
some extra bits. Since we can repeat the process described in this paragraph ad infinitum, 
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we have the generalization we need. We have deduced that for every strict partial order 
relation R, there is a higher than structure that depicts it. Therefore, being a strict partial 
order relation suffices for serving as a higher than relation. 
Now for the shorter proof. What is different here is that it begins with a strictly 
partially ordered collection of any size. To make our lives simpler, we will begin with 
linked ordered sets. We will generalize to unlinked ordered sets afterwards.  
(Preliminaries) Let O be a set with cardinality n (call it the ‘origin set’) and let R 
be a binary strict partial order (SPO) relation on O that links O’s 
elements (in the sense of linkage defined above). Let H be an 
empty collection that is filled81 with elements according the 
recursive process below (called ‘inductive step’); and let Ћ denote 
a higher than relation on H. 
1. Take any two arbitrary elements of O, x and y, such that xRy and let H 
now contain them such that xЋy.  
2. Now take any v that is in O, but not in H, and then for every w that is 
found in both O and H, compare its R-relatedness with v, via the following 
inductive step: (i) if wRv, then let H contain v such that wЋv; (ii) if vRw, 
then let H contain v such that vЋw; (iii) if neither wRv or vRw, then leave 
                                                   
81 This process of “filling a collection” is unconventional. To restore convention, we can say that this 
“filling” is short for an iterative sequencing on H. That is, we can say that ‘H’ is an abbreviation for a 
sequential class of collections H1… Hn (where 1n; and there exists a structure-preserving mapping from 
each Hn to Hn+1). Under this convention, adding elements to H is to be understood as an implicit shift in the 
denotation of ‘H’: that is, my use of the expression ‘let H contain…’ actually means “let ‘H’ now 
designates the next Hn in the H-sequence, which is structurally identical to H except that it contains…”. 
Doing things this way allows us to avoid the messy metaphysical issues surrounding the claim that 
collections might change their parts. But, it also forsakes readability. 
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v out of H (for now) and move on to the next w that is in both O and H, 
repeating (i)-(iii) until there are no more w’s to compare. 
3.  Repeat 2 until there is no v that is in O but not in H.  
From 1-3 we must conclude that any SPO relation can be used to produce a higher than 
structure (in fact, a hierarchy). What you end up with by going through this process is an 
internally-linked higher than structure that is isomorphic to the SPO-structure you started 
with.  
Although the recursive process used involves finite structures, we can 
nevertheless generalize the result to those that are infinite. The finite limitation only 
prevents the actual generation of an infinite higher than structure; but that was never my 
intent. The process shows that for any n, if O is a collection of size n, and R is a strict 
partial ordering relation linking the elements of O, then there is a collection H with a 
relation Ћ on H, such that R is isomorphic to Ћ. Although n is presumed to be finite, we 
can nevertheless induce an infinitely persistent isomorphism. 
 Another way to challenge the generality of these arguments is to complain that we 
began the recursive process with a collection that is linked by the SPO relation. Since we 
have not begun with any arbitrary (possibly unlinked) set, the result is not fully general: 
we have only shown that SPO relations that link the origin-set can be considered higher 
than relations. 
 But this is misleading. All we need to show is that any SPO relation can be used 
to create a higher than structure. If we were to be given an unlinked SPO-ordered 
collection to start with, we can simply run the algorithm on each of its linked sub-
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collections. The result will be the generation of multiple higher than structures. If there 
are disconnected bits in the origin-set, then we simply add those to the higher than 
structure with one sweeping stipulation at the end of the recursion: “Let H contain all the 
extra disconnected bits!” After which, full generality is restored. Since we can construct 
multiple higher than structures from an SPO relation, then the fact remains: every SPO-
structured set can be used to create a (i.e., at least one) higher than structured collection. 
Being a strict partial order, therefore, is both necessary and sufficient to serve as a higher 
than relation. 
And so, we can see that every binary relation with the properties of asymmetry, 
and transitivity can be treated as a higher than relation. At last, an analysis of higher than 
has been delivered. 
(HIGHER) A relation, R, is a higher than relation iff R is a strict partial order 
(i.e., is asymmetric, and transitive) 
In other words: ‘higher than’ is then just another name for ‘strict partial order’. Every 
SPO is a higher than relation: causes, is ancestor to, is greater than, is less than, is 
proper part of are all higher than relations, insofar as they are asymmetric and transitive.  
We can use this understanding of higher than to define a notion of being at a 
higher level than. 
(AT-HIGHER) x is at a higher level than y iff y is at some level L, and for 
every level L such that y is at L, there is a level L* such 
that x is at L* and L* is higher than L. 
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This is, of course, merely one way of specifying such a relation. It differs from our 
HIGHER-LEVEL analysis from Chapter 1, and it might differ from other accounts as 
well. It is an inessential addition to Core Hierarchy Theory, so I will leave the AT-
HIGHER analysis out of it. The hierarchical analyst must make themselves clear what 
they mean by ‘at a higher level than’ whenever they use the expression. It is enough that 
the expressive resources of Core Hierarchy Theory facilitate such clarifications. AT-
HIGHER is simply an example. 
Our informal Core Hierarchy Theory is now complete. There are four questions a 
general theory of hierarchies qua hierarchies must answer: What is a hierarchy? What is a 
level? What is higher than? And what is it to be at a level? We have arrived at an answer 
to all of them.  
A hierarchy is a collection of levels linked together by higher than. A higher than 
relation is nothing other than a strict partial order. Levels are nothing special: they are 
simply the relata of higher than. To be “at” a level is to be a part of it that falls within the 
contextual interest of the hierarchical analyst. That is, the things “at” each level are 
determined by the parts of that level, plus contextual fiat:   
(-AT) Something x is (-)at a level L iff L is a level, x is part of L, and x 
satisfies . 
Now that we have completed our informal analysis of hierarchies, levels, and 
higher than, we are able give it a regimented reconstruction using the relational predicate 
calculus (Appendix A) or a very basic model theory (Appendix B). I intend the 
regimented reconstruction to be used by computer modelers, scientists, ontologists, and 
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philosophers who hope to use hierarchies in their work and to prove things about 
hierarchy-based theories. Let us consider some objections to Core Hierarchy Theory 
before we proceed to this reconstruction. 
3.0 Objections to Core Hierarchy Theory 
For some, this analysis might seem suspiciously simple. I anticipate three main 
objections. First, critics might insist that the analysis is overly general: that the set of 
definitions provided imply that intuitively non-hierarchical structures turn out to be 
hierarchical. Second, it might be objected that the analysis provided implies that higher 
than is arbitrary. And third, it might be objected that the understanding of level provided 
by Core Hierarchy Theory is too deflationary; it becomes an empty notion. 
3.1 The “Too General” Objection 
The first reaction one might have to the SPO account is that it is overly general. If being 
an SPO is sufficient for being a higher than relation, then a collection that is linked by the 
to the left of relation counts as a hierarchy. For example, Mary’s being to the left of John. 
Such collections are not common examples of hierarchies. 
 In fact, there is empirical evidence which supports the idea that to the left of is a 
hierarchical relation. Consider Mary’s being to the left of John. Replacing ‘to the left of’ 





Mary ← John 
Our empirical evidence is acquired from the following procedure, which I rely on you to 
perform: physically turn this page clockwise by ninety degrees. Voila! We encounter a 
hierarchy. Although the names are written sideways, we can plainly see that Mary is 
higher than John in this hierarchy (when maintaining the convention that the higher than 
arrow points to what is higher). We can perform the same procedure with respect to is to 
the right of. Of course, we have not created anything by turning the page; we simply 
change our perspective. The hierarchy, evidently, was there all along.  
These are only simple examples. There are others. It is possible to string together 
a collection of branching hierarchies in a way that does not seem to yield a hierarchy at 




For those who deny that the zigzagging Figure 12 represents a hierarchy, the SPO 
account will be unsatisfying. 
 But what argument justifies this denial? There are, in fact, straightforward 
examples of hierarchical organizations that take the zigzag structure: some terrorist 
organizations have no singular hierarch (i.e. an agent at the top-level). Instead they have a 
collection of cells which have contact with, and take orders from, only a handful of 
higher level coordinators, none of whom answer to anyone in particular. Terrorist 




hierarchies, then, are often “short and wide” in the sort of manner depicted in Figure 12. 
The possibility of extremely complex zigzagging strict partial orders thus does not appear 
problematic for the SPO analysis of higher than, or the Core Hierarchy Theory it informs. 
3.2 The Arbitrariness Objection 
One noteworthy feature of the process used to establish higher than as a strict partial 
order is that an analogous process can be used to establish the same thing with respect to 
lower than; any hierarchy can simply be flipped upside-down. That is the inversion 
principle from the previous chapter.  
This gives rise to another potential problem for the SPO analysis: it appears that 
higher than is an arbitrary relation. This arbitrariness might be problematic in one of two 
ways. First, if there is no substantive difference separating higher from lower, that might 
be taken to straightforwardly entail that there is nothing substantive about higher than. It 
is, one might think, a useless or meaningless relation. 
But there is a substantial difference between these two relations: one is the 
converse of the other. If having a converse means a relation is meaningless, then why 
bother talking about relations at all? Every binary relation has a converse. 
The second way to deride the arbitrariness resulting from Core Hierarchy Theory 
is to spot a potential reductio: if lower than is a strict partial order, and any strict partial 
order is a higher than relation, then it straightforwardly follows that anything lower than 
something else is also higher than that something. But that appears to conflict with one of 
the foundational principles of Core Hierarchy Theory: the incompatibility principle 
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requires that if Jill is higher than Bob, then Jill is not lower than Bob. Core Hierarchy 
Theory might then appear to contain an internal contradiction. 
But the contradiction is only an appearance. The SPO account tells us that any 
strict partial order yields a higher than structure, but that does not mean that every strict 
partial order yields the same higher than structure. In fact, throughout the development of 
the Core Hierarchy Theory, I have been assuming that things stand higher than only 
relative to some particular higher than structure; ‘higher than’ can be interpreted in many 
ways. If, for example, Jill is higher than Bob in one interpretation there could 
nevertheless be a different hierarchy in which Jill is lower than Bob.  
Although it is true that the lower than relation is a strict partial order, this only 
means that the lower than ordering can always be reinterpreted as a higher than ordering. 
As long as two levels are not both higher and lower than each other relative to the same 
interpretation of ‘higher than’, the reductio can be avoided. With respect to some 
hierarchy, H1, Bob might indeed be lower than Jill; and yes, since lower than is also a 
strict partial order, there is indeed a hierarchy, H2, in which Bob is higher than Jill. But in 
this case, Bob’s being higher than Jill only holds relative to H2. We are dealing with 
different hierarchies: since their levels are ordered differently, H1 ≠ H2. With respect to 
H1, Bob is still the lower one; with respect to H2 Bob is the higher one. The reductio can 
therefore be avoided. 
3.3 The Emptiness Objection 
Two notable aspects of Core Hierarchy Theory are its account of higher than and its 
account of level. It was argued that any asymmetric and transitive relation can be 
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considered a higher than relation, and the notion of level was characterized at the relata 
of any such relation. This account of hierarchical levels might be cause for some concern. 
The concern is not that the account is false, but rather that it is uninteresting. 
 To think of a level simply as the relata of higher than is indeed a deflationary 
account of level. But it is not the purpose of Core Hierarchy Theory to reveal any deep 
insights into the metaphysics of hierarchical levels. The purpose is only to capture what is 
meant by ‘hierarchy’ in the simplest and most general terms, and to provide a backdrop 
for the investigation of more substantive questions about theories and models that utilize 
hierarchical structures. In fact, there is a risk of including too much substance within Core 
Hierarchy Theory. To give a more substantive analysis of level risks making Core 
Hierarchy Theory overly specific and unnecessarily complicated; the foundational 
purpose of Core Hierarchy Theory is thereby sacrificed. Staying non-committal on the 
notion of level is one way of mitigating that risk. 
Also note that the account of level inherent in Core Hierarchy Theory is not 
entirely trivial; it was argued, recall, that levels are sorts of collections (in the 
mereological sense of ‘collection’). Specifically, they are collections of those things said 
to be “at” a level, which is partially determined by whoever is offering the hierarchical 
analysis. Maintaining a deflationist account of ‘level’ within Core Hierarchy Theory 
allows more leeway for the hierarchical analyst: the more substantive aspects of any 
theory or model that utilizes hierarchical structure are to remain unspecified in Core 
Hierarchy Theory. With all this in mind, the triviality concern appears misplaced; the 
emptiness of ‘level’ is, in fact, intentional and should be viewed as an advantage. 
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4.0 Consequences of Core Hierarchy Theory 
Recall from the introduction that the central thesis of this dissertation involves three 
claims: that hierarchical Realism is true, that Metaphysical-MLE appears false, and that 
Reductionism is false. Having formulated a precise notion of what a hierarchy is, we can 
now put it to work. Core Hierarchy Theory, I will now argue, supports Realism; it implies 
that hierarchies are indeed to be found in the world insofar as the subjects of interest in 
ecology actually exist.82 
There are other notable consequences as well. I also argue that Core Hierarchy 
Theory implies that the ‘is a level of’ relation is not generally transitive, intransitive, 
asymmetric, or irreflexive. These results sound tame, but they are informative.  
Lastly, an adherence to Core Hierarchy Theory settles the issue of whether or not 
nested hierarchies, in the sense described by Allen and Starr (1982), Allen and Ahl 
(1996), Simon (1962), and Webster (1979), are coherent, motivated, and well-suited for a 
characterization of the ecological hierarchy. Nested hierarchies, I argue, are all these 
things, since it follows from Core Hierarchy – the simplest and most general account of 
hierarchies – that every (unrestricted) compositional hierarchy83 is a level of itself, which 
suggests that every (such) compositional hierarchy is nested. I acquire these results using 
standard philosophical argumentation below, and then I reacquire them more rigorously 
                                                   
82 Also recall from the introduction that it is a fundamental assumption of this dissertation that the subjects 
of scientific discourse (hierarchies notwithstanding) really do exist. Keller and Golley call this assumption 
“metaphysical-epistemic realism.” (2000, p. 12) 
 
83 Recall that I add the ‘unrestricted’ qualification to pick out only hierarchies in which the contents of 
levels have not been restricted by -constraints imposed on the parthood (i.e., “is at”) relation. This 
qualification allows that there are compositional hierarchies which are not subject to our results: those 
hierarchies in which the contents of levels are specified using a -part relationship rather than the primitive 
parthood relation. Recall that these “restricted” hierarchies are non-basic; they are nothing more than 
unrestricted hierarchies in which some of the contents are ignored by fiat. 
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within Appendix B, which is a formal reconstruction of the Core Hierarchy Theory 
developed over the course of the past two chapters. Having shown that Core Hierarchy 
Theory implies that every (unrestricted) compositional hierarchy is nested, there is 
nothing at all wrong with the idea that the ecological hierarchy, qua a compositional 
hierarchy, is a nested hierarchy. 
4.1 An Argument for Hierarchical Realism 
Hierarchies, I contend, are collections of levels that are internally linked by a relation 
with certain formal characteristics – viz., asymmetry and transitivity. If we suppose that 
there is a reified collection that is linked by a relationship which has these characteristics, 
then it follows that there is a reified hierarchy. 
 There are many such collections. Although there is some dispute regarding the 
properties of the relationship of proper-parthood, the classical characterization takes it to 
be a strict partial order. Since we are idiomatically using ‘collection’ to pick out those 
individuals with proper-parts, it follows that composites are collections. Composites are 
not identical to their proper-parts (Lewis 1991, is convincing when he points out that the 
composite is a single thing while the parts are many), and proper-parthood is a strict 
partial order. Core Hierarchy Theory then tells us that there are hierarchies everywhere 
there is a composite object. 
 We can also take relative size as an example. Is-bigger-than is a strict partial 
order, and there are plenty of examples of things being bigger than others. Find three 
books of differing sizes, and remove them from the shelf with one hand. There you are; 
you have a simple three level hierarchy. You are holding it right in your hand. Now take 
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a look at your bookshelf. More than likely, each shelf is further from the ground than 
some other shelf, expect for the bottom. Further-from-the-ground-than is another strict 
partial order. And so, again, we see that these objectors to the reality of hierarchies are 
harboring them in their very own living quarters! 
 Finally, there is something to be said when it comes to the role of hierarchies 
within scientific practice. The is-a-sub-system-of and is-a-sub-mechanism of relation is 
also a strict partial order. Biological, neural, and medical sciences make frequent use of 
the concept of a system and of a mechanism (MDC 2000, Glennan 1996, 2002). On all of 
these accounts, it is important for the mechanistic scientist to describe the entities, 
activities, properties, and relations that come together to make a sufficient difference to 
the occurrence of a phenomena.   
Some systemic and mechanistic phenomena are not so simply produced. 
Neurologists must look at relations between cellular and molecular phenomena, as well 
as their connection to conscious experience. For a patient with renal troubles, she should 
hope to find a doctor interested in the source of renal failure at many levels. It is 
important to know whether it was a physical blow, a vascular problem, a sort of poison, 
or whether it was genetics that was responsible for the kidney problem. Each of these 
sources corresponds to a different compositional level of the renal system: a karate kick 
to the kidney is a high-level source; narrowed blood vessels are lower level components 
of the renal system; poisons are found within those blood vessels; and genetic 
abnormalities are the lowest source of failure. Knowing the source of the problem is 
helpful in treating it. This establishes kidney function as a multi-level phenomenon and 
the renal system as a multi-level system (or mechanism).  
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We can conclude, then, that Core Hierarchy Theory implies that there are 
hierarchies to be found in the world. We see it in the standard ontology of parts and 
wholes; we see it within our scientific practices and explanations, and we even see it in 
our own homes, should we care to look. Taking basic scientific realism for granted, since 
there are objects of scientific interest that can be collected such that those collections 
stand in asymmetric and transitive relations, it straightforwardly follows from Core 
Hierarchy Theory that there are hierarchies. Of course, it does not follow from Core 
Hierarchy Theory that every hierarchy used within science actually exists, but insofar as 
ECOHIERARCHY is a collection of real things ordered by composition, its existence is 
justified by Core Hierarchy Theory.   
To challenge this defense of Realism requires one of three things: a skeptical 
stance towards basic scientific realism, lingering doubts that the objects of scientific 
interest can be collected such that there is an asymmetric and transitive relation holding 
between those collections, or a skeptical stance towards Core Hierarchy Theory itself.  
I have little to say to those who doubt basic scientific realism. It was listed as one 
of our fundamental assumptions in the introduction; to defend it takes us beyond the 
scope of the present work. But for the other skeptical concerns, something must be said in 
effort to dispel them. For those who doubt that the objects of scientific discourse can be 
collected and ordered in the manner required by our argument, let us be reminded of the 
ecological hierarchy in the first chapter. Unless one can object to the “collect and order” 
process used to characterize ECOHIERARCHY in that chapter, those doubts should be 
quelled. For those skeptical of Core Hierarchy Theory itself, let us be reminded that it is 
the result of an extended argument occupying this and the previous chapter. Does the 
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source of doubt involve the claim that hierarchies are mereological collections of levels, 
that levels are themselves mereological collections, or that higher than is simply a name 
given to asymmetric and transitive relations? Without a clear reason to cast doubt on the 
specific arguments given in favor of these three contentious aspects, there is little reason 
to cast doubt on Realism. Nor is there reason to cast doubt on the direct consequences of 
Core Hierarchy Theory yet to be mentioned. 
4.2 Transitivity of ‘is a level of’ 
Let us now turn to some of the other consequences of Core Hierarchy Theory. Since they 
rely heavily on the notion of a higher than relation, let us henceforth designate this 
relation using the h-bar symbol: Ћ. The formal properties of Ћ have already been 
investigated within our hierarchy theory (Appendix A contains further developments), 
but this still leaves us to inquire into the formal properties of the is-a-level-of relation. Is 
it transitive? Is it symmetric? Is it reflexive?  
 It is doubtful that the ‘level of’ relation is generally transitive. To say x is a level 
of H is transitive would be to say that levels of one hierarchy H are, ipso facto, also levels 
of any hierarchy that has H as one of its levels.84 For example, if Doug is the lowest 
member of the accounting department, and the accounting department is the lowest level 
of the organizational hierarchy, then given transitivity, Doug is the lowest member of the 
organization. Superficially, the reasoning appears sound. 
 Although there are contexts in which transitivity is satisfied, there are cases in 
which it fails. Consider two hierarchies A, and B, and suppose that A has two levels, d 
                                                   
84 Where Lxy is ‘x is a level of y’: for any x, y and z, if Lxy and Lyz, then Lxz. 
155 
 
and e, and that B has three levels f, g, and h. Since the A and B can be collected together 
and ordered by the has a greater number of levels than relation – a strict partial order – 
the collection of hierarchies A and B is thus itself a hierarchy, H, with A and B as levels: 
B is higher than A by virtue of B’s having one extra level. 
 But let us now suppose that the letters ‘a’ through ‘h’ designate things that are not 
hierarchies: things that have no levels. Since a through h cannot be ordered by the has a 
greater number of levels than relation, a through h are therefore not levels of the main 
hierarchy, H; although they are indeed parts of H. Transitivity thus fails in this case. The 
‘is a level of’ relation is therefore neither generally transitive nor generally intransitive. 
4.3 Asymmetry, Irreflexivity, and ‘is a level of’ 
We can also see that an asymmetry constraint also fails for the is a level of relation. If 
asymmetry were to hold, then so would irreflexivity. That is, if x’s being a level of H 
implies that H is not a level of x (asymmetry), then it would immediately follow that x 
could not be a level of itself (irreflexivity). But, having argued that levels are parts of 
hierarchies, it can then be shown that there are hierarchies which break the irreflexivity 
constraint. And so, the is a level of relation cannot be generally asymmetric. I describe 
one such reflexive hierarchy in what follows. 
Let UNIVERSE be the total summation of everything there is in the domain of 
quantification, for some such domain. By ‘summation’ here, I mean to invoke the 
mereological operation of fusion. Summations, or sums, are the result of fusion 
operations on things called parts. Although it is contentious whether or not the fusion 
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operation has a restricted or unrestricted application, we can stipulate that we are 
beginning with a domain of quantification that permits all of its contents to be fused. 
Philosophers distinguish between two types of parts. They distinguish parthood 
from proper-parthood. Parthood is a simple partial ordering: reflexive, anti-symmetric, 
and transitive. Proper-parthood, on the other hand, is a strict partial ordering commonly 
defined in terms of the parthood relation (though you can always do things the other way 
and define parthood in terms of proper-parthood). Proper-parthood is irreflexive, 
asymmetric, and transitive. 
This distinction is important. It allows us to associate a hierarchy with 
UNIVERSE. Since proper-parthood is a strict partial order, Core Hierarchy Theory 
implies the existence of a hierarchical structure. And so, since UNIVERSE is the 
summation of everything in the domain, it follows from Core Hierarchy Theory that there 
is a hierarchy H with UNIVERSE as the top level of H: UNIVERSE is the terminal relata 
in a (rather large) chain of proper-parthood.85 
However, since UNIVERSE is the summation of everything within the domain of 
quantification, and since we have derived that H is something that “is” (i.e., we are 
quantifying over it), it follows that H is a part (either proper or improper) of UNIVERSE. 
But, since levels are parts of hierarchies (as argued in the previous chapter), and Core 
Hierarchy Theory implies that UNIVERSE is a level of H, it follows that UNIVERSE is 
part (either proper or improper) of H. And so, we have derived both that UNIVERSE is 
part of H and H is part of UNIVERSE.  
                                                   
85 Or perhaps the bottom level of H, invoking the inversion principle. Whether UNIVERSE is the top or 




As we are already aware, the proper-parthood relation is asymmetric: UNIVERSE 
and H thus cannot stand in the proper-parthood relation. So, they must stand in the 
general parthood relation. Parthood, we know, is anti-symmetric: if x is part of y and y is 
part of x, then x = y. Therefore, it follows that H = UNIVERSE. UNIVERSE, it turns out, 
is both the top level86 of its parthood hierarchy, as well as that parthood hierarchy itself. 
We can only conclude, then, that it is possible for a hierarchy to be a level of itself. The is 
a level of relation is not generally asymmetric. 
4.4 Compositional Hierarchies are Levels of Themselves? 
What we see above is only a single example. It has not been shown that Core Hierarchy 
Theory implies that compositional hierarchies are, in general, levels of themselves. We 
have only shown that there are hierarchies that are levels of themselves. But, in fact, we 
can generalize this argument with respect to any composite object, not just our 
UNIVERSE toy-example.  
First let us take for granted Core Hierarchy Theory: hierarchies are collections 
whose levels are (primitive) parts of it which stand higher than other (primitive) parts of 
it. Levels are collections whose (primitive) parts are their contents. I use the primitive 
interpretation of parthood, rather than a -part (e.g., functional part, -part) interpretation 
in the spirit of parsimony, but at the expense of full generality: set-theory based 
hierarchies are beyond the scope of everything that follows.  
To generalize the result from the preceding section, we merely crop everything 
from the domain of quantification except the composite object in question and its parts. 
                                                   
86 Or bottom level, if you choose to reason upside-down. 
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By doing so, the composite object O becomes a UNIVERSE of sorts. Since O has proper-
parts, Core Hierarchy Theory implies that there is also a hierarchy H* associated with O, 
which consists only of O and its parts. Since we are only quantifying over O and its parts, 
and we have just now quantified over H*, it follows that H* is part of O: either a proper 
or improper-part. Moreover, since O is a level of H*, and Core Hierarchy Theory implies 
that levels are parts of hierarchies, O is thus a part of H*. Since O is part of H* and H* is 
part of O, the anti-symmetry of primitive-parthood entails that O=H*. H*, is therefore a 
level of itself. Since we can do this for any composite object, it follows that everything 
with proper-parts is a level of itself with respect to its unrestricted parthood, or 
“compositional”, hierarchy.  
This, of course, does not imply that every possible compositional hierarchy is a 
level of itself: set-based hierarchies are beyond the reach of this sort of argument. There 
are no sets in the domain, by stipulation, and so we have shown nothing about set-based 
hierarchies. The argument applies only to the simplest sort of compositional hierarchy: 
the sort that consists only in the composite and its parts. 
Even with this qualification, the result is unexpected and puzzling. Perhaps too 
puzzling; it might cause concern for Core Hierarchy Theory. The notion of a reflexive 
level is something that appears prima facie incoherent. When reasoning diagramatically, 
it appears to entail a contradiction. If H is a hierarchy consisting of levels A, B, and C, 
such that H = A; and if H* is a hierarchy consisting of levels B and C, and H*= B, then it 
appears to follow that B is higher than itself (relative to H): it is found within both levels 
A and B. But, given the asymmetry of Ћ this is impossible. The situation is depicted in 
Figure 13.  
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The diagram is misleading. It is made to appear that that B in level A is higher than B in 
level B because the diagram portrays two hierarchies stacked one on top of the other, 
yielding what appears to be six levels in total for H. But, recall from above, the is a level 
of relation is not generally transitive. H only contains three levels: the three levels 
separated by a solid line in H, which are the same as the three separated by dashed lines 
in A (Figure 13). The B-level that is designated by short-dashed lines in B in Figure 13, is 
within another hierarchy altogether: H*, a two-level hierarchy. B, therefore, is not higher 
than itself relative to H, nor to H*.  
Another factor giving rise to the appearance of incoherence is that B is contained 
in a level higher than itself. But again, the incoherence is only an appearance. Since the 
higher than relation explicitly relates levels, being contained within a higher level than 
oneself does not entail being higher than oneself. Recall from the first chapter that we 
drew a distinction between the higher than (i.e., is a higher level than) and the is at a 
higher level than relations. With that distinction in mind, all the diagram really suggests 
is that hierarchies can stand in the higher than relation with one another (e.g., H is higher 












Figure 13: A Reflexive Hierarchy -- H has levels A, B, C; H* has levels B and 




 Besides, Figure 13 is not the best way to visualize the situation. Visualizing 
hierarchies diagrammatically can be useful in simple cases, but this does not mean that a 
visual paradigm is the best way to investigate the nuances of the structure. In fact, there is 
a familiar image that depicts the situation a bit better than Figure 13. Consider Figure 14, 
below. 
Figure 14, recall, is how we depicted the nested ecological hierarchy, 
ECOHIERARCHY, in the first chapter. We might then consider the coherence of our 
original depiction of it to be vindicated. If all basic compositional hierarchies (“basic” in 
that they consist only of the composite and its parts) are levels of themselves, 87 viz., the 
top-level, then a two-level compositional hierarchy will be the second level of itself, a 
three-level hierarchy the third level, and so on. A three-level basic compositional 
hierarchy is simply a two-level hierarchy with an extra level on top; or, more generally, 
an n-level (where n>2) basic compositional hierarchy is a n-1 level hierarchy with an 
extra level on top. Since levels are primitive-parts of hierarchies and primitive-parthood 
is transitive, those levels that are themselves hierarchies are such that their levels are also 
                                                   
87 For a proof of this generalization that utilizes an even more general understanding of ‘compositional 
hierarchy’, see Appendix B. But again, note that the generalization is only intended to apply to 
compositional hierarchies that utilize the unrestricted (i.e., undefined) notion of being “at” a level (viz., 
parthood).   
A (= H) 
B (= H*) 
C 





primitive-parts of the n+1 level. Every level of these bare compositional hierarchies, then, 
is also found at all levels higher than it. For a generalized presentation of this result, see 
Theorem 4 of Appendix B. 
  These basic compositional hierarchies, therefore, are nested hierarchies qua top-
levels of themselves. Although we acquired this result informally, a formal presentation 
can be given. In the appendices that follow this chapter, I give two formal reconstructions 
of Core Hierarchy Theory. The first uses nothing but the resources of the standard 
predicate logic (Appendix A). I use it to show how one might expand the vocabulary of 
Core Hierarchy Theory.  
The second formulation (Appendix B) is far more compact and useful for 
theorem-proving. I take it to be the definitive formulation of the unrestricted Core 
Hierarchy Theory, and I use it to rigorously recover the main results from our (largely 
informal) investigation. When I refer to Core Hierarchy Theory from this point forward, 
please note that I am referring to the articulation given in Appendix B, and no other.   
5.0 Conclusion 
The central purpose of this chapter was to develop and defend a general theory of 
hierarchies qua hierarchies, as the notion is used within philosophy and the sciences. I 
began, in the last chapter, with a review of the available theories of hierarchies. All of 
them were problematic. I began this chapter with a superficial description of the notion of 
hierarchy that they were trying to capture precisely. Building and refining each aspect of 
this superficial notion proved fruitful. Not only were we able to repair the problems with 
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the standard view of hierarchies, the strict partial order view, we were also able to argue 
for it. 
The argument for the view came in two parts. First, I argued that asymmetry and 
transitivity are necessary conditions for a relation to count as a higher than relation. 
Second, I argued that these properties are also sufficient to count as a higher than 
relation; I showed that, given any strict partial order on a set, an isomorphic higher than 
structure can be given via recursion. 
The account of hierarchies provided helped to make progress towards the central 
thesis of this dissertation by providing a compelling reason to favor the hierarchical 
Realism of Salthe over the Anti-realism of Allen and Starr (under the assumptions 
specified in the introductory chapter). We argued that since hierarchies are collections of 
things ordered by a higher than relation, and since there are real collections of things 
related by real strict partial orders – e.g., turtles are related to their proper-parts via a 
proper-parthood relation – it follows that there are, at least some, “real” hierarchies.  
To end the chapter, I argued that in certain compositional hierarchies the is a level 
of relation is reflexive; moreover, under the unrestricted interpretation of “is at”, Core 
Hierarchy Theory implies that all compositional hierarchies (that consist only of the 
whole and its parts) are levels of themselves. This feature of hierarchies is surprising. But 
nevertheless, it clarifies and vindicates the coherence of Allen and Starr’s bold 
characterization of the ecological hierarchy, which is so often misunderstood. It also adds 
credence to the views of Simon and Webster (see Chapter 2) who draw an analogy 
between hierarchies of systems and an assortment of nested “Chinese boxes” in which the 
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larger systems/boxes contain the smaller. (Webster 1979, p. 120) In appendices A and B 
to this chapter, I formalize Core Hierarchy Theory, and use that formalization to 
generalize the main results of this chapter as theorems (but with a more general 
characterization of ‘compositional hierarchy’). The definitive statement of Core 
Hierarchy Theory, as well as its theorems, can be found in Appendix B. 
In the coming chapters I put these theorems to work. In the next two chapters I 
use Core Hierarchy Theory to argue for the remaining conjuncts of our central thesis. In 
the next chapter, I discuss what is commonly known as “the layered worldview” with 
respect to the philosophical positions of Reductionism and Holism (which, recall, is a sort 
of anti-reductionism). I argue that Core Hierarchy Theory, insofar as we accept it, 





Appendix A: A First-Order Reconstruction of Core Hierarchy Theory 
To reconstruct our naïve Core Hierarchy Theory (CHT) in formal terms, there is no need 
to specify which relation counts as higher than. We can take it as a primitive, in the same 
way ‘is part of’ is treated in formal mereology. Mereologists, however, take parthood as 
primitive because they have no account of it; here we take higher than as primitive out of 
convenience. The main chapter gives reason to think that it is simply the name given to a 
strict partial order relation of particular interest. We can account for this insight using a 
second-order extension to CHT, as I demonstrate below. 
1.0 Preliminaries 
Let H be a domain of individuals and h be an interpretation that assigns the symbol ‘Ћ’ to 
any relation on H that satisfies the axioms listed below. Let ‘@’ designate the general 
parthood relation on H. Where ‘x’ and ‘y’ are variables, and ‘Ћh’ denotes an arbitrary 
interpretation of the higher than relation on H.88 We can express ‘x is higher than y (on 
interpretation h)’ as: 
 (P1) xЋhy       (Higher than)  
With this primitive, we can define its converse, ‘is lower-than’: 
 (D1) xȽhy =df yЋ
hx      (Lower) 
We can also use Ћ to define the ‘is a level of’ relation that stands between levels and 
hierarchies (D2).  
                                                   
88 I use collection rather than hierarchy here since there are higher than structures that are not hierarchies: 
e.g. the broken hierarchy from the second chapter. 
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 (D2) Lxh =df y(xЋ
hy  yЋhx)  x@h    (Level) 
D2 captures the idea that a level (relative to some hierarchy) is a part of that hierarchy 
that stands in the higher than relation with another part of the hierarchy. Recall from the 
main chapter our deflationary account of levels: levels are simply the relata of higher 
than. The contents of those levels, it was argued, stand in the is at a higher level than 
relation.  
The Ћ relation is also useful in characterizing the notion a hierarchy itself (D3): 
(D3)  Hh =df xLxh  h*h**(x((Lxh*  Lxh**)  Lxh)  x(Lxh*  
Lxh**) → xy(Lxh*  Lyh**  (xЋhy  yЋhx)))  (Hierarchy) 
The second conjunct of D3 is simply a formalization of the linkage requirement from our 
naïve account. It ensures that for every way of partitioning the collection into two sub-
collections without remainder, those sub-collections are linked by the higher than 
relation.89  
This Ћ relation is also sufficient to characterize the axioms of incompatibility and 
transitivity: 
 (A1) xЋhy → xȽhy           (Incompatibility) 
 (A2) (xЋhy  yЋhz) → xЋhz     (Transitivity) 
From this we can, of course, derive the irreflexivity and asymmetry of Ћ: 
                                                   
89 The second conjunct of D3 can be omitted by those who affirm broken hierarchies as genuine 




 (T1) xЋhx        (Irreflexivity) 
 (T2) xЋhy → yЋhx      (Asymmetry) 
And this completes the lexical core of our naïve hierarchy theory, taken as a first-order 
theory. CHT1 = D1 +D2 + D3 + A1 + A2. Given this CHT, it follows from D2, D3 and 
T1 that: 
 (T3) Hh → xy(Lxh  Lyh  x≠y)    (Pairs) 
which says that every hierarchy has at least two distinct levels. 
2.0 Extensions to CHT 
One advantage of stating our CHT using quantificational logic is that it is easily 
extended. Although I will not attempt to provide a complete theory of hierarchies here, I 
will suggest a few different ways in which our theory can be extended.  
2.1 The Second-Order Extension 
As a first-order theory, we must take an interpretation of Ћ as a primitive. To extend 
CHT in a way that eliminates the primitiveness, we can give a second-order 
characterization of Ћ itself.  
(D4) ixЋiy   R(xRy  mno((mRn → nRm)  ((mRn  nRo) → 
mRo))) 
In other words, there is an interpretation on which x is higher than y if and only if there is 
some relation, R, such that x stands R to y, and R is a strict partial order: it is asymmetric 
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and transitive. This second-order extension is given as, CHT2 = D1 +D2 +D3 +D4 + A1 
+ A2.  
2.2 Axiomatic Extensions to CHT 
With the predicates comprising the lexical core of CHT – xЋy, xȽy, Lxh, Hh – we have a 
way to describe a variety of different hierarchies. The variable designating the 
interpretation of ‘Ћ’ will be henceforth suppressed out of convenience. Besides, we have 
now defined it. 
(E1) x(Lxh → y(Lyh  yЋx)    (Topless Hierarchies) 
(E2) x(Lxh → y(Lyh  xЋy))         (Bottomless Hierarchies) 
To describe a hierarchy with a top – that is, a highest level – one merely negates E1. 
Negating E2 gives us a hierarchy with a fundamental level. And to describe a finite 
hierarchy, one merely gives the negation of both E1 and E2.  
These predicates also suffice to describe the two major sorts of hierarchies: 
branching and non-branching (linear) hierarchies: 
(E3) xy((Lxh  Lyh) → (xЋy  yЋx))    (Linearity) 
(E4)  xy(Lxh  Lyh  xЋy  yЋx)    (Branching) 
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3.0 Definitional Extensions to CHT 
By extending the list of definitions, we can describe relations between levels and even 
describe relations that hold between different hierarchies. Let us begin with relations that 
hold between levels.  
(D5) CPzxy =df zЋx  zЋy    (Common Parent) 
(D6) CDzxy =df xЋz  yЋz   (Common Descendant) 
(D7) CIzxy =df (xЋz  zЋy)  (yЋz  zЋx) (Common Intermediary) 
In other words, the class of common parents of x and y are all those levels which are 
higher than both x and y, the common descendants of levels x and y are all those levels 
which are lower than both x and y, and the class of common intermediaries of x and y are 
all those levels which form a chain between x and y. 
The ‘level of’ relation that holds between levels and hierarchies (or perhaps 
between two hierarchies) can also be used to define hierarchical correlates of well-known 
mereological notions: 
(D8) Oxy =df z(Lzx  Lzy)    (Level-overlap) 
(D9) Uxy =df z(Lxz  Lyz)   (Level-underlap) 
(D10) OXxy =df Oxy  Lxy   (Over-cross) 
(D11) UXxy =df Uxy  Lxy   (Under-cross) 
(D12) HCxy =df z(Lzx → Lzy)   (Hierarchical Containment) 
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Overlap occurs when two hierarchies share a level in common. Underlap picks out 
situations in which two things are both levels of the same hierarchy. Over-cross describes 
situations in which two hierarchies have a level in common, but the first hierarchy is not 
a level of (not contained within) the second hierarchy – they cross-over one another. 
Under-crossing describes situations when two things are levels of the same hierarchy but 
the first thing is not a level of the second thing. Lastly, hierarchical containment describes 
what it is for one hierarchy to be contained within another.  
 By now it is clear that further extensions to CHT are possible. As noted before, 
however, fleshing out a complete hierarchy theory is a daunting task, and my purposes 
here do not require it. It should be obvious, however, that the relational predicate calculus 
can be used to underwrite a rich, and perfectly general, theory of hierarchies. 
 There is one deficiency of the first-order approach. The theory we have given 
ignores the contents of levels. A more robust formal apparatus is therefore needed. I 





Appendix B: Theorems For Unrestricted Hierarchies 
The terminology here is idiomatic, but consistent with the rest of the dissertation. Here 
‘individual’ picks out those things within the grasp of our singular quantifiers; and 
‘collection’ picks out a special sort of individual that has other individuals as proper-
parts.90 
Taking for granted the first order predicate calculus, we can define a model of 
hierarchical structure H (of kind o)91 to be an ordered triple that satisfies (i), (ii), (iii), 
Axiom 1 and Axiom 2 found below: 
Ho = <H, <Ћ, @,>, o>  
Where: 
(i) H is a collection (viz., the hierarchy) and every proper-part of H is an 
individual found in the domain of discourse. 
a. Let HTH = the sub-class of all asymmetric and transitive binary 
relations on H.92 Call them the higher than relations on H. 
(ii) <Ћ, @> is a signature of symbols consisting of, in the first place, the two-
place predicate x higher than y, and in the second place, the two place 
predicate is-at, to be taken as a primitive-parthood relation.  
                                                   
90 Although I take ‘proper-part’ as a primitive within the meta-language; for purposes of proof, I later 
define proper-parthood using the resources of the object language being developed. Since the definition is 
the standard one in mereology, this subtle overlap should not lead to any problems.  
 
91 Take note the difference between a model of a hierarchical structure and a hierarchical structure. A 
model of a hierarchical structure is an n-tuple consisting of a domain, a signature of symbols, and an 
interpretation function. A hierarchical structure (in the most general sense) is that which we are modeling. 
 
92 Although relations are typically defined on sets, we must alter this conception in order to avoid problems 
with collections that have no set of parts, for fear of antimony. Instead, let us define a relation on a 
collection C as a set of ordered pairs (x,y) such that x and y are both parts of C. 
171 
 
(iii) o is an interpretation function, from the symbols in the signature into HTH:  
a. o(Ћ) is exactly one element of HTH, called the specified ordering 
relation.  
b. o(@) is the parthood relation on H, called the association relation. 
The interpretation function o determines what type of hierarchy is being modeled: a 
parthood hierarchy, an asymmetric supervenience hierarchy, a “has power over” 
hierarchy, etc.  
For those puzzled by (iii)-(b), recall from Chapter 2 that we argued that levels are 
parts of hierarchies on the grounds that a mereological characterization offers the 
simplest and most general account of hierarchies qua hierarchies. One might think that 
set-membership is a more familiar way to characterize the relationship, but again recall 
from Chapter 2 the argument that the set-based characterizations of hierarchies is not the 
most general approach to understanding hierarchical structure: we argued that 
elementhood is a sort of parthood: a specific and restricted sort of parthood. The purpose 
of this Appendix is to explore the logical consequences of the most unrestricted sort of 
hierarchy. Nevertheless, the above definition can be used to model any restricted 
hierarchy one finds favorable; one need only specify the sort of -parthood relevant for 
that restriction. For example, o(@) might have set-membership as its value. Of course, 
the theorems derived here, under the unrestricted interpretation, should not be taken to 
apply to these restricted interpretations of ‘@’.  
From the recursion arguments found in the main chapter, we say that any strict 
partial order is a higher than order; and so, for any member of HTH, there is a 
corresponding Ћ. This does not imply that there is a corresponding hierarchy.  Not just 
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any higher than collection counts as a hierarchy. All and only those collections which are 
Ћ-linked count as a hierarchy. To formalize this requirement, let us, relative to an 
arbitrary interpretation, define what it is to be a level of H, viz. the higher than collection, 
and use that definition to specify two axioms: the aforementioned Axiom 1 and Axiom 2. 
(Definition 1) LxH =df y(xЋy  yЋx)  x@H   (is a level of H) 
(Axiom 1) xLxH       (Existential axiom) 
(Axiom 2) h1h2(x((Lxh1  Lxh2)  LxH)  x(Lxh1  Lxh2) → xy(Lxh1  
Lyh2  (xЋy  yЋx)))    (Linkage axiom) 
Definition 1 captures the idea that levels are parts of collections which stand higher than 
other parts of that collection. Contents of levels, recall, are not taken to stand in this 
relation; according to Core Hierarchy Theory, they stand in the is at a higher level than 
relation. The is at a higher level than relation is left unspecified; there are a variety of 
different ways that such a relation can be specified. One’s preferred specification can be 
given as an axiom added to the two provided above.  
The existential axiom ensures that the hierarchy has a level. And the linkage 
axiom requires that for every way H can be partitioned into two non-overlapping sub-
collections, h1 and h2, there is always some part x of the first sub-collection and some part 
y of the second sub-collection such that one stands higher than the other. To distinguish 
structures that satisfy only the first axiom from those that satisfy both, let us say that Ho is 
considered a model of higher than structure iff Ho satisfies Axiom 1 but not Axiom 2. 
Keeping with our original definition, let us maintain that Ho is a model of hierarchical 
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structure iff Ho satisfies clauses (i) - (iii), as well as Axiom 1 and Axiom 2. Having 
defined a model of hierarchical structure, we can finally say, formally, what a hierarchy 
is: it is the collection found within a model of hierarchical structure. 
(Definition 2) for any c, c is a hierarchy iff for some model of hierarchical structure Ho, 
Ho  =  <c, <Ћ,@>, o>  
Having said what a hierarchy is, there is still something missing. As stated, a model of a 
hierarchical structure involves some individual, namely, a collection. Pluralities, 
however, might also be said to exhibit a hierarchical structure, so they too must be 
accounted for by our core hierarchy theory. Let us say that a plurality, the xs, exhibits a 
hierarchical structure iff there is some c and a model of hierarchical structure Ho such that 
Ho = <c, <Ћ,@>, o> and every one of the xs is a part of c. That is, a plurality, the xs, is 
hierarchically structured when the xs are collected together into a hierarchy. Of course, 
qua plurality, the pluralistic hierarchical structure is not a hierarchy. 
The above is a structural reconstruction and re-articulation of the Core Hierarchy 
Theory given in the main chapters, plus an extension of that theory to account for 
hierarchical pluralities. Note that for the present purposes, our ambition is not to develop 
a complete semantics of ‘higher than’. We only need a precise reconstruction of our 
hierarchy theory that facilitates deduction, using standard bivalent deductive reasoning. 
Truth in a model and theoremhood will be defined in a complete semantics for ‘higher 
than’, but there is no need to add such complications just yet. We already have enough 
resources to demonstrate some interesting facts about unrestricted-@ hierarchies. 
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Let us then use our hierarchy theory to demonstrate these facts. To begin, let us 
use our structural reconstruction of Core Hierarch Theory to prove our simple “pairs” 
theorem: a constraint on any acceptable theory of hierarchies.  
(Theorem 1)  For every hierarchy, there are at least two unique levels. 
  I.e., z(z is a hierarchy → xy(Lxz  Lyz  x≠y)) 
Proof: Assume some arbitrary h is a hierarchy. Thus, from Definition 2, for some 
model of hierarchical structure H* , H* = <h,<Ћ,@>,*>. Since H* is a model of 
hierarchical structure, by clause (iii) of its definition ‘Ћ’ is a predicate designating 
a strict partial order, as determined by the interpretation function, *. Since Ћ is a 
strict partial order, it is asymmetric, irreflexive, and transitive. Since Ћ is 
irreflexive nothing satisfies xЋx. Moreover, since H* is a model of hierarchical 
structure, Axiom 1 is satisfied with respect to h. Thus, xLxh. Existentially 
instantiating a for x, from Definition 1 we then derive y(aЋy  yЋa). 
Existentially instantiating for y, we get aЋb v bЋa. No matter which disjunct we 
assume, it follows from Definition 1 that both Lah and Lbh, i.e. that both a and b 
are levels of h. Given that Ћ is irrefexive, it also follows, assuming either 
disjunct, that b≠a. Existentially generalizing over a and b, we derive xy(Lxh  
Lyh  x≠y). Since this derivation holds no matter which disjunct, aЋb or bЋa is 
true, the derivation must hold within the scope of our original assumption. 
Closing our original assumption under conditional proof while universally 
generalizing over the arbitrary h, we derive our theorem: z(z is a hierarchy → 
xy(Lxz Lyz  x≠y)).     QED 
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Simple enough. To prove the compositional reflexivity result from the main 
chapter, as well as generalize it, things get a bit more complicated. We must first specify 
some definitions. Definitions 3 and 4 distinguish two sorts of compositional 
relationships:93 direct and indirect. Roughly put, a direct compositional relationship is 
taken to be the proper-parthood relationship itself; whereas an indirect compositional 
relationship is one that holds between x and y whenever x and y have parts that stand in a 
proper-parthood relationship with one another. If directness picks out proper-parthood, 
then indirectness picks out proper-parthood once removed. Definition 5 then combines 
these definitions into a general definition of a compositional relationship. Lastly 
Definition 6 specifies what it meant by ‘compositional hierarchy’: a hierarchy for which 
higher than is interpreted as either a direct or indirect compositional relationship. 
(Definition 3) For any relation R, R is a direct compositional relationship iff for all x and 
y, (xRy  yRx) ≡ (x is a proper-part of y or y is a proper-part of x). 
(Definition 4) For any relation R, R is an indirect compositional relationship iff for all x 
and y, (xRy  yRx) ≡ zv(z@y  v@x  (z is a proper-part of v or v is a 
proper-part of z))94 
(Definition 5) For any relation R, R is a compositional relationship iff R is either a direct 
or indirect compositional relationship. 
                                                   
93 The standard view of composition, as I understand it: the xs compose y iff each x is proper part of y, no 
two (distinct) xs properly overlap (i.e. no two xs have a proper-part in common), and every proper part of y 
overlaps (i.e. has a part in common) at least one of the xs. Since the notion of composition can be 
understood entirely in terms of parthood and proper-parthood, these will be the relations (aside from our 
logical connectives and quantifiers) that we will use to define compositional relationship. 
 
94 I use existential quantifiers here to ensure that we are dealing with the weakest sort of compositional 
connection between levels. The definition is intended to capture the idea that an indirect compositional 
relationship is a direct compositional relationship “once removed”. 
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Having specified that the type of hierarchical structure (e.g. compositional, 
supervenience, etc.) is given by the interpretation function o, it is appropriate to define an 
(unrestricted) compositional hierarchy as follows: 
(Definition 6) for any h, h is a compositional hierarchy iff Ho (Ho = <h, <Ћ,@>, o> and 
Ho is a model of hierarchical structure and for every R, if o(Ћ) = R, then R 
is a compositional relationship). 
In other words: a compositional hierarchy (the ‘unrestricted’ should henceforth be taken 
to be implicit, for sake of convenience) is defined as a collection found within some 
model of hierarchical structure where the interpretation of @ in this structure is the 
unrestricted parthood relationship and the interpretation of Ћ in this structure is a 
compositional relationship: either direct or indirect. A hierarchy ordered directly will 
produce a hierarchy where each level is a relata of the proper-parthood relation; if the 
hierarchy is ordered indirectly, it will produce a hierarchy in which the ordering of the 
levels depends on the proper-parthood relations holding between some of the contents 
(i.e. parts) of those levels (Figure 15).  





Figure 15: A Hierarchy Ordered by a Direct 
Compositional Relationship (left) vs One Ordered by an 
Indirect Compositional Relationship (right). ‘a’ and ‘b’ 
designate levels; 'higher than' is indicated by a solid 
arrow (pointing to what is higher); 'proper part of' is 
represented by a dashed arrow (pointing to the whole). 
The relationship is direct when the arrows are 
coextensive; indirect when it holds in between things 
found within the levels (i.e. some parts of each level). 
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(Theorem 2)  Every compositional hierarchy is a level of itself. 
  I.e., h (h is a compositional hierarchy→ Lhh) 
Proof: Assume for some arbitrary k: that k is a compositional hierarchy. Then, 
given Definition 6, it follows that Ho (Ho = <k, <Ћ,@>, o>), that Ho is a model 
of hierarchical structure and that for every R  HTk, if o(Ћ) = R, then R is a 
compositional relationship. Existentially instantiating for Ho, we get (1) Hcomp = 
<k, <Ћ,@>, comp> and (2) Hcomp is a model of hierarchical structure, and (3) for 
every R, if comp(Ћ) = R, then R is a compositional relationship. Letting F = 
comp(Ћ), i.e. the relation Ћ is interpreted as designating in Hcomp, it then follows 
from (3) that F is a compositional relationship. 
Open a second assumption (for reductio): Lkk. Then, given Definition 1, it 
follows that (4) y(kЋy  yЋk) or k@k. Parthood, of course, is reflexive, and 
so k must be part of itself.95 Since clause (iii) of our original definition tells us @ 
is parthood, it follows that k@k; and therefore, y(kЋy  yЋk): nothing stands 
Ћ to k and k stands Ћ to nothing. Since, we have given the label F to the ‘Ћ’ in 
Hcomp, it follows that y(kFy  yFk) and (equivalently) y(kFy  yFk). Since 
                                                   
95 Some might be tempted to think that the appeal to parthood here is simply a methodological choice, and 
that ‘@’ is better interpreted as proper-parthood or some other -refined notion of parthood (i.e., -
parthood). Since the proof does not work with ‘@’ designating proper-part, the proof is problematic. To 
alleviate such concerns, note that ‘@’, as shorthand for ‘is at’ or ‘is in’, must be taken to be reflexive: some 
hierarchies might have levels without any proper-contents. Consider a hierarchy of mereological atoms. 
Since mereological atoms have no proper-parts, but are nevertheless levels of the hierarchy, the only things 
at each level are the levels (i.e., the atoms) themselves. Besides, one of the purposes of Core Hierarchy 
Theory is to given the simplest and most encompassing (i.e., general) account of hierarchies upon which all 
other hierarchies can be specified; with that purpose in mind, it does not seem appropriate to retreat to a 
restricted sense of parthood (e.g., proper-part, functional-part, direct-part, etc.) when characterizing the 
most basic hierarchical relations. 
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F is a compositional relationship, from Definition 5 it follows that F is either a 
direct or an indirect compositional relationship. 
 (Lemma 1) F is not a direct compositional relationship 
Proof of Lemma: Suppose (for reductio) that F is a direct compositional 
relationship. Then, from Definition 3, it follows that for all x and y, (xFy  
yFx) iff (x is a proper-part of y or y is a proper-part of x). Universally 
instantiating k for x and a for y, we now have (kFa  aFk) iff (k is a 
proper-part of a or a is a proper-part of k). Since we already have 
y(kFy  yFk), it follows from universal instantiation that (kFa  
aFk). From the biconditional we derived a moment ago, it follows from 
modus tollens and DeMorgan’s that k is a not proper-part of a and a is not 
a proper-part of k. Since our constant ‘a’ appeared via universal 
instantiation within our most recent assumption, we can universally 
generalize: for all x, x is not a proper-part of k. But, from our 
undischarged assumption that k is a hierarchy, it follows from clause (i) 
from our original definition of a model of hierarchical structure that k 
must have proper-parts. A contradiction! We have established both that k 
has, and does not have, proper-parts. Closing our most recent assumption 
under reductio, it thus follows that F is not a direct compositional 
relationship. 
Applying our lemma to the preceding disjunction that F is either a direct or 
indirect compositional relationship, it then follows that F is an indirect 
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compositional relationship. From this and Definition 4 it follows that for all x and 
y, (xFy  yFx) ≡ zv(z@y  v@x  (z is a proper-part of v or v is a proper-part 
of z)). Universally instantiating k for x and a for y, we now have that (kFa  aFk) 
≡ zv(z@a  v@k  (z is a proper-part of v or v is a proper-part of z). Since we 
have established (just prior to the statement of our lemma) that y(kFy  yFk), 
we instantiate a for y, giving us (kFa  aFk). Applying this result to the left 
hand side of our most recent biconditional, it follows that zv(z@a  v@k  (z 
is a proper-part of v or v is a proper-part of z); which is equivalent to zv((z@a 
 v@k) → (z is a proper-part of v or v is a proper-part of z). Universally 
instantiating for both z and v, results in: (a@a  k@k) → (a is a proper-part of k 
or k is a proper-part of a). Since @ is parthood, which is reflexive, it follows that 
a@a  k@k; allowing us to apply modus ponens to our above conditional. Once 
we do so, we arrive at (a is a proper-part of k or k is a proper-part of a); which 
straightforwardly implies that a is not a proper-part of k. Since ‘a’ was introduced 
via universal instantiation within the current assumption, we can universally 
generalize: for all x, x is not a proper-part of k. That is, it follows that nothing is a 
proper-part of k. But again, given clause (i) of our definition of a model of 
hierarchical structure, it must be that k has proper-parts. A contradiction! Since, 
within the scope of our second assumption, we have established that k both has, 
and does not have, proper-parts, we can thus discharge that assumption and 
conclude, via reductio, that Lkk. 
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Now that we have derived the consequent of our theorem under the scope of our only 
remaining undischarged assumption, we close that assumption under conditional proof 
and derive: if k is a compositional hierarchy, then Lkk. Since k was chosen arbitrarily, we 
simply generalize this conditional to derive our theorem: for all x, if x is a compositional 
hierarchy, then Lxx. That is, every compositional hierarchy is a level of itself.96 QED 
One interesting corollary of this can be seen by combining Theorem 2 with Lemma 2 
below. 
(Lemma 2) For everything x that is a level of itself, there is a level that contains 
everything found on any level of x. 
 I.e., x(Lxx → y(Lyx  vz((Lvx  z@v) → z@y))). 
Proof: assume (for an arbitrary h) that y(Lyh  vz((Lvh  z@v) → z@y)). 
Exchanging the existential for universal quantifier, we push the leading negation 
throughout the formula using the appropriate elementary inferences, finally 
resulting in: y(Lyh → zv((Lvh  z@v)  z@y)). Universally instantiating h 
for y, we arrive at: Lhh → zv((Lvh  z@v)  z@h).  
Assume (for reductio): that Lhh. Then, from modus ponens, we get 
zv((Lvh  z@v)  z@h). Existentially instantiating for b z and a for 
v, we derive Lah  b@a  b@h. Given that Lah, from Definition 1 it 
follows that a@h. Since @ (primitive mereological parthood) is transitive, 
and we have b@a  a@h, it follows that b@h. We have derived a 
                                                   




contradiction: b@h and b@h. Closing our assumption under reductio ad 
absurdum, it follows that Lhh. 
Closing our original assumption under conditional proof, we have y(Lyh  
uz((Lvh  z@v) → z@y)) → Lhh. Contraposing the conditional, and then 
universally generalizing over the arbitrary h, we arrive at our Lemma: x(Lxx → 
y(Lyx  vz((Lvx  z@v) → z@y))).     QED 
(Corollary 1) For every compositional hierarchy h, there is a level of that hierarchy 
which contains the contents of any level of h. 
I.e., x(x is a compositional hierarchy → y(Lyx  vz((Lvx  
z@v) → z@y))) 
Proof: the proof is straightforward. Theorem 2 tells us that every compositional 
hierarchy h is a level of itself and Lemma 2 tells us that for everything h that is a 
level of itself, there is a level of h that contains everything found on any level of 
h. From Hypothetical Syllogism, we get our Corollary.   QED 
We have not yet shown that every (unrestricted) compositional hierarchy is a nested 
hierarchy and so far we have not concerned ourselves with the direction of the 
compositional ordering. To proceed to our next step let us eliminate the generality we 
have enjoyed so far, and turn the investigation to those (unrestricted) compositional 
hierarchies where wholes are associated with higher levels than their parts. Let us call 
them upwards directed compositional hierarchies. Henceforth letting ‘Ћ’ designate its 
own interpretation; they can be defined as follows.  
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(Definition 7) For any h, h is an upwards directed compositional hierarchy =df h is a 
compositional hierarchy and either (a) or (b) hold: 
(a) xy(xЋy ≡ y is a proper-part of x) 
(b) xy(xЋy≡vz(v@y  z@x  v is a proper-part of z)) 
NB: To define a downwards directed compositional hierarchy, we merely 
replace the order of the variables flanking the ‘is a proper-part of’ in (a) 
and (b). Wholes are lower than their proper-parts in such a hierarchy.  
With this definition we can show that every upwards directed compositional hierarchy is 
the top level of itself. 
(Theorem 3) Every upwards directed compositional hierarchy h is the top level of h.97 
I.e. h(h is an upwards directed compositional hierarchy → (Lhh  x(Lxh 
 xЋh))) 
Proof: first, assume k is an upwards directed compositional hierarchy. Then, from 
Definition 7, it follows that k is a compositional hierarchy and it follows that 
either (I) or (II) hold.  
(I) xy(xЋy ≡ y is a proper-part of x) 
(II) xy(xЋy ≡ vz(v@y  z@x  v is a proper-part of z)) 
Since k is a compositional hierarchy, it follows from Theorem 2 that Lkk.  
                                                   




Now open a second assumption (for reductio): x(Lxk  xЋk). Existentially 
instantiating a for x, we derive both Lak and aЋk. Since aЋk holds, from clause 
(i) of our original definition of a model of hierarchical structure, a must be part of 
k: a is in the “domain” of Ћ, and since according to clause (i), Ћ is a relation on k 
(where <x,y> is a relation on collection k iff x and y are parts of k), it follows that 
a is part of k. Given clause (iii), it then follows that a@k.  
Lemma 3: if a@k, then either a is a proper-part of k or a=k. 
Proof: The lemma follows from clause (iii) of our original definition of a 
model of hierarchical structure and the standard definition of proper-
parthood: for all x and y, x is a proper-part of y =df x is part of y and y is 
not part of x. Let us assume, for conditional proof, that a@k. Then, given 
clause (iii), it follows that a is part of k. 
Now assume, for reductio, that a is not a proper-part of k and a≠k. Since a 
is not a proper-part of k, then by the definition of proper-parthood, either a 
is not part of k or k is part of a. Since we have already assumed that a is 
part of k, from disjunctive syllogism it follows that k is part of a. But, 
since we have established that a is part of k and k is part of a, it follows 
from the anti-symmetry of parthood (parthood is reflexive, anti-
symmetric, and transitive), that a=k. That a=k directly contradicts the 
second conjunct of our most recent undischarged assumption, and so that 
assumption must be false. Closing it under reductio, it follows that a is a 
proper-part of k or a=k. Closing the remaining open assumption, we get 
184 
 
the lemma we need for the current theorem:  if a@k, then either a is a 
proper-part of k or a=k.      QED 
From Lemma 3 and the fact that a@k (a fact established immediately before the 
statement of our lemma), it then follows that either a is a proper-part of k or a=k.  
Now open a third assumption that a=k. Since we have already established 
aЋk, it follows that aЋa. But, from clauses (iii-a) and (i-a) of our original 
definition of a model of hierarchical structure, it follows that Ћ is 
asymmetric. Since the asymmetry of Ћ implies the irreflexivity of Ћ,98 it 
follows that aЋa. Since we have derived by aЋa and aЋa within the 
scope of our most recent assumption, we can close our third assumption 
under reductio: a≠k.  
Looking at the disjunction that precedes our most recently closed assumption, it 
thus follows that a is a proper-part of k.  
With the third assumption discharged, let us open a fourth assumption 
(still within the scope of the second assumption). Assume: vz((v@a  
z@k) → v is not a proper-part of z). Universally instantiating a for v and k 
for z, we arrive at ((a@a  k@k) → a is not a proper-part of k). Since we 
have already noted that @ is reflexive, it straightforwardly follows that 
a@a  k@k. Modus ponens then allows us to derive that a is not a proper-
part of k. Since we have established that a is proper-part of k within the 
                                                   
98 I suppress the proof because it is obvious: Ћ is asymmetric when and only when all x and y satisfy (xЋy 
→ yЋx). If we assume for some arbitrary a that aЋa, then it follows from the asymmetry definition that 
aЋa; a contradiction. 
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scope of our first two assumptions (but no others), we have arrived at a 
contradiction. Discharging our forth assumption under reductio, we have 
vz((v@a  z@k) → v is not a proper-part of z), which is equivalent 
to vz(v@a z@k  v is a proper-part of z).  
We now have all the resources we need to complete the proof. Since we have 
derived, at the beginning of the proof, that either (I) or (II) hold, and we have 
derived that aЋk within the scope of our undischarged assumptions, it follows 
from (I) that k is a proper-part of a. (I), then must be false, since we have already 
derived that a is a proper-part of k, and proper-parthood is an asymmetric. Since 
the first disjunct, (I) is false, it must be that (II) is true. That is, 
xy(xЋy≡vz(v@y  z@x  v is a proper-part of z)). Instantiating k for x and 
a for y, we get kЋa ≡ vz(v@a  z@k  v is a proper-part of z). Since we were 
able to derive vz(v@a z@k  v is a proper-part of z) from our most recent 
reductio assumption, it follows that kЋa. Since we derived aЋk near the 
beginning of our second assumption, we have then derived both aЋk and kЋa. 
Since Ћ is a strict partial order, it is asymmetric (i.e. aЋk → kЋa), and we have 
therefore arrived at a contradiction: kЋa  kЋa. Closing our second assumption 
under reductio, we arrive at: x(Lxk  xЋk). Having already established that 
Lkk at the start, we have Lkk  x(Lxk  xЋk). Closing our original 
assumption under conditional proof, it follows that, if k is an upwards directed 
compositional hierarchy, then (Lkk  x(Lxk  xЋk). Since our choice of k was 
arbitrary, we can generalize to establish our third theorem: h(h is an upwards 
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directed compositional hierarchy, then (Lhh  x(Lxh  xЋh))). That is, every 
upwards directed compositional hierarchy is the topmost level of itself. QED 
To obtain the most interesting results, that is, to vindicate the coherence of Allen and 
Starr’s vision of the nested ecological hierarchy by showing that every unrestricted 
upwards directed compositional hierarchy reflects this vision, we must remind ourselves 
what it means to be upwards-nested.99  
(Definition 8) h is an upwards nested hierarchy =df for any level x of h, everything at 
that level is also at every higher level.   
I.e., h(h is upwards nested ≡ xyz((Lxh  y@x  Lzh  zЋx) → 
y@z)   
With this definition and Definition 7, we can prove: 
(Theorem 4) Every upwards directed compositional hierarchy is upwards nested 
I.e.,  h(h is an upwards directed compositional hierarchy → h is 
upwards nested) 
For some arbitrary k, assume (for reductio) that k is an upwards directed 
compositional hierarchy and that k is not upwards nested. Then it follows from 
Definition 7 that k is a compositional hierarchy and that either (a) or (b) hold: 
(a) xy(xЋy ≡ y is a proper-part of x) 
(b) xy(xЋy≡vz(v@y  z@x  v is a proper-part of z)), 
                                                   
99 I henceforth write only about upwards directed compositional hierarchies, since the upward direction is 
how they are standardly presented, as witnessed in Chapter 1.  
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and it also follows from Definition 8 that xyz(Lxk   y@x  Lzk  zЋx  
y@z). Existential instantiating a for x, b for y, and c for z, it follows that Lak  
b@a  Lck,  cЋa  b@c.  
Assume for reductio, that (a) holds. Then, instantiating c for x and a for y 
we derive cЋa ≡ a is a proper-part of c. Since we have cЋa, biconditional 
modus ponens tells us that a is a proper-part of c. Since a’s being a proper-
part of c implies that a is part of c,100 and from clause (iii) of our original 
definition, ‘part of’ is the @ relation, it follows that a@c. Thus, we have 
b@a  a@c. Since @, qua parthood, is transitive, it follows that b@c. 
Since we have derived a contradiction – viz. b@c and b@c – in the 
scope of our assumption, we can close it and conclude that (a) does not 
hold.  
Since (a) does not hold, but we have derived that either (a) or (b) must hold, it 
follows that (b) must hold: xy(xЋy≡vz(v@y  z@x  v is a proper-part of 
z)). Since Ћ is asymmetric, nothing is higher than itself, and so kЋk. Given (b), 
it then follows that vz(v@k  z@k  v is a proper-part of z), which is 
equivalent to vz((v@k  z@k) → v is not a proper-part of z). Since k is a 
hierarchy, by Definition 2 it follows that there is a model of hierarchical structure 
Ho =  <k, <Ћ,@>, o>. Given clause (i) of our original definition of a model of 
hierarchical structure, it follows that k has proper-parts.  
                                                   
100 Given the standard definition of proper-parthood mentioned earlier, a is a proper part of c iff a is part of 
c and c is not part of a. 
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Assume for arbitrary m (for reductio) that m is a proper-part of k. 
Universally instantiating m for v and k for z, we derive (m@k  k@k) → 
m is not a proper-part of k. Since we have just assumed that m is a proper-
part of k, we derive from modus tollens that either m@k or k@k. Since 
@ is reflexive, it follows that k@k. And so, we have m@k. Since x is a 
proper-part of y just in case x is part of y and y is not part of x, and clause 
(iii) tells us our interpretation of ‘@’ is parthood, it follows that m is a 
proper-part of k just in case m@k  k@m. On our most recent 
assumption, m is a proper-part of k; and so, m@k. Since we have derived 
m@k and m@k within the scope of our most recent assumption, that 
assumption must be false for any arbitrary m: for all x, x is not a proper-
part of k. That is, k lacks proper-parts.  
Since we have derived that k has no proper-parts, but we have derived (just prior 
to our assumption) that k has proper-parts, we must close our last remaining open 
assumption under reductio, giving us: either k is not an upwards directed 
compositional hierarchy or k is upwards nested.  Converting this disjunction into 
a material implication that generalizes over our arbitrary k, we derive our 
theorem: for all x, if x is an upwards directed compositional hierarchy, then k is 
upwards nested.        QED 
Having proved Theorem 4, we have shown that our Core Hierarchy Theory entails that 
every (unrestricted) upwards directed compositional hierarchy101 (a compositional 
                                                   
101 It is important to note here that I am only referring to unrestricted compositional hierarchies. 
Hierarchies constructed from a restricted -@ conception of is at are not subject to these theorems. 
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hierarchy in which the @ relation is unrestricted and the wholes reside on higher levels 
than their parts) is upwards nested, just as Allen and Starr (1982) suggest. Nesting is not 
only a coherent feature of compositional hierarchies, such as ECOHIERARCHY, 
according to Core Hierarchy Theory it is a necessary feature of the simplest and most 
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1.0 Introduction 
The defense of the existence of hierarchies given so far depends on two things: that there 
are real collections of things, and that there is a real relation – some sort of strict partial 
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order – that holds between them. Taking for granted that there are such things (e.g., 
elephants) and such relations (e.g., composition), it follows that there are hierarchies.102  
That there are hierarchies supports the characterization of Realism that was 
specified in the introductory chapter. Realism, recall, is the first component of the view I 
called Multi-Grade Holism. Two components of that view remain undefended. In this 
chapter I argue the third component; I argue that ecological Holism is true by arguing 
that Reductionism is false under the assumption that Core Hierarchy Theory is our best 
theory of hierarchies. The distinction, recall, is as follows: 
[Reductionism] If the world is hierarchical in the sort of way portrayed 
within ecology, then wholes are there along with their parts 
at the bottommost level, whatever that might be.  
[Holism] The world is hierarchical in the sort of way portrayed 
within ecology, but the wholes are not there along with 
their parts at the bottommost level, whatever that might be. 
In defense of Holism, I argue that Reductionism is incompatible with Core Hierarchy 
Theory. Insofar as Core Hierarchy Theory is the simplest and most general available 
theory of hierarchies, Reductionism should therefore be rejected. 
 I begin with a short discussion of what one might mean by ‘layered’ worldview. 
This discussion also provides the backdrop for both this and the next chapter. After 
laying the groundwork, I differentiate between the epistemological and metaphysical 
                                                   
102 Note that this sort of argument can only establish that some hierarchies are real. It does not justify the 
stronger thesis that all hierarchies of scientific interest are real. Only those hierarchies consisting in real 
things, ordered by real relationships are subject to the argument; it has not been shown that all hierarchies 
of scientific interest are ordered by reified relationships. 
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components of reductionism, as discussed within the philosophy of science, and then 
focus on the metaphysical component.  
  The review of reductionist metaphysics, and how it has evolved in tandem with 
the idea of the layered world, begins with the state-of-the-art. I review Carl Gillett’s 
description of what is called the “new” reductionism (or compositional reductionism), 
which picks out the hard core of the reductionist metaphysics that has remained constant 
throughout its evolution: the claim that everything needed to account for any scientific 
phenomena is, in fact, found at the bottommost level of the world. In support of Gillett’s 
analysis of metaphysical reductionism, I review two classic writings on the layered 
worldview itself: Oppenheim and Putnam’s classic reductionist analysis, and William 
Wimsatt’s (critical) refinements of it.103 Both conform to Gillett’s analysis of reduction, 
as well as the characterization of Reductionism found above, despite minor differences in 
their view of the layered world. 
 An examination of the interface between the hard core of Reductionism and the 
Core Hierarchy Theory developed in the previous chapter yields results that do not favor 
Reductionism. I argue that Core Hierarchy Theory is incompatible with Reductionism 
with respect to the most basic sort of hierarchical structure. I conclude the chapter by 
considering some Reductionist attempts to challenge, or modify, Core Hierarchy Theory. 
Each of the available options faces serious hurdles; overcoming the challenge posed by 
Core Hierarchy Theory is not a simple task.  
                                                   
103 Note that Wimsatt should not be taken to endorse reductionism in the classic sense. In his 1976, he only 
means to describe an interpretation of reductionism that a traditional antireductionist, such as himself, can 
sympathize with. He ends the paper by writing, “If this constitutes a reduction of the mental to the physical, 
then so be it!” (p. 263) 
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2.0 The Layered Worldview 
The layered worldview has a number of proponents, and has served as an implicit 
backdrop for a number of philosophical discussions including, but not limited to: the 
Unity of Science movement (Putnam and Oppenheim, 1958; Fodor 1974), the 
metaphysical reduction of special science theories or phenomena to microphysical 
theories (ibid.; Wimsatt 1976; 1994; 2007), the specific relationship between the mental 
and the physical (Kim 1998; 1999; 2002; Lycan 1995), and more recently, discussions 
surrounding the role of multi-level mechanisms within the life sciences (Craver 2001, 
2002, 2007; Craver and Bechtel 2007; Glennan 2010).  
Although it serves as a backdrop for these philosophical debates, the claim that 
the world is layered is ambiguous. One might mean a number of different things. One 
might mean to say that the entire universe is some sort of hierarchy; or one might mean to 
say that everything found within the universe is a hierarchy; or even weaker, that only 
some things found within the universe are hierarchies. The difference between these 
approaches has been made clear by Jaegwon Kim (2002). He distinguishes between 
global and local hierarchies. 
2.1 Global Hierarchies  
On the first disambiguation one would be asserting that the universe itself can be 
partitioned into a set of levels, and everything found within the world falls somewhere 
within this hierarchy. For example, a hierarchy of mereological objects with, perhaps, the 
entire universe as the terminal object at the top (Simons 1987, Lewis 1991, Varzi 1999); 
a hierarchy of properties, ordered by some asymmetric supervenience relation; a 
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hierarchy of events (e.g., where atomic events reside lower in the hierarchy than 
molecular events); a hierarchy of causal relations; a hierarchy of laws; and a hierarchy of 
scientific branches. Such hierarchies are the result of a de dicto reading of ‘the layered 
world’. Let us call this view globalism; and let us call these de dicto hierarchies global 
hierarchies. Oppenheim and Putnam (1958) and Lycan (1995) are among most prominent 
defenders of this sort of approach within philosophy;104 but, in fact, this view appears to 
enjoy implicit acceptance within much of science. 
2.2 Local Hierarchies 
The remaining disambiguations are to be associated with the view that the universe 
contains hierarchies, without making the further claim that the universe itself is 
hierarchical. That is, individual objects and systems found within the universe – a tree, an 
ecosystem, a toilet, an alarm clock, to name but a few – might be considered hierarchical, 
but the universe is possibly not such a system. Such hierarchies are picked out by a de re 
reading of ‘layered world’. Call this view localism; and call these de re hierarchies local 
hierarchies.105 Defenders of the local view include Jaegwon Kim (2002) and Carl Craver 
(2007). 106  
                                                   
104 Lycan’s (1995) partitioning of things into levels is similar to the division found in Oppenheim and 
Putnam’s work. The most striking difference between them is that Lycan orders his levels along a 
continuum (rather than a predetermined set of discrete levels) by virtue of his notion of levels-of-functional-
abstraction. 
 
105 Note that there is no inconsistency in holding both localist and globalist views. They are not in 
opposition. Localism is simply a weaker sort of hierarchical realism. Indeed, in a world containing only one 
global hierarchically organized object, the two views are equivalent. 
 
106 It should be noted that localism comes in two different varieties. On the stronger view, everything falls 
into a hierarchy of some sort or another. On the weaker view, one is only committed to the idea that some 




2.3 Global vs. Local Hierarchies 
Within philosophy, globalism is thought to be contentious. William Wimsatt (1976), 
Jaegwon Kim (2002), among others, have argued for positions which suggest that a 
neatly ordered global scientific hierarchy is highly implausible, and does not fit well with 
actual science. Each of these authors, however, have a specific sort of global hierarchy in 
mind. Wimsatt (p. 252) synthesizes a number of different approaches to the global 
explanatory hierarchy: scalar hierarchies, compositional hierarchies, and hierarchies in 
which a variety of different scientific kinds populate levels. Kim concerns himself with a 
global supervenience hierarchy, where (roughly speaking) classes of events are taken as 
levels and are ordered by a relation of asymmetric supervenience.107  
Localism, on the other hand, appears to be relatively uncontentious. It is the sort 
of approach found in the writings (cited above) of Jaegwon Kim, Carl Craver, and Stuart 
Glennan. We will discuss their work in the next chapter. Here we focus on the layered 
worldview within the metaphysics of reduction.  
3.0 Hierarchies and the Metaphysics of Reduction 
Reductionism,108 as it was characterized at the outset, involves both an epistemological 
component and a related metaphysical component. This bipartite aspect of reductionism 
is not unique to that characterization; in fact, all of the philosophical work on reduction 
                                                   
107 Although Kim is a reductionist, we will leave him out of the discussion until the next chapter, where we 
discuss realization hierarchies. 
 
108 Recall that I use the uppercase ‘R’ to designate the characterization of reductionism given in the 
introduction; the lowercase is used to designate the basic notion of reduction that requires further 




confronts this mixture of metaphysics and epistemology. In this section, I review both the 
classic efforts to characterize the epistemic component, with an eye for its metaphysics, 
as well as the more contemporary focus on the metaphysical component. 
3.1 The “Old” Reductionism 
The epistemological component of reduction, recall, is the idea that “lower level” 
knowledge (e.g., of the parts) suffices for “higher level” knowledge (e.g., of the whole). 
Much effort has gone into making this epistemic thesis more precise. Kemeny, 
Oppenheim, and Putnam (Kemeny and Oppenheim 1956; Oppenheim and Putnam 1958), 
for example, held that reduction is primarily a relationship between theories: theory T2 
reduces to theory T1 iff (a) the vocabulary of T2 contains terms not in the vocabulary of 
T1, (b) any observable data which can be explained by T2 is explicable by T1, and (c) T1 
is at least as well systematized as T2.109  
Ernest Nagel (1961), by contrast, omits the reference to observation data but 
retains the idea that reduction is a relationship between scientific theories. For Nagel, 
reduction involves only the logical relationship between the laws of the respective 
theories: T2 reduces to T1 iff the laws of T2 can be logically derived from the laws of T1. 
If the vocabulary of T2 contains terms not found in T1 (e.g., ‘gene’ is foreign with 
respect to the language of organic chemistry), then the reduction requires an appeal to a 
                                                   
109 They also articulate a derivative understanding of reduction: as a relationship between scientific 
branches, where branch B2 reduces to B1 (at time t) iff there is some T1 in B1 (at t) such that T2 is reduced 
to T1 (at t). Since they take scientific disciplines to be composed of theories, an incomplete branch-





“bridge principle” that connect T2’s special terms to (perhaps, a complex construction of) 
predicates found in the language of T1.110   
Despite their differences, these two proposals share a common ground: the idea 
that the phenomena investigated within one science are to be explained by another, more 
basic, science. To use a hierarchical locution, the idea is that all of the so-called “higher 
level” phenomena are ultimately explicable by the behaviors and properties of the 
individuals found in the domain of “lower level” sciences.111 Where those individuals are 
the entities described by microphysics, the sort of reduction is called a microreduction, 
though not all uses of the term ‘microreduction’ involve an appeal to microphysics.112  
The metaphysical component of reductionism has received little attention by 
comparison. Rather than involving relationships between theories and theoretical terms, 
metaphysical (sometimes called ontological) reduction involves certain relationships 
between individuals and between properties: those things and properties in the domain of 
“higher level” sciences are either identical to or composed of (or can be eliminated in 
favor of) the things and properties in the “lower level” domain.  
Although their concern is not exclusively metaphysical, Oppenheim and Putnam 
(1958) and Wimsatt (1976) are pioneers in the investigation of metaphysical 
                                                   
110 These bridge principles might take the form of a biconditional or identity claims (see Causey 1972, 1976 
and Enc 1976). Schaffner’s (1967) account of reduction is similar to Nagel’s in that they both make use of 
derivation relations between the reduced and reducing theories. The main point of difference is that 
Schaffner adds the requirement that all of the statements – not just the laws –of T2* are derivable from T1 
(where T2* is the corrected version of T2; that is, it is T2 appropriately modified such that it contains no 
false statements).    
 
111 This epistemic thesis pairs nicely with a methodological thesis that explanations in higher level sciences 
should proceed, in actual scientific practice, by examining the properties and behaviors of entities residing 
at lower levels; e.g., to explain the properties of the whole, one investigates the properties of the parts. 
 
112 E.g., Oppenheim and Putnam’s notion of microreduction allows that it might hold between two branches 
of science, neither of which are microphysics. Their definition of ‘microreduction’ is given in §3.2 below. 
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reductionism. Using the notion of a hierarchy as a foundation, they investigate the 
metaphysical and epistemic components as a mixed issue. Wimsatt (1976), for example, 
takes reduction to involve an explanatory relationship between a lower level theory (or 
lower level phenomena) and higher level phenomena (1976, p.224); the phenomenon of 
fire, for example, is explained by oxidation, a process described by, and found within the 
domain of, theoretical chemistry. Where Oppenheim and Putnam straightforwardly 
maintain that the ordering between reductive levels is a compositional ordering, Wimsatt 
entertains a variety of ordering options – size (p. 237), mereological composition (p. 
243), or direction of explanation (pp. 245-52) – eventually settling on composition as 
being the most intuitive and least problematic. In any case, these metaphysical 
approaches clearly diverge from the sort of reductionism that Nagel had in mind. 
3.2 The “New” Reductionism 
Contemporary reductionists are in general agreement that Nagel’s classic epistemic 
approach to reduction is deeply flawed. The problems are well-known. Classic 
reductionism requires either attribute-identities between the properties picked out by the 
two theories (Causey, 1972; Enc, 1976), or at the very least attribute-coextensions 
between the predicates found within the two theories. The multiple-realizability 
arguments of Jerry Foder (1974) and Hilary Putnam have convinced many that this sort 
of reductionism should be abandoned; giving rise to the most popular contemporary 
metaphysic for science, non-reductive physicalism – the view that special science 
properties (or their instances) are not identical to micro-physical properties, but are rather 
realized by them.  
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Accounting for this “realization” relation has been the subject of intense debate 
within the non-reductivist’s camp (see Melnyk 2003; Gillett 2002, 2007; Shapiro 2008; 
Shoemaker 2007, 2011). Contemporary reductionists look on in interest. They too are 
eager to embrace this notion of realization. Reductionists, such as Kim, see realization as 
a way to reincarnate the spirit of classic reductionism into a new, strictly metaphysical, 
sort of reductionism. Carl Gillett (2007) calls this “new” reductionism compositional 
reduction.113  
According to this view, special science terms are not redefined using terms from 
any micro-based science. In this respect a compositional reduction is not Nagelian. What 
makes compositional reduction a genuinely metaphysical sort of reduction is that it 
retains the idea that there really is nothing more than the entities and properties of micro-
physics, and configurations thereof. Composition does not add anything to the world, 
says the compositional reductionist, and neither does realization.  
The austere realism espoused by the compositional reductionist should not be 
confused with an extreme eliminitivism. There is a difference. The new reductionist 
retains and respects higher level explanations and descriptions, whereas extreme 
eliminitivists approach the special sciences armed with a conceptual machete; they hack 
away at special sciences as if they were jungle-vines, doing away with macro-level 
descriptions and theories altogether. Eliminitivists label them “folk” descriptions, and 
                                                   
113 Note that Gillett’s characterization differs somewhat from Kims. Kim’s (1999, p. 15) “reduction by 
functionalization” strategy upholds the classic reductionist picture by identifying special science property 
instances with micro-based based property instances. The difference between Kim and Gillett’s respective 
presentations makes no difference to our purpose here.  
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argue that the “folk” language is more or less empty, ingenuine, and about nothing in 
particular.114  
According to the compositional reductionist, the predicates and other terms of our 
special sciences are in fact genuinely about micro-based properties and entities, and 
configurations thereof: if reality is exhausted by configurations of micro-particles, then 
insofar as ‘ecosystem’ picks out anything at all, it picks out some of those configurations. 
While the language of special science might rightly be criticized as a clumsy tool, 
delivering vague descriptions and ceteris paribus explanations of the world at best, this 
language is nevertheless considered indispensable by the new reductionist.115  
In short, the thesis of compositional reductionism is this: configurations of 
fundamental individuals and properties are all that exists, and they explain everything 
without having to “reduce” (i.e., define) our indispensable special science terms to those 
of micro-based science. The “new” compositional reduction therefore upholds the 
characterization of Reductionism offered in the introductory chapter: if the world is 
layered into a hierarchy (e.g., as we see in ecology), then everything to be found in that 
hierarchy falls within the level of fundamental science.  
3.3 Reduction, Realization, and Hierarchy 
The advances in the philosophy of reduction since Nagel seem to have narrowed the gap 
between reductionism and anti-reductionism: anti-reductionists are steadfast in their 
                                                   
114 I am unsure whether or not anyone holds such an extreme eliminitivism. But that is all the more reason 
not to confuse it with Reductionism. 
 




commitment to non-vacuous special science predicates and the macroscopic individuals 
in their extension; the new reductionists, on the other hand, also say that special-science 
predicates have non-vacuous extensions, except they say that their extensions consist 
entirely in things from the microphysical domain.  
 It should now be clear that the sort of reduction under dispute is best considered a 
sort framed by decomposition (i.e., parthood) relations. By virtue of the appeal to 
composition, the debate then occurs within a hierarchical framework: since the collection 
of micro property instances and individuals and the collection of macro property 
instances and individuals are linked by asymmetric and transitive parthood relationships 
(within the reduction-neutral realization framework mentioned above), they are therefore 
linked by a higher than relation; and that is sufficient to make the macro and micro 
collections levels of some hierarchy. Call it, the microreduction hierarchy. 
 The relationship between reductionism and hierarchies is well-known. When 
Oppenheim and Putnam first delivered their grand vision for the unification of science 
under the reductionist paradigm, they delivered it within an explicitly hierarchical 
framework. Having decided that the “new” reductionism falls within the characterization 
of Reductionism given in the introduction, let us now look back to the old. 
4.0 Oppenheim and Putnam on the Microreduction Hierarchy 
Although we see above that a hierarchical framework underwrites the metaphysics of the 
new reductionism, by virtue of its compositional formulation, it is in fact a very old idea. 
Even prior to Nagel’s work on inter-theoretic reduction, Oppenheim and Putnam make 
202 
 
explicit appeals to what we called the microreduction hierarchy as a way of making 
precise the notion, “unity of science”.  
Oppenheim and Putnam, like the new reductionists discussed by Gillett, take the 
essential metaphysical feature of a (micro)reduction to be parthood, or more specifically, 
decomposition. They tell us that a scientific discipline or theory B1 is a microreduction of 
B2 iff B2 is reduced to B1 and the objects in the domain of B2 can be decomposed into 
parts, all of which belong to the domain of B1. (1958, p. 8) 
Having framed their notion of microreduction in terms of composition, 
Oppenheim and Putnam notice that the microreduction relation has the following 
properties: it is transitive – if B1 microreduces B2 and B2 microduces B3, then B1 
microreduces B3 – and asymmetric – if B1 microreduces B2, then not vice-versa.  
These properties, recall from the previous chapter, are indicative of a hierarchical 
relationship. Oppenheim and Putnam are perfectly aware of this and adopt a hierarchical 
framework for science without hesitation. After designating microreduces-to as higher 
than, they describe six levels, as well as six necessary conditions for a system of 
scientific levels. The six levels are (from the bottom going up): elementary particles, 
atoms, molecules, cells, multi-cellular living things, and lastly, social groups. The six 
necessary conditions are as follows:  
(1) There must be several levels. 
(2) The number of levels must be finite. 
(3) There must be a unique lowest level. 
203 
 
(4) Anything of any level that is not the lowest must have a decomposition into 
things belonging to the next lower level. 
(5) Nothing on any level should have a part on any higher level.  
(6) Level selection must be justifiable from the standpoint of empirical science. 
They do not take these propositions to describe general principles about hierarchies; but 
still, with exception of (1) and (6), their list is quite contentious. Ned Block (2003) and 
Jonathan Schaffer (2003), for example, discuss the possibility of a world with no 
fundamental level; a world of infinite descent calls into question both (2) and (3). Kim 
(2002) notes that (5) becomes problematic as soon as a key principle, the downward-
inclusion principle (DIP) is introduced: “Any whole which possesses a decomposition 
into parts, all of which are on a given level, will be counted as also belonging to that 
level.” (pp. 9-10) In other words, 
 [DIP] Each level includes all higher levels. 
DIP might seem odd at a glance, but in fact it is central to reductionist metaphysics. 
Insofar as composition and realization does not add anything to the world (a claim needed 
to uphold the idea that reality is exhausted by configurations of micro-particles), each 
level of the reductionist’s compositional hierarchy then consists in the individuals and 
instanceables that are characteristic of that level, as well as all “higher level” individuals 
and instanceables that are composed of (or realized by) those “lower level” individuals 
and instanceables. To use the hierarchical locution endorsed at the outset, if x is 
composed of the ys, then x is “nothing above” those ys. 
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The problems mentioned by Block and Schaffer are straightforward. We need say 
nothing more about them. Kim’s criticisms are not so simple. Let us now examine them 
more closely. 
4.1 Free-Molecules and Other Problems 
Kim (2002) identifies a number of tensions within the preceding proposal. One problem, 
he says (p. 13 n. 18), is that DIP, which implies that I am located at all levels lower than 
my own, implies that I am found at the atomic-level. And so, it implies that I have parts 
at higher levels than mine: my molecules and cells are at a level higher than the atomic 
level at which I am said to reside. (5) must then be false, since it requires that I have no 
parts at higher levels than those at which I am found.  
 Of course, there is a simple reply to Kim. The highest level at which something is 
found is designated by Oppenheim and Putnam as the proper-level of the thing in 
question, giving us a way to accommodate Kim’s insight: simply take (5) to mean (5’). 
 (5’) Nothing on any level has a part at any level higher than its proper-level. 
Even with the adjustment, there is still a problem for those who want to read (5’) as a 
general hierarchical principle, rather than as something peculiar to the microreduction 
hierarchy. The ecological hierarchy, an upwards-nested hierarchy in which everything 
that is part of the atomic level is also part of all higher levels, presents a simple 
counterexample to (5’): if everything is at the biospheric level, then every ecosystem has 
proper-parts on levels higher than its proper-level. (5’), then, is at best a necessary 
condition that is idiomatic to the Oppenheim and Putnam microreduction hierarchy. To 
restore generality, (5’) should be replaced with  
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(5’’) Nothing on any level L has a part p such that the proper-level of p is higher 
than the proper-level of L. 
With respect to the upwards nested ECOHIERARCHY, we might say that the proper-
level of a thing is the lowest level at which it is located, which would allow (5’’) to apply 
to both downward and upward nested hierarchies. 
Moving on to (4), notice that there is an ambiguity between two readings: 
complete vs. partial decomposition. Kim (2002) argues that the former is unacceptable. 
Since some of my molecules are not part of any of my organs (Kim, p. 14, calls them 
“free-molecules”), but they are nevertheless a part of me, I do not completely decompose 
into the next-lower level. To help Oppenheim and Putnam escape the problem, Kim 
suggests a modification to (4): 
(4’) Anything of any level L that is not the lowest must have a decomposition into 
things belonging to levels lower than L. 
Alternatively, one might respond by appealing to partial decomposition. Instead of 
requiring that there is a complete decomposition, one might require that  
(4’’) Anything of any level that is not the lowest must have some proper-parts at the 
next lower level.  
Both (4’) and (4’’) are consistent with DIP; but an advantage of (4’’) over (4’) is that 
(4’’) rules out alternative orderings. As Brian Epstein (MS) points out, nothing implied 
by (4’) rules out social groups as being lower than molecules, since both have complete 
decompositions into things found at levels lower than both molecules and social groups. 
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(4’’), however, rules out this inverted ordering: since molecules do not have any social 
groups as parts, molecules cannot be higher than social groups in the hierarchy if one 
accepts (4’’) as a necessary constraint. 
 Another problem for Oppenheim and Putnam’s hierarchy is that it leaves no way 
to position certain aggregates within the hierarchy. For example, a-man-in-a-phonebooth 
consists both in something from the molecular level (viz., a phonebooth) and the multi-
cellular level (viz., a man). Putnam and Oppenheim dismiss such examples as having no 
noteworthy place in the reductionist’s hierarchy. As long as the explanatory relevance of 
aggregations which span multiple levels can be captured at the lowest level, a tidier 
hierarchy with a special place for such aggregates is unnecessary. The man in the 
phonebooth, taken as a singular unit, is found at the bottommost level; and that is really 
what matters to Oppenheim and Putnam. Otherwise, they could simply respond that 
gerrymandered aggregates are always found at all levels at which all of the listed parts 
are found. 
Although either response is sensible, I think the first glosses over a subtle but very 
important point: if everything non-fundamental is indeed composed, as the reductionist 
appears to presume it is, then one would expect to find an appropriate place for it in a 
global compositional hierarchy. Hiding one’s skeletons in the basement, after all, is no 
better than the proverbial closet. Notice, for example, that the upwards nested 
ECOHIERARCHY from the first chapter clearly has what is needed to sensibly position 
the man-in-the-phonebooth within the ecological hierarchy: any object composed out of 
things within the ecological hierarchy is “at” any level of that hierarchy at which all of its 
parts are found. In ecological terms, the man-in-phonebooth is an organism bounded by a 
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pitiful ecological gradient, so it is found at the organism, and all higher, levels. This, I 
take it, is an independent point in favor of upwards nested hierarchies, such as 
ECOHIERARCHY, over those which are downwards nested. 
4.2 The Metaphysics of Reduction – Old and New 
The similarities between Oppenheim and Putnam’s form of reduction and Gillett’s 
description of the new reductionism are quite striking. The compositional understanding 
of the metaphysical aspect of reduction is endorsed by both. And both versions take 
reality to be found entirely in the “basement”, so to speak; that is, DIP, as stated above, is 
retained within the new reductionism.116 As Oppenheim and Putnam (1958) write,  
it seems very doubtful, to say the least, that a branch B2 could be reduced to a 
branch B1, if the things in the universe of discourse of B2 are not themselves in 
the universe of discourse of B1 and do not possess a decomposition into parts in 
the universe of discourse of B1. (“They don’t speak about the same things.”) (p.8) 
These similarities are striking, but what of the difference? Since the new reductionist is 
no less apt to describe things in terms of higher and lower levels, Oppenheim and 
Putnam’s list of hierarchical constraints becomes a potential point of difference between 
the new and classic views.  
Some of the list is plausibly retained. One of the uncontentious claims, namely 
(1), is trivial; and the other, (6), simply restricts the levels to those whose contents are 
                                                   
116 I fail to see how DIP can be denied by any sort of reductionist. If one thinks, as the reductionist does, 
that composition is an ontological free-lunch, then the intervening levels between the macro and the 
fundamental level should contain all levels higher than them, for sake of consistency. I know of no reason 





determined by their involvement in some nomic or natural kind. The new-reductionist is 
not likely to reject either of these claims. (2) and (3) are both available for dispute, 
although such a dispute strikes me as being subject to empirical investigation. (5’), on the 
other hand, appears to follow from the asymmetry of the (compositionally guided) 
microreduction relation, and is unlikely to be rejected.117  
(4’’), on the other hand, would be rejected if the new reductionist found reason to 
think some decompositions might skip levels entirely (i.e., there is no partial 
decomposition into the next lower level); however, it is unlikely that (4’) would be 
rejected since it is trivializes the decomposition. Not much differentiates Oppenheim and 
Putnam from the new reductionism in the end. The main difference, it seems, is in the 
new-reductionist’s instance on the indispensability of higher level language, as well as 
the noticeable absence of a clear delineation of levels in Gillet’s (2007) discussion of the 
new-reductionism.  
To summarize: Oppenheim and Putnam take a hierarchy to be an asymmetric and 
transitive higher than ordering of elements, where ‘higher than’ can receive a number of 
possible interpretations; for example, x microreduces y. In this respect, Oppenheim and 
Putnam defend a version of our Core Hierarchy Theory from the previous chapter.118 The 
levels include individuals involved in significant nomic kinds, and are finite in their 
number with some level being the bottommost “basement” level. Each level is connected 
to its predecessor by virtue of (at least) partial decomposition. What makes Oppenheim 
and Putnam’s hierarchical metaphysics reductive is no different than from the new-
                                                   
117 The same goes for (5’’). 
118 In fact, the Core Hierarchy Theory developed in the previous chapter has its origins in a preliminary 
investigation of the similarities one finds between Oppenheim and Putnam’s account of hierarchies, and 
those of Kim (2002), Craver (2007), as well much older views, such as that of Conger (1925).  
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reductionists. They accept DIP, or at the very least the weaker claim that everything in 
the hierarchy is found at the bottommost level: the domain of fundamental physics.  
5.0 Wimsatt on the Microreductionist Hierarchy 
Although Oppenheim and Putnam might have been the first to give the reductionistic 
hierarchy a rigorous treatment, other philosophical accounts have been given. William 
Wimsatt (1976; and again in 2007), for example, conducts what might well be the most 
thorough investigation into hierarchical science as a supplement to his investigation of 
reduction. His verdict: there is no global reductionistic hierarchy in the classic sense, but 
rather a quasi-hierarchical tree of explanation and composition.  
5.1 Wimsatt’s Initial Assumptions About Levels 
At the outset of his investigation, Wimsatt (1976) lists his assumptions about levels:119  
I will assume that being at a given level is a property primarily of things in 
the world: phenomena, objects, properties, processes, causes and effects, 
etc., and derivatively of linguistic things relating to them: descriptions, 
law-statements, theories, predicates, etc. Intuitively, one thing is at a 
higher level than something else if things of the first type are composed of 
things of the second type, and at the same level with those things it 
interacts most strongly and frequently with or is capable of replacing in a 
variety of causal contexts. (2007, p. 215) 
                                                   
119 Years after stating these assumptions, Wimsatt is still without an analysis: “The notion of a 
compositional level of organization is presupposed but left unanalyzed by virtually all extant analyses of 
inter-level reduction and emergence.” (2007, p. 203) 
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Here we find three assumptions: levels contain things in the world, the levels are ordered 
by composition, and two things are at the same level if they interact in the right sort of 
way.  Wimsatt is also clear to note that he does not assume “that theories are limited to 
single levels, that levels are always well defined, or that two or more entities can always 
be unambiguously ordered with respect to level.” (1976, p. 215)  
5.2 Composition, Explanation and Scalar Orderings 
Although he explicitly assumes that levels are ordered by composition, he later 
complicates his approach by pairing this ordering with causal-explanatory relationships; 
he writes, “higher levels are in some sense composed of the entities at lower levels” 
(1976, p. 243), but then adds that “the arrows [in Figure 17, below] represent significant 
causal or explanatory connections” (ibid, p. 252), and finally pairs the compositional and 
explanatory together, “If we can’t fairly uniformly say what is composed of what or what 
explains what, then the things in question are not clearly orderable: they not only fail to 
be clearly at or not at the same level, but there are no clear levels.” (ibid, p. 254)120  
Further complications are introduced in Wimsatt’s discussion on scale. He notes 
that scalar orderings can be largely coincident with compositional orderings (wholes are, 
after all, typically larger than their parts), where “higher than” increases the scale 
(roughly) by orders of magnitude (1976, p. 241; c.f., Salthe 2009 p. 88). He offers the 
following caricature:  
                                                   
120 Note that in Wimsatt’s most recent writings on the subject, he appears to drop the explanatory 
requirement: “By level of organization, I mean here compositional levels-hierarchical divisions of stuff 
(paradigmatically but not necessarily material stuff) organized by part-whole relations, in which wholes at 




Figure 16: Wimsatt's Waveforms Depicting Regularity and  
Predictability Across Levels (1976, p. 240-1) 
Figure 16, note, is not representative of his view on the layered worldview: paramecia do 
not compose metazoan, and so it is clearly not a compositional ordering. Rather, he offers 
the diagram to help clarify the various ways regularity and predictability might map onto 
a scalar hierarchy, as a way of distinguishing the various alternatives to the reductionist 
hierarchy. In waveform c, (the middle one), we see that regularity and predictability tends 
to increase as you descend lower down the hierarchy; he labels this the pro-reductionist 
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waveform. By contrast, the anti-reductionist’s waveform (d) has the regularity and 
predictability pushed towards the topmost level.121  
Despite the rough correspondence to compositional orderings, Wimsatt’s appeal 
to scale should only be taken as a rough heuristic with respect to the reductionist 
hierarchy, for he notes a clear weakness of scalar hierarchies. The same weakness was 
mentioned in the first chapter: there are many cases in which an increase in level is not 
coincident with an increase in size; we pointed out that some individual fungi are larger 
that entire ecosystems and, as Wimsatt points out, “black holes and bacteria can be the 
size of a dust mote, though the three will have radically different behaviors in similar 
circumstances.” (1976, p. 237)  To associate them with the same level seems 
inappropriate. Scale is no doubt important in both biological and physical sciences – 
Wimsatt claims that size is a major factor “in determining which physical forces are most 
central to the explanation of behavior” (p. 206) – but that does not imply that it makes for 
a good scientific ordering.  
Although he argues that scalar orderings are inadequate (he gives an extended 
criticism of the black-hole-bacteria problem in his 2007, p. 209), Wimsatt nevertheless 
maintains that scale plays a role when characterizing the contents of each level. He 
demarcates his levels by virtue of a clustering of causal interactions. (1976, p. 242) In his 
most recent characterization of the demarcation of levels, he writes: 
                                                   
121 Noticeably absent from the space of waveforms is a regularly fluctuating, rather than random, pattern of 
regularities as the hierarchy increases. E.g., somewhat regular at the bottom, very regular near the middle, 
somewhat regular at the middle, very regular near the top, somewhat regular at the top. It goes without 
saying that Wimsatt’s diagrammatic waveforms do not exhaust the space of logical possibilities regarding 
the mapping of regularity distributions to the layered worldview. Exactly how these regularities map to 
levels is an interesting question, but is not one that will be pursued here. 
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They are constituted by families of entities usually of comparable size and 
dynamical properties, which characteristically interact primarily with one 
another, and which, taken together, give an apparent rough closure over a 
range of phenomena and regularities. (2007, p. 204 emphasis mine)122 
 
This characterization appears quite sensible in light of his other views. If, as Wimsatt 
purports, scale is a major factor in determining what is responsible for a thing’s behavior, 
then this clustering of causal interactability will bear a rough correspondence to 
similarities in relative size; and it is then no wonder that Wimsatt thinks levels will 
contain things of roughly the same size, despite that his hierarchy is not a scalar 
hierarchy.  
Even so, Wimsatt acknowledges that the demarcation of levels is imperfect. He 
notes that “parts of roughly commensurate sizes as the whole system are treated as being 
at its level.” (2007, p. 206) Although this imperfection appears innocuous to Wimsatt, 
many might think that it renders his account insensible. It might strike some as being 
prima facie inconsistent to maintain that levels are ordered by composition while also 
maintaining that there are levels at which the composition relation holds intra-level.  
But this is an uncharitable criticism. Wimsatt’s approach to the scientific 
hierarchy clusters things together into levels, and then orders them according to 
compositional relationships that are relevant to the explanation of higher level 
phenomena. The specification of levels comes first, and the compositional ordering is 
                                                   
122 This is not a final definition. Yet, oddly enough, it is more informative than the final statement he offers 
in lieu of a definition: “Level of organization can be thought of as local maxima of regularity and 
predictability in the phase space of alternative modes of organization of matter. This is the closest I will 
come to a definition…” (2007, p. 209) 
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then applied to those specified levels. The view becomes problematic only on the added 
assumption that ordering-relationships play a large role in both the ordering and 
specification of levels. Wimsatt is not committed to this assumption and so his view 
retains its coherence.  
 Indeed, there is a good reason for Wimsatt to want to maintain such a view. 
Throughout his career, he has been emphasizing what he calls causal thickets (1976; 
1994; 2007), which he characterizes as a breakdown in clarity in the sense that they 
“indicate a situation of disorder and boundary ambiguities.” (1994, §IV). The disorder 
characterizing these causal thickets provide one reason to think the demarcation of levels 
is at best rough and imperfect. 
5.3 Wimsatt vs. Oppenheim and Putnam  
Wimsatt gathers together these claims – about composition, (reductive) explanation, 
scale, and complex bundles of interactions – into a singular reductive “hierarchy” (Figure 
17 below), which nicely characterizes the difference between his view and that of 




Figure 17: Wimsatt's Reductionist (Quasi)Hierarchy (1976, p. 253) 
To hierarchically represent the explanatory relationship that characterize the 
reductionist’s metaphysical epistemology, in Wimsatt’s view, requires a much more 
complex organizational structure than what the classic reductionist ever imagined. As we 
see in the diagram, Wimsatt even expresses some doubt (viz., his “?”), as to whether his 
picture really is illustrative of the reductionist’s global hierarchy. 
216 
 
He is correct to express doubt. His diagrammatic insight cannot be said to follow 
from reductionism; it follows only from his own idiomatic starting assumptions about 
how hierarchies relate to reductionist metaphysics, especially from the way he chooses to 
specify the contents of levels. For the classic reductionist, levels are specified to 
correspond to scientific branches. But they are free to specify their collection of levels 
however they see fit, as long as their specification is justified from the standpoint of 
empirical science (recall Oppenheim and Putnam’s condition (6) mentioned above). 
Wimsatt selects his levels in a very narrow sort of way: by some function of 
interactability and relative size. But there are all sorts of ways to specify levels. 
Wimsatt’s preferences for relative size, interaction, regularity, and predictability are 
perhaps justified from the standpoint of empirical science, but they are not sacrosanct.  
The ordering of levels also differs between Wimsatt’s diagram and classic 
reductionists. According to the classic reductionist, the levels are ordered using an 
asymmetric microreduction relationship, whereas for Wimsatt’s graphical presentation, 
the ordering relation appears to be a more general explanatory relationship; both for the 
reason that the compositional ordering has been clearly been abandoned and that Wimsatt 
is not a microreductionist. In his version of reductionism (if it is rightfully called 
“reductionism”)123,  
the point of reduction is not to get an… explanation for “eventually 
everything” in terms of “essentially nothing,” but only to make sure that 
everything gets explained – at some level or other. This in fact allows for 
                                                   
123 Wimsatt (2007, p. 202) acknowledges that his version of reductionism is not what philosophers typically 
think of as reduction; he thinks it falls in line with what scientists think of as reduction.   
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the possibility that some things may require explanation at higher levels 
(1976, p. 225).   
The explanatory methodology that Wimsatt describes here is clearly not one a 
microreductionist would endorse.  
The reason the compositional ordering must be abandoned is indicative of a more 
serious problem for, at least, his Figure 17 presentation of the reductionist layered 
worldview: near the top right corner of the diagram there are higher than sub-orderings 
that are either not asymmetric or not transitive; with respect to the edges connecting the 
“causal thicket” on the right side of the tree to the “socio-ecology of man”, the ordering 
transforms into a cyclic directed graph into and out of the thicket (the direction of the 
arrows might be hard to see in my reproduction). The cycle, presumably, designates 
feedback relationships; Wimsatt only tells us that the ordering breaks down. 
That breakdown is a problem. Since higher than is an asymmetric and transitive 
relation, as was argued in the previous chapter, and Wimsatt’s ordering is not asymmetric 
and transitive, he cannot plausibly claim that Figure 17 depicts a hierarchy, or even that is 
a structure of levels (assuming that levels are the relata of higher than).124 So what is it, 
this quasi-hierarchy? It is hard to say. It is a different breed of beast altogether; perhaps it 
is a hybrid of a hierarchy and some other sort of structural kind.125 In any case, Figure 17 
                                                   
124 Wimsatt (2007), in a footnote, makes it explicitly clear that his picture is not to be taken as a hierarchy, 
but rather as a more general higher than structure of levels. But we see here that his diagram does not even 
give him that. The view he expresses in writing, however, is not problematic in the same way. Although his 
writings do not stray far from the diagram (he acknowledges potentially conflicting orderings), when one 
ignores the perspectival and thicket-related claims, his view resembles something very much like the new 
reductionism Gillett describes. 
 
125 In fact, Wimsatt himself notes the problem. (1976, p. 254) I do not find his “perspectival” solution to be 
particularly satisfying. It completely trivializes the levels framework by allowing anything to be higher than 
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should not be taken to be indicative of any version of reductionism. His waveform 
characterization, as depicted in Figure 16, is far more illustrative; unfortunately, it is not 
representative of his actual view on the layered world. The hierarchy depicted by Figure 
16 is ordered by size, whereas Wimsatt’s reductionist hierarchy is ordered by 
compositional-explanatory relationships. 
 Perhaps what is most surprising about Wimsatt is that while he claims to be a kind 
of reductionist (2007, p. 203)126, he nevertheless feels pulled towards, what he calls, 
holism. He writes,  
levels of organization are a deep, non-arbitrary, and extremely important feature 
of the ontological architecture of our natural world, and almost certainly of any 
world that could produce, and be inhabited or understood by, intelligent beings. 
(ibid. emphasis his) 
These are hardly the words one would expect a reductionist to write. The characteristic 
feature of reductionist metaphysics is that there is no metaphysically significant 
hierarchy: everything is found at the level of micro-physics, and the indispensable 
predicates associated with higher level scientific subjects, in fact, correspond to lower 
level things and their properties (or arrangements thereof). Higher levels are of little 
metaphysical importance for the true reductionist since they are superfluous: everything 
science needs, they say, is found buried “in the basement.”  
                                                                                                                                                       
anything else in the same hierarchy, as long as it is permitted by some relevant and adoptable 
“perspective”. From what I can tell, by ‘perspective’ Wimsatt does not mean interpretation of ‘higher 
than’.  
 
126 He writes, “As a kind of reductionist, I want to get as much as I can about higher levels from the 
properties of lower ones.” (2007, p. 203) 
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 Although Wimsatt resists the epistemological thesis of microreduction whereby 
all phenomena are to be explained at the bottommost level, he nevertheless issues 
remarks which either imply, or strongly suggest, that he adheres to the same DIP 
endorsed by classic and “new” reductionists: 
the same system will be found at a number of levels, if it has any 
reasonable degree of complexity, though it will of course be a system at 
only one level. At lower levels, it will be a multiplicity of systems in 
complex “ecological” interaction (1976, p. 242).127 
That is, a system at any given level, is found at all levels below it, not as a system, but as 
a plurality of systems; insofar as ‘it’ in the above quotation designates the system in 
question, Wimsatt clearly suggests that it is at lower levels. Wimattian reduction, then, 
upholds the characterization of Reductionism given in the introductory chapter: if the 
world is layered into a hierarchy (e.g., as we see in ecology), then everything to be found 
in the domain of science falls within the level of fundamental science. 
  To summarize: Wimsatt, who claims to endorse a sort of reductionism, has a 
much different picture of the layered worldview than classic reductionists, and perhaps 
even those Gillett calls the “new” reductionists. His view is very complex. Levels are 
understood as collections of interacting things of roughly similar sizes. They are ordered 
by either composition relations, or (as depicted in Figure 17) a weaker explanatory 
relationship that has exceptions to its asymmetry. Classical reductionists view their 
                                                   
127 He goes on to write “… and at higher levels, it will appear as a part of a system.” (1976, p. 242) I 
confess, I do not know what he means by this. Does he mean that the system is found at all levels of the 
hierarchy? If so, then there is a tension here with his earlier claim that levels are an important ontological 
feature of the world.  
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hierarchy as a neat pillar of well-chosen nomic kinds; Wimsatt, by contrast, heavily 
emphasizes a more natural ordering where the levels are not chosen, but are rather the 
result of similar size, dynamics, and regular interactions. Despite the differences between 
Wimsatt, the old, and the “new” reductionist they all have (at least) one thing in common: 
they uphold our initial characterization of Reductionism from the introduction. 
6.0 The Nesting Problem for Reductionism -- Old and New 
Insofar as Core Hierarchy Theory is our best (simplest and most general) account of 
hierarchical structures,  none of these Reductionisms -- the old, new, or Wimsattian – 
provides an adequate characterization of the layered worldview. If we combine the results 
from our previous chapter with some of the basic commitments of the Reductionist views 
described here, we expose a very serious tension within Reductionist metaphysics. 
Consider the following two claims: 
(A) Special sciences reduce to a more fundamental science. 
(B) Everything (in the domain of natural science) is in fact found “in the 
basement” – i.e., in the domain of fundamental science. 
Clearly, all of the reductionsts described above are committed to both of these claims. (A) 
is the mantra of the microreductionist, of all sorts;128 and (B) is straightforwardly implied 
by DIP, the downward inclusion principle, or a weakened version of it. For the 
Reductionist, (B) is trivially true; if it were not, then it would follow that there exists 
                                                   
128 Note that Wimsatt is not committed it. Even so, his reductionist hierarchy is still an upwards directed 
compositional hierarchy, and our earlier investigation into Wimsatt’s “reductionist” hierarchy indicates an 
apparent commitment to (B). Since the objection raised below draws out a tension between (B) and 





something that is absent from the fundamental domain, which is contrary to all versions 
of reductionism we have examined here. 
The problem for Reductionism is that (A) and (B) are jointly incompatible under 
Core Hierarchy Theory. Metaphysical reduction, as we have seen, is an asymmetric and 
transitive ordering that holds between scientific “levels” by virtue of composition 
relations holding between the contents of those levels. As an asymmetric and transitive 
ordering, Core Hierarchy Theory implies that the collection of special science levels (no 
matter how the redutionist opts to label them) forms a hierarchy. Moreover, it is a 
hierarchy of a well-known sort: in the Reductionist’s hierarchy, for one level to be higher 
than another is for it to contain something that has a part contained within the other. That 
is, the Reductionist’s higher than relation is a compositional relationship, in the sense 
described in the third chapter (See Definition 7 in Appendix B to Chapter 3).  The 
Reductionist’s hierarchy then counts as a compositional hierarchy, as characterized in 
that chapter: specifically, an upwards directed compositional hierarchy. 
Since the Reductionist’s hierarchy is an upwards directed compositional 
hierarchy, the theorems of our Core Hierarchy Theory require that (B) is false. From the 
fourth and final theorem found within the appendix, we learn that all (unrestricted)129 
upwards directed compositional hierarchies are upwards nested. That is, we learn that, 
qua compositional, everything found on any level of the (unrestricted) Reductionist 
hierarchy is ipso facto also on all levels higher than it. If (B) is true, then everything 
found on any level at all is ipso facto at the lowest level. But if everything is found at the 
                                                   
129 Recall that by ‘unrestricted’ I mean that no  restrictions have been placed on the @ relation described 
in Appendix B. ‘@’ is interpreted as pure primitive parthood. 
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lowest level, as implied by (B), and everything found at the lowest level is found on all 
levels higher than it, as implied by the notion of upwards nesting, then it follows that 
everything at any level is, in fact, at all levels. But, if there is no difference between the 
levels, then they are all the same level, which is not consistent with the first theorem of 
our Core Hierarchy Theory: every hierarchy has at least two unique levels.  
Here, then, is the problem: since Reductionism implies both (A) and (B), and (A) 
implies that the Reductionist’s hierarchy is upwards nested, which, when combined with 
(B), implies a contradiction – it then follows that Reductionism is false. The world is 
hierarchically layered (according to compositional relationships, as the ecologist holds) 
but it is not the case that everything is at the bottommost level of that hierarchy. Since the 
denial of Reductionism is simply Holism (as it was characterized in the introduction), we 
therefore have an argument for the third thesis of the dissertation: taking Core Hierarchy 
Theory for granted, Reductionism is false, and Holism is not. 
This is no mean result! Let us look back at the argument more carefully. To draw 
out the inconsistency we inferred that there is only one level from the fact that the levels 
have identical contents. It might not be clear why this is the case. Perhaps one might deny 
that hierarchical structures are extensional. Why not, after all, have many levels with 
exactly the same contents?  
There are two answers. First, to suggest that there are distinct levels with identical 
contents conflicts with the Reductionist’s insistence that composition is ontologically 
innocent. To suggest that there is something more to levels than their contents goes 
against the very core of Reductionist metaphysics. Second, that there is only one level to 
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the Reductionist hierarchy straightforwardly follows from Upwards Nesting and the anti-
symmetry of parthood. To see this, let us reconstruct (B) using the syntax of our Core 
Hierarchy Theory. Where the quantifier ranges over the individuals and instancesables in 
the physical domain, ‘B’ is a name for a particular level (viz., the fundamental level), we 
have: 
(B’) x(x@B  y(BЋy))  [Entities and properties are in the basement] 
(B’), however, straightforwardly entails that H@B, where H is the reductionist’s 
hierarchy itself (those who worry that H is not within the domain of  are hereby referred 
to section 5.1 below). But, since B is a level of H, it follows from Core Hierarchy Theory 
(viz., Definition 1 in Appendix B to Chapter 3) that B@H. Since the unrestricted ‘@’ 
designates primitive-parthood, which is antisymmetric, H@B and B@H implies H=B. 
The top level (recall that every compositional hierarchy is the top level of itself) is the 
bottom level. Given any level of the hierarchy, L, since it is part of H (qua being a level 
of it) and H is part of L (qua being part of the lowest level and, given nesting, all higher 
levels than that), it follows that H=L. That is, it follows from the nesting theorem and the 
anti-symmetry of ‘@’ (i.e., “is at” or parthood) that the reductionist’s hierarchy has only 
one level. 
This takes us to the contradiction. Since our “pairs” theorem (Theorem 1 in 
Appendix B to Chapter 3) requires that hierarchies have at least two levels, it then 
follows that there is some level L that is higher than B, since B has been designated to be 
the lowest level. But since H=B, it then follows from Leibniz’ Law that L is higher than 
H. But, from Theorem 3 of Appendix B to Chapter 3, H, being a compositional hierarchy, 
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must be a top level of itself: there is no level higher that H. Since L must be both higher 
than, and not higher than, H, we have an explicit contradiction.130 
Notice that we do not need to endorse any mereological supplementation 
principles to derive this contradiction: it is derived straightforwardly from the anti-
symmetry of parthood and our Core Hierarchy Theory. We do not require an extensional 
mereology to acquire this result: the weakest (unsupplemented) mereology combined 
with the most basic doctrines of reductionism will suffice.  
To summarize the argument: the versions of metaphysical reductionism 
considered above all imply a hierarchical ordering of the explanatory interests of science 
– specifically, a (upwards directed) compositional hierarchy – as well as the metaphysical 
view that everything is found at the bottom level of that hierarchy. Having shown in the 
previous chapter that, unless one places restrictions on the “is at” relation, Core 
Hierarchy Theory implies that all such compositional hierarchies are upwards nested, are 
the topmost levels of themselves, and must contain at least two distinct levels (Theorems 
4, 3, and 1, respectively), we are able to derive a contradiction: since the Reductionist’s 
“basement” is in the hierarchy, and the hierarchy itself is in the basement (Core 
Hierarchy Theory tells us that the unrestricted hierarchy is the topmost level of itself and 
Reductionism tells us the basement contains all levels), it then follows that the 
Reductionist hierarchy is its own top and bottom level; but since every hierarchy must 
have two levels, that implies that there must be a level that is both higher and not higher 
than the lowest (also highest) level. A contradiction. 
                                                   
130 Although the inconsistency appears earlier – having derived that the Reductionist hierarchy has only one 
level, it thus cannot then have two levels, as the pairs theorem requires – I draw out the explicit 
contradiction as a matter of methodological preference. 
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All of the forgoing has been derived using (A) and (B) and Core Hierarchy 
Theory. Since reductionists are committed to both (A) and (B), they must therefore reject 
Core Hierarchy Theory, or some relevant aspect of it. In what follows I offer some 
suggestions on behalf of the troubled Reductionist, but as we will see the matter is not at 
all straightforward. 
6.1 Option 1: There is no Hierarchy!  
The first reaction to the aforementioned problem is to concede that Reductionism is 
committed to a compositional ordering, but then respond that the “levels” implied by (A) 
are metaphysically vacuous. There simply are no real hierarchies. If there are no 
hierarchies, then it should not matter whether or not there is only one level. In fact, that 
there really is only one fundamental domain is exactly the sort of thing the Reductionist 
might want to claim. A contradiction cannot be generated, the Reductionist might say, 
because the “pairs” theorem has been misapplied. 
Core Hierarchy Theory, however, tells us that there are hierarchies in the 
Reductionist’s domain of discourse. According to Core Hierarchy Theory, a hierarchy is 
any collection of levels (which are themselves collections of things), that are ordered by 
an asymmetric and transitive relation to which we assign the label, ‘higher than’. 
Reductionists accept that there are chemical, biological, and social phenomena that need 
explaining; they just say that these phenomena are, like everything else, in the 
fundamental domain by virtue of their decompositions into fundamental parts. 
In order to explain higher level phenomenon, the Reductionist – as with the social 
scientist explaining to the authorities how the Volkswagen found its way onto the roof of 
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the campus chapel – must appeal to fundamental things working together (or in the case 
of the social scientist: a bunch of fraternity brothers playing a prank together). When 
individuals are taken together, however, we have all we need to count them as one. But, I 
shall now argue, this is all we need in order to apply our hierarchy theory, pace the 
Reductionist.  
Core Hierarchy Theory, the simplest and most general account of hierarchies qua 
hierarchies presently available, is described using certain idioms: an individual is 
something that falls within the range of our existential quantifiers, and a collection is an 
individual with proper-parts (either other collections or atomic individuals). Since the 
Reductionist’s higher level predicates are latching on to collections of fundamental 
things, those collections are captured by the idioms of Core Hierarchy Theory. And so, 
insofar as there is a collection within the Reductionist’s domain of quantification, and the 
scientifically relevant predicates applied to that collection stand in a reductive 
relationship to the fundamental properties of the fundamental parts of that collection, it 
follows from the asymmetry and transitivity of (micro)reduction, and our Core Hierarchy 
Theory, that there is a Reductionist hierarchy. The Reductionist, then, cannot plausibly 
reject the Reduction hierarchy while also endorsing Core Hierarchy Theory.   
6.2 Option 2: Reject Core Hierarchy Theory. 
Since the existence of a hierarchy is implied by our Core Hierarchy Theory, one way to 
avoid all of the problems raised here would be to simply reject Core Hierarchy Theory. 




Rejecting the second axiom, the linkage axiom, is not apt to gain any ground for 
the Reductionist. And rejecting the first axiom, the existential axiom, has untoward 
consequences. To deny the existential axiom is to claim that nothing is a level of H, 
where H is some collection of individuals. But, given Definition 1 – something is a level 
of H iff it is a part of H and it stands in the higher than relation with something else in H 
–131 a denial of the existential axiom entails that either H does not have parts (which is 
impossible: everything is part of itself) or nothing in H stands higher than anything else 
in H. Since ‘higher than’ here means reduces to, it follows that a rejection of the 
existential axiom only places the reductionist’ view into deeper peril:  if nothing in H 
stands higher than, then nothing reduces; and if nothing reduces, then (A), one of the two 
central reductionist doctrines listed above, is false. Rejecting the axioms of Core 
Hierarchy Theory, therefore, does nothing to help the Reductionist. The Reductionist 
must then either reject the definition of hierarchy, or the definition of being a level of a 
hierarchy. 
 The definition of hierarchy, again, is this: a collection of levels related and linked 
by some strict partial order, which we call “higher than.” This definition is something 
Reductionists (such as Oppenheim and Putnam) take for granted; it appears obvious.  
The definition of is a level of offers a more promising option: to be a level of a 
hierarchy is to be a part of it that serves as a relatum of higher than. What justifies this 
definition, I maintain, is its simplicity and generality. The definition must be general in 
order to cover the vast number of things that a hierarchical analyst might want to treat as 
                                                   
131 Note that this is the definition of what it is to be a level of a hierarchy. To be a level simpliciter is even 
more straightforwardly defined: a level is nothing more than a relatum of higher than. Some might dismiss 
this definition as being cheap, but being cheap is not always bad: if a cheap suit fits the occasion, then wear 
it; if a cheap definition suits the model, then use it. 
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hierarchies, or as levels: sets, classes, objects, worlds, networks, or whatever else. Such 
generality is a virtue of the definition. If there is a problem with the definition, then, it 
must fall on the appeal to primitive-parthood. This brings us to our next option. 
6.3 Option 3: Reinterpret ‘@’ in Core Hierarchy Theory. 
Reductionists who work through the proofs in the appendices to Chapter 3, will notice 
that they rely heavily on a particular feature of the definition of hierarchy used 
throughout this dissertation: that to be at, or in, a level, and at or in a hierarchy is to a 
part of that level or hierarchy. Most of the proofs, one might notice, rely on the anti-
symmetry, reflexivity and transitivity of parthood. If it can be rationally argued that 
parthood is too general, or too specific, to count as the fundamental association relation 
between levels, their “contents”, and hierarchies, then Core Hierarchy Theory can and 
should be reinterpreted with a more appropriate association relation. 
 One might think that the primitive-parthood relation is too specific because there 
are other relations that might be taken as an association relation, but are not part-whole 
relationships. Hierarchies of sets or classes might be more appropriately specified by 
interpreting the association relation as the inclusion relation, or perhaps the elementhood 
relation, for example.  
I maintain that parthood is not too specific. Recall from Chapter 2 that the 
relationship of parthood was specifically chosen for the analysis of hierarchies for its 
generality. Following David Lewis’s (1991) proposal that sub-classes are parts of classes, 
and the proposal given in Chapter 2 that elements () are special parts of classes, the 
primitive-parthood relation, equipped with an extremely general understanding of 
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‘individual’ and ‘collection’ provide an analysis that is general enough to cover all of the 
important cases of hierarchies that are relevant to mathematical and empirical science, 
including those specified using the elementhood or inclusion relations. All one must do is 
place an appropriate restriction on parthood to yield a -@ hierarchy in the sense 
described in the previous chapter: x is -@ y iff x is part of y and xy. 
 Perhaps, for some reason, one might think that the parthood relation is too 
general. For instance, if a hierarchical analyst wants to analyze a collection of levels that 
happen, by coincidence, to be order-coextensive with a compositional hierarchy, 
Theorem 4 requires that one pins every individual at any level to all higher levels higher 
than the one containing it. For example, if we wanted to model the hierarchy {Piston → 
Engine → Car}, our theorems require us to consider each of the lower levels to be at all 
higher levels. That is, pistons are at the Piston, Engine, and Car levels; and engines are at 
the Engine and Car levels. But that means we cannot specify the Car level to consist in all 
and only cars and the Engine level to consist in all and only engines. It might then be 
objected that since Core Hierarchy Theory cannot give the hierarchical analyst the 
resources to model these restricted hierarchies because of its dictatorial interpretation of 
‘@’, Core Hierarchy Theory’s ‘@’ must then be reinterpreted. 
 In response, let us note that Core Hierarchy Theory has the resources to model 
these hierarchies, and so ‘@’ does not need reinterpretation. Again, recall our earlier 
discussion of fiat-levels in the previous chapters. Using the existing interpretation of ‘@’, 
we can define a more complex -@ relation, which we can then use to represent the 
restricted hierarchy one wants. In order to represent the automotive components 
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hierarchy above we could say the following: where ‘’ is a variable ranging over kinds, 
x-@y iff x@y and x satisfies .  
For example, we can say that x is characteristically-at y iff x@y and x is of the 
type characteristic of y. When the analyst goes to model this hierarchy, she first specifies 
characteristic type for each of the levels, Car, Engine, Piston, and then represents the 
contents of the levels using “-@” as defined above, rather than ‘@’. By doing so, one 
yields a hierarchy in which all and only cars are (characteristically-)at the Car-level; all 
and only engines are (characteristically-)at the Engine-level; and all and only pistons are 
(characteristically-)at the Piston-level.132  
Core Hierarchy Theory’s parthood interpretation of ‘@’ is therefore neither too 
general, nor too specific. The parthood interpretation of ‘@’ is exactly as general as one 
should want: it allows one to define and represent very specific and restricted hierarchies, 
such as a set-theoretic hierarchy or the simple component hierarchy described here, using 
‘@’ as a basis, in the most unrestricted sense of ‘@’. And as a final consideration, take 
note that the parthood interpretation of ‘is at’ resulted from our negotiation of the 
disagreement between Roberto Poli and Herbert Simon in Chapter 2. To reject the 
parthood interpretation of ‘@’, one must say what has gone wrong in that negotiation. It 
is possible that something has indeed gone wrong, but it is now up to the Reductionist to 
tell us what that something is. 
                                                   
132 The hyphenations in parentheses are intended to be read as if they were implicit. Although -@ allows 
us to use ‘at’ idiosyncratically, there is no need to explicitly articulate the idiosyncrasy. As one sees if one 
reads the contents of the parentheses aloud, its success in disambiguating from the more general ‘at’ comes 
at the expense of making things unnecessarily confusing.  
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6.4 Option 4: The Reductionist’s Hierarchy as a -@ Hierarchy 
The response from the preceding section might spark an idea in the Reductionist. 
Reductionist metaphysicians might think to shift attention to a different hierarchy, one 
specified with a refined notion of @: some sort of “-@”. If the Reductionist hierarchy is 
to be represented by a complex -@, rather than simple parthood, then upwards nesting 
would not apply to the restricted Reduction hierarchy. Understood in terms of -@ rather 
than @, the Reductionist’s hierarchy would therefore enjoy consistency with Core 
Hierarchy Theory. 
 But alas, describing the Reductionist’s hierarchy with a specialized “-@” 
relation is not going to make the basic, fundamental @-based hierarchy go away, no 
matter how clever the definition of “-@.” The restrictions imposed by the -@ 
definitions strike me as little more than artificial representations of an analyst’s 
conceptual scheme, designed for purposes known only to them. They therefore cannot 
plausibly be said to relate to the basic hierarchical structure of the world independent 
from our perspective and pre-theoretic biases; namely, to the sort of structure of interest 
to metaphysics. Hierarchical metaphysics is best conducted in the most general, and most 
foundational terms if one wants to ensure a reasonable distance from the idiosyncrasies of 
perspective. 
In short: -@ implies @. So, the refined -@ hierarchy still implies the existence 
of a general @ hierarchy as described in the previous chapter. Since the @ hierarchy is 
more basic and more general in that the -@ hierarchy is defined on the @ hierarchy, the 
-@ hierarchy does not really get to the bottom of its own metaphysics; it is merely to 
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turn a blind eye to some of the contents of the levels, putting the spotlight on some of the 
others. The -levels are nothing other than a sort of epistemological favoritism. That is 
not a sound methodology for Reductionist metaphysics: a large part of the motivation for 
Reductionism is a devotion to simplicity, the very same devotion that motivates the 
unrestricted interpretation of @ over the -@ interpretation. 
6.5 Option 5: ‘Hierarchy’ is Ambiguous 
Without a good reason for rejecting the legitimacy of Core Hierarchy Theory as a theory 
of hierarchies, the Reductionist must find a way to live with it. One way of doing this 
might be to plead ignorance. Core Hierarchy Theory was not available to Reductionist’s 
when laying down the groundwork for their metaphysics. Hierarchical structure was 
taken for granted and never given a rigorous analysis. 
Now that a rigorous analysis has been given, the reductionist can nod in 
agreement: there are indeed hierarchies as described by Core Hierarchy Theory. But that, 
they might say, is irrelevant. This entire time Reductionists were objecting to the 
metaphysical robustness of a restricted -@ sort of hierarchy discussed above, rather 
than the unrestricted @-based (i.e., primitive-parthood based) hierarchy. They had no 
reason to think that there was a more fundamental hierarchy lurking in the background. 
But, now granting the meanings of ‘individual’ and ‘collection’ used to express the Core 
Hierarchy Theory, its level of generality might appear quite sensible to the reductionist. 
They might now agree that there is indeed this more fundamental hierarchy, having 
finally made clear what we mean by ‘hierarchy’. But this is no slight against 
Reductionism; its DIP is only intended to apply to the restricted hierarchy, and not to the 
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fundamental hierarchy. Having picked its target-hierarchy carefully, there is nothing at all 
inconsistent with the Reductionist position. 
 Such a response should spark concerns that the Reductionist view collapses into 
Holism. Since the Holist’s hierarchy is straightforwardly captured within Core Hierarchy 
Theory, and the Reductionist admits the existence of that hierarchy (in addition to, or 
rather, underwriting, their own special hierarchy), it follows that Reductionism with 
respect to one hierarchy is a sort of Holism with respect to another. For the Reductionist 
to base their defense on an ambiguity in the term ‘hierarchy’, the whole debate becomes a 
farce: the disagreement was no disagreement at all. Reductionists and Holists were 
simply talking about different hierarchies: the Holist is talking about the most general 
sort of hierarchy, while the Reductionist’s view involves reference to a special and 
restricted sort of hierarchy. Since the disagreement certainly appears genuine, the 
ambiguity option is rather unsatisfying. 
 But perhaps the ambiguity option is unnecessary. Perhaps the Reductionist thinks 
that this concern about genuine disagreement warrants a reconsideration of the -@ 
option suggested in the previous section. That there is a genuine metaphysical 
disagreement between Holism and Reductionism might lead to an argument against the 
idea that the best way to investigate hierarchical metaphysics is to use the unrestricted @ 
interpretation in lieu of a -@ interpretation. The argument is this: if we investigate the 
debate using the unrestricted approach, then the debate disappears only because 
Reductionism has been unfairly or illegitimately suppressed on an a priori basis; there is 
a genuine debate that should not be unfairly or illegitimately suppressed, and so, we 
should not use the unrestricted interpretation of @. 
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 Have we been unfair to Reductionists in adopting the unrestricted interpretation of 
‘@’ to represent their (metaphysical) disagreement with Holists? Is that adoption 
illegitimate?  While it is true that the dispute between Reductionism and Holism is not 
preserved by within unrestricted Core Hierarchy Theory, it takes a lot of hard work to see 
that. It is by no means obvious. If there is a dispute between two views V1 and V2, and 
an independently motivated (e.g., via simplicity and generality) metaphysical framework 
resolves the dispute in a way that favors V1 over V2, then to defend V2, one must 
challenge the motivation for the framework. That the framework favors V1 over V2 is no 
reason to reject that framework. 
Even if one insists that there is a genuine metaphysical dispute between 
reductionists and holists that the unrestricted application of Core Hierarchy Theory fails 
to capture or illegitimately rules out, the Reductionist must argue for this insistence; they 
must offer an account of the restricted hierarchy that best frames the dispute, and then tell 
us why it is the best. Moreover, whatever restricted hierarchy the Reductionist offers 
must be one to which the Holist agrees, otherwise the dispute will not have been 
appropriately restored.  
It is not obvious that there is a restriction that satisfies these constraints. The most 
obvious restriction involves a set-theoretic approach: to be “at” a level is to be an -part 
of it; that is, the idea that levels are then elements rather than primitive-parts. The Holist, 
however, will protest. The set-based approach is impure compared to the unrestricted 
approach, in the sense that set-based hierarchies do not consist entirely of their levels and 
the contents of those levels (and collections thereof): set-theoretic hierarchies also consist 
in the empty set, which cannot be mistaken for nothing, for the empty set is surely 
235 
 
something. The unrestricted mereological approach is then simpler (more parsimonious) 
by a mere hair. To bring the set-based approach into parsimonious parity with the 
unrestricted mereological approach, the set-based approach must construct their account 
of the layered worldview using a set theory that forgoes the empty set. I know of no such 
set theory. But, then again, such ignorance is hardly compelling. Nevertheless, the onus is 
on the Reductionist to defend a restricted approach.  
As a final note, it should be emphasized that the nesting results obtained from the 
unrestricted Core Hierarchy Theory are by no means obvious, and are perhaps even 
astonishing. Non-compositional hierarchies, after all, are unaffected by the theorems; 
they behave exactly as one would expect under the unrestricted Core Hierarchy Theory, 
with no surprises. Only when we turn our attention to compositional hierarchies do we 
obtain surprising results. Before witnessing the theorems derived from the unrestricted 
interpretation of ‘@’, I very much doubt that the Reductionist would object to that 
interpretation. It is not until the nesting results are obtained that the legitimacy of ‘@’ is 
questioned. I thus see no reason to think that we have been unfair to Reductionism in 
adopting an unrestricted framework. 
6.6 Option 6: Challenging the Assumptions 
Are there any other options available to the Reductionist? Perhaps there are. One might, 
for example, deny the assumption of mereological monism stated in the introductory 
chapter, and then use an entirely different, non-classical, notion of parthood as the 
interpretation of ‘@’. One might define a hierarchy to be a set (instead of a general 
mereological collection) and then interpret ‘@’ as the transitive closure of 
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elementhood.133, 134 One might take a hierarchy to be a plurality of levels, or one might 
take it to be a kind of relation. We have already considered these options, but there might 
be any number of alternatives to Core Hierarchy Theory that have not been considered 
here. Logical space has not been completely exhausted; the second chapter contains only 
a sampling of possible accounts of hierarchies. 
Even so, the development of Core Hierarchy Theory has proceeded by argument. 
To adopt an alternative interpretation of ‘@’, one must confront those arguments. To 
reject mereological monism, for example, one must reject the arguments given in its 
favor (see the introductory chapter). To reject the mereological approach in favor of a 
strictly set-theoretic approach, one must argue against the mereological approach, against 
the idea that the existence of a set hierarchy implies the existence of a more general 
mereological hierarchy (see Chapter 2), or at least against the assumption that ‘hierarchy’ 
is univocal. To challenge univocality one must also argue that the set-theoretic approach 
is not simply focusing on a sub-type of hierarchy that is already captured by a simple 
restriction on the mereological approach; otherwise, the set-based definition will suffer 
from a lack of generality. Not all hierarchies need be thought of as sets, unless a good 
reason can be given to the contrary. 
As a final note, recall that two virtues of the mereological approach were listed in 
the second chapter: simplicity (specifically, parsimony) and generality. To offer an 
alternative interpretation of ‘hierarchy’ or ‘@’ as a way to save Reductionism, those 
                                                   
133 Recall, from Chapter 2, the argument that @ is a transitive relation: ‘@’ means in; since knowing that x 
is in a level and L is in hierarchy H is enough to infer that x is in H, it follows that in is transitive, and thus 
so is @.  
 




virtues must be retained, downplayed, or other virtues must be brought to bear. The 
Reductionist, after all, certainly does not want to abandon simplicity as a virtue; 
simplicity is among the main virtues of the Reductionist picture to begin with. We must 
then ask: aside from saving Reductionism, what benefit is gained from rejecting Core 
Hierarchy Theory as it has been developed here? Does the unrestricted Core Hierarchy 
Theory fail to capture some relevant feature of the Reductionist-Holist debate? If so, what 
is that feature and why are we unable to capture it?  
There might be satisfying answers to these questions, but if so, they are not 
available to us at this stage of the dialectic. We have no choice but to proceed under the 
assumption that Core Hierarchy Theory is indeed the best available account of 
hierarchies. 
7.0 Conclusion 
Insofar as Core Hierarchy Theory is our best account of hierarchies qua hierarchies, if it 
can be said that the world is layered, it is not layered by virtue of the Reductionist’s 
hierarchy. Although not much has been said about the epistemology of Reductionism, we 
have a complete critical analysis of its metaphysics using Core Hierarchy Theory as our 
central framework. The metaphysics of Reductionism is inconsistent with our simplest 
and most general understanding of hierarchies qua hierarchies: its two most basic 
doctrines are incompatible with Core Hierarchy Theory. To uphold their view, the 
Reductionist must develop reasons to reject or modify Core Hierarchy Theory. 
 In the next chapter, we will investigate the layered worldview as described by 
anti-reductionist philosophers. We will also pay special attention to the work of Jaegwon 
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Kim. Although Kim is a Reductionist, his work will help us to understanding the 
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1.0 Introduction 
Two thirds of our central thesis, Multi-Grade Holism, have now been defended. We have 
argued for Realism and for Holism. There is only one issue left to address: the issue of 
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so-called “multi-level” explanations in ecology (and perhaps other life sciences). At the 
outset of the dissertation, we inquired into the justification for the multi-level approach. 
We listed two possibilities: 
[Metaphysical-MLE] The hierarchical structure of the world justifies our 
describing, explaining, and analyzing things using 
hierarchical terms. 
[Epistemic-MLE] The usefulness of hierarchical structure justifies our 
describing, explaining, and analyzing things using 
hierarchical terms. 
We also noted some connections between these two justificatory approaches and the two 
theses defended thus far. For one, if Reductionism is true then neither Metaphysical-MLE 
nor Epistemic-MLE is true; if everything is at the bottommost level of the “layered” 
world, and all can be described, explained, and analyzed using resources contained within 
the bottommost level, then there is no need for multi-level explanation at all. 
Reductionism is incompatible with the very notion of a multi-level explanation. 
 Nevertheless, we argued against Reductionism in the previous chapter in favor of 
Holism. Explanations of ecological phenomena that span over (by virtue of quantifying 
over individuals and instanceables at) multiple levels seem quite fitting under a Holist’s 
view. But now we must ask: what is it that makes these sorts of explanations (e.g., those 
that appeal to the nitrogen cycle) fitting: is it because the world is structured 
hierarchically, because it is useful to exploit hierarchical structures, or both? 
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 In the introductory chapter, Realism was paired with Metaphysical-MLE. Having 
argued for Realism in the third chapter, one would expect that the metaphysical 
justification for multi-level explanation follows straightforwardly. It does not. In this 
chapter, I raise a problem for the pairing of Realism with Metaphysical-MLE with respect 
to a certain class of hierarchy: the upwards nested hierarchy. Inspired the Reductionist 
argument above, I offer some considerations which seem to suggest that Metaphysical-
MLE is false, or at least dubious, given the sort of Realist-Holism defended so far. Near 
the end, I offer some suggestions on how the Realist-Holist might go about defending 
Metaphysical-MLE. 
As it was characterized earlier the Holist thesis relates specifically to the 
philosophy of ecology. Unfortunately, most philosophical accounts of explanation in 
multi-level contexts fall outside of philosophical and theoretical ecology. So, to 
investigate Metaphysical-MLE within ecology, we must broaden our approach. Here I 
examine views outside of ecology that share the relevant features of Holism: views 
according to which the world is (non-reductively) layered in a way that is relevant to 
scientific understanding.  
I begin with a close examination of Jaegwon Kim. Although Kim is a self-
ascribed reductionist, his view nevertheless provides a useful starting point for our 
investigation. His approach to the layered world is unlike anything we have seen so far. 
After arguing against Kim’s special approach to the reductionist layered worldview, I 
present the mechanistic views of Stuart Glennan and Carl Craver. Although I agree that 
levels-of-mechanisms can be used to characterize the layered worldview, by re-
introducing Carl Gillett’s work on realization, we will see that it provides a local layering 
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that, pace Craver, subsumes the mechanistic hierarchy. Before getting to the details of 
Kim’s approach, it is prudent to distinguish the basic metaphysical commitments of Kim 
from those of the mechanists. 
2.0 The Basic Metaphysical Framework 
Taking Realism for granted, the world is layered in at least one of the two senses 
described above: either globalism or localism, or both, is true. We do not know which. Of 
the two, the local approach is far less contentious. Let us focus there, first by describing 
and contrasting the basic metaphysical commitments of the main proponents of a (local) 
layered worldview. 
2.1 The Humean vs. Mechanistic Approaches 
As Glennan (2010) notes, the metaphysics of “non-reductive” explanation comes in two 
general varieties. One variety is the standard Humean approach, which includes entities, 
the properties they exhibit, relations, and laws. The rival variety, the “mechanistic” 
approach, includes entities, the activities they engage in, the properties they exhibit and 
the relations they stand in. Proponents of either approach also tend to mention events in 
their discussions, most often without endorsing any specific account of events.  
This notion of activity is the main point of disagreement between standard non-
reductivists and mechanistic philosophers. Mechanists reify activity as a special ontic 
type (Glennan 2010, Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000, Craver 2007), whereas 
supporters of the standard view typically understand activity simply as a series of 
property changes over some span of time.  
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The difference is crucial to their respective approaches to causal explanation. To 
causally explain a phenomenon, one gives some sort of account of how it came to be 
produced. For the mechanist, reified activities are what account for this productivity since 
activities, on the mechanist’s view, are the ontic locus of productivity: they are 
understood simply as those bits of reality that are productive. Since activities are taken to 
be ontic primitives by mechanists, many think that no further account of productivity is 
then to be expected of them. Scientifically interesting phenomena occur because they are 
produced by the entities and activities organized within a mechanism. In short, the notion 
of causation is built into the mechanistic framework itself as an ontic primitive: activity. 
2.2 Jackson and Petit on Efficacy vs. Relevance 
For the standard non-reductivist, on the other hand, causation is far more mysterious. The 
relata of the causal relation are standardly taken to be events; and so productivity seems 
to be found either in the antecedent causal event itself, or some property that it 
instantiates.135  
Jackson and Petit (1990) attempt to capture the distinction between those 
properties (or events) that are productive and those that are not by drawing a conceptual 
distinction between efficacy and relevance. They justify this distinction using three 
assumptions, one of which is an account of inefficacy: property F is not efficacious in the 
production of an effect e if (i) there is a distinct property G such that F is efficacious in 
e’s production only if G is; (ii) the F-instance and the G-instance are not sequential causal 
                                                   
135 To say that the productivity is found within the causal relation itself suggests that the causal relation is 
an antecedent cause; but it does not seem right to say that the phenomenon of interest occurs because of 
some cause C as well as the causal relation R into which it enters. Causation does not cause the door to 
unlock when I turn the key. Rather, the turning of the key caused the door to unlock. 
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factors (they are not simply nodes in a single causal chain); and (iii) the F-instance and 
G-instance do not combine together to produce e, that is, they are not “coordinate causal 
factors.” (1990, p. 108) Given this, and their other two assumptions, they go on to argue 
that higher level properties, such as special science properties, are causally relevant but 
are not efficacious. Efficacy, and hence productivity, is found only at the level of 
fundamental physics according to Jackson and Petit.136 
I do not think we should endorse their causal metaphysics immediately. Their 
account of inefficacy (p. 108) seems to imply that in cases of genuine causal 
overdetermination (e.g., Bill and Suzy both throw rocks which simultaneously strike, and 
shatter, a window, yet either rock alone would accomplish the shattering) the 
overdetermining causal properties turn out to be inefficacious, since the overdeterminers 
meet the three aformentioned conditions for inefficacy: (i) qua simultaneous, if one rock-
throw is efficacious, then so is the other; (ii) qua simultaneous the overdeterminers are 
not simply sequential instantiations in a single causal chain; (iii) qua individually 
sufficient for the effect, the overdeterminers are not coordinate causal factors (they do not 
work together to produce the effect). The problem is that genuine overdeterminers should 
be considered efficacious: what makes overdetermination cases puzzling for 
counterfactual accounts of causation is that in such cases there is more efficacy than is 
needed, but on Jackson and Petit’s account, there is no efficacy at all. The consequence 
that there is no efficacy at all is just as much a problem for Jackson and Petit’s argument 
as it is for naïve counterfactual accounts of causation.  
                                                   
136 This metaphysical picture informs their special view of multi-level explanation, which they call 
programmatic explanation. We will contrast their view of multi-level explanation with that of Craver’s in a 
later section.  
245 
 
This is, of course, a minor complaint. It does not imply that there is no 
metaphysical distinction between efficacy and relevance; but rather, only that one should 
be careful to endorse Jackson and Petit’s account of it. Since their key premise regarding 
inefficacy is faulty, we must leave their claim that only the lower level is efficacious as a 
metaphysical option for which we have insufficient evidence. 
To summarize: the basic metaphysical picture, in general, includes entities, some 
locus of productivity, properties, relations, and often events. In the next section, I 
examine how these different approaches might facilitate a global hierarchical ordering. 
3.0 Global Orderings: Supervenience and Nesting 
Despite favoring a sort of reductionism, Kim’s writings on the layered worldview are not 
entirely critical. Kim lays out a metaphysical view that utilizes not one, but two 
hierarchies, and the relations they bear to one another.  
3.1 Supervenience and the Layered World 
Although Kim (2002) expresses explicit interested in the metaphysics of the layered 
worldview, he is sure to note that it might in fact be incoherent to say that the world itself 
has a layered structure, and that levels might only apply to concepts, descriptions, or 
language. (2002, p. 4) He is also sure to note the importance of being clear about what is 
involved in the levels picture. He writes: 
The idea of “higher” and “lower” is essential to the levels picture: the 
levels are ordered from lower to higher, and as noted it is often thought 
that there is a bottom level, a level than which there is no lower. Unless 
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one could meaningfully speak of “higher” and “lower”, there would be 
little point in talking about levels… those who use the levels language 
today are, we may assume, concerned exclusively with the physical 
domain, and the imagery evoked by levels talk is a picture, somewhat 
fuzzy and unarticulated, of the physical world neatly stratified into a 
structure of discrete levels, with a bottom level of basic particles… and the 
rest as forming a vertically ordered system of levels each resting on the 
one below and all ultimately resting on the base level of microparticles. 
(ibid.) 
The view he describes here is not a view he intends to defend. What we see above is 
Kim’s description of the globalist approach to the layered worldview, which he later 
rejects in favor of a sort of localism. 
This characterization of globalism is not sacrosanct. We have already argued 
against the idea that levels are necessarily discrete in the first and third chapters when 
describing the notion of a nested hierarchy. We might also question whether or not there 
must be a lowest level, as Kim suggests. And, following Wimsatt, we might question 
whether or not the layering must be non-branching, as Kim suggests with the expression 
“vertically ordered system.” Aside from these quibbles, Kim’s approach to the layered 
worldview roughly matches that which we have been discussing so far. He attempts to 
chip away at the globalist worldview by showing the discreteness and non-branching 
constraints to be objectionable. He is not chipping away at the more general 
understanding of globalism we had specified earlier. 
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  When it comes to the layered worldview, Kim favors a supervenience approach 
(2002 p. 10).137 Specifically, he appeals to the notion of strong supervenience between 
sets of properties U and L:  
U strongly supervenes on L iff for any property u in U, if something x instantiates 
u, there is a property, l, in L such that x instantiates l, and, necessarily, if anything 
instantiates l, it instantiates u. (2002 p. 9) 
To preserve the asymmetry of the higher than relation, Kim adds constraints to the strong 
supervenience ordering with the following definition: H asymmetrically supervenes on L 
just in case H strongly supervenes on L and L does not supervene on H. This gives us an 
analysis of higher than for the layered worldview. 
(SV) H is higher than L iff H asymmetrically supervenes on L. 
3.2 Arguing Against Supervenience Orderings 
There are problems with the supervenience approach. Consider Angela Potochnik’s 
(2010)138 counterexample: the phenotypic properties of organisms are typically 
considered to be higher than genotypic properties, but phenotypic properties do not 
supervene on genotypic properties. An organism’s camouflage, she argues, varies 
independently of any changes to the organism’s genotype. There are thus cases in which 
x is taken to be higher than y, but x does not supervene on y. Kim’s (SV) analysis seems 
to fail. 
                                                   
137 It is unclear whether or not Kim is talking about C. Lloyd Morgan’s hierarchy in particular or the 
layered world in general, when he describes supervenience orderings as the best option for order the levels 
of the layered worldview. I will presume the latter since it is congenial to his larger view. 
138 Also see Potochnik and McGill (forthcoming). 
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Potchnik’s objection relies on an uncharitable reading of Kim. In earlier chapters, 
we noted that there is a difference between the higher than relation and the is at a higher 
level than relation; this distinction provides a way for Kim to avoid Potochnik’s worry. If 
we allow that higher than relates the levels themselves whereas is at a higher level than 
relates the contents of those levels, we can take (SV) at face value, leaving is at a higher 
level than unanalyzed. In issuing her objection, Potchnik’s must interpret (SV) to be an 
analysis of is at a higher level than: Kim is not committed to the idea that phenotypic and 
genotypic properties are themselves levels; he is only committed to the idea that these 
properties are at levels. If (SV) is not an analysis of is at a higher level than, then he is 
free to maintain that the level that contains phenotypic properties (i.e., the organism 
level) does supervene on the level that contains genotypic properties (i.e., the molecular 
level): the distribution of molecules in our world, by hypothesis, necessitates the actual 
distribution of phenotypic and other organismal properties. Higher levels, then, might 
indeed supervene on lower levels; Kim’s account appears salvageable despite 
Potochnik’s counterexample. 
Having a response to Potochnik is not enough. There is a more serious problem 
for Kim’s supervenience ordering. It involves the nature of the supervenience relation 
itself. If Kim’s definitions are correct, then ‘Q strongly supervenes on P’ is about 
instantiation, elementhood, and a modal relation, viz., (P→Q). Supervenience claims 
are not made true by virtue of the way our world is; they are made true by virtue of what 
our world and other-worlds are like.  
That these claims are not made true by virtue of what our own world is like 
strongly suggests that supervenience relations do not exist in the same way as other, 
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similar, ordering relations: reduces to and is realized by, to use familiar examples. Claims 
about those relations, it seems, are made true by how things are in our world. Since it is 
difficult to see how an other-worldly (perhaps “many-worldly” is better) relation might 
give structure to our world, it is difficult to see supervenience as the relation to bring 
hierarchical order to our world. The existence of hierarchies, recall, is justified on the 
grounds that its defining-parts exist: that the collection of things being ordering 
hierarchically is a reified collection, and that the relation serving as higher than is also 
reified. Globalist hierarchies are no different. To put the point succinctly: since 
supervenience is not a reified (i.e., “real”) relation within the scientific domain, it does 
not qualify as a higher than relation for the layered world.  
3.3 Forging a Global Hierarchy 
So far, we have restricted the discussion to Kim’s remarks on a global hierarchy of 
properties. But there is more to the layered worldview than simply properties. There are 
individuals as well. To set up his argument against the globalist layered worldview, Kim 
chooses Oppenheim and Putnam’s hierarchy as his target (2002, p. 12). Starting with 
what he calls the universal domain of physics, U, Kim carves out a comprehensive, and 
familiar, account of a global layering: 
First consider atoms: atoms and aggregates of atoms form a subdomain of 
U; call it UA… Molecules and aggregates of molecules form a subdomain 
of UA, and hence of U. Call it UM. What are left out of UM are elementary 
particles and atoms that are not part of molecules. In a similar fashion we 
can take cells and their aggregates as a subdomain, UC, of UM. We then 
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have the domain of multicellular living organisms, UL, as a subdomain of 
UC, and the domain of social groups US. Notice that U, UA, UM, UC, UL, 
and US form a nested series in which each domain that follows U is 
properly included in its predecessor. (Kim 2002, p. 17) 
Following what Kim tells us here, we are presented with the following picture: 
Figure 18 bears both a striking resemblance to the Oppenheim and Putnam downward-
nested reductionist hierarchy discussed earlier and a stark contrast to the Allen and Starr 
upward-nested hierarchy from the first chapter. The only difference between Oppenheim 
and Putnam’s hierarchy, and that of Kim, is that the former hierarchy is ordered by a 
microreduction relation, whereas Kim offers no explicit interpretation of ‘higher than’. 
Implicitly, he seems to maintain that the asymmetric supervenience ordering is correct, at 
least for properties; and then adds a (de)compositional mereological ordering for 
individuals in the hierarchy. Having developed what he takes to be the strongest 
presentation of the globalist picture, Kim then aims to refute it. 









3.4 Arguing Against Monolithic Globalism 
Kim raises a number of problems for the approach to globalism set out in the previous 
section. His free-molecule problem, which we discussed in the first chapter, is a 
straightforward counterexample to the claim that the level of living organisms is properly 
included in the level of cells. Some of an organism’s molecular parts might not be 
included in the level of cells (i.e., there might not be a cell for which the free molecule is 
a part), and so the level of organisms cannot be completely included within the cellular 
level.   
While it might also be true that the organism level is properly included in the 
molecular level, Kim thinks it is unacceptable to simply crop out the cellular level since 
“cells form a significant nomic kind, and the biological functions and behaviors of 
organisms seem perspicaciously explainable in terms of the properties and behaviors of 
cells.” (2002, p. 17) In short, Kim thinks cells must be included as a level in the layered 
worldview because of their significance for multi-level explanations of biological 
functions and behaviors.  
Kim raises other concerns as well. He thinks that the possibility of artificial minds 
and the mere existence of computing machines “throws into doubt the idea of a single 
hierarchy of connected levels”, (2002, p. 16) suggesting that there is little sense in asking 
whether such machines are higher or lower than sea slugs or birch trees. (ibid.) 
To continue to endorse globalism, Kim tells us, there is little recourse but to say 
that such computers would reside at the molecular level, since they are not composed of 
biological cells, and are not living organisms. Otherwise, one would have to endorse what 
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we have been calling a branching-hierarchy, (2002, p. 17) in which the computational and 
cellular levels reside on separate branches of the hierarchy, and are not comparable in 
terms of “higher than”. Branching, however, degrades the neat and tidy globalist layered 
world as Kim conceives it, into a comparatively messy tree-like branching structure with 
overlapping levels. (ibid.) Although Kim has taken pains to provide the most charitable 
interpretation of monolithic globalism, his concerns ultimately lead him to reject it.  
As we remarked earlier, however, Kim’s version of globalism is loaded with 
unnecessary details. A purer form of globalism claims only that the entire world has a 
hierarchical structure; not that it has a discrete, non-overlapping, and non-branching 
structure. Such qualities are not essential to hierarchies and so they are not essential to a 
globalist hierarchical worldview. Kim has not shown that a globalist approach to the 
layered worldview fails; he has only shown that the version he takes for granted fails. 
There are other available options aside from what has been offered by Oppenheim and 
Putnam. 
3.5 An Upwards-Nested Global Hierarchy 
Let us pause momentarily to take notice of how an upwards nested version of Kim’s 
global hierarchy can avoid the free-molecule and branching problems altogether. On such 
a view, social groups are not properly included in the level of organisms, but rather, vice 
versa. Starting at the top, the level of social groups (rather than physics) becomes the 
“universal” domain, organisms are properly included in that level (qua proper-parts of 
social groups), and the nesting of cells into the organism level, molecules into cells, and 
then atoms follows suit. This upwards-nested picture frees us from having to find a 
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reason for placing things in the level directly below; and at the same time, provides a 
reason to place things in the level directly above: the upwards-nestedness of 
(unrestricted) compositional hierarchies is a theorem of Core Hierarchy Theory, and so 
we do not have to account for why free-molecules are found on the cell level, they are 
there because we are using the simplest and most general interpretation of hierarchical 
structures Core Hierarchy Theory can offer. 
 One might be bothered by the fact that not everything belongs to a social group, 
leading one to think that it is inappropriate to use the level of social groups as the 
universal domain. I am sympathetic to such a concern: galaxies and planets are poorly 
suited for inclusion in the level of social groups. Nevertheless, this is a mere toy example 
(i.e., a local hierarchy) used to make a small point about how upwards nesting can resolve 
Kim’s concern. In a truly globalist picture, the upwards nested hierarchy would have the 
universe itself as the topmost level.  
 Still, one might be bothered by the fact that not every organism, cell, molecule, 
and atom belongs to a social group. This might lead some to question the appropriateness 
of the nesting approach in general. To this concern, I am not as sympathetic. Antlers, to 
reuse an earlier example, are to be considered at the organism level, but they do not have 
to actually be attached to any deer for them to be appropriately positioned at that level. 
Kim and his reductionists cohorts will complain that the upwards nested picture is 
at odds with the established view that physics is the only science with “full coverage” 
(Kim 2002, p. 16); i.e., the only one that seeks to provide “a comprehensive description 
and explanation of all phenomena of this world.” (ibid.) Everyone agrees that this 
254 
 
ambition should be respected in a hierarchical representation of the world; but, they 
would argue, inverting Kim’s picture to form an upwards nested hierarchy, in fact, 
inappropriately shifts these ambitions from physics to sociology, economics, or social 
science in general. That, we should all agree, seems incorrect. 
Such complaints are of no serious concern. They are based upon a distortion of 
Oppenheim and Putnam’s vision for scientific unity: the idea that the best or only way to 
represent the role of physics is to associate it with the lowest, i.e., the “basement”, level 
of some grand hierarchy, and then apply a reductionist principle – such as the downward 
inclusion principle (DIP) from the previous chapter – in order to ensure that everything is 
included within the bottommost level. But there are other straightforward ways to 
represent the “full coverage” of physics aside from applying the DIP: physics, we can 
say, is the only science that seeks to explain the behaviors of things found at any level. 
Physics, therefore, has “full coverage” on the upwards nested view.  
Some might dismiss this as “full coverage” in name alone; it was applied by 
stipulation. I disagree. Classical physics deals with the motion of macro-bodies, and 
astro-physics deals with the motions of galaxies and galaxy clusters. Moreover, on an 
upwards-nesting view, everything at any given level is also at all higher levels; atoms and 
other micro-particles studied by physicists, according to the nested view, are thus found 
at every level, from the bottom to the top. Physics should be labeled with “full coverage” 
since everything within the topmost level falls within its scope, and since everything falls 
within the topmost level on an upwards nested view, it straightforwardly follows that 
everything falls within the scope of physics. If micro-physics is associated with the 
bottommost level, physics, in general, should simply be associated with the universe 
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(topmost) level. The idea that everything falls within the scope of physics, but not 
everything falls within the scope of micro-physics is a perfectly sensible way to 
understand the structure of science and its connection to the structure of physical reality. 
Earlier we called this sort of view Holism. 
 To summarize: Kim’s arguments against globalism – viz., the idea that the entire 
universe is structured hierarchically – are unconvincing. He has only raised problems for 
certain global hierarchies: such as those which expect to carve out a special place for 
everything of interest to scientists, and those for which the levels are taken to be discreet 
or downwards-nested. It was also argued that a supervenience ordering does not provide a 
satisfactory interpretation of ‘higher than’ for a layered worldview.  
4.0 Local Orderings: The Dual-Hierarchy Model 
Let us now examine Kim’s localist position. Kim uses his locally layered worldview to 
frame and develop a novel sort of reductionism. This reductionism is a bit different from 
the microreductionist view we developed earlier; but, as we will see, it is no 
improvement.  
4.1 Causal Exclusion and Functional Reduction 
Kim (1993; 2002) endorses the standard metaphysics described in the previous section.139 
He takes the relations of reduction, supervenience, and causation to hold primarily 
between properties. Supervenience is characterized as a relation between families of 
properties; individual events stand in causal relations insofar as they are subsumed under 
                                                   




some law, where laws are understood as an objective connection between properties. 
Kim’s functional-model of reductionism is, in his view, the most plausible way to deal 
with the metaphysical problems that arise for the standard approach. 
The problem Kim is concerned with, the causal exclusion problem, is well-known 
and has a substantial body of literature devoted to it.140 The problem, roughly, is that there 
appears to be a tension between the common idea that higher level properties (having a 
desire, for example) are efficacious in bringing about certain higher level behaviors, 
(going for a run, for example), and the idea that those same behaviors are also brought 
about by lower level, that is, fundamental physical, properties. Suppose H and H* are 
higher level properties, and that H causes H* to be instantiated. Let L and L* be the 
respective lower level supervenience base for H and H*. Since H* supervenes on L*, the 
only way for H* to come about is for L* to come about. But if we then suppose that L 
causes L*, then we have a complete story for H*’s production without invoking H 
whatsoever; that is, there is no causal role for H to perform since L is causally sufficient 
on its own. Without a role to play, it appears that H is inefficacious and epiphenomenal. 
 Kim’s point is that if we were to say that H = L, then H would play the 
appropriate causal role: the very same role as L. Epiphenominalism can then be avoided 
via the reduction of H to L. To establish this sort of reduction, Kim introduces what 
might be called the functional model of reduction. His idea (1998, p. 98) is to construe H 
as a second-order property141 defined by its causal role, where a causal role might be 
                                                   
140 I review some of this literature in the next chapter. 
141 Kim characterizes second-order properties as follows: “F is a second-order property over set B of base 
(or first-order) properties iff F is the property of having some property P in B such that D(P), where D 




thought of as a list of typical causes and typical effects.142 If we think of H as a second 
order functional property, that is, the property of having a property with causal role C, 
and this C is exactly the causal role that L plays (in all nomologically possible worlds), 
then Kim thinks we can say that H = L.143  
 Consider the property of transparency, for example. Kim thinks that we should 
first construe transparency, standardly stated as the capacity of a substance to transmit 
light-rays intact, in a functional way: as the second-order property of having a first-order 
property that bestows the power to transmit light-rays intact to a substance that 
instantiates it. Next, we find an explanation, at the micro-level, for why the substance has 
this power. The relevant first-order property picked out in this explanation, call it L, then 
realizes the transparency. In this circumstance, the instance of transparency and the 
instance of its micro-realizer have the same causal powers. Kim thinks that the properties 
are then identical: transparency, it turns out, is nothing other than having L. 
 To summarize: Kim’s solution to the causal exclusion problem is to preserve the 
efficacy of supervenient properties by first construing them in the right sort of way 
(according to their causal role), and then by identifying those properties instances with 
their supervenience-base by virtue of the fact that they have the same causal powers.   
                                                   
142 Cf. Shoemaker (2007) who characterizes such a property X in terms of its causal profile: a set forward-
looking (typical effects of X) and a set of backward-looking causal features (typical causes of X). 
 
143 Alexander Rueger thinks that it would be better for Kim to draw the identification between the causal 
powers of H and the causal powers of L. (2006, p. 336) 
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4.2 Orders vs. Levels: The Dual Hierarchy View 
The appeal to the “micro-level” must be qualified in Kim’s picture of functional 
reduction. He thinks that it is important to make a distinction between what he calls 
“orders” and “levels” if we hope to resolve his causal exclusion worries. 
Kim’s distinction is not meant to suggest that orders and levels are different sorts 
of things altogether. The distinction is merely terminological. The terms ‘order’ and 
‘level’ are both used to designate relata of, what appears to be, a higher than relation. If 
this is correct, then they qualify, in the mind of the core hierarchy theorist, as levels.  
The purpose of the distinction is to specify the sort of hierarchy to which Kim 
thinks his reductionism applies. (1998, p.83) When Kim talks about higher or lower 
orders, he refers only to a hierarchy of functional properties: the property of having some 
other property. In other words, to instantiate a higher-order property is to instantiate the 
property instantiates some lower-order property; for example, the property of having 
some property that plays such-and-such a causal role.  
Higher levels, in Kim’s terminology, are to be understood mereologically. Higher 
level properties are those properties belonging to wholes that do not belong to their parts. 
Kim’s reductionism is intended to apply only to order-based hierarchies. He 
thinks that it is unproblematic to suggest that new causal powers appear on higher levels 
in the mereological hierarchy. Many, I suspect, will feel inclined to agree.  A baseball has 
a certain mass, but that mass is not shared by any one of the baseball’s proper-parts. 




For Kim, the realizers of high-level functional properties are not functionally 
reduced to lower level properties – i.e., micro-properties – but rather to properties found 
at that same higher level. In this respect, functional reduction is an intra-level 
relationship, rather than inter-level. The high-level, but micro-based, reducing properties 
(i.e., the realizers) are accounted for in the following way: 
P is a micro-based property just in case P is the property of being 
completely decomposable into non-overlapping proper parts a1, a2, …, an 
such that P1(a1), P2(a2), … Pn(an), and R(a1, a2, …, an). (Kim 1998, p. 84) 
Here P is a higher level property, a micro-based property, of a composite object, and the 
properties of that objects parts, P1…Pn are the micro-properties. The situation is depicted 
in Figure 19. The idea is that a mereological aggregate instantiates both the functional 
property and P, the micro-based property. The parts into which the aggregate decomposes 
do not have P. They have other properties, viz. micro-properties, and they are related to 















Figure 19: The Dual-Hierarchy Approach 
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4.3 The Dual-Hierarchy View, Reduction, and Core Hierarchy Theory 
One might be tempted to think that the dual-hierarchy view can be used to relieve the 
tension between Reductionism and Core Hierarchy Theory brought out in the previous 
chapter. The mereological “levels” hierarchy, qua compositional, is perfectly consistent 
with Core Hierarchy Theory. The property-based “order” hierarchy, on the other hand, is 
not a compositional hierarchy of any sort. Decomposition does not figure into the 
property hierarchy since the realization relation, for Kim, holds between a functional 
property and a micro-based property that is instantiated in the same individual (Gillett 
2002 calls this “flat” realization). Upwards nesting, then, is not a derivable feature of the 
functional-reductionist hierarchy144 and so Kim can make the identification of functional 
and micro-based properties without conflicting with Core Hierarchy Theory’s theorems 
for unrestricted hierarchies.  
Even so, Kim’s dual-hierarchy approach cannot be used to defend Reductionism, 
for his view is not Reductionist in the sense described at the outset. By separating the 
property-hierarchy from the mereological-hierarchy, the conflict with Core Hierarchy 
Theory is avoided entirely: by rejecting the slogan “everything’s in the basement!” with 
respect to the mereological hierarchy, Kim avoids the problem we raised for 
Reductionism; but at the same time, by rejecting the slogan Reductionism is abandoned. 
So, the dual-hierarchy approach cannot be used to defend Reductionism after all.  
                                                   
144 But note that Kim’s “functional-reductionist hierarchy” turns out not to be a hierarchy at all, according 
to Core Hierarchy Theory. For Kim, realization is property-identity. As soon as it is claimed that the 
realizer is identical to the property it realizes, it follows from the symmetry of identity that Kim-style 
realization lacks the requisite asymmetric property that is necessary for being a higher than relation. Kim’s 
“reduction hierarchy” is therefore not a hierarchy, according to Core Hierarchy Theory.  
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Ironically, Kim turns out to be a kind of Holist. According to Kim, the micro-
based properties are identical to the higher-order mental properties they realize, but are 
not identical to any collection of (or structuring of) micro-properties. This is perfectly 
consistent with Holism, as characterized in the introductory chapter: for Kim, there is a 
mereological hierarchy (the Holist agrees) and higher-level properties are not positioned 
at the bottommost level (the Holist agrees); higher-order properties are identical to lower-
order properties, but are not identical to anything at the lower-level. Kim’s functional 
reductionism, as it is described here, thus counts as a kind of Holism, as characterized in 
the introductory chapter.  
This is a strange result. Kim thinks that there is a problem with non-reductivist 
metaphysics: the causal exclusion problem. Yet, Kim counts as a kind of Holist. Since 
non-reductive (i.e., Holist) metaphysics is the target of the causal exclusion problem, and 
this metaphysics appears to be the same as Kim’s, we should expect that Kim’s 
metaphysics fails to solve the causal exclusion problem (i.e., fails to avoid 
epiphenomenalism). Indeed, that is exactly what Stuart Glennan argues in order to 
advance his mechanistic approach to the layered worldview. 
5.0 The Mechanistic Hierarchy 
Glennan (2010) argues that Kim’s reductionism fails to solve the causal exclusion 
problem. He accuses Kim of something called property bias, taking issue with the idea 
that higher level properties are determined only by base properties and appropriate 
nomological relations, which he says is implicit in Kim’s view. Glennan thinks that this 
approach ignores that higher level properties are mechanistically explicable, and that 
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causal relationhips are mediated by underlying mechanisms.145 To ignore the role of 
mechanisms, Glennan thinks, is to invite causal exclusion worries back into the 
mereological hierarchy. According to him, taking special note of mechanisms, especially 
their activities, is the only way to put these causal worries to rest. I conclude, in part, by 
arguing otherwise.  
5.1 What is a Mechanism? 
Glennan’s account of mechanism (c.f. 1996, 2002) is as follows:  
A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces that 
behavior by the interaction of a number of parts, where the interactions 
between parts can be characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating 
generalizations. (2002, p. 344) 
According to Glennan there is no such thing as “a mechanism simpliciter. One cannot 
even identify a mechanism without saying what it is that the mechanism does.” (Glennan 
1996, p. 52).  
Contrast this characterization with that of Machamer, Darden, and Craver 
(henceforth, MDC): “Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are 
productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions.” 
(MDC 2000, p. 3) MDC call their characterization “dualist” since on their account, 
                                                   
145 The notion of ‘mechanistic mediation’ is also found in Craver and Bechtel’s (2007) account of so-called 
top-down causation. They argue that top-down causation refers to mechanistically mediated effects, which 
are understood partly as a constitutive claim and a causal claim: the causal relations, for Craver and 
Bechtel, are exclusively intra-level; whereas composition and constitution relations are inter-level. A 





entities and activities are both primitive ontological categories of the sort that can enter 
into a composition relation; that is, “mechanisms are composed of both entities (with 
their properties) and activities” (Machamer, Darden, & Craver 2000, p. 3).146 
In both characterizations, mechanisms are productive by virtue of their 
decomposition into parts that engage in productive activities. Glennan does not see the 
two characterizations to be at odds. In fact, when arguing against Kim, he adopts MDC’s 
idea that activities are the locus of productivity, rather than events, properties or laws. In 
this respect, he upholds what we earlier called the mechanistic, rather than Humean, 
metaphysical approach. 
5.2 Glennan on The Dual-Hierarchy View 
Glennan (2010) argues against Kim’s dual-hierarchy view by raising doubts as to whether 
it solves the causal exclusion problem. According to Glennan, to describe something in 
terms of a complex conjunction of properties and relations of its low-level parts implies 
that there is a configuration of those parts at the lower level. Those micro-parts, 
instantiating the very properties and relations mentioned in Kim’s high-level micro-based 
property, according to Glennan, also correspond to a complex lower level property. 
I think Glennan’s point is a good one, albeit slightly misstated. The general idea is 
that we can concede to Kim that high-level (but low-order) micro-based properties – e.g., 
being decomposable into the Ps standing R – are instantiated by a high-level individual, 
expressed formally as Dx. This concession also requires that we admit the existence of an 
organized assortment of micro-entities, x1,x2,...,xn, each instantiating micro-properties and 
                                                   
146 How should we understand these ontic-primative activities? According to Peter Machamer (2004, pp. 
30-2), activities are what are referred to by verb expressions.   
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bearing the R relation to one another – e.g., being the Ps standing R –  at the lower level. 
The “complex lower level property” to which Glennan refers is in fact a low-level 
relation:147 expressed as Rx1,x2,…,xn. If the relational-structuring of micro-entities and 
their properties, Rx1,x2,…,xn, is sufficient for an effect, then the high-level micro-based 
property to which Kim attributes efficacy is made inefficacious. What further work does 
being decomposable into the Ps standing R do that is not already done by being the Ps 
standing R? None, it seems. Since what goes on at the micro-level of the mereological 
hierarchy is sufficient for what goes on everywhere else, the causal exclusion problems 
snaps back at Kim’s functional-reduction (i.e., intra-level identity theory) solution.  
To respond, one might suggest that we should further reduce the properties of 
high-level composites to Glennan’s complex lower level relations, without reducing the 
composites themselves. That way the causal efficacy of higher level properties might be 
saved, via microreduction, without endorsing the fatal downward-inclusion principle. The 
problem, of course, is that Leibniz’ Law forbids relational properties, such as Kim’s 
micro-based properties, from being identified with lower level complex relations. 
Properties of high-level individuals are quite generally monadic, whereas the low-level 
complex relations are polyadic. Since one is not many, the difference implies that this 
further reductionism is untenable. Kim cannot avoid epiphenomenalism so easily. 
                                                   
147 Otherwise, Glennan’s objection does not make sense. Since ‘level’ refers to mereological level in the 
current context, if he were to construe his complex structural property as a low-level property, then it would 
be a property possessed by something at the lower mereological level. But there is nothing at that level, no 
micro-part, that instantiates that sort of complex structure. So, Glennan’s complex structural property 
cannot be a lower-level property instantiated by a lower-level thing, but rather a relationship between 
lower-level things instantiating the properties that they do. 
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5.3 Productive Activities vs. Causal Relevance 
Glennan (2010) thinks he has a way to resolve the issue. He thinks that properties, 
independent of the mechanisms that realize them, are quite generally inefficacious. The 
consequence we end off with in the previous sub-section is, in Glennan’s mind, exactly 
correct. 
Activities, for Glennan are where productivity, and hence efficacy, is found. 
Consider a simple example: a key opening a lock. Turning the key causes the lock to 
open by virtue of the key’s shape and rigidity. Where Kim faces a struggle to preserve the 
efficacy of the key’s macro-properties shape and rigidity in the presence of its 
microstructural properties, Glennan denies the efficacy of both. It is the turning of the 
key that is productive, and hence efficacious, in opening the lock. Properties, in fact, are 
only causally relevant, which is a notion he, following Jackson and Petit, takes to be 
distinct from productivity.148 Since changing the micro-structure of the key, while holding 
its macro-structure fixed (e.g., expose the key to extreme heat and then let it cool), will 
make no difference to the opening of the lock, Glennan tells us that it is the macro-
structure that is causally relevant rather than the micro-structure. 
This is largely in agreement with Carl Craver’s (2007, Ch. 6) mechanistic analysis 
of the causal exclusion worry. He denies that the exclusion problem applies to the 
mechanistic framework he and Glennan take for granted, since Kim’s “argument simply 
does not apply to the central explanatory sense of levels in neuroscience.” (Craver 2007, 
p. 198) Both Glennan and Craver deny the efficacy of properties altogether. Efficacy, for 
                                                   




these mechanists, relates to productivity, and properties do not actively produce anything; 
mechanisms, on the other hand, are productive and hence efficacious.  
Craver (2007, p. 165) thinks that the productivity of higher level mechanisms 
escapes causal exclusion worries because the causal exclusion argument affects only 
those accounts of local hierarchies that are based on a ranking of properties: Kim’s 
realization hierarchy.149 Craver, perhaps misleadingly, calls these “realization” 
hierarchies. Mechanistic hierarchies, he claims, are not realization hierarchies in this 
sense. 
Here I hesitate. I worry that relying on a distinction between property hierarchies 
and mechanistic hierarchies bring us no closer towards solving the causal exclusion 
problem. The problem, I suspect, can be regenerated with respect to the mechanistic 
approach to the layered worldview as well. To understand why, let us first look at the 
mechanist’s vision of the layered worldview.  
5.4 Craver and the Layered Worldview: Levels of Mechanisms 
The fifth chapter of Craver’s (2007) book is devoted to an investigation of the usage of 
the word ‘level’ in the biological, especially neurological, sciences. His goal for the 
investigation is to shed light on the sort of “multi-level” explanation that is at work 
within neuroscience. He thinks that levels-of-mechanisms are most relevant to 
                                                   
149 As far as I am aware, Craver accepts Kim’s levels/orders distinction, as well as Kim’s claim that the 
causal exclusion worries apply only to the intra-level (i.e., order-based, rather than mereologically-based) 





explanations surrounding spatial memory,150 which he takes as a paradigmatic example of 
a multi-level explanation in neuroscience.151 
 He understands ‘level’ to be “multiply ambiguous” (2007, p. 163); there are levels 
of abstraction, analysis, behavior, complexity, description, explanation, function, 
generality, organization, science, theory, and mechanism. (2007, p. 164) He thinks that 
the application of term “requires only a set of items and a way of ordering them as higher 
or lower” (ibid.), and uses this general understanding to carve out a taxonomy (2007, p. 
170) of the different senses of level. He then uses this taxonomy to narrow in on the sense 
of ‘level’ used in neuroscience. I have two minor quibbles. 
 First: ‘Level’ is not multiply ambiguous. Craver defines it well enough as “a set 
of items and a way of ordering them as higher or lower.” This is simply a set-theoretic 
variant of the Core Hierarchy Theory formulation: levels are the relata of higher than. 
The main source of ambiguity, it strikes me, is not found in the term ‘level’; but rather, in 
the way of ordering them. ‘Higher than’, we have seen, courts many suitors. 
 Second: there is a problem with his taxonomy. It is missing a rather important 
sense of ‘level’ in both neuroscience and philosophical metaphysics: levels-of-realization. 
Craver hastily dismisses levels-of-realization on the grounds that realization is a relation 
between properties possessed by the same individual. He agrees with Kim that realization 
                                                   
150 There are four levels in Craver’s main example: at the top, you have a mouse navigating a water maze 
(2007, p. 166-7); lower, you have the hippocampus generating a spatial map (p. 167); lower still are 
neurons inducing long-term potentiation (p. 169); and at the bottom, the molecular level, you have NMDA 
receptors activating (p. 169). He notes that the choice of four levels is an over-simplification. But I do not 
dispute that it is a useful one. 
 
151 There are many other examples that fit with Craver’s picture. Bechtel, for example, thinks the human 




as an intra-, rather than inter-, level relation. But there is a different way to think of 
realization. Carl Gillett (2002) argues in favor of a dimensioned view of realization. He 
gives the following analysis:  
(REALIZATION)  Property instances F1—Fn, in individuals s1— sn (or 
individual s*), realize a property instance G, in individual 
s* under background conditions $, if and only if the powers 
contributed by F1—Fn to s1—sn (or s*), which are 
constituents/parts of s*, together comprise the powers 
individuative of G, in s* under $, but not vice versa. (2007, 
p. 202) 
This sort of analysis incorporates two kinds of realization: property, or “flat”, realization 
in which both the realized and realizing property are instantiated in the same individual, 
and dimensioned realization in which the property of the whole is realized by the 
properties of (a structuring of) its parts. Kim’s approach to realization is flat, whereas 
(our interpretation of) Glennan’s argument – that the causal exclusion argument 
generalizes from order-based hierarchies to mereological hierarchies – exploits 
dimensioned realization. By overlooking the hierarchy of dimensioned realization, Craver 
ignores a viable contender for levels of explanation in neuroscience. 
5.4.1 Craver, Mechanisms and Globalism 
Although Kim and Craver disagree about the efficacy of higher-order properties, they are 
in agreement with respect to the tenability of globalism: they are skeptical. Presuming 
that the Oppenheim and Putnam approach to be best representative of the globalist 
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ambition, and that the metaphysics of a global ordering is grounded in composition, 
Craver argues that there is no neat correspondence between levels of objects and levels of 
sciences (physics, chemistry, etc).  
First, the atoms-to-societies ranking is incomplete. It is missing solar systems, 
galaxies, and other important scientific features. Societies are at the top-level of 
Oppenheim and Putnam’s compositional global hierarchy, but solar systems are not 
societies. Nor, says Craver, will it do to simply add levels to the hierarchy. Solar systems, 
he claims, do not have societies as parts, so they cannot be higher than societies in the 
global compositional hierarchy. 
 Craver’s claim is puzzling. Surely some solar systems have societies as parts. 
Solar systems have biospheric and non-biospheric planets as parts; biospheres have 
ecosystems as parts; ecosystems have communities as parts; and societies are a sort of 
community.152 From the transitivity of primitive-parthood it follows that societies are 
parts of some solar systems. They are not parts that cosmologists care about in their 
professional work, but the interests of cosmologists do not determine what counts as a 
part of what, in the most basic sense. Societies, therefore, fit quite nicely in a global 
compositional hierarchy stretching from galaxies down to atoms. We should only agree 
that the society level is ill-placed in local hierarchies involving distant solar systems that 
contain no life. 
 Nevertheless, Craver raises other objections to the tidy correspondence between 
the compositional hierarchy and the hierarchy of scientific fields. He uses neuroscience 
                                                   




as one example. “Theories in neuroscience, in short, do not correspond to tidy levels of 
nature.” (2007, p. 176) Moreover, the mere presentation of Wimsatt’s wildly branching 
global “hierarchy”153, Craver thinks (2007, p. 190), is evidence enough. 
But note, globalism is not the view that there is a perfect, or near-perfect, fit 
between a global hierarchy of scientific fields and a global hierarchy of composition. 
That is only one version of globalism. Globalism, as it was characterized earlier, is 
simply the idea that the entire scientific domain exhibits hierarchical structure. On such a 
characterization, there might be many ways in which the entire domain can be ordered 
into a hierarchy; it imposes no requirement that any global hierarchy whatsoever must 
“match up” with existing scientific fields. Craver’s objection is restricted to something 
that might be called integrative globalism: the idea that all or many of the global 
hierarchies, can be integrated into one singular “master” hierarchy. I agree that 
integrative globalism is implausible. Globalism, the idea that the entire scientific domain 
exhibits a hierarchical structure as a whole, in one or more ways, remains a live option. 
 Even so, the existence of a globalist mechanistic or compositional hierarchy does 
not imply that Craver’s localist account of levels-of-mechanisms is problematic. Craver 
only means to assert that hierarchical structures should be investigated on a case-by-case 
basis, depending on what is “explanatorily relevant for a given phenomenon.” (2007, p. 
191)  Let us now examine Craver’s localist approach in greater detail. 
                                                   
153 Quotations are used because, as it was noted in the previous chapter, Wimsatt’s hierarchy is not 
genuinely hierarchical: there are failures of the asymmetry constraint on higher than. 
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5.4.2 Craver on Levels-of-Mechanisms  
Craver’s view of mechanistic hierarchies begins from two assumptions, which he makes 
explicit: 
  (LM1) Levels of mechanisms are ordered compositionally. (2007, p. 184) 
(LM2)  Levels of mechanisms are exclusive, in the sense that each item 
appears at only one level in a given hierarchy. (ibid. p. 185) 
When characterizing levels-of-mechanisms as a sort of compositional ordering, Craver 
warns against the presumption that levels-of-mechanisms are levels-of-aggregates, where 
“aggregates” are understood as mereological sums, irrespective of their structure and 
organization. Neuroscience properties, he argues, are not always aggregate-like, they 
depend on the spatial location of the parts. Aggregation does not depend on location. So, 
neuroscience levels are not levels of aggregation. (2007, p. 187) 
 Craver also warns against the presumption that mechanistic levels correspond to 
levels of spatial containment. Such a characterization, he argues, fails to differentiate 
between components and pieces. Pieces of mechanisms are arbitrarily specified hunks of 
it; components are “pieces that make identifiable contributions to the behavior of a 
mechanism.” (2007, p. 188) He understands ‘identifiable contribution’ in terms of causal 
relevance: components make a difference to the behavior of a mechanism as a whole.  
Following Stuart Kauffman (1971), Craver thinks that decomposition into 
components is always relative to some behavior of the system. He summarizes his 
positive account of levels-of-mechanisms in the following way: 
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Levels of mechanisms are levels of composition… the relata are behaving 
mechanisms at higher-levels and their components at lower levels. These 
relata are properly conceived neither as entities nor as activities; rather, 
they should be understood as acting entities… X’s -ing is at a lower 
mechanistic level than S’s -ing if and only if X’s -ing is a component in 
the mechanism for S’s -ing. Lower-level components are organized 
together to form higher-level components… By organization, I mean that 
the parts have spatial (location, size, shape, and motion), temporal (order, 
rate and duration), and active (for example, feedback) relations with one 
another by which they work together to do something. (2007, p. 189) 
His diagram (Figure 20) is most helpful: 
 
Figure 20: Craver's Depiction of a Mechanism With  
Three Levels (2007, p. 189) 
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At the top-level, we have the mechanistic behavior to be explained: S’s -ing. The level 
below it is the mechanism that explains S’s -ing; at that level, we see x’s -ing. The 
bottom level is the mechanism for x’s -ing.154 
Craver thinks his view corresponds nicely to Wimsatt’s general remarks on levels: 
components are smaller than the mechanisms that contain them; levels-of-mechanisms 
are “loci of stable generalizations”, and can be seen as “local maxima of regularity and 
predictability.” (Craver 2007, p. 190)155 
His presentation differs from Wimsatt’s in an important way. The difference, in 
fact, might be taken to raise trouble for Core Hierarchy Theory. The difference is that 
levels-of-mechanisms are not levels of entities since mechanistic components, Craver 
argues, are not always entities. The synapse, he gives as an example, is part axon-
terminal, part dendrite, and the gap between them. (2007, p. 190)  
If our Core Hierarchy Theory were expressed in terms of ‘entity’ rather than 
‘individual’, then this subtle point would indeed place Craver’s levels-of-mechanisms out 
of its reach. An individual, recall, is anything that falls within the scope of our singular 
quantifiers. All entities are then individuals, but not all individuals are entities. The 
synapse, for an example, is an individual in the idiomatic sense of Core Hierarchy 
Theory, as evidenced by our quantifying over it in this very sentence.  
                                                   
154 Note, Craver does not mean that the contents of levels (the “relata”) are not literally entities; acting 
entities are still entities, after all. He is merely suggesting that all mechanisms are active. For the 
mechanism to exist, it must be an organization of entities, and the activities they engage in. No activity, no 
mechanism. 
 
155 Note that Craver’s approach to mechanistic levels has nothing to do with Wimsatt’s waveform diagram 
(i.e., the scalar hierarchy) from the previous chapter.  
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So, Craver has no reason to complain that Core Hierarchy Theory’s range to be 
too narrow. To do so, he must show that there are components of mechanisms that are not 
individuals in the idiomatic sense of Core Hierarchy Theory, which is implausible. To 
give the counterexample, he must mention something outside the range of our singular 
quantifiers. But by mentioning it, he thereby shows that it is, in fact, within the range of 
our singular quantifiers. Craver’s account of levels-of-mechanisms, therefore, falls within 
the scope of our Core Hierarchy Theory. 
5.5 Mechanisms, Causation and Multi-level Explanation 
To give a multi-level explanation of some phenomena is to describe the mechanism for 
that phenomenon by describing (which involves quantifying over) the behaviors of its 
relevant components. What makes the explanation multi-level, rather than single-leveled, 
is that these behaviors require quantification into different levels of composition. To 
explain a phenomenon mechanistically is to give the entities and activities that make a 
contribution to the production of that phenomenon. If this list of entities and activities 
includes components of the mechanism, then giving the explanation requires 
quantification into different levels (e.g., there exists, at compositional level L, a 
mechanism m such that…).  
For Craver’s take on both the layered worldview and multi-level explanation, 
higher than and is-at-the-same-level-as must be understood as relations to mechanisms. 
(2007, p. 192) The question, “what’s higher than what?” is only sensible if the subjects of 
inquiry are both components of the same mechanism. (2007, p. 191)   
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He thinks that this insight helps to resolve confusions regarding inter-level 
causation, claiming that “one ought not to say that things at different levels causally 
interact with one another.” (ibid. p. 195)156 According to Craver (2007) and Bechtel (with 
Craver, 2007), there is no genuine inter-level causation: seemingly inter-level causal 
claims are, they say, partially a causal claim and partially a constitutive claim. This 
suggests, first, that downward causal-mechanistic claims are in fact, claims about 
mechanisms being composed of parts, such that those parts stand in lower level causal 
relations, and second, that upwards causal-mechanical claims are, in fact, about 
components in a mechanisms for some high-level phenomena, such that the operation of 
those components are relevant to the production of  that phenomena. Inter-level causal 
claims, they claim in contrast to popular opinion, have little to do with scale. 
Craver (2007, p. 195) offers an example: an elephant crushing a flea. To think of 
interactions at different scales as inter-level causation, he thinks, is to confuse levels-of-
mechanisms with scalar hierarchies: a different sort altogether. According to Craver, the 
crushing causal claim is not inter-level, but rather, intra-level. What “places two items at 
the same mechanistic level is that they are in the same mechanism, and neither is a 
component of the other. Two items at very different size scales can satisfy this 
relationship.” (ibid.) If the crushing of the flea is a component of the mechanism for flea 
extinction, then the elephant and its victim must be at the same level of that mechanism. 
 In the first chapter, we said that the development of a practical hierarchical theory 
could be given by specifying some levels, an account of what it is to be at each of these 
levels, and a way of ordering the levels as higher and lower. We can see from the above 
                                                   
156 Also see Craver and Bechtel (2006), and Craver (2001; 2002). 
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that Craver’s theory of mechanistic hierarchies fits the bill. His characterization suggests 
the following analysis: 
(@-LEVELM)  x is at level L of mechanism M iff L is a mechanism, L is a 
component of M and x is a component of L.  
That is, if x is a component of sub-mechanism L of M. Craver can also account for the 
distinction between the higher than relation, which is a relation between levels, and the is 
at a higher level than relation, which is a relation between the contents of levels:  
(HIGHER-LEVELM)  H is higher than L iff L is a sub-mechanism of H and H is 
not a sub-mechanism of L. 
(@-HIGHER-LEVELM) For all x and y, x is at a higher level than y iff the 
lowest level x is at is higher than the lowest level y is at. 
5.5.1 Mechanistic Explanation and Programmatic Explanation 
Craver’s account of mechanistic levels and multi-level explanation is largely coincident 
with other approaches to multi-level explanation. But there are differences. Consider 
Jackson and Petits programmatic explanation. Their idea is this: all the causal work is 
actually found at the level of fundamental physics, just as the microreductionist claims, 
but we can nevertheless explain higher level phenomena by appeal to relevant (but non-
efficacious) properties. 
Let us borrow Glennan’s lock-and-key example to help clarify the difference 
between programmatic and mechanistic explanation. To explain why the lock opened, on 
Jackson and Petit’s view, you need only mention the relevant properties, that is, the 
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properties which program for the effect. The idea is this: a property, P, programs for an 
effect whenever the instantiation of P implies the co-instantiation of some lower level 
property, P1, which is efficacious to the event. In the lock-and-key case, the lower level 
micro-structural properties of the key do all the causal work, but the higher level macro-
structure is no less relevant. 
The programmatic view differs from that of Glennan, Craver, and Bechtel in the 
following way: these mechanists think that there is genuine causation on many levels. 
Mechanisms are found on many levels, and mechanisms are productive. To produce is to 
cause. So there must be genuine causation at many levels, on the mechanist’s view pace 
Jackson and Petit. Does either approach have the upper hand? We have reason to think 
so. Having argued against Jackson and Petit’s account of efficacy, we have every reason 
to reject Jackon and Petits restriction of efficacy to the bottommost level.  
5.5.2 Mechanisms and Metaphysical-MLE 
Recall that Craver’s development of the local mechanistic hierarchy is founded on two 
assumptions: (LM1) and (LM2), we stated them earlier. Recalling the theorems of our 
Core Hierarchy Theory, as well as our discovery that the mechanistic hierarchy falls 
within their scope, it might seem that (LM1) and (LM2) are inconsistent with Core 
Hierarchy Theory.  
Why might they seem incompatible? (LM1) implies that the mechanistic 
hierarchy is a compositional hierarchy. We learned earlier that unrestricted compositional 
hierarchies are necessarily nested. Nested hierarchies are, by definition, non-exclusive: 
items appear at multiple-levels in nested hierarchies; for example, in ECOHIERARCHY 
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lower levels are contained within higher levels. (LM2) requires that the levels are 
exclusive. (LM1), therefore, appears to imply the negation of (LM2). 
In fact, they are compatible. In defense of Craver, his hierarchy is not an 
unrestricted compositional hierarchy. It is a restricted compositional hierarchy: for x to 
be at a level of Craver’s hierarchy is for x to be both a primitive-part of that level and a 
mechanism; that is, for Craver, to be at a level is to be a -part (viz., a mechanistic-part) 
of that level. Since restricted hierarchies are not (necessarily) nested hierarchies, Craver’s 
mechanistic hierarchy fits nicely within Core Hierarchy Theory. 
 Such an insight might seem to lead to yet another apparent incompatibility, this 
time between Craver’s mechanistic hierarchies and Metaphysical-MLE. Recall the 
distinction between restricted and unrestricted hierarchies according to Core Hierarchy 
Theory. A restricted hierarchy is simply an unrestricted hierarchy in which one simply 
ignores (by fiat) the parts of levels that are irrelevant to the interest of the hierarchical 
analyst. According to Core Hierarchy Theory, higher levels include everything found at 
lower levels in the most basic sense of “is at”. Assuming that the most basic and 
unrestricted sense of “is at” is what is relevant to metaphysics (qua its independence from 
human interests), it then appears that Craver’s mechanistic hierarchy, the hierarchy that 
conforms to (LM1) and (LM2), is not a purely metaphysical hierarchy. Metaphysical-
MLE then appears false under Craver’s view: what justifies multi-level explanation does 
not appear to be the hierarchical structure of the world, but rather, Craver’s epistemic and 
explanatory interests. That is, it is only because Craver’s restricted mechanistic 
hierarchies are useful in achieving our epistemic and explanatory aims that multi-level 
explanations are justified. 
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 I think Craver can respond to this worry. Craver’s restricted hierarchy is still 
getting at the hierarchical structure of the world, despite the fiat restrictions that have 
been placed on being at a level. What is most relevant here is that the fiat restrictions 
involve mechanisms, which are not individuals-by-fiat; they are real things according to 
Craver and most other mechanists. Thus, while it might be true that Craver’s hierarchy is 
a fiat-refinement of the basic nested hierarchy whose existence is implied by Craver’s 
approach, this refined hierarchy seems no less metaphysical than the basic nested 
hierarchy which underlies it. Metaphysical-MLE is therefore preserved under the 
mechanistic approach to the layered worldview.  
5.5.3 Nested Hierarchies and Metaphysical-MLE 
Let us agree that Craver’s mechanistic vision of the layered worldview supports 
Metaphysical-MLE. We can also agree that Craver’s approach is only one of many. 
ECOHIERARCHY, recall from the first chapter, is an upwards nested hierarchy (e.g., the 
organism level contains cells, molecules, and atoms), and as such fails to meet Craver’s 
exclusivity constraint expressed in (LM2) above. Although the coherence and motivation 
for ECOHIERARCHY is vindicated by Core Hierarchy Theory and its theorems, I will 
now argue that this same vindication appears to undermine Metaphysical-MLE with 
respect to that sort of hierarchy. 
Multi-level explanation, generally speaking, is a special sort of explanation that 
requires quantification into multiple levels to describe all of the features relevant to the 
production of the phenomenon to be explained; to restrict quantification to a level is to 
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leave something out of the story. In the introductory chapter, a standard explanation for 
lake eutrophication was given as an example.  
Reductionist metaphysics, recall from the outset of this chapter, is incompatible 
with genuinely multi-level explanation for the simple reason that all of the resources 
required to explain the phenomena are found at the bottommost level. Scientific 
explanations, according to the Reductionist, really only quantify into one level. 
 If such an argument works with respect to the Reductionist’s downward nested 
hierarchy, then there is a worry that the same sort of argument can be given with respect 
to upwards nested hierarchies. Since everything within the range of the ecologist’s 
quantifiers is found at the topmost level of the explanans hierarchy, qua upwards nested, 
it follows that ecological explanations too only quantify into one level: either the topmost 
level of the entire hierarchy (viz., the biosphere level) or the lowest level at which the 
phenomenon to be explained is found (e.g., in the case of lake-eutrophication, the 
ecosystem level). 
 While it is true that in upwards nested hierarchies, some of those higher level 
things are also lower level things, this does not salvage the metaphysically robust 
conception of multi-level explanation enjoyed by the mechanists. There is no need to dive 
to the bottom of the ocean when the treasures one is looking for have floated to the top. 
By the same token, there is no need to bother with ecological levels at all, when 
everything needed to explain (for example) lake eutrophication has “floated” to the 
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top?157 If we do bother with levels in an upwards nested ecological context, it seems, it is 
not because ecology is structured in a way that requires reference to levels, but rather, 
because it is useful for us to refer to them. It appears, then, that insofar as 
ECOHIERARCHY is an explanatory framework, Metaphysical-MLE is false; at best, the 
justification for “multi-level” explanation conforms to Epistemic-MLE.  
 Alas, Epistemic-MLE faces a similar problem. Notice that in our original example 
of lake eutrophication, the explanation was given without using, or mentioning, the word 
‘level’ at all. This leads us to wonder: why is a levels framework useful at all within 
ecology? The world is indeed structured exactly as described by ECOHIERARCHY, but 
the worry is, that structure might be entirely irrelevant to our understanding of ecological 
phenomena. Both Metaphysical-MLE and Epistemic-MLE appear false within the 
context of ecological explanations. It seems that, insofar as ECOHIERARCHY is the 
basis of such explanations, phenomena can be described, explained, and analyzed without 
using any hierarchical terms. 
 To reply to this sort of worry, one might think to simply reject the nested 
conception of the ecological hierarchy in favor of a non-nested one, such as that 
presupposed by Potochnik and McGill. But, as we saw in the first chapter, Potochnik and 
McGill are quite skeptical about the justification and relevance of compositional 
hierarchies, and raise a number of problems for them in ecology. The nested conception 
of ECOHIERARCHY, recall, was used as a defense against some of their criticisms. 
                                                   
157 In the metaphorical sense of “floated”, of course; I do not mean to suggest that green 
sludge explains everything. 
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 Another reply to the worry might be to draw out another common feature of 
nesting: that upwards nested hierarchies are top levels of themselves. The idea is this: if 
the ecosystem level is a hierarchy consisting of all levels below it (not to forget the 
ecosystems composed of those things found at lower levels), then we cannot avoid an 
implicit appeal to hierarchical levels when offering ecosystemic explanations that utilize, 
for example, the nitrogen cycle. Since the molecular level is included in the ecosystem 
level on the nested approach, any reference to molecules within an ecosystemic 
explanation (e.g., for lake eutrophication) involves an implicit reference to lower levels, 
by virtue of those levels being part of the higher level as well. So it might appears 
perhaps, that Metaphysical-MLE is true with respect to ECOHIERARCHY after all. 
 We should remain skeptical. Even with the concession that the ecosystem level 
contains all lower levels as well as the contents of those levels, that does not imply (or 
even suggest) that Metaphysical-MLE is true. If the ecological hierarchy is upwards 
nested, as in ECOHIERARCHY, the topmost level of the hierarchy must be such that it 
has all the resources needed to completely explain the phenomenon of interest without an 
appeal to “levels” or any other hierarchical term: when we restrict our quantifiers to that 
which is contained within the topmost level, the contents of the entire ECOHIEARCHY 
remain within reach; not so with Craver’s mechanistic levels – by restricting one’s 
quantifiers to the topmost level of a mechanism, one obtains nothing but a big black box 
of mystery (see Figure 20 above). What you obtain is a puzzle: a phenomenon that needs 
explaining.  
 Although the matter is hardly settled, it appears that Core Hierarchy Theory 
supports skepticism regarding Metaphysical-MLE with respect to ECOHIERARCHY. 
283 
 
The argument for Multi-Grade Holism, the central thesis, of this dissertation is then 
complete. By assuming that Core Hierarchy Theory is the best (i.e., simplest and most 
general) account of hierarchies, it provides strong support for Realism, Holism, and now 
we see that it appears that Metaphysical-MLE is false with respect to the ecological 
hierarchy. With respect to the mechanistic hierarchy, on the other hand, Metaphysical-
MLE appears justified by virtue of the fact that Craver’s restriction on being at a level is 
metaphysical in nature, and ensures that the mechanistic hierarchy is non-nested. Since 
the problem for Metaphysical-MLE is restricted to nested hierarchies, which I maintain 
are the most basic sort of hierarchical structure, it might follow that the basic hierarchical 
structure of the world fails to justify multi-level explanations, but it nevertheless holds 
true that restricted mechanistic hierarchies succeed in justifying multi-level explanations 
on a metaphysical basis.   
5.6 The Causal Exclusion Problem Revisited   
So far, it appears that the mechanistic approach to the layered worldview is superior to 
Kim’s. Kim’s dual-hierarchy view, recall, succumbs to a slightly recast causal exclusion 
problem. Mechanists, we noted earlier, generally take their view to be beyond the reach 
of causal exclusion arguments by virtue of the fact that their view of efficacy is grounded 
in productive activities. Activities are obviously productive, they say, no matter what 
compositional level they are on; the causal exclusion problem, they think, applies only to 
realization hierarchies.  
In “flat” realization hierarchies, functional properties appear inefficacious since 
their micro-based realizers are sufficient to accomplish whatever it is that functional 
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properties accomplish. Kim’s solution to the problem is to identify functional properties 
with their micro-based realizers. As Glennan argues, Kim’s solution is not enough: an 
analogous exclusion problem applies to Kim’s mereological hierarchy. Taking for 
granted Gillett’s notion of dimensioned realization, what Kim calls higher level micro-
based properties – e.g., being decomposable into the xs instantiating P1…Pn and standing 
R – are in fact dimensionally realized by a complex relation involving lower level micro-
properties – e.g., being the xs instantiating P1…Pn and standing R. Since the complex of 
low level micro-properties are sufficient to accomplish whatever it is that higher level 
micro-based properties are said to accomplish, the higher level micro-based properties 
thus appear excluded from being efficacy. 
The mechanist feels safe from these worries: elephants crush, planets rotate; 
crushing and rotation are productive. Such feelings might be hasty. Their view, despite 
what they say, might in fact succumb to (a version of) the causal exclusion problem.  
5.6.1 Mechanistic Hierarchies are Dimensioned Realization Hierarchies 
We have what we need to plausibly argue that a mechanistic hierarchy is a sub-species of 
realization hierarchy, taking for granted Craver’s account of the mechanistic hierarchy, as 
well as Gillett’s aforementioned account of dimensioned realization.  
Mechanisms are organized entities and activities that are productive to some 
phenomenon of interest. The mechanism for that phenomenon is often multi-level in the 
sense that the mechanistic behavior, S’s -ing, decomposes into sub-mechanisms, the 
xs’s -ing, at lower levels. If S is -ing, then S has the property is -ing, and if the xs are 
-ing, then the xs have the property is -ing.   
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The mechanist’s causally efficacious mechanisms are then subject to Gillett’s 
analysis. Insofar as S’s -ing has powers that are individuative of -ing instances in 
virtue of the powers contributed by the property instances belonging to its constituents 
(e.g., the xs instantiating is -ing), but not vice versa, it Gillett’s dimensioned account, 
REALIZATION, implies that the mechanistic hierarchy is a sort of realization hierarchy. 
In short, mechanistic decomposition meets the conditions for dimensioned realization.  
The mechanistic and realization hierarchies are not coextensive hierarchies since 
there are realization hierarchies that are non-mechanistic. However, since every 
mechanistic hierarchy accounts for higher level causal efficacy in terms of the efficacy of 
its components, the inter-level mechanistic relationship implies a realization relationship 
as well. So, every mechanistic hierarchy is a realization hierarchy, but not vice versa. 
Mechanists might scoff at the mentioning of powers in the above argument, and 
might try to motivate a rejection of it on those grounds. Mechanists talk of activity, not 
power.  
Such a response seems promising, but must be developed carefully. Although 
mechanists make no explicit mention of powers, they do talk about properties. One of the 
more popular views of properties found within the debates over realization is the power-
based theory of properties, which can be characterized by the claim that properties are 
individuated by the causal powers they bestow.158 If mechanists have a different account 
of property, then we must hear it. Only then can we evaluate whether avoiding the use of 
‘power’ can help the mechanist distance herself from the realization hierarchy. Under the 
                                                   




scope of our present assumptions, however, the conclusion that S’s -ing is (perhaps, 
mechanistically) realized by its sub-mechanisms has not been made any less compelling. 
And so, the mechanist approach to multi-level causation succumbs to the causal 
exclusion argument. By Craver’s admission, the causal exclusion argument applies to the 
realization hierarchy; and as we have now discovered, the mechanistic hierarchy is a sort 
of realization hierarchy.159  
5.6.2 Causally Excluded Activities and Mechanisms 
There is another way to argue that levels-of-mechanisms succumb to the causal exclusion 
problem. We simply adjust its initial formulation. Recall that Glennan diagnoses the 
problem with causal exclusion as a category error: properties are not the sorts of things 
that can be efficacious; productive activities are. Properties, the mechanist says, are only 
relevant to the production of the phenomenon.  
 The idea is simple, but it is not obviously correct. On the contrary, shifting 
efficacy from properties to activities strikes me as an ineffective solution to causal 
exclusion worries. Let a be an activity of some mechanism, m, let R[x’s a1-ing…x’s an-
ing] be the acting entities of its lowest-level sub-mechanisms with a complex relation R 
holding between them, and let e be some phenomenon that is produced by m.  
Now consider the following: if m’s a-ing produces e, and m’s a-ing 
mechanistically-decomposes into R[x’s a1-ing…x’s an-ing], then e is also produced by 
R[x’s a1-ing…x’s an-ing]. Why? Since m’s a-ing decomposes into x’s a1-ing…x’s an-ing, 
                                                   
159 An interesting corollary, Realization hierarchies, pace Craver, might then best capture the sense of 




if m’s a-ing suffices for the production of e, then R[x’s a1-ing…x’s an-ing] is presumably 
sufficient for the production of e: presumably, any world where you have R[x’s a1-
ing…x’s an-ing] is a world where m is a-ing. Following Kim, we do not want to say that e 
is overproduced, and so the vexing question resurfaces: why posit a higher level 
mechanism when a complex of inter-related lower level mechanisms will do? Since R[x’s 
a1-ing…x’s an-ing] is sufficient for e, it appears that higher level mechanisms are 
superfluous; they appear inefficacious and thus unproductive. This is a terrible result for 
any mechanistic philosopher of science who favors a metaphysically robust multi-level 
approach to explanation.  
 Consider a simple example: a bicycle. Mechanists should want to say that the 
chain’s pulling on the gear is productive of the rear wheel’s turning. They should also 
want to say that the chain and gear mechanistically decompose into sub-mechanisms: 
each link of the chain grabs a tooth of the gear. The mechanism decomposes even further 
than that, but let us bottom out here for sake of simplicity. The point is, the plurality of 
chain-links grabbing teeth is a plurality of inter-related sub-mechanisms, and this 
plurality of sub-mechanisms, related as they are, is productive of the rear wheel’s 
turning.160 Since the plurality of sub-mechanisms (each link grabbing a tooth), related as 
they are, is sufficient to make the wheel turn, the higher level mechanism (viz., the 
chain’s pulling on the teeth) appears superfluous. To avoid the overproduction of the 
effect, it seems, we must give up the efficacy of the higher (or perhaps lower?) level. The 
causal exclusion problem is not as easily pacified as Glennan and Craver assume. 
                                                   
160 That Craver draws a “production arrow” at the bottom level of Figure 20(above) is certainly suggestive 
of this. It suggests that, for each mechanism at the second level, there are similar production arrows exiting 
the mechanism boundary at the bottom level. What, then, is the higher level production arrow 
accomplishing that the lower level arrows are not? Nothing, perhaps. 
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One way to solve the problem might be to issue identity statements relating the 
higher level mechanism with the complex of inter-related lower level sub-mechanisms. 
But there is a familiar problem with such a suggestion. Identity is a one-to-one 
relationship: one thing is not many things. The relationship between the singular a, and 
the plural, a1…an, is therefore not identity. Perhaps, then, it is something like identity. In 
the next chapter, the causal exclusion argument is the main focus.  
6.0 Conclusion 
Our inquiry into the metaphysics of multi-level explanation has led us to a problem with 
causation in multi-level contexts. We began by laying out our metaphysical options: what 
we called the Humean approach and the mechanistic approach. We then undertook a 
rigorous investigation of Kim’s take, a mostly Humean take, on the layered worldview. 
We saw both that his supervenience view fails, and that his funtionalist dual-hierarchy 
view succumbs to the very problem it was intended to solve: the causal exclusion 
problem. 
 The mechanistic approach to the layered worldview is, by contrast, highly-
developed and well-supported by actual scientific explanation and practice. One 
commonly mentioned feature of mechanistic explanation, and the mechanistic view of the 
world, is that it facilitates a view of multi-level explanation. The mechanistic approach to 
the layered worldview, we argued, supports the metaphysical justification for multi-level 
explanation: it satisfies Metaphysical-MLE. 
Not so for the ecological hierarchy. Since the compositional hierarchy, 
ECOHIERARCHY, is upwards nested, everything at any level is contained within all 
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higher levels; the explanatory resources one needs to explain a phenomenon at level L is, 
thus by default, contained in L. Since we can restrict our quantifiers to a single level 
without losing anything relevant to the explanation of the phenomenon, it appears that the 
metaphysics of upwards nested hierarchies (much like Reductionist hierarchies) does not 
justify our describing, explaining, and analyzing things using hierarchical terms. 
Metaphysical-MLE, therefore, appears false with respect to ECOHIERARCHY and, 
taking Core Hierarchy Theory for granted, all other unrestricted compositional 
hierarchies as well.  
 To end, we raised a familiar problem for the mechanistic approach to the layered 
worldview. What purportedly makes mechanistic philosophy different from standard 
Humeanism is its reification of productivity. That difference, it seems, is unhelpful. There 
are compelling reasons for thinking that the mechanistic notion of higher level 
productivity succumbs to (a version of) the causal exclusion argument. If mechanists 
hope to advance their metaphysics on the grounds that it solves causal worries in multi-
level contexts, they must tell us what is wrong with the causal exclusion argument. 
Insofar as Kim’s dual-hierarchy succumbs to the problem, and mechanistic philosophy 
hopes to do better than Kim, mechanists owe us a story. But what could that be? In the 
next chapter, our attempt at answering this question reveals deep and profound features of 
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The defense of Realism with respect to the ecological hierarchy depends on whether or 
not there really are ecosystems, communities, organisms, and the like. If there are, then 
there are ecological hierarchies. If there are not, then Core Hierarchy Theory tells us that 
there are no such hierarchies.  
One might then present two metaphysical worries: that higher level things do not 
exist; and that higher than relations do not exist. In this chapter, I defend Realism against 
two arguments that lend credence to these sorts of worries. The first is quite famous. It is 
a simplified variant of Jaegwon Kim’s (1993, 1998, 2005) causal exclusion argument. 
The second is a more general concern that lends credence to both worries: the general 
Eleatic argument. In short, the argument is as follows: those things that do not make a 
difference, as a matter of metaphysical principle, do not exist. Higher level things 
(Beckermann, 1997) and the inter-level relations that hold between them (Wrenn 2010) 
do not make a difference. Therefore, there are no higher level things and there are no 
inter-level relations.  
In this chapter, my primary purpose is to solve these causal worries. I do three 
things. I explore some resolutions to the causal exclusion argument. I argue that 
realization, and higher level things do, in fact, make a difference to the world. And I 
argue that, even if they do not, we have good reason to reject the metaphysical principle 
that calls for their elimination.  
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2.0 There is No Higher level: The Eleatic Objection 
In what follows, I will examine the arguments against the reification of higher level 
property instances. I begin with Kim’s infamous causal exclusion argument, followed by 
Beckermann’s general Eleatic argument. 
2.1 The Causal Exclusion Argument: Simply Stated 
The causal exclusion argument can be stated most simply with two premises. The first 
premise can be called the principle of causal sharing. 
[CSHARE] If x is realized by y, then everything brought about by x is also 
brought about by y, its realizer.  
xy(x/y  e(x>>e  y>>e))161 
CSHARE derives is plausibility from some of the standard tenants of physicalism: the 
causal closure thesis. Since the physicalist thinks that everything that occurs in the 
macro-world occurs by virtue of what goes on in the micro-world, all macro-events are, 
in some sense, determined by lower-level events. Many physicalists take this to imply 
that every event has a completely sufficient micro-physical cause. Causation at higher 
levels, these physicalists think, must be underwritten by causation occurring at lower-
levels; that is, presuming that there is such a thing as higher level causation. Given this 
commonly presumed connection between higher and lower-level causation, many 
conclude that lower-level realizers must then be causally sufficient for anything its higher 
level realization might cause. Such is the nature of causal underwriting, at least according 
to common physicalist intuitions.  
                                                   
161 Where ‘x/y’ is ‘x is realized by y’, and ‘x>>e’ is ‘x brings about e’.  
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The second premise of the exclusion argument, call it the principle of no-
overdetermination, is a rather strong claim.  
[NOD] If x is realized by y, then everything e that is brought about by y is not also 
brought about by x.  xy(x/y  e(y>>e  x>>e)) 
What NOD tells us is that lower-level events exclude their higher level realizations from 
being causally efficacious. As noted above, the claim seems a bit strong: if water is 
realized by a structuring of H2O molecules, NOD implies that drinking water does not 
bring about the quenching of thirst, because the H2O molecules are sufficient for the 
quenching. The same thing can be said with respect to many everyday activities.  
To motivate NOD, its defenders offer the following sort of consideration: if 
lower-level L is sufficient for whatever its realization H is sufficient for, as CHSARE 
implies, then it seems intuitive to say that the real work is being done at the lower level. 
Drinking water, for example, does not appear to do anything that is not accomplished by 
its realizer, say, H2O molecules entering the body. But if all the work is being done at the 
lower-level, then it appears that there is no causal work left for H to accomplish. H, it 
seems, makes no difference to the world that is not already made by L. To maintain that 
H makes a difference, while accepting that L makes all the difference, is to suggest that 
there is more causation in the world than necessary. Insofar as one desires a parsimonious 
metaphysic, one should not posit more causation than necessary. Thus, insofar as we feel 
sympathy for parsimony, NOD appears warranted. 
 This poses a serious problem for non-reductive physicalist: CSHARE and NOD 
jointly entail that there is no causation at higher levels. If H is realized by anything at all, 
then H is inefficacious. It is inert. Higher level things thus cannot stand in causal relations 
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or enter into genuine laws. Drinking water, then, quenches no thirst! We can state this 
conclusion as follows: 
 
[Exclusion Conclusion] If x is realized by y then x is causally inert (there is 
no e such that x brings about e).  
xy(x/y  e(x>>e)) 
Moreover, if higher level events cannot stand in causal relations, then it is hard to see 
how higher level properties and events can figure into genuine laws. Given the exclusion 
conclusion, higher level things are made to seem causally and scientifically irrelevant. 
Without causal and scientific relevance, however, the very existence of higher level 
things is called into question: intuition tells us that we should never posit irrelevant 
things. Given the conditions for hierarchy reification, realization hierarchies (e.g., the 
mechanistic hierarchy, as it was argued in the previous chapter) fail to provide a robust 
account of the layered worldview unless one can justify a rejection of the exclusion 
argument. 
Obviously, non-reductivist response options are few: they must reject CSHARE, 
NOD or both. All three options carry unfortunate consequences, however. On the one 
hand, rejecting CSHARE and accepting NOD entails that realization sometimes results in 
the production of novel causal powers and causal relations not found at lower levels. 
Realization seems to give rise to ontological emergence in such cases. In fact, the non-
reductivist would be well-advised to hold realization to be emergent in all cases. The 
typical, non-emergent, higher level products of realization are still subject to the principle 
of NOD, effectively losing their efficacy; and with that gone, their very right to exist. 
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If the non-reductivist were to reject NOD and accept CSHARE, on the other hand, 
they would be forced to accept what many take to be an offensive sort of systematic 
overdetermination. Genuine overdetermination is supposed to be rare; it is not often that 
two bullets fired from different pistols simultaneously penetrate a victim’s heart, 
competing equally for being the cause. Such rarity is inconsistent with a wholesale 
rejection of NOD, however; for then it will turn out that overdetermination is everywhere.  
The third option is, of course, to reject both. Rejecting both principles with 
respect to every instance of realization might be overkill when rejecting one will do; but 
then again, choosing which principle to reject on a case-by-case basis hardly seems any 
better. Nevertheless, whichever route is ultimately chosen, one thing is certain: if you 
accept CSHARE, you must reject NOD.  
 Given the mystery of emergence and the promiscuousness of overdetermination, 
all three of these response options seem unpalatably sour. Even so, the non-reductivist 
had better get used to the taste. An argument advanced by Ned Block (2003)162 shows 
that an acceptance of both CSHARE and NOD lead to an absurdity.  
2.1.1 The Problem of Causal Drainage 
Block points out that, as far as we know, there might not be a fundamental level at all; or 
more specifically, there might be infinite realization. This possibility, however, is 
incompatible with the conclusion of the causal exclusion argument. If nothing is 
fundamental (i.e., there is an infinite chain of realization163), then the exclusion 
                                                   
162 The argument can be found within Schaffer (2003) as well. 
 
163 Stated more formally, xy(x/y). 
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conclusion entails that there is no causation anywhere.164 Since it is an open question 
whether or not there is a fundamental level, but, according to Block, it is not an open 
question as to whether there is causation, there must be something wrong with Kim’s 
argument: either CSHARE or NOD (or both) must go.  
In response, Kim (2003, p.168, p. 175) suggests that there is a way to block the 
drainage. Even if you think that mental properties do not reduce to neurological, 
biological, or physical properties, recent successes in science appear to support reduction: 
we have discovered, for example, that water = H2O and (perhaps) that thermodynamics 
reduces to statistical mechanics.165 This suggests that the properties and events competing 
for causal status attain a reductive nature as soon as we get down deep enough; at some 
lower-level, they can be identified with one another. And as soon as we reach a level at 
which the properties or events in competition for being cause can be identical, the 
drainage will bottom out at that level. Such a bottoming-out will then allow causation to 
take root in the world, even if the entities instantiating the identified properties can be 
infinitely decomposed. Absurdity averted, or so Kim thinks. 
In fact, the response is weak. There are multiple ways of formulating Block’s 
worry and Kim’s reply is only effective against one such formulation. In his original 
formulation, Block understands the possibility of non-fundamentality as nothing more 
than the possibility of infinite supervenience. Since identity is a supervenient relation 
Kim expects to make his a priori claim about event and attribute identities without facing 
too much controversy; the matter, he thinks, will be left in the hands of empirical science.  
                                                   
 
164 More formally, xy(x>>y). 
 
165 The case of thermodynamic reduction is, in fact, not so straightforward. It is a contentious issue. 
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Notice, however, that CSHARE and NOD contain no reference to supervenience. 
They contain only the notions of realization and brings about; and the notion of non-
fundamentality is taken to be infinite realization, as opposed to infinite supervenience. 
Realization, we learned in the previous chapter, has a dimensioned and flat interpretation. 
We are using the dimensioned interpretation for the specification of the non-reductivist 
global and local hierarchy. This subtle difference in set-up, however, is enough to block 
Kim’s response; as we have seen, if some H is (dimensioned) realized by some L, then 
the asymmetry (and irreflexivity) of realization implies that H is not identical to L, pace 
Kim. Kim’s reductionist move is unavailable unless he stands firm against infinite 
(dimensioned) realization; that is, accept finite (dimensioned) realization as a brute fact 
about the world. 
But even this is not enough; he must also state, even more boldly, that realization 
necessarily bottoms-out. Any world in which there is causation as well as infinite 
realization is ipso facto a world where either CSHARE or NOD is false. But why should 
the truth of these two principles turn only on whether or not realization is infinite: what 
explains the “ipso facto”? Does infinite realization preclude micro-determination? It 
should not. But if it does not, then why does it preclude CSHARE? I see no reason why it 
would. Does infinite realization suddenly pave the way for massive overdetermination, 
making it less offensive? Again, I cannot see why it would. Until someone convincingly 
argues that realization does bottom out, I think we have good reason (though we do not 
yet know what it is) to cast general suspicion on the causal exclusion argument: either 
CSHARE or NOD must be false. The trouble is simply deciding which, and why. 
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2.1.2 The Diffusion of Exclusion: Causal Selfishness 
Like most physicalists, realization physicalists think that everything happens by virtue of 
the micro-physical. However, by rejecting CSHARE, the non-reductivist will admit a 
case where a causal relation’s obtaining at a higher level in fact excludes its holding at the 
lower-level: there is an effect that is not caused by virtue of micro-physical events. The 
problem with this, as noted earlier, is that it conflicts with the causal closure thesis, one 
of the central theses of non-reductive physicalism. Preserving higher level causal efficacy 
at the expense of standard physicalist views hardly seems like a profitable trade for the 
realizationist.  
But is such a trade really necessary? There are multiple ways the physicalist 
might characterize the thesis of causal closure, and some interpretations might suggest a 
way to reject CSHARE while upholding closure. One way to characterize closure, albeit 
weakly, is to say that everything that occurs, occurs by virtue of micro-physical 
occurrences. A slightly stronger characterization might tell us that causation, everywhere, 
occurs by virtue of microphysical causal occurrences. The strongest interpretation, of 
course, would convey the thought that every event is ultimately caused by micro-physical 
events; that every event has a completely sufficient physical cause.  
Notice that the last characterization is the only one that is explicitly causal. While 
it cannot be denied that ‘by virtue of’ could be interpreted causally in the previous 
characterizations, we need not commit ourselves to such an interpretation. The phrase is 
clearly quite vague. Instead we might choose a more general interpretation, where ‘by 
virtue of’ only picks out the determination relation rather than causation. By making a 
distinction between determination and causation, we might choose to recast the causal 
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closure thesis, not as the claim that all effects are caused by micro-physical states, but 
merely that all effects are determined by micro-physical states. Determination can be 
causal. But there might be other sorts of determination as well. Take realization, for 
instance. It is not at all implausible that realization is a sort of determination. 
Such a reformulation of the closure thesis is nothing new. Philosophers of science 
who are skeptical about the role of causation within physics, among many others, should 
be happy to interpret closure as expressing a fact about determination (insofar as they 
think anything is determined and not mere probability) rather than causation. Skepticism 
about causation in general, after all, does not entail skepticism about determination.  
The determination interpretation of the closure thesis remains silent on the 
existence of inter-level causal relations between micro-physical causes and macro-
physical effects. Yet, it seems to perform just as well when it comes to capturing the 
general point about the micro-physical world that physicalists really care about: that the 
micro-physical world is, in some sense, responsible for every event that occurs.  
By understanding this responsibility in terms of determination rather than 
causation, the non-reductivist then has a way to respond to the exclusion argument: 
simply reject CSHARE. By doing so, the physicalist will admit that there are events that 
are brought about by higher level occurrences and not brought about by micro-physical 
occurrences. But this is perfectly consistent with the idea that micro-physical states 
nevertheless determine what is brought about by those higher level occurrences. By 
recasting causal closure as a thesis about determination rather than causation, the non-
reductivist can avoid the troublesome inconsistency. 
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 Even so, there are still major obstacles preventing the outright rejection of 
CSHARE in this sort of way. For one, when we replace the occurrence of ‘brings about’ 
in CSHARE with ‘determines’, the principle clearly cannot be rejected, given the new 
understanding of causal closure. And if we make the same terminological replacement 
with respect to NOD, the exclusion argument will then entail that there is no higher level 
determination, which is just as bad as saying that there is no higher level causation. 
Block’s argument will still entail something the physicalist considers an absurdity: that 
there is no determination anywhere. The modified principle of NOD, therefore, must also 
be rejected if one takes this tack in rejecting CSHARE.  
Rejecting the modified principle of NOD might be less offensive than rejecting 
the original ‘brings about’ version, however. When two assassins simultaneously pierce 
the heart of the same target, the death of that target is not just overdetermined, it is over-
caused. The intuition supporting the original causal version of NOD seems to rely more 
on worries regarding massive over-causation than overdetermination. 
 Overdetermination, when divorced from over-causation, does not seem as 
problematic. While over-causation is indeed supposed to be rare, over-determination 
need not be. In fact, if we accept deterministic causation, then over-determination will 
turn out to be trivially widespread: any time the first node of a linear causal chain is 
deterministically sufficient for each subsequent event in the same chain, each of those 
subsequent events are equally guilty of overdetermining the final event in the chain. 
Strictly speaking, in a linear chain, the first event was sufficient for, and hence 
determines, the last; but the same can be said for the intermediating nodes as well. Causal 
chains are not the only example of vacuous overdetermination, however; realization 
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chains are just as effective in demonstrating the same point. Non-reductivists are 
generally in agreement that the instantiation, H, of a higher level property is determined 
by its lower-level realizer, each step in the realization chain connecting H to its most 
basic realizer R must then overdetermine the realization of H. Inter-level 
overdetermination is vacuous. 
But there is another, more serious, obstacle preventing a rejection of CSHARE. 
The idea that there are effects without a micro-physical cause, for some reason, strikes 
many as being wildly implausible. And even when we entertain the possibility, and recast 
the closure thesis as suggested, we are still left with the question of how higher level 
causation can operate without micro-physical causation doing the obvious work; or more 
plainly, how it is that the micro-physical occurrences can determine without also causing. 
Until this mystery is solved, a rejection of NOD will no doubt be the more popular option 
when responding to Kim’s exclusion worries. 
2.1.3 The Diffusion of Exclusion: The Triviality Response 
Assuming that non-reductivists would endorse a widespread rejection of the principle of 
NOD, how one should go about motivating this rejection becomes the important question. 
One common strategy is call into question the genuineness of the purported 
overdetermination. 
 One way to argue that causal exclusion-related overdetermination is ingenuine is 
to take a standard example of overdetermination, use it to create some sort of general 
analysis of genuine overdetermination, then use that analysis to show that causal-
exclusion related overdetermination fails to meet some necessary condition for 
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genuineness. Jesper Kallestrup (2006, p. 472) has explored this sort of strategy using the 
aformentioned example of the overdetermined assassination. In the standard case, when 
the two bullets simultaneously pierce the heart of the unfortunate victim, we typically 
acknowledge that either bullet is sufficient to bring about the effect in the absence of the 
other. This example accords with the following notion of overdetermination: 
[OD] e is overdetermined by H and L iff (i) H is sufficient for e, (ii) L is 
sufficient for e, (iii) if H occurred without L, e would have occurred, and 
(iv) if L occurred without H, e would have occurred. 
In Kallestrup’s view, the non-reductivist should accept that inter-level overdetermination 
meets (i)-(iv), but nevertheless fails a condition for genuineness: non-vacuity. By 
assuming that realization is supervenient, he argues that one of these conditions is 
trivialized: if H supervenes on L, for example, (iv) becomes vacuous. Since the condition 
is vacuously satisfied, the overdetermination is deemed inoffensive. 
 I hesitate to endorse this response, however. It is not clear why a vacuous 
satisfaction of one of (i)-(iv) makes the overdetermination to be less problematic. If the 
overdetermination were completely vacuous, then all of (i)-(iv) should be vacuous. But in 
the exclusion case, only one is vacuous. The overdetermination found in the exclusion 
argument, then, is not entirely vacuous. 
Moreover, the partial vacuity does not change the fact that L is independently 
sufficient for e but not vice versa: H is not part of the causal chain that connects L to e, 
and since the direction of determination progresses from lower to higher, H’s causing e 
depends on L’s causing e. That is, everything is being determined by the lower-level, 
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independently of any higher level causation. So then what’s the point of higher level 
causation? It doesn’t seem to make a difference to anything, and that is the only 
motivation NOD seems to need. It does not matter whether or not the overdetermination 
is partially vacuous in order for overdetermination to seem problematic.  
2.1.4 The Diffusion of Exclusion: The Near-Identity Response 
A simpler way to spin-doctor the overdetermination result in the realizationist’s favor is 
to maintain that realizations are not identical to their realizers, but are nevertheless 
“nothing over and above” those realizers. In such a scenario, it becomes natural to think 
that whatever causal relations higher level events happen to stand in, those relations are 
likewise nothing “over and above” the causal relations at lower-levels.  
The problem with this response is that it appears to unnecessarily obfuscate the 
issue. The idiom “nothing over and above” is notoriously vague and quite well-despised 
by philosophers who cannot make sense of it. Clearly it does not mean ‘nothing other 
than’. If it did then realization would be nothing other than identity. But ‘nothing over 
and above’ is not an expression of identity. If it were, then there would not be any need 
for scare quotes when putting the expression to use.  
That the realization hierarchy is upwards-nested might help us finally make sense 
of it. In a nested hierarchy, such as ECOHIERARCHY, the parts are at the same level as 
the whole. The whole is, quite plainly, not over and above the parts in the realization 




Nested hierarchies aside, we do not need to put ‘nothing over and above’ into 
precise terms to reject the principle of NOD. We already know NOD must be false; we 
merely need to give a sketch of an explanation as to why.  
To fill in the sketch, we might compare other examples of relations associated 
with the phrase ‘nothing over and above’, looking for common patterns. Finding 
examples is the easy part: the notoriety of the expression is well-founded. Everyday 
objects, it is often said, are “nothing over and above” their parts or constituents. Again we 
are faced with this mysterious notion.  
What constitution, composition, realization, and the correspondence relation 
between higher and lower-level causal relations (whatever that relation might be) seem to 
have in common is the property of identity-likeness (Baxtor 1988, Lewis 1991). Within 
these sorts of cases, x’s being nothing “over and above” y seems to be something quite 
like identity, even if it falls a bit short of what we standardly call identity.  
Despite its shortcomings, most notably its vagueness, I think identity-likeness is 
enough to defuse the causal exclusion argument. Although identity-likeness is by no 
means a precise notion, it nevertheless explains why the sort of overdetermination cited 
in NOD is not genuine.  
In classic cases of genuine overdetermination, the overdetermining causes are in 
no way identity-like. If the two bullets that simultaneously penetrate a victim’s heart were 
to have stood in an identity-like relation, then the death would not seem to have been 
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genuinely overdetermined. 166 That is, if the two bullets are almost the same bullet – e.g. 
bullet1= the bullet you see flying from the gun-barrel and bullet2= the sum of undetached 
bullet-parts – then the two causal relations holding between each bullet and the death-
event should likewise be seen as virtually identical. Although, strictly speaking, there are 
two causal relations, those relations are virtually one. That there are two (barely) distinct 
relations turns out to be nothing more than a technicality bearing very little ontic 
significance.  
The ontic insignificance of this technicality can be argued for, given the shared 
identity-likeness of composition, constitution, and realization. The argument is this: 
worrying about higher level events entering into “overdetermining” causal relations on 
the grounds that their lower-level realizers are getting the job done on their own is 
analogous to worrying about overfeeding your cat on the grounds that the sum of your 
parts will have fed it as well. But that is silly. Your feeding the cat (nearly) is your parts 
feeding the cat. Since such overfeeding is not the sort of thing pet-owners need to worry 
about, the same holds for the physicalist. The principle of NOD, being akin to something 
very silly, should therefore be rejected. Being akin to silliness is a weaker form of 
reductio, but it is a sort of reductio nonetheless.167  
 Although there is more to be said for the causal exclusion argument, I think we 
have said enough to move forward. The problem with the argument is the principle of 
                                                   
166 Where identity-likeness, as a minimal requirement must involve spatiotemporal co-location; in this 
sense it is much more than a sort of similarity.  
 
167 Again, I must emphasize, this solution is available to the non-reductivist even if the notion of identity-
likeness turns out to be incoherent. All that matters is that realization has the same ontic innocence as 
composition. Since overdetermination is innocent in the case of composition, it should be equally 
inoffensive in the case of realization. 
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NOD. Although it seems intuitive at first blush, it must be false. Given Block’s insights 
combined with the principle of causal sharing, it leads to an absurdity: the end of all 
causation everywhere. Moreover, the intuitiveness of NOD depends entirely on our 
emphasizing the distinctness of higher and lower-level events. But we can argue that this 
emphasis should be downplayed. The connection between higher and lower-levels (e.g., 
realization) might not be one of identity; but, as is the case with composition, the 
connection does seem to bear an important resemblance to identity. Borrowing from 
Lewis (1991), the non-reductivist can maintain that identity-likeness is sufficient for the 
ontological innocence of higher level determination. 
2.2 The General Eleatic Argument  
It is a mistake to think that embracing overdetermination will be enough to save the 
realization hierarchy, however. Part of the motivation driving the causal exclusion 
argument is the intuition that causally relevant things should, at least in most 
circumstances, make some sort of difference to their effects; and by accepting massive 
overdetermination one appears to concede that higher level property instances make no 
difference to the world, qua redundant.168 Even if higher level determination is 
ontologically innocent, we are still left to wonder why these purportedly innocent things 
should be posited in the first place.  
                                                   
168 For another thing, if all higher level causation is guilty of overdetermination, then the micro-physical 




2.2.1 The Eleatic Principle 
The above considerations point to a well-known method for unmasking false innocence. 
To ensure that one treads cautiously when issuing new posits, austere realists commonly 
appeal to this intuitive connection between ontology and causal difference-making. They 
reason that since existent things should be relevant to the world, they should therefore 
make a causal difference to it. This sort of reasoning is often presented in the form of a 
general naturalistic principle: the Eleatic principle – existent things make a causal 
difference. 
Despite the austere realist’s noble intentions, the principle nevertheless faces 
challenges (see Colyvan 1998, for example). After all, anyone committed to the existence 
of abstracta is already accustomed to rejecting Eleatic intuitions. Nevertheless, the 
principle is not entirely useless. As Wrenn (2010) notes, the principle can be sufficiently 
weakened so as to remove mathematical abstracta from its scope.  
(NEP) For all x, if x (physically) exists, then it makes a causal difference. 
Such a weakening should restore the intuitive merit of the Eleatic principle. If the only 
complaint is that it rules out mathematical abstracta, then the parenthetical qualification 
within NEP should quell the complainer. Indeed, the intuition favoring NEP appears 
widespread even amongst non-reductive physicalists. 
In support of this intuition is the widely held assumption that an adherence to 
something like NEP is part and parcel of the contemporary approach to science. When 
constructing theories, scientists are pressured to drop certain bits of their theory whenever 
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they are discovered to be irrelevant to the explanandum; and when a piece is dropped 
from the theory, it is also dropped from our scientific ontology.  
To deny NEP leaves one to wonder why: to accept that there might be something 
that fails to make a difference but nevertheless physically exists, then streamlining our 
theories according to custom would disallow the reading of ontology off the quantifiers 
of our best theories; for that custom would mistakenly entail the non-existence of certain 
things that might very well exist. For those who wish to trim the excess bits from their 
scientific and philosophical theories without disrespecting ontology in the process, the 
principle appears quite helpful. 
But good help comes at a price. If the characteristic posits of a theory fail to make 
a causal difference, then sympathy for NEP will bring that theory to bankruptcy. The 
theorist must then provide a reason to reject it.  
2.2.2 The Higher level Does Not Make a Difference 
To use the Eleatic principle to deny reification to the higher level, we must first say a bit 
more about the key feature of the principle: making a causal difference. To be charitable 
to the non-reductive physicalist, Chase Wrenn (2010) characterizes ‘making a causal 
difference’ in the following way: a property or relation makes a causal difference if it 
makes a “difference in the causal powers had or manifested by particulars.” (Wrenn 
2010, p. 6) In other words, the satisfaction of a predicate must contribute in some way to 




The general Eleatic argument can be stated in different ways. Beckermann’s 
(1997) version is straightforward. He writes: What would be the difference between the 
case where an object a possesses both F and its realizer  
…and the case in which a possesses both the micro-structure [C1,…, Cn; R] and 
the property F? Obviously there would not be any difference. For, if a has the 
micro-structure [C1, …, Cn; R], then, according to [realization theorists], a has all 
features which are characteristic of F, and therefore everything in the world will 
just go as if a had F. (p. 313) 
Given the NEP interpretation of the Eleatic principle, these irrelevant higher level 
property instances, therefore do not exist. But if there are no such property instances as 
being an ecosystem, being a community, etc., then ecosystems, communities, organisms, 
etc., simply do not exist. Evidently, there is no ecological hierarchy, nor any other 
realization hierarchy.  
Although I am unconvinced by Beckermann’s ex impossibile reasoning – you 
simply cannot conclude anything interesting from contrasting impossible cases169 – his 
general point remains: the non-reductivist typically concedes that low-level micro-
physical properties are metaphysically sufficient for, and hence completely determine, the 
actual distribution of causal powers throughout the actual world. But, if that is the case, 
then higher level properties do not appear to make a difference to what things do or can 
do: they are causally redundant. NEP then entails then entails their non-existence. The 
                                                   
169 Or at least it is very rare that such reasoning gives legitimate conclusions. With respect to Beckermann’s 
case: if a has all features which are characteristic of F, then a cannot fail to have F; and therefore it is trivial 




layered worldview appears deflated; realization looks to be a relation without relata. 
Before I respond to Beckermann’s argument, let us first examine a recent extension of it. 
3.0 There is No Realization: The Eleatic Problem Once Again 
Chase Wrenn (2010) extends this general eliminitivist worry to the non-reductivist’s 
realization relation itself. Since micro-physical properties are metaphysically sufficient 
for the actual distribution of causal powers in the actual world, the realization relation 
does not make a causal difference to that distribution. Therefore, given NEP, realization 
does not exist.  
The non-existence of realization is problematic for the non-reductivist for the 
same reason that the elimination of higher level things is a problem: realization plays an 
explanatory role within their theory. Even when describing the most superficial features 
of realization, LePore and Loewer (1989) characterize it as a “necessary connection 
which is explanatory.” (p. 179) Being realized by a particular molecular structure, for 
example, explains why a particular substance possesses the characteristic of solubility. 
This explanation is cast into doubt, however, if it turns out that there is no such thing as 
realization, since it does not make a difference. 
3.1 Four Tests for Difference-Making 
To buttress his eliminitivist argument, Wrenn (2010) devises some tests for causal 
difference-making and argues that the realization relation fails all of them: the Quinean 
test, the modal juxtaposition test, and the refined juxtaposition test. All such arguments 
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can be generalized, presenting us with three separate, but equally general, tests for 
reification.  
3.1.1 The Quinean Test 
The Quinean test (Wrenn 2010, p. 310) interprets difference-making in terms of 
differences made to the distribution of energy across space-time. Since the conjunction of 
micro-physical facts is metaphysically sufficient for all the facts about energy 
distribution, Wrenn concludes that there is no room for realization. Realization does not 
make a difference to energy distributions; therefore, realization does not exist. Moreover, 
given micro-physical sufficiency, it appears that there is no room for higher level 
properties as well. Higher level properties do not make a difference to energy 
distributions since all the difference is already made by the micro-physical. 
The Quinean test is unconvincing. Those who adopt Quine’s picture, and also take 
NEP seriously, have gotten themselves into a mess. If we buy into the picture of an 
expansive four-dimensional manifold of distributed mass-energy, then it is hard to see 
how anything is making a causal difference to anything. The distribution is just there. 
The fundamental scientist is interested in describing general characteristics of this mass-
energy distribution. They look for patterns, and then they look for ways to describe them 
in a way that facilitates prediction. There is nothing causal here. Many philosophers have 
observed this. It gives rise to a view I call causal deflationism, and it is gaining in 
popularity. The general idea is that causation, has no real “oomph”; the term is used to 
track patterns of what-increases-the-probability-of-what within this mass-energy 
distribution ranging across a four-dimensional manifold. To understand difference-
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making in terms of “oomph”, it turns out that NEP eliminates the entire manifold from 
existence. To understand difference-making as the causal deflationist does has the 
consequence of narrowing the applicability of the Quinean test to a very specific 
conception of the world. It is no longer acceptable as a general test.  
Moreover, it is doubtful that the non-reductivist would agree that causal 
difference-making requires that one makes a difference to energy distributions; any non-
reductive physicalist who sees fit to analyze objects, properties, or relations as being 
something other than a distribution of energy is going to reject this presumption. For the 
non-reductivist, if X makes a difference to Y, X is justifiably reified whether or not Y is a 
distribution of energy. All that matters is that Y exists, and X makes a difference to it. 
The eliminitivist needs a more neutral test for difference-making. 
3.1.2 The Modal Juxtaposition Test 
The modal juxtaposition test (Wrenn 2010 p. 308) also makes use of the metaphysical 
sufficiency of the micro-physical. According to Wrenn, if realization (viz., L realizes H) 
makes a causal difference to the world, then there must be a causal difference between 
cases where L realizes H and where L does not realize H. However, finding a causal 
difference between these cases requires that both such cases are possible. But, Wrenn 
argues, such cases are not possible: given the aforementioned facts about the 
metaphysical sufficiency of the micro-physical, ‘L realizes H’, whenever true, is 
metaphysically necessary. Thus, the realization relation does not exist. 
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Wrenn argues for the strong modal profile of realization in two related ways: as a 
purely logical exercise and by exploiting its explanatory role. The logical argument 
appears in a footnote. According to Wrenn,  
Every account of realization either analyses the claim that L realizes H as 
the claim that something is necessarily so (e.g., as the claim that, 
necessarily, if x has L then x has H) or as a claim that happens to be 
necessary… (2010, p. 314 n. 13) 
In either case, Wrenn derives ‘Necessarily, L realizes H’ with a quick appeal to S5. If 
realization claims are analyzed as claims that happen to be necessary, then realization 
claims themselves must also be necessary.170 Wrenn, however, is making too much of the 
supervenient nature of realization. Even if Wrenn is correct that realization should be 
analyzed using the supervenience claim ‘necessarily, if x has L then x has H’, that claim 
cannot be all there is to the analysis: realization claims can only turn out true if it is also 
actually the case that x has L. The analysans of ‘L realizes H’ must therefore also affirm 
the antecendent of Wrenn’s supervenience claim. But such an affirmation is typically 
contingent. The analysans, therefore, must also be contingent. S5 thus has no bearing on 
the present circumstances. 
Wrenn makes a similar point regarding realization’s explanatory role. On all 
accounts of realization, he claims, for L to realize H is for L to explain H in the right sort 
of way. On “all these accounts, though, it is not contingent whether L explains H; if L 
explains H in the requisite way, it is necessary that L explains H in that way.” (2010, p. 
                                                   
170 S5, recall, tells us that (R iff P) and P, together, entails R. 
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314) Wrenn infers from this that true realization claims are metaphysically necessary. But 
again this cannot be correct: L cannot explain H in world in which L does not exist; and 
so even if L actually explains H, it cannot necessarily be what explains H. H might be 
explained by something else, L*, in worlds where L does not exist. Indeed, that some 
higher level properties are multiply realizable is a core feature of non-reductive 
physicalism. The modal juxtaposition test is therefore no more convincing than its 
Quinean cousin, at least in its current formulation.  
3.1.3 The Contrastivist Test 
The strongest version of Wrenn’s eliminitivist argument (Wrenn 2010, p.315 fn. 14), call 
it the contrastivist test, again begins with a juxtaposition:  
(CT)  X makes a causal difference to Y (atop the causal contribution made by Z) 
if and only if there is a causal difference in Y between cases where X and 
not-X (holding Z fixed in both cases).171  
What this tells us is that L’s realizing H makes a difference to some particular (atop the 
contribution made by the micro-physical instantiation of L) only if there is a causal 
difference in that particular between cases where L obtains and H is realized and cases 
where L obtains, but H is not realized. But, given that L is supposed to be metaphysically 
sufficient for H’s being realized, the second case is impossible. Thus, realization makes 
no causal difference: there is no causal difference between L-obtaining cases in which ‘L 
realizes H’ holds and L-obtaining cases in which it does not, since the latter cases are 
impossible. 
                                                   
171 Wrenn ultimately wants to convince us that there is no contribution made by realization that is not 
already made by some micro-physical property instantiation on its own. 
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But now the refined test is no more convincing than Beckermann’s original ex 
impossibile argument. The test might be convincing if realization failed on the grounds 
that both cases were possible, and still no difference could be found by their 
juxtaposition. But that’s not the result here. Here the failure hinges only on the fact that 
the juxtaposition itself is impossible.  
The non-reductivist can simply argue, however, that if juxtaposition is impossible, 
then the juxtaposition test becomes useless. Eliminitivists are pushing it beyond its limit. 
Just because there is no juxtaposition does not entail that there is no causal difference. It 
seems more appropriate to say that if we cannot compare cases, then we simply cannot 
use juxtaposition to test the causal contribution of realization atop the contribution made 
by L’s being instantiated.  
This problem echoes one of the more serious limitations of interventionist 
accounts of causation  (Woodward 2003): just because it is metaphysically impossible to 
intervene on, or “wiggle”, an element in a causal system does not immediately entail that 
element’s inefficacy, it entails that the metaphysical possibility of an intervention on X is 
not necessary for X to be a cause.172 
Consider a magic pipe. Suppose you have a tobacco-pipe that is metaphysically 
impossible to alter in any sort of way.  173 This means, for any particular feature of the 
                                                   
172 Woodward instead relies on the logical possibility of interventions. In cases where an intervention is not 
physically possible, we can instead look to an appropriate theory to justify counterfactual claims involving 
purely hypothetical interventions (Woodward 2003 p. 128-30).  
 
173 I do not mean to make any substantive claim about the world by talking about magic pipes. Rather, I’m 
questioning the coherence of the testing method, and so hypothetical examples should carry weight, 
however simplified. If hypothetical examples tell us that the test can fail in circumstances where a 
juxtaposition or intervention is impossible, then we absolutely cannot use the test to conclude anything 
substantive when such circumstances in fact obtain. 
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pipe, it is impossible to “wiggle” that feature independently of the others in order to test 
its relevance. Is the shape of the handle relevant to the causing of its owner’s lung-
cancer? Perhaps not; but even so, the causal vacuity of the handle’s shape does not seem 
to have anything to do with the fact that the pipe is impossible to alter. That one cannot 
compare the original case to a juxtaposed case in which the pipe has been altered has 
nothing to do with the causal relevance, or irrelevance, of any given feature of the pipe. 
As with all cancer-causing pipes, some feature of the pipe is partially responsible for the 
cancer it helps to bring about.  
This is not to say that intervention tests are bad tests, only that they have their 
limit. The same can be said with the contrastivist test for difference-making. If the results 
of the test are not in realization’s favor, then so be it; but if the nature of the thing being 
tested makes it impossible to even make a juxtaposition or intervention, then the test 
simply cannot be performed. No results whatsoever can be obtained. 
We can see this point again from a more abstract perspective. Suppose you have a 
causal chain, A causes B causes C. If we assume deterministic causation, then A is 
metaphysically sufficient for B, and B is sufficient for C. If we apply the contrastivist 
test, however, it will follow that B makes no difference to C atop the difference already 
made by A: qua deteriministic, there can be no case where A and not-B; and thus there is 
no difference between an A and B case, and an A and not-B case. Given NEP, B, 
therefore does not exist and as such is not part of any causal chains. But that is clearly 
false: B does exist as part of a causal chain, by stipulation. And besides, it also seems 
clear that B, being part of the causal chain, is ipso fact part of the difference made by its 
predecessor, A. The contrastivist test, in its current formulation, thus fails to recognize 
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the difference made by intervening nodes in a deterministic causal chain; and therefore, 
the test simply fails. 
The third, and final problem with the test is that it illegitimately entails that there 
are no metaphysically necessary events. If an event e (e.g., some great explosion or 
expansion near the beginning of time) is metaphysically necessary, then you cannot 
compare a case in which e obtains with a case where it does not, since there are no cases 
of the latter sort. And so, given the contrastivist test and NEP, no such e makes a 
difference and therefore metaphysically necessary events do not exist.  
This line of reasoning is quite suspicious. In general, the discovery that X makes a 
difference should not permit us to infer that X is not necessary. The contrastivist test 
simply does not seem like an appropriate way to settle disputes about the modal status of 
events. 
The main reason the contrastivist test is unconvincing is not because it 
illegitimately settles modal disputes, however; it is because, on the face of it, big bangs, 
necessary or not, make a big difference.174 Ultimately, any test that tells us that modal 
status matters for its difference-maker status is not a test anyone should accept.  
3.1.4 The Refined Contrastivist Test 
Wrenn’s contrastivist argument is therefore unsound. Because the modal status of an 
event is irrelevant to its ability to make a difference, we must reject the key premise: X 
makes a causal difference (to Y) atop the difference made by Z if and only if there is a 
                                                   
174 As an anonymous referee has pointed out, one might add deities to the list: God, should He exist, is 
generally taken to be both a difference-maker and a necessary being.  
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difference (in Y) between cases where X and Z hold and cases where not-X and Z hold. 
To repair the test, that biconditional premise needs to be stated as part of a greater 
biconditional: it is to be affirmed if and only if a difference between such cases is 
possible. Only with such a modification does the test gain credence. Modifying the test in 
such a way, of course, makes it impossible for Wrenn to draw the conclusion he wants.  
Somewhat ironically, with this more plausible test in hand, non-reductive 
physicalists find themselves in a position to respond to the general eliminitivist argument. 
In what follows, I show how they can use the repaired contrastivist test to restore the 
realization hierarchy, by arguing that the realization relation, and the higher levels 
realizations do in fact make a difference to the world, at least within the framework 
provided by non-reductive physicalism. 
4.0 Resurrecting the Realization Hierarchy 
To defend the realization hierarchy from Eleatic concerns, I argue for two claims. First, I 
argue that the realization relation should be considered to be reified within the framework 
of science, since it makes a difference. Second, I argue that the higher levels of the 
realization hierarchy are similarly reified, since they make a difference as well. 
4.1 The Reification of Realization: It Makes a Difference 
Even if each of Wrenn’s specific Eleatic tests can be challenged, non-reductivists still 
need to respond to the general eliminitivist argument. They still must say how it is that 
the properties and relation targeted for elimination do in fact make a difference to the 
causal powers of particulars, even though micro-physical property instantiations are 
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metaphysically sufficient for the total distribution of causal powers throughout the 
universe.  
One way to do this is to show that micro-physical property instantiations are not, 
by themselves, metaphysically sufficient to account for the causal powers of particular 
higher level property instances. One might argue that while micro-physical property 
instantiations are metaphysically sufficient for the distribution of causal powers found at 
the higher level, this fact holds only because of these important higher level properties 
and connecting relations.  
4.1.1 The (Causal) Disconnection Between Levels 
Eliminitivists think that the set of microphysical events is sufficient for all other events; 
and non-reductivists typically agree. Eliminitivists also tends to think that micro-physical 
facts are also sufficient to explain all other facts; but here the non-reductivist disagrees. 
For the non-reductivist, the modal properties of micro-physical property instances explain 
little (LePore and Loewer 1989, p. 178-9). Indeed, the logical relationship of 
metaphysical sufficiency that holds between micro-physical L-instances and higher level 
H-instances – e.g. Nec(L  H) –  is itself something that needs to be accounted for. Such 
modal facts are supposed to be accounted for by the fact that L realizes H; they are too 
important to be left to brute supervenience. 
Given the analytical impotence of mysterious modal facts, the non-reductivist can 
argue that micro-physical property instantiations alone cannot account for the causal 
powers of higher level property instances. While satisfying the predicate instantiates-L 
(where ‘L’ denotes some micro-physical property) can account for a particular L-
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instance, x, having the powers it does, higher level property instances (H-instances) do 
not happen to instantiate L. If the H-instance, h, were identical to the L-instance, then the 
causal power h obtains by instantiating L would be accountable simply by the fact that h 
instantiates L, and the strong modal connection between the L-instance and the H-
instance would be likewise accountable by virtue of their being identical. 
However, if the H-instance is not identical to the L-instance, the L-instance’s 
instantiation of L on its own does not account for the H-instance’s having the causal 
powers it does; nor does it account for the aforementioned strong modal connection: that 
the L-instance is metaphysically sufficient for the H-instance. The non-reductivist will 
ardently maintain that there must be some explanatory relationship between the L-
instance and the H-instance if the L-instance is to account for the powers possessed by 
the H-instance. Presumably the L-instance gets its powers by instantiating L, but how 
then does the corresponding (but non-identical) H-instance get its powers? Assuming that 
the instances are not identical, the instantiation of L on its own does not account for much 
at all.  
The layered worldview under discussion, recall, is one of dimensioned realization, 
which is irreflexive: nothing realizes itself. The H-instance, h, then cannot be identical to 
the L-instance that realizes it. Indeed, if they were identical it would be hard to see how 
non-reductive physicalism can genuinely be considered non-reductive. 
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4.1.2 Co-opting the Contrastivist Test 
Given that the mere fact that L is instantiated fails to account for the causal powers 
possessed by higher level property instances, the non-reductivist is presented with a way 
to show that realization makes a causal difference. 
Consider the claim ‘H is realized by L’, where L is an instance of a micro-
physical property and H is an instance of a higher level property. As noted earlier, such a 
claim must be considered contingent in order to accommodate the non-reductivist 
concept of multiple-realizability; there are some worlds where H instantiates ‘realized by 
L’ and there are some worlds where it does not. Moreover, in any such world where H 
exists but is not realized by L, H must nevertheless be realized by something else, some 
L*.  
Focusing on these two worlds, we now have two cases to feed into the 
contrastivist test. Is there a difference between cases where H instantiates realized-by-L 
and cases where H instantiates realized-by-L*? Although the repaired test should deliver 
an answer (since the difference between cases is possible), the answer it delivers is going 
to depend on the nuances of the particular form of non-reductive physicalism one favors. 
Specifically, the answer will depend on one’s reaction to the following principle: 
(Power-essentialism)  For any two property instances, h and h*, and any two 
micro-physical properties p and p* if h and h* are instances 
of the same property and p and p* are instances of different 
properties, and h is realized by p and h* is realized by p*, 
then h and h* have all the same causal powers.  
322 
 
Otherwise put: higher level property instances have the same causal powers no matter 
how they happen to be realized. Non-reductivists do not endorse this principle. Some 
powers, it is standardly thought, are conditional: their acquisition depends on how the 
higher level instance is realized.  
Given the denial of power-essentialism, the non-reductivist is free to assert both 
(1) and (2) below:  
(1) By instantiating realized-by-L, the H-instance obtains a certain set of causal 
powers. 
(2) By instantiating realized-by-L*, an H-instance obtains a different set of causal 
powers. 
By affirming (1) and (2) and Wrenn’s contrastivist test, it follows that a difference has 
been made to the causal powers of the H-instance. Specifically, we see that satisfying the 
predicate realized-by-L* makes a causal difference to the H-instance atop the 
contribution made by the H-instance itself.  
Does this mean that realization makes a difference? It does. Since this complex 
predicate can be broken down into two components – the realization relation and the L* 
instantiation – given that the L*-instance cannot account for the causal powers of the H-
instance on its own (since it does not instantiate L), it will then follow that the realization 
relation does in fact make a causal difference. Although I have not said exactly what that 
difference is, the argument strongly suggests that a difference is made by realization.  
On the other hand, if one accepts this principle of power-essentialism, this 
response option quickly evaporates. Given power-essentialism, juxtaposing a case where 
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H is realized by L with a case where H is realized by L* yields a different answer: it 
follows that no difference is made to the partitioning of causal powers to the H instance 
by virtue of being realized by L*. Luckily for the non reductivist, there is no good reason 
to accept power-essentialism, although some philosophers might find it tempting. 
4.2 The Reification of the Higher level: It Makes a Difference 
In the previous section, we used the contrastivist test to describe one sort of difference 
that realization makes to the causal powers of particulars. As the test was originally 
designed to eliminate realization, the result is rather ironic. In this section, I will press 
forward with the irony, employing the same strategy with respect to higher level property 
instances. I argue that higher level property instantiations do make a difference, pace 
Beckermann’s argument from section two.  
4.2.1 The Contrastivist Strategy Revisted 
Rather than juxtaposing the micro-physical property instantiations against the realization 
relation, here we must instead juxtapose the realizing micro-physical property 
instantiation against the higher level property instantiation that is realized. Recall the 
contrastivist aspect of Wrenn’s argument. Assuming that both claims X and Z and not-X 
and Z are possible,  
(CT)  X makes a difference atop the difference made by Z if and only if there is 
a difference between cases where X and Z and cases where not-X and Z. 
To use this principle to positively affirm that H makes a difference atop the difference 
made by L seems to require contrasting a case where both H and L obtain with a case 
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where L obtains but H does not. However, given that L is metaphysically sufficient for H, 
such a contrast turns out to be impossible; indeed, this is the very feature that 
Beckermann and Wrenn attempted to exploit when arguing against realization 
physicalism. As we learned from our study of their arguments, however, impossible 
contrasts do not imply Eleatic inefficacy; they only imply that Eleatic efficacy cannot be 
determined from that particular test. 
Still, one might be able to find a way to use the contrastivist test to indirectly 
demonstrate that H does make a difference within non-reductive physicalism. Given that 
H and L are in competition for the status of difference-maker, if we can use the 
contrastivist test to show that L does not make a difference atop the difference made by 
H, it will then follow that H does make a difference; for if it did not, then it would follow 
that the micro-physical property does not make any sort of difference at all. Anything that 
fails to make a difference atop something that makes no difference must also be 
something that makes no difference. But since it is unquestionable that micro-physical 
properties do make some sort of difference (given the non-reductivist’s commitment to 
the causal closure of the micro-physical), it then follows that higher level properties must 
also make some sort of difference within non-reductive physicalism. Saying exactly what 
that difference is becomes the only remaining challenge. 
 This is only the sketch of the argument. We have yet to perform the test.  
4.2.2 Implementing the Contrastivist Strategy 
To set things up, let us consider the following scenario: 
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H1  H2 
    
L1  ---causes---> L2 
Figure 21: Hs realized by Ls 
Let us imagine that the H’s are not reducible to the L’s, but rather, are realized by them: 
let RH1 denote the set of possible lower-level realizers of H1 and 
RH2 denote the set of 
possible lower-level realizers of H2. Finally, let us imagine that any world where an 
element of RH1 obtains is a world where an element of 
RH2 obtains. 
Given this scenario, let us run the contrastivist test. Since any possible realizer of 
H1 is sufficient to bring about a realizer of H2, it follows that if it were the case that H1 
obtains but L1 does not, H2 would nevertheless obtain. In other words, H2 is insensitive to 
changes in L1 when we hold fixed the contrast class H1 (cf. Van Frassen 1982; Schaffer 
2005).  
Since H2 is insensitive to changes in L1, holding fixed H1, we have thus failed to 
satisfy the right-hand side of the contrastivist test. By holding H1 fixed in both cases, no 
difference is made to H2 by altering L1. Therefore, it follows that L1 makes no difference 
to H2 atop the difference made by H1. Maintaining the assumption that L1 makes some 
difference to H2 on account of its bringing about H2’s actual realizer, L2, it therefore 
follows that H1 also makes some difference. Again, what exactly that difference is 
remains a mystery.  
Note that this result is consistent with what we see in actual scientific practice. 
Particle physicists cannot predict the precise behavior of individual particles. They are 
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just too erratic. Instead, statistical mechanics is called in to make predictions from an 
initial set of possible particle configurations. Those predictions nevertheless turn out to 
be quite accurate on the macro-level. This accuracy suggests that the particular 
configuration in which those particles actually find themselves is quite irrelevant to the 
macro-level behavior of the system. It makes no difference to the prediction.  
Now that it has been argued (from the eliminitivist-endorsed contrastivist test) 
that both higher level property instances and the realization relation make some sort of 
causal difference within non-reductive physicalism, we are warranted to think that there 
is a sort of non-reductive physicalism is compatible with both the NEP interpretation of 
the Eleatic principle and the SEP interpretation. But there are other versions of the 
realization hierarchy. 
4.2.3 The Problem for Property Realization 
Some non-reductive physicalists will be wary to endorse the above solution. They will be 
bothered by the presumption that the relata of realization are property instances rather 
than the properties themselves. Kim and Shoemaker, for example, maintain that 
realization holds between properties.175 
How does the eliminitivist’s argument hold up against this alternate conception of 
realization’s relata? If we take the view that higher level properties and their realizers are 
instantiated by the same particulars, then realization will end up succumbing to the 
eliminitivist argument: that one property realizes another does not seem to have any 
bearing on the powers of particulars. If a particular already instantiates the lower-level 
                                                   




realizer, it automatically acquires all of the powers bestowed by that realizer. There is 
nothing to be gained by also instantiating a higher level property or by introducing a 
realization relation connecting the higher level property to the lower. Neither realization 
nor higher level property instantiations make a difference, and are therefore eliminated by 
NEP.  
If, on the other hand, the non-reductive physicalist maintains that nothing 
instantiates both a higher level property and its realizer, we can run the same argument as 
we did for instances. Since higher level particulars do not instantiate the lower-level 
realizer property, the powers they acquire are gained solely by their instantiation of 
higher level properties (presuming that powers are acquired by particulars via the 
instantiation relation). With such restrictions in place, higher level properties do make a 
difference to the powers of particulars that instantiate them. 
The realization relation is a different story. For those who think that realization 
relates properties as opposed to property instances, one is left to wonder what realization 
adds to the causal story. Since higher level particulars gain all the powers they do by 
instantiating a property, the fact that that property is realized by another contributes 
nothing. Since particulars fall outside the domain of the realization relation, there are no 
grounds to claim that realization contributes anything.  
In this case, however, defending the existence of realization does not require 
arguing that it is a relation that makes a difference. One can instead argue that it is, 
strictly speaking, a mathematical relation. Take Shoemaker’s (2007) “subset” view of 
realization as an example. For Shoemaker, X is realized by Y iff the set of X’s forward 
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looking causal features is a subset of Y’s forward looking causal features, and Y’s 
backward looking causal features are a subset of the backward looking causal features of 
X. The subset relation, however, is a mathematical relation. Having been analyzed as a 
mathematical relation holding between sets of powers, the realization relation fails to 
satisfy the “physical” antecedent of NEP, and so it is exempt from having to make a 
difference to the world, passing through on its set-theoretic credentials. No conflict 
between subset-realization and NEP is generated. The non-reductivist who disagrees with 
Shoemaker about the mathematical nature of the realization (subset) relation, however, 
will have to fight back. 
4.3 Eliminating the Eleatic Principle 
Those non-reductivists who rail against a mathematical analysis of realization, but who 
also fail to account for the difference it makes will have to reject NEP. A passive 
dismissal does them no favors, however. It would be in their interest to mount a case 
against the principle. If it can be shown that NEP fails to hold as a metaphysical 
principle, then the NEP connection between existence and difference-making can be 
severed; and the non-reductive physicalist has nothing to fear from the Eleatic 
eliminitivist. 
Metaphysical principles are typically those which bear a strong modality: 
metaphysical necessity. NEP is no exception; it tells us that difference-making is 
metaphysically necessary for existence. The entire point of the principle, after all, is to 
draw a metaphysical connection between causality and existence. If there are beings in 
possible worlds where difference-maker status is not required for non-mathematical 
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existence, then that connection is broken. Even worse, if that connection breaks down in 
a model of world like ours, then the “intuition” that ours is one of those lucky worlds 
where NEP holds becomes nothing more than bad faith.  
The following is a model of a world like ours. Although it makes use of the notion 
of a conditional power we introduced earlier, it is nothing special: it merely represents a 
familiar sort of overdetermination. The philosophical importance of overdetermination 
cases, of course, is well-known. Traditionally offered to quiet the claim that difference-
making is necessary for causation, such cases are what keep counterfactual accounts of 
causation shrouded in skepticism.176 But as we will see, those problems extend to the 
eliminitivist interpretation of the Eleatic principle, NEP, as well. 
Consider a causal model consisting of four events D, C1, C2 and E, held together 
by the following chain of relationships: (a) D, given background conditions α, causes 
both C1 and C2; (b) C1 is a completely sufficient cause of E; and (c) C2 is too. (b) and (c), 
of course, tell us that E is overdetermined by C1 and C2.  
This scenario poses a problem for NEP. If making a causal difference were 
metaphysically necessary for existence, then it would follow that C1 and C2 do not exist: 
as we noted earlier, if an effect is genuinely overdetermined then each of its 
overdeterminers is causally redundant. Individually, they make no difference to the 
                                                   




effect.177 But their non-existence contradicts the parameters of the model: recall that each 
of these four things had been stipulated to exist at the outset.  
Taking C1 and C2 to compose a single event C3 is of little help to NEP. By 
invoking the notion of a conditional power, we can extend the model to entail that C3 
does not make a difference. If, for example, we suppose that D has the power to bring 
about both C1 and C2 only under the α conditions, we can then add the stipulation that D 
has the power to bring about some C* given any other background condition, β. We can 
then further stipulate that this C* is itself metaphysically sufficient for E and derive via 
the contrastivist test that C3 does not make a difference: there is no difference between 
cases where D and C3 hold and cases where D and not-C3 since not-C3 and D together 
imply C*,178 which is also guaranteed to bring about E. Represented diagrammatically: 
  
F 
 Making a causal difference, therefore, cannot be a metaphysical requirement for 
reification. If it were, then the above causal model would involve overdeterminers that 
both do and do not exist, which is nonsense. 
The eliminitivist’s interpretation of the Eleatic principle (NEP) therefore does not 
accurately portray the metaphysical connection between difference making and ontology, 
                                                   
177 As can be confirmed by the revised contrastivist test. It is still possible, however, that C1 and C2 are 
nevertheless causes of the effect despite not making any causal difference. 
 
178 Not-C3 and D implies C* since not-C3 and D implies that the α-condition do not obtain, which implies 
that the β-conditions do obtain, which, when combined with D, implies that C* obtains. 
 
    C1 
             ↗       ↘ 
<α, D>  C2  E 
 
<β, D>  C*  E 
Figure 22: Two Causal Situations 
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suggesting an agnostic approach instead: do not eliminate the irrelevant, 179 but do not 
reify it either.   
5.0 Implications for the Causal Exclusion Argument 
Before closing, it is worth mentioning the implications that the rejection of NEP has for 
the causal exclusion argument: none whatsoever. The fact that some things might fail to 
make a difference to the world does not make systematic overdetermination suddenly 
more plausible, nor does it make it any more likely that the higher level brings about 
phenomena that the lower-level does not. Epiphenomenalism still looms. The rejection of 
NEP does, however, prevent the elimintivist from using Eleatic arguments as a way of 
turning that epiphenomenalism into stark eliminitivism. 
Our contrastivist test, on the other hand, does seem to have implications for the 
exclusion argument. The causal sharing principle (i.e., CSHARE) tells us that anything a 
higher level instance brings about is also brought about by lower-level instances. As we 
have seen here, there could be cases where the lower-level instance makes no difference 
to the effect atop the difference made by the higher level instance. One might take this to 
suggest that the causal work is being done at the higher rather than the lower level; but 
really, we cannot say for certain: the contrastivist test cannot confirm that the higher level 
makes a difference atop the difference made by the lower. If causal work sometimes turns 
out to be higher level work, then we would expect that the higher level would indeed 
make a difference atop the difference made by the lower. But there is no way to confirm 
                                                   
179 That is, unless you have an independent (non-Eleatic) reason for doing so. 
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that with our analysis: we would need a test for contrastive difference-making that does 
not require us to reason ex impossibile.  
5.1 Weighing the Options 
We might still try an alternative way to reason through the issue. We can describe the 
space of options regarding inter-level difference-making in the following set of diagrams 
(a) through (h). Where A designates the higher level and B designates the lower, and the 
diagonal shading designates that a difference was made:180 
(a)   (b)   (c)   (d) 
 
(e)   (f)   (g)   (h) 
 
 
(a) tells us that the difference made by A is the same difference as that made by B; (b) 
tells us that A and B both make a difference, but they are entirely separate; (c) tells us 
that all the difference is made by B and A makes no difference; (d) tells us that all the 
difference is made by A and that B makes no difference; (e) tells us that no difference is 
made whatsoever; (f) tells us that A and B both made a difference, but the difference B 
makes is part of the difference made by A; (g) tells us that A and B both make a 
                                                   
180 We could also represent the space symbolically: (a) 0≠A=B; (b) 0≠A≠B≠0; (c) 0=A≠B≠0; (d) 
0≠A≠B=0; (e) 0=A=B; (f) A = B + N, where N>0; (g) B = A + N, where N>0; (h) 0 ≠ A + B = B + A. I see 

























Figure 23: Eight Difference-making Options 
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difference, but the difference A makes is part of the difference made by B; (h) A and B 
both make a difference, and they both contribute to the difference each makes. 
Many of these options seem to suggest trouble for CSHARE. If we accept (b), (d), 
or (f), then the higher level makes a difference that the lower level does not. Since this 
suggests that the higher level is contributing something that the lower-level is not, it 
appears that CSHARE can be rejected.  
Most of the above options can be eliminated immediately, however. In those 
special cases in which the lower level does not make a difference atop the difference 
made by the higher, we can eliminate (b), (c) and (g). In all these cases we have B 
making a difference not already made by A.  
We can also eliminate (d) and (e). In those special cases where the lower-level 
makes no more difference to the effect than the higher level, the contrastivist test should 
nevertheless confirm that the lower-level instances make a difference atop the difference 
made by, say, some distant planet. Even in those special cases, then, the lower-level 
instances still make some sort of causal difference. (d) and (e) must therefore be 
eliminated. 
This leaves us with a trilemma: either the difference made by the two levels is the 
same as in (a), the difference made by B is part of the difference made by A as in (f), or 
the difference made by each is partially made by each other as in (h). 
It is hard to get a grasp of the latter horn, I admit. But there is a reason for that: 
the trilemma is a false one. (h) and (a) amount to the same thing. The reason (h) does not 
seem to be ruled out by the special case under consideration is because, even though B is 
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making its own difference, it is still not making a difference atop the difference made by 
A, since the difference made by A includes the difference made by B. But the same can 
be said for A, and this is why the dilemma is a false one. It follows from (h) that the 
difference made by A is the difference made by both A and B and the difference made by 
B is the difference made by both A and B. The difference made, therefore, is the same 
across levels: (h) collapses into (a).  
And so we actually face a dilemma: either (a) the difference made is the same, or 
(f) the lower-level difference is part of the higher-difference. If we accept the causal 
closure of the micro-physical, as nearly every non-reductive physicalist does, then (f) can 
also be eliminated. (f) gives us a case where the higher level brings new differences into 
the picture, differences not found at the micro level. If one sees fit to reject (f), then, one 
must also reject the causal closure of the micro-level; and with that, CSHARE can be 
rejected.  
Note also that if (f) is true, then it becomes necessary to reject the principle of no-
overdetermination (i.e., NOD); (f) is a picture of a case where the lower-level makes 
enough of a causal difference to bring about the effect (since it brings about the realizer 
of the effect), and the higher level nevertheless makes an extra difference on top of that. 
The effect is not then just overdetermined; even worse, it is over-overdetermined. We 
have no choice but to reject NOD. 
This leaves option (a). If true, (a) also seems to suggest that overdetermination is 
unavoidable, again mandating a rejection of NOD.  
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5.2 Interpreting the Result 
There are only two possible ways to account for the possibility of sameness of the 
differences made by the higher and lower-levels. First, one might take a metaphysically 
reductionistic, identity-theoretic stance towards difference-making, independent of any 
claims reaching towards inter-theoretic reduction that motivated the variety of 
reductionism favored in Putnam’s and Nagel’s day – namely, the reduction of scientific 
predicates or posited properties.  
Such an account calls for a change in the common pictorial representation of 
inter-level causation; where the vertical bar | denote realization: 
H1 - - - - - - - - -> H2     H1   H2 
|               |  becomes:  |   ---------------->| 
L1 ----------------> L2     L1    L2 
Figure 24: Inter-level Causation 
This picture suggests that the entire difference made is made by the hierarchical structure 
that includes both the H1 instance and the L2 instance. One might then interpret the 
situation as depicting a different sort of scientific reduction. If non-reductive physicalism 
holds for scientific predicates, perhaps those involved in the reductionist project should 
take to the business of looking for ways to reduce the differences made by the predicate-
instances to the difference made at the lower level: reduce the differences made rather 
than the properties. Although I acknowledge the (epistemic) possibility of such a 
reductionist position, I have no reason to favor it. I simply have no reason to reject it. 
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The second option a quasi-reductionistic stance towards difference making, 
whereby the difference-making relation does not reduce, but nearly-reduces in the same 
sort of way we said that higher level property instances are nearly-identical to the 
instances that realize them. That is, we might say that the difference made by the higher 
level is realized by the difference made by the lower. Again, this calls for a difference in 
the standard picture: 
H1 - - - - - - - - -> H2     H1 - - - - - - - - -> H2 
|                  |  becomes:  |    |       | 
L1 ----------------> L2     L1 ----------------> L2 
Figure 25: Realizing Causation 
Here we see that the higher level difference is, in fact, realized by the lower-level. Again, 
I have no argument for this position.181 Either option is sufficient to mandate a rejection 
of the no-overdetermination principle (i.e., NOD). Both epiphenomenalism and Eleatic 
eliminitivism can be avoided. 
This defense need not reset on a defense of (a), however: if either (a) or (f) holds, 
then we have what we need to reject the causal exclusion argument. If (a) holds, then 
NOD must be rejected: you have a case where both the lower and higher levels make a 
sufficient difference to the effect; if (f) holds, then both NOD and CSHARE must be 
rejected: not only do there appear to be novel causal powers at higher levels within (f), 
                                                   
181 I am tempted to appeal to relational properties here. If relational properties, in general, can be realized at 
the lower-level, then H1’s instantiating makes-a-difference-to-H2 might be said to be realized by L1’s 
instantiating makes-a-difference-to-H2. There are too many issues at work here to be able to say anything 




mandating a rejection of CSHARE, there is also more causal power in the picture than is 
needed to bring about the effect, requiring us to also abandon NOD. Either way, the 
contrastivist test, therefore, requires that NOD must be rejected.  
Higher level things, therefore, make a difference. The causal exclusion argument 
is unsound. Block’s drainage argument tells us that we have to reject at least one of the 
premises, and the contrastivist test then confirms that it is NOD that it has to go, 
supporting our original intuition.  
6.0 Conclusion 
I should note before closing that the eliminitivist positions discussed here were never 
offered as arguments against the appeal to hierarchies in scientific endeavors. I have 
simply redeployed them, exploring the concern that our talk of levels in everyday, 
analytical, and scientific discourse is just that: talk.  
 As noted in the outset, eliminitivitism about higher level things or the ordering 
relation that holds between them entails levels-deflationism with respect to that hierarchy. 
The causal exclusion argument purports to show that higher level property instances are 
inefficacious. Qua inefficacious, some austere realists then feel compelled to eliminate 
higher level properties by invoking the NEP interpretation of the Eleatic principle: if 
something exists, it must make a causal difference.  
There are two ways non-reductive physicalists can respond: they can reject the 
causal exclusion argument or they can reject the Eleatic principle. If one does the former, 
one must give reason to think that higher level things make a difference. If one does the 
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latter, one must give an example of something that does not make a difference but 
nevertheless exists. 
Here I have pursued both avenues. In response to the causal exclusion argument, I 
considered the rejection of both premises. Ultimately, they amounted to the same thing: 
NOD must be rejected. In the end, it appears that the sort of overdetermination involved 
in the causal exclusion argument is ingenuine. Either way, epiphenomenalism is averted.  
But the eliminitivist has other resources at his disposal. Eliminitivists commonly 
dismiss non-reductive physicalism more directly, on Eleatic grounds. The Eleatic 
principle, they say, ought to be part of our approach to science. The construction of 
theories is an ongoing process involving frequent refinements. Part of what drives such 
changes is an implicit adherence to the Eleatic principle: drop whatever is causally 
irrelevant. It simply does not exist. Because non-reductive physicalism is committed to 
higher level properties and a realization relation that do not make a difference, it appears 
that it is incompatible with the Eleatic principle. Non-reductive physicalism, they 
conclude, provides a poor metaphysic for science. 
In the second half of the chapter, however, I went on to describe a variety of ways 
eliminitivists attempt to show that non-reductivist elements do not make a causal 
difference: the Quinean test, the juxtaposition test, the contrastivist test, and the refined 
contrastivist test. It was shown that the only acceptable test was the refined test, and that 
the requisite refinement effectively removed the bite from the eliminitivist’s contrastive 
argument; the refined test ousts neither the realization relation nor higher level property 
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instantiations from the non-reductivist’s ontology. Ironically, the same refinement allows 
the non-reductivist to respond to the general eliminitivist argument. 
I then went on to show that there is no incompatibility between non-reductivism 
and the Eleatic principle. Higher level properties and the inter-level realization relation 
do in fact make a difference, by the eliminitivist’s own standard. When an effect is 
tolerant to changes at the lower-level, holding fixed the higher level, the contrastivist test 
implies that higher level properties make a difference. What that difference is, exactly, 
remains a mystery. 
But there is a deeper lesson to be learned from our investigation. Applying the 
contrastivist test to a simple causal model shows that making a difference is not necessary 
for physical existence. That something makes a difference might be sufficient for it to 




 Conclusion and Directions for Future Research 
 
Progress is made in the metaphysics of science whenever it can be shown that the 
assumptions of an explanatory framework have consequences about the nature, contents, 
and structure of the world. In the preceding examination of the use of hierarchical 
structures within ecology, we have done just that. 
 The thesis defended consists in three claims: the claim that the world is 
hierarchically structured (i.e., Realism); the claim that the world is hierarchically 
structured as ecologists claim, but it is not the case that everything in the hierarchy is, in 
fact, contained within the bottommost level (i.e., Holism); and the claim that 
Metaphysical-MLE – the idea that the hierarchical structure of the world is what justifies 
the practice of describing, explaining, and analyzing things using hierarchical terms – 
appears false with respect to some hierarchies. 
I began by providing a clear and concise statement that describes the ecological 
hierarchy, as it is conceived by Allen and Starr (1982), and others (e.g., Webster 1979, 
and Salthe 1985). The ecological hierarchy defended here is a sort of compositional 
hierarchy. I then defended this description, ECOHIERARCHY, from some recent 
objections. 
In the second chapter I reviewed the most prominent general theories of 
hierarchies qua hierarchies: theories of hierarchies that are detached (or abstracted from) 
any concrete example of a hierarchy; theories that capture the notion of ‘hierarchy’, as it 
is employed within science, however the term is employed. After arguing that levels are 
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parts of hierarchies, it was then argued that the theoretical considerations of parsimony 
and generality favor an unrestricted mereological approach over a set-based approach for 
understanding what hierarchies are. To be “at” a level, it was argued, is to be a part of 
that level, since such a conception provides a general foundation for the construction of 
any hierarchy. What is it for one level to be higher than another? Two answers were 
considered: the partial order view and the strict partial order view. We came to favor the 
strict view. 
Taking these considerations for granted, in the third Chapter a robust general 
theory of hierarchies qua hierarchies was developed: Core Hierarchy Theory. Its 
formalization has interesting consequences: it vindicates the conception of 
ECOHIERARCHY from the first chapter by giving us a way to argue that all unrestricted 
compositional hierarchies are nested hierarchies. That is, Allen and Starr’s (as with 
Webster and Simon’s) idea that compositional hierarchies are upwards nested hierarchies 
turn out to be a theorem of the formalized Core Hierarchy Theory when the “is at” 
relation is left unrestricted. 
These results were then applied to well-known issues in the metaphysics of 
ecology: debates between Reductionism and Holists, and issues surrounding mechanistic 
vs. Humean approaches to scientific explanation. Having shown that Reductionism is 
inconsistent with Core Hierarchy Theory when the “is at” relation is left unrestricted, I 
argue that Reductionism should be rejected: unless it can be shown that the most basic 
unrestricted sort of hierarchical structure fails to capture some important aspect of the 
debate, Holism is to be preferred.  
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Causal explanation, mechanistically-driven or otherwise, is commonly associated 
with compositional hierarchies. Since Craver’s levels-of-mechanisms approach to multi-
level explanation utilizes restrictions on the “is at” relation, it does not follow that 
mechanistic hierarchies are upwards nested hierarchies. Unrestricted compositional 
hierarchies, such as Allen and Starr’s, Salthe’s, and ECOHIERARCHY, on the other 
hand, are upwards nested hierarchies. Metaphysical-MLE (the metaphysical justification 
for multi-level approaches to explanation) is problematic on such a conception: since, in 
an upward nested hierarchy, everything at any level is found at all higher levels, it 
follows that the top-most level (e.g., the ecosystem level) of such a hierarchy contains all 
the resources needed to provide a complete explanation of any (e.g., ecosystemic) 
phenomena of interest. Core Hierarchy Theory then suggests that, with respect to certain 
hierarchies, Metaphysical-MLE is false, despite that those hierarchies are “real”. 
There are those who challenge the reality of hierarchies. They think that there is 
an internal conflict within hierarchical metaphysics, arguing that since higher level 
things, and inter-level realization relations, do not make a difference, they do not exist. In 
response to these worries, I indirectly show, from our starting assumptions, along with a 
well-known scientific heuristic, that these higher level things and inter-level realization 
relations do indeed make a difference. So, we should think that they exist after all.  
Directions for Future Research: 
There are five general areas of inquiry for which this dissertation might serve as a 
starting-point: philosophy of ecology, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, philosophy of 
mathematics, and formal ontology and bioinformatics. 
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Within the discussion of the ecological hierarchy, there were issues surrounding 
specific levels of the ecological hierarchy: challenges to the community concept, for 
example. Similar challenges have been raised for the ecosystem level as well. It would be 
valuable to contrast ECOHIERARCHY with different ecological level-schemes, to see 
whether or not the way we structure ecology has any influence on progress within the 
discipline. For example, a more detailed examination of the use of compositional 
hierarchies vis-à-vis the scalar alternative.  
An examination into to the application of diversity metrics across hierarchical 
levels within ecology, I think, provides another avenue for future research. Along with an 
investigation into the potential mechanistic modeling has towards understanding 
ecological phenomenon. 
This dissertation also opens up further avenues in the philosophy and metaphysics 
of mind. Here I have largely presupposed Carl Gillett’s work on realization. Seeing how 
Gillett’s account fares against criticisms is the most direct way to contribute to the 
general project I began here. There are other approaches to realization that I have not 
discussed. Seeing how well these alternative conceptions work within a layered 
worldview is an interesting and worthwhile project. It is also worth investigating the 
extent to which the results of this dissertation apply to hierarchical modeling within 
cognitive science and neuroscience. 
Third, this dissertation project serves as a foundation for further investigations in 
metaphysics. Questions surrounding the notion of fundamentality and grounding have 
been gaining interest amongst contemporary metaphysicians. It is common to associate 
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fundamentality with hierarchies: to be fundamental is to be at the bottom level. An 
investigation into the extent to which this association holds is a potential research project.  
A more detailed investigation into the metaphysics of multi-level causation is also 
warranted by the results of this work: the dissertation ends with an argument that higher 
level things can make a causal difference to the world, but arguments do not pass for 
understanding. For a robust understanding of causation in multi-level contexts we must 
do more than wrestle with the causal exclusion argument; a coherent account of causation 
in multi-level contexts is needed. 
The theory of hierarchies developed and defended in this work, Core Hierarchy 
Theory, is a mereological approach to understanding hierarchical structures. The 
important theorems of Core Hierarchy Theory were derived by exploiting a connection 
between hierarchies and mereology: classical mereology informs this understanding of 
hierarchies. Perhaps the informativity holds in the other direction as well: a more detailed 
investigation into the connection between hierarchies and mereology might shed light on, 
or help to reconceive, mereology itself. For example, Core Hierarchy Theory might lead 
to insights on the status of supplementation and extensionality principles in classical 
mereology. 
This third area of future research suggests a fourth: philosophy of mathematics. In 
the dissertation I argued against a set-based characterization of hierarchies. It is then 
worth investigating whether or not the mereological approach to hierarchies leads to any 




Formal ontology and bioinformatics might also benefit from my research. 
Presenting data in a layered way is common in medical information systems, geographic 
information systems, and knowledge management information systems. The formal 
system presented in Appendix A to Chapter 3, I think, might serve as a foundational and 
universal hierarchical language for information systems. In any case, its potential must be 









Allen T. F. H. and Starr, T. B. (1982), Hierarchy: Perspectives for Ecological 
Complexity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Allen, T. F. H. and Ahl, V. (1996), Hierarchy Theory: A Vision, Vocabulary, and 
Epistemology, New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Anderson, P. W. (1972), “More is Different,” Science, 177: 393-396. 
 
Baxtor, D. (1988), “Many-One Identity,” Philosophical Papers, 17: 193-216. 
 
Beckermann, A. (1997), “Property Physicalism, Reduction and Realization,” in M. 
Carrier, and P. Machamer, Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind, Pittsburgh: 
Pittsburgh University Press, pp. 303-321. 
 
Block, N. (2003), “Do Causal Powers Drain Away?” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 67 (1): 133-150. 
 
Bunge, M. (1969), “The Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Methodology of Levels,” in 
L.L. Whyte, A.G. Wilson and D. Wilson (eds.), Hierarchical Structures, New York: 
Elsevier, pp. 215-228. 
 
Causey, R. (1972), “Attribute-Identities in Microreductions,” Journal of Philosophy, 69 
(14): 407-422. 
 
Causey, R. (1976), “Identities and Reduction: A Reply.” Nous, 10 (3): 333-7. 
 
Colyvan, M. (1998), “Can the Eleatic Principle Be Justified?” Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, 28 (3): 313-335. 
 
Conger, G. (1925), “On the Doctrine of Levels,” Journal of Philosophy, 22 (12): 309-
321. 
 
Craver, C. (2001), “Role-functions, Mechanism, and Hierarchy,” Philosophy of Science 
68: 53-74. 
 
Craver, C. (2002), “Interlevel Experiments and Multi-level Mechanisms in the 
Neuroscience of Memory,” Philosophy of Science Supplemental Volume, 69: S83-S97. 
 
Craver, C. (2007), Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of 
Neuroscience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Craver, C. and Bechtel, W. (2007), ”Top-Down Causation Without Top-Down Causes,” 
Biology and Philosophy, 22 (4):547-563.  
 
Dawkins, R. (1976), “Hierarchical Organization, a Candidate Principle for Ethology,” in 
347 
 
P. P. G. Bateson and R. A. Hinde (eds.), Growing Points in Ethology, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 7-54. 
 
Deneault, J. and Ricard, M. (2006), “The Assessment of Children's Understanding of 
Containment Relations: Transitivity, Asymmetry, and Quantification,” Journal of 
Cognition and Development, 7: 551–70. 
 
Enc, B. (1976), “Identity Statements and Microreductions,” Journal of Philosophy, 73 
(11): 285-306. 
 
Epstein, B. (MS), “Science Without Levels,” Accessed (04/23): 
http://epstein.org/brian/PhilPapers/sci_without_levels.pdf. 
 
Feibleman, J. (1954), “Theory of Integrative Levels,” The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, 5: 59-66. 
 
Fodor, J. (1974), “Special Sciences: Or, the Disunity of Science as a Working 
Hypothesis,” Synthese, 28: 97-115. 
 
Gibson, D. (2009), Grasses and Grassland Ecology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Gillett, C. (2002), “The Dimensions of Realization: A Critique of the Standard View,” 
Analysis, 62 (4): 316-22. 
 
Gillett, C. (2007), “Understanding the New Reductionism: The Metaphysics of Science 
and Compositional Reduction,” Journal of Philosophy, 104 (4): 193-216. 
 
Gleason, H. A. (1926), “The Individualistic Concept of the Plant Association,” Bulletin of 
the Torrey Botanical Club, 53: 7-26. 
 
Glennan, S. (1996), “Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation,” Erkenntnis, 44: 49-71.  
 
Glennan, S. (2002), “Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation,” Philosophy of Science, 69: 
342-353. 
 
Glennan, S. (2010), “Mechanisms, Causes and the Layered Model of the World,” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81 (2): 362-381. 
 
Greene, T.R. (1989), “Children’s Understanding of Class Inclusion Hierarchies: The 
Relationship Between External Representation and Task Performance,” Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 48: 62-89. 
 
Greene, T.R. (1994), “What Kindergartners Know About Class Containment 
Hierarchies,” Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 57: 72–88. 
 
Guttman, B. (1976), “Is ‘Levels of Organization’ a Useful Biological Concept?”  




Hempel, C. and Oppenheim, P. (1948), “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” Philosophy 
of Science, 15 (2): 135-75. 
  
Hull, David (1980), "Individuality and Selection," Annual Review of Ecology and 
Systematics, 11: 311-332. 
 
Jackson, F. and Petit, P. (1990), “Program Explanation: A General Perspective,” 
Analysis, 50 (2): 107-17.  
 
Jagers op Akkerhuis, G.  (2008), “Analysing Hierarchy in the Organization of Biological 
and Physical Systems,” Biological Reviews, 83: 1-12. 
 
Kallestrup, J. (2006), “The Causal Exclusion Argument,” Philosophical Studies, 131: 
459-85. 
 
Kauffman, S. A. (1971), “Articulation of Parts Explanation in Biology and the Rational 
Search for Them,” in R.C. Buck and R.S. Cohen (eds.), PSA 1970, Dordrecht: Reidel. 
 
Keller, D. and Golley, F. (2000), The Philosophy of Ecology: From Science to Synthesis. 
Athens: University of Georgia Press. 
 
Kemeny, J. and Oppenheim, P. (1956), “On Reduction,” Philosophical Studies, 7: 6-19. 
 
Kim, J (1993), “Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event,” in his 
Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Kim, J. (1998), Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem, 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Kim, J. (1999), “Making Sense of Emergence,” Philosophical Studies, 95: 3-36. 
 
Kim, J. (2002), “The Layered Model: Metaphysical Considerations,” Philosophical 
Explorations, 5: 2-20. 
 
Kistler, M. (2006), “Mechanisms and Downward Causation,” Philosophical Psychology, 
22 (5): 595-609. 
 
Kitcher, P. (1984), “1953 And All That,” Philosophical Review, 93 (3): 335-73. 
 
Koestler, A. (1967), The Ghost in the Machine, Oxford: Macmillan. 
 
LePore, E., & Loewer, B. (1989), “More on Making Mind Matter,” Philosophical Topics, 
17: 175-191. 
 




Lycan, W. (1995), Consciousness, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Maddy, P. (1990), Realism in Mathematics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Machamer, P. (2004), “Activities and Causation: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of 
Mechanisms,” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 18: 27-39. 
 
Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. (2000), “Thinking About Mechanisms,” 
Philosophy of Science, 67: 1-25. 
 
Melnyk, A. (2003), A Physicalist Manifesto: A Thoroughly Modern Materialism, New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
  
Murphy, G. (2002), The Big Book of Concepts, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Nagel, E. (1961), The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific 
Explanation, New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World. 
 
O’Neill, R., DeAngelis, D., Waide, J., and Allen, T. (1986), A Hierarchical Concept of 
Ecosystems, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Oppenheim, P. and Putnam, H. (1958), “Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis,” 
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
 
Pickett, S. T. A., Jurek K., and Jones, C. (1994), Ecological Understanding: The Nature 
of Theory and the Theory of Nature, San Diego: Academic Press. 
 
Poli, R. (2001), “The Basic Problems of the Theory of Levels of Reality,” Axiomathes, 
12: 261-283. 
 
Poli, R. (2006), “The Theory of Levels of Reality and the Difference between Simple and 
Tangled Hierarchies,” in G. Minati, E. Pessa, M. Abram (eds.), Systemics of Emergence: 
Research and Development, Berlin: Springer, pp. 715-22. 
 
Poli, R. and Gnoli, C. (2004), “Levels of Reality and Levels of Representation,” 
Knowledge Organization, 21: 151-60. 
 
Potochnik, A. (2010), ”Levels of Explanation Reconceived,” Philosophy of Science, 77: 
59-72. 
 
Potochnik, A. and McGill, B. (forthcoming), “The Limitations of Hierarchical 
Organization,” Philosophy of Science. 
 




Ricklefs, R. (2008b), “Disintegration of the Ecological Community,” The American 
Naturalist, 172 (6), pp. 741-50. 
 
Rueger, A. (2006), “Functional Reduction and Emergence in the Physical Sciences,” 
Synthese, 151 (3): 335-46. 
 
Rueger, A., and McGivern, P. (2010), “Hierarchies and Levels of Reality,” Synthese, 176: 
379-397. 
 
Sadava, D., Heller, C., Orians, G., Purves, W., Hillis, D. (2008), Life: The Science of 
Biology, Eighth Edition, New York: W. H. Freeman. 
 
Salthe, S. (1985), Evolving Hierarchical Systems: Their Structure and Representation, 
New York: Columbia University Press.  
 
Salthe, S. (2009), “A Hierarchical Framework for Levels of Reality: Understanding 
Through Representation,” Axiomathes, 19: 87-99. 
 
Schaffer, J. (2003), “Is there a Fundamental Level?” Nous, 37 (3): 498-517. 
 
Schaffer, J. (2005), “Contrastive Causation,” The Philosophical Review, 114: 297-328. 
 
Shapiro, L. (2008), “Understanding the Dimensions of Realization,” Journal of 
Philosophy, 105 (4): 213-222. 
 
Shoemaker, S. (2007), Physical Realization, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Shoemaker, S. (2011), “Realization, Powers, and Property Identity,” The Monist, 94: 3-
18. 
 
Sider, T. (2007), “Parthood,” Philosophical Review, 116: 51-91. 
 
Simon, H. (1962), “The Architecture of Complexity,” Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society, 106 (6): 467-82. 
 
Simon, H. A. (1973), “The Organization of Complex Systems,” in H. H. Pattee (ed.), 
Hierarchy Theory, New York: George Braziller, pp. 3-27. 
 
Simons, P. (1987), Parts: A Study in Ontology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Slattery, B., Stuart, I., and O’Hora, D. (2011), “Testing for Transitive Class Containment 
as a Feature of Hierarchical Classification,” Journal of the Experimental Analysis of 
Behavior, 96: 243-60. 
 




Tansley, A. (2000), “The Use and Abuse of Vegetational Concepts and Terms,” in D. 
Keller and F. Golley (eds.), The Philosophy of Ecology: From Science to Synthesis, pp. 
55-70. 
 
Tuomisto, H. (2010) “A Diversity of Beta Diversities: Straightening Up a Concept Gone 
Awry. Part 1. Defining Beta Diversity as a Function of Alpha and Gamma Diversity”, 
Ecography, 33: 2-22. 
 
Turney, P. (1989), “The Architecture of Complexity: A New Blueprint,” Synthese, 79: 
515-42. 
 
Van Frassen, B. (1982), The Scientific Image, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Varzi, A. (1999), Parts and Places, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Voorhees, B. (1983), “Axiomatic Theory of Hierarchical Systems,” Behavioral Science, 
28: 24-34. 
 
Webster, J. (1979), “Hierarchical Organization of Ecosystems,” in Halfon (ed.), 
Theoretical Systems Ecology, New York: Academic Press, pp. 119-29. 
 
Whittaker, R. J., Willis, K. J., Field, R. (2001), “Scale and Species Richness: Towards a 
General, Hierarchical Theory of Species Diversity,” Journal of Biogeography, 28: 453-
470. 
 
Wimsatt, W. (1976), “Reductionism, Levels of Organization, and the Mind-Body 
Problem,” in Globus, Maxwell and Savodnik (eds.), Consciousness and the Brain, New 
York: Plenium Press, pp. 199-267. 
 
Wimsatt, W. (1994), “The Ontology of Complex Systems: Levels of Organization, 
Perspectives, and Causal Thickets,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement, 20: 
207-74. 
 
Wimsatt, W. (2007), Re-engineering Philosophy For Limited Beings, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Winer, G. A. (1980), “Class Inclusion Reasoning In Children: A Review of the Empirical 
Literature,” Child Development, 51: 309–28. 
 
Woodward, J. (2003), Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Wrenn, C. (2010), “The Unreality of Realization,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 
88 (2): 305-22. 
 
